Iran-US

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Contents

• 1 US
  • 1.1 OFAC
  • 1.2 FinCen
  • 1.3 US FinCen – AML/CFT Deficiencies Warning List
  • 1.4 ITAR
  • 1.5 BIS – EAR
  • 1.6 US Foreign Terrorist Organizations

US

June 15, 2013 – Result of the Iranian Presidential Election

We have seen the announcement by Iran’s Interior Ministry that Hassan Rouhani has been declared the winner of the country’s 11th presidential election.

We admire the courage of the Iranian people who went to the polls and made their voices heard in a rigidly controlled environment that sought to limit freedom of expression and assembly. We remain concerned about the lack of transparency in the electoral process, and the attempts to censor members of the media, the internet, and text messages. Despite these challenges, however, the Iranian people have clearly expressed their desire for a new and better future.

President-elect Rouhani pledged repeatedly during his campaign to restore and expand freedoms for all Iranians. In the months ahead, he has the opportunity to keep his promises to the Iranian people.

We, along with our international partners, remain ready to engage directly with the Iranian government. We hope they will honor their international obligations to the rest of the world in order to reach a diplomatic solution that will fully address the international community’s concerns about Iran’s nuclear program.

US Department of State Press Release

June 04, 2013 – Testimony Of Under Secretary For Terrorism And Financial Intelligence David Cohen Before The Senate Committee On Banking, Housing And Urban Affairs On “Iran Sanctions: Ensuring Robust Enforcement, And Assessing Next Steps”

WASHINGTON – Chairman Johnson, Ranking Member Crapo, and distinguished members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today on the Treasury Department’s application of sanctions pressure as one part of the U.S. government’s effort, coordinated with counterparts around the world, to counter the threat posed by Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile program. Our continued close collaboration with this Committee and your colleagues in Congress is essential to our success in addressing this threat.

As this Committee will appreciate, no issue is of greater concern or urgency than preventing Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon. As the President recently warned, an Iran in possession of such a weapon would increase the risk of nuclear terrorism, undermine the global nonproliferation regime, trigger an arms race in the Middle East, and embolden a regime that has ruthlessly repressed its citizens.

That is why this Administration, from its first days in office, has tenaciously pursued a dual-track strategy that offers Iran a path to reclaim its place among the community of nations while making clear that we, along with our partners in the international community, would apply and enforce increasingly powerful and sophisticated sanctions on Iran if it continues to refuse to satisfy its international obligations with respect to its nuclear program. As we have repeatedly made clear, Tehran faces a choice: it can address the call of the international community to give up its nuclear ambitions and be permitted to reintegrate itself diplomatically, economically and financially into the world community, or it can continue down its current path and face ever-growing pressure and isolation.

INCREASING PRESSURE ON IRAN

Since my last appearance before this Committee, the scope, intensity, and impact of U.S. sanctions on Iran have expanded through the enactment of legislation, the adoption of executive orders (E.O.s), and the energetic implementation and enforcement of the entire sanctions framework. These efforts have heightened the economic pressure and imposed a very significant strain on the Iranian regime.

Designating Iranian Banks and their Financial Partners

When I last appeared before the Committee, I described the Administration’s extensive efforts to implement the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (CISADA). CISADA calls for the exclusion from the U.S. financial system of any foreign financial institution that knowingly facilitates significant transactions or provides significant financial services for Iranian financial institutions designated in connection with Iran’s nuclear or missile proliferation activity, or its support for international terrorism.

The mere fact that we have CISADA at our disposal has been sufficient to drive the overwhelming majority of banks away from business with Iran’s designated banks, isolating those Iranian banks from the global financial system. To date we have employed this authority against two foreign banks, China’s Bank of Kunlun and Iraq’s Elaf Islamic Bank, (1) for facilitating millions of dollars’ worth of transactions for several designated Iranian banks. Were there any question about our willingness to apply CISADA sanctions, these actions clearly demonstrated that we will target sanctionable activity, wherever it may occur.

Targeting the Central Bank of Iran and Iran’s Oil Revenues

Just over a year later, in December 2011, the President signed into law the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (NDAA), which threatens CISADA-like consequences – that is, terminating or restricting correspondent account access to the U.S. – for foreign financial institutions that transact with the Central Bank of Iran (CBI) in a way not authorized by U.S. law. Significantly, the NDAA also marked a new phase in our sanctions campaign by targeting Iran’s economic lifeblood: its oil exports.

The logic behind the measures in the NDAA is two-fold. First, it seeks to isolate the CBI from the international financial system – a process begun in November 2011 when we designated the entire jurisdiction of Iran as a “primary money laundering concern” under Section 311 of the USA PATRIOT Act. These actions undercut the CBI’s ability to facilitate the conduct of designated Iranian banks and to support Iran’s illicit activities within Iran and abroad.

Second, because the CBI is the primary bank into which Iran receives oil payments, the NDAA intensifies economic pressure on the regime. To prevent Iran from benefiting from a spike in oil prices that might be caused by a rapid reduction of Iranian oil in the global market, the NDAA was designed to encourage Iran’s oil customers to undertake significant but incremental reductions in their Iranian oil imports, giving customers and alternative suppliers a measure of time to adjust and accommodate this reduction. This law – working in tandem with our efforts targeting Iran’s access to the international financial system – has had an enormous impact on Iran’s oil revenues.

Locking Up Iran’s Oil Revenues

The impact of the NDAA was further enhanced by a powerful measure contained in the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (TRA) that entered into effect on February 6, 2013. Under Section 504 of the TRA, any country that has received an NDAA “significant reduction” exception – meaning that its banks can pay Iran for its significantly reduced oil imports without risk of correspondent account sanctions – must now ensure that those revenues are used only to facilitate bilateral trade or humanitarian trade. Iranian oil-import revenue cannot be repatriated to Iran, transferred to a third country, or used to facilitate third-country trade, except for humanitarian purchases. This is a very powerful provision, as it effectively “locks up” Iranian revenues in the few countries that still buy Iranian oil and denies Iran the free use of its diminishing oil revenue.

Tightening the Sanctions Regime Through Executive Orders

To further enhance the pressure on Iran, over the last year the President has issued a series of executive orders (E.O.) targeting Iranian activity – including one yesterday that takes aim at Iran’s currency and its automotive sector, and expