Category:FinCen Embargoed Countries


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USA Patriot Act

The official title of the USA PATRIOT Act is “Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001.” To view this law in its entirety, click on the USA PATRIOT Act link below USA PATRIOT Act.

The purpose of the USA PATRIOT Act is to deter and punish terrorist acts in the United States and around the world, to enhance law enforcement investigatory tools, and other purposes, some of which include:

  • To strengthen U.S. measures to prevent, detect and prosecute international money laundering and financing of terrorism;
  • To subject to special scrutiny foreign jurisdictions, foreign financial institutions, and classes of international transactions or types of accounts that are susceptible to criminal abuse;
  • To require all appropriate elements of the financial services industry to report potential money laundering;
  • To strengthen measures to prevent use of the U.S. financial system for personal gain by corrupt foreign officials and facilitate repatriation of stolen assets to the citizens of countries to whom such assets belong.

FinCen – US Patriot Act Section 311

[] FinCen Embargoed Countries  Angola  Antigua & Barbuda  Argentina  Bangladesh  Belarus  Bolivia  Brunei Darussalam  Cambodia  China  Cuba  Dubai  Ecuador  Ethiopia  FINCEN Overview  Gambia  Ghana  Honduras  Indonesia  Iran  Iran-US  Kenya  Latvia  Lebanon  Moldova  Mongolia  Morocco  Myanmar  Namibia  Nepal  Nicaragua  Nigeria  North Korea  Pakistan  Paraguay  Philippines  Sao Tome & Principe  Sri Lanka  Sudan  Syria  Tajikistan  Tanzania  Thailand  Trinidad & Tobago  Turkey  Turkmenistan  Ukraine  Venezuela  Vietnam  Yemen  Zimbabwe

Special Measures for Jurisdictions, Financial Institutions, or International Transactions of Primary Money Laundering Concern

This Section allows for identifying customers using correspondent accounts, including obtaining information comparable to information obtained on domestic customers and prohibiting or imposing conditions on the opening or maintaining in the U.S. of correspondent or payable-through accounts for a foreign banking institution FinCen 311 in Alphabetical Order.

March 25, 2014 – FinCEN Issues Advisory on the FATF-Identified Jurisdictions with AML/CFT Deficiencies

On February 14, 2014, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) updated its list of jurisdictions with strategic AML/CFT deficiencies. These changes may affect U.S. financial institutions’ obligations and risk-based approaches with respect to relevant jurisdictions.

September 18, 2013 – FinCEN Issues Advisory on FATF-Identified Jurisdictions with AML/CFT Deficiencies

On June 21, 2013, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) updated its lists of jurisdictions with strategic AML/CFT deficiencies. These changes may affect U.S. financial institutions’ obligations and risk-based approaches with respect to relevant jurisdictions.

May 28, 2013 – Treasury Identifies Virtual Currency Provider Liberty Reserve as a Financial Institution of Primary Money Laundering Concern under USA Patriot Act Section 311

Action Targets Liberty Reserve, a Web-Based Money Transfer System Employed by Criminals Worldwide to Launder the Proceeds of Illicit Activities

The U.S. Department of the Treasury today named Liberty Reserve S.A. as a financial institution of primary money laundering concern under Section 311 of the USA PATRIOT Act (Section 311). Liberty Reserve – a web-based money transfer system or “virtual currency” – is specifically designed and frequently used to facilitate money laundering in cyber space. This is the first use of Section 311 authorities by Treasury against a virtual currency provider.

Liberty Reserve is widely used by criminals worldwide to store, transfer, and launder the proceeds of a variety of illicit activities. Liberty Reserve’s virtual currency has become a preferred method of payment on websites dedicated to the promotion and facilitation of illicit web based activity, including identity fraud, credit card theft, online scams, and dissemination of computer malware. It has sought to avoid regulatory scrutiny while tailoring its services to illicit actors.

Treasury’s regulatory action today was taken in coordination with the unsealing of an indictment by the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York, which charged Liberty Reserve and seven of its principals – Arthur Budovsky, Vladimir Kats, Azzedine El Amine, Mark Marmilev, Maxim Chukharev, Ahmed Yassine Abdelghani, and Allan Esteban Hidalgo Jimenez – in Manhattan federal court for their alleged roles in running a $6 billion money laundering scheme and operating an unlicensed money transmitting business.

“Treasury is determined to protect the U.S. financial system from cyber criminals and other malicious actors in cyberspace, including overseas entities like Liberty Reserve that facilitate online crime and hope to evade regulatory scrutiny,” said Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence David S. Cohen. “We are prepared to target and disrupt illicit financial activity wherever it occurs – domestically, at the far reaches of the globe or across the internet.”

Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) has delivered to the Federal Register a regulatory finding explaining the basis of the actions as well as a notice of proposed rulemaking (“NPRM”) that, if adopted as a final rule, would prohibit covered U.S. financial institutions from opening or maintaining correspondent or payable-through accounts for foreign banks that are being used to process transactions involving Liberty Reserve. The NPRM also proposes to require covered financial institutions to apply special due diligence to their correspondent accounts maintained on behalf of foreign banks to guard against any transactions involving Liberty Reserve. If adopted, these measures would effectively cut off Liberty Reserve from the U.S. financial system. After publication in the Federal Register, the public will have 60 days to comment on the proposed rule against Liberty Reserve.

Liberty Reserve S.A.

Liberty Reserve is a web-based money transfer system or “virtual currency.” It is currently registered in Costa Rica and has been operating since 2001. Liberty Reserve uses a system of internal accounts and a network of third-party intermediaries or exchangers to move funds. Operating under the domain name “www.libertyreserve.com,” Liberty Reserve maintains accounts for registered users, which are funded through exchangers. Registered users typically send a bank or non-bank wire transfer to an exchanger, who then transfers the corresponding value of Liberty Reserve virtual currency from the exchanger’s account to the user’s account. Once an account is established, transfers can be made from account-to-account instantly and anonymously. Withdrawal of funds requires a user to instruct Liberty Reserve to send transfer value from the user’s account to the account of an exchanger, who then transfers the value as U.S. dollars or other currency as a bank or non-bank wire transfer to the user or to other recipient(s). Exchangers operate as independent money service businesses globally, charging a commission on each transfer of funds into or out of the Liberty Reserve currency.

Liberty Reserve’s virtual currency appeals to illicit users because it provides the capability to conduct anonymous transactions around the world. Liberty Reserve does not conduct verification of account registration for individuals using the system, asking only for a working e-mail address, and allow an individual to open unlimited number of accounts. By paying an additional “privacy fee,” users can hide their internal unique account number when sending funds within the Liberty Reserve system. Once an account is established, Liberty Reserve virtual currency can then be sent, instantly and anonymously, to any other account holder within the global system. For example, a cyber-criminal online marketplace would accept payment in Liberty Reserve transfers for illicit activity that included spam services and key-logging programs used to steal personal information, such as account numbers and passwords, from innocent victims. Also for anonymous sale were destructive malware programs designed to assault financial institutions, as well as lists of information from thousands of compromised personal accounts.

US Department of the Treasury Press Release

FinCen – AML/CFT Deficiencies Warning List

December 04, 2013 – Guidance to Financial Institutions Based on the Financial Action Task Force Public Statement on Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorist Financing (AML/CFT) Risks

On October 18, 2013, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) updated its list of jurisdictions with strategic AML/CFT deficiencies. These changes may affect U.S. financial institutions’ obligations and risk-based approaches with respect to relevant jurisdictions.

FinCen Guidance FIN-2013-A008

April 24, 2013 – Guidance to Financial Institutions Based on the Financial Action Task Force Public Statement on Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorist Financing (AML/CFT) Risks

The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) is issuing this advisory to inform banks and other financial institutions operating in the United States of the risks of money laundering and financing of terrorism associated with jurisdictions identified by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF),

  • on February 22, 2013, as having deficiencies in their AML/CFT regimes and that
    • have not made sufficient progress in addressing these deficiencies or
    • are subject to FATF’s call for countermeasures.
  • Also, FinCEN is issuing a complementary advisory today, FIN-2013-A003,
  • which addresses a separate, but related, FATF document identifying jurisdictions with strategic AML/CFT deficiencies, for which each jurisdiction has provided a high-level political commitment to address.

November 19, 2012 – Description of Third-Party Payment Processors

The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) is issuing this Advisory to provide guidance to financial institutions when filing Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs) on activities related to third-party payment processors (“Payment Processors”). This Advisory furthers the Department of the Treasury’s broader efforts to protect the U.S. financial system from money laundering and terrorist financing.

FinCen guidance FIN-2012-A010

November 15, 2011 – Guidance to Financial Institutions Based on the Financial Action Task Force Public Statement on Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorist Financing Risks.

  1. Countermeasures: Iran and Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK).
  2. Enhanced Due Diligence (EDD): Cuba; Bolivia; Ethiopia; Kenya; Myanmar; Nigeria; São Tomé and Príncipe; Sri Lanka; Syria, and Turkey.

FinCen detailed information / guidance note on Countermeasures & EDD FIN-2011-A015

Guidance to Financial Institutions Based on the Financial Action Task Force Publication on Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorist Financing Risks posed by Algeria; Angola; Antigua and Barbuda; Argentina; Bangladesh; Brunei Darussalam; Cambodia; Ecuador; Ghana; Honduras; Kyrgyzstan; Indonesia; Mongolia; Morocco; Namibia; Nepal; Nicaragua; Pakistan; Paraguay; Philippines; Sudan; Tajikistan; Tanzania; Thailand; Trinidad and Tobago; Turkmenistan Venezuela; Vietnam; Yemen; and Zimbabwe; and the substantial AML/CFT improvements in Ukraine.

FinCen overview of Countries with AML/CFT deficiencies – FIN-2011-A014

July 13, 2011 – Guidance to Financial Institutions Based on the Financial Action Task Force Public Statement on Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorist Financing Risks.

Guidance to Financial Institutions Based on the Financial Action Task Force Public Statement on Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorist Financing Risks.

  1. Countermeasures: Iran and Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK).
  2. Enhanced Due Diligence (EDD): Bolivia; Cuba; Ethiopia; Kenya; Myanmar; Sri Lanka; Syria, and Turkey.

FinCen detailed information / guidance note on Countermeasures & EDD FIN-2011-A012

Guidance to Financial Institutions Based on the Financial Action Task Force Publication on Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorist Financing Risks posed by Angola; Antigua and Barbuda; Argentina; Bangladesh; Brunei Darussalam; Cambodia; Ecuador; Ghana; Honduras; Indonesia; Mongolia; Morocco; Namibia; Nepal; Nicaragua; Nigeria; Pakistan; Paraguay; Philippines; São Tomé and Príncipe; Sudan; Tajikistan; Tanzania; Thailand; Trinidad and Tobago; Turkmenistan; Ukraine; Venezuela; Vietnam; Yemen; and Zimbabwe; and the substantial AML/CFT improvements in Greece.

Angola Antigua & Barbuda Argentina Bangladesh Brunei Darussalam Bolivia (EDD) Cambodia Cuba (EDD) Ecuador Ethiopia (EDD) Ghana Greece (no longer subject of AML/CFT deficiencies) Honduras Indonesia Kenya (EDD) Mongolia Morocco Myanmar (EDD) Namibia Nepal Nicaragua Nigeria (EDD) Pakistan Paraguay Philippines Sao Tome & Principe (EDD) Sri Lanka (EDD) Sudan Syria (EDD) Tajikistan Tanzania Thailand Trinidad & Tobago Turkey (EDD) Turkmenistan Ukraine Venezuela Vietnam Yemen Moldova

FinCen overview of Countries with AML/CFT deficiencies – FIN-2011-A011

Pages in category “FinCen Embargoed Countries”

The following 50 pages are in this category, out of 50 total.

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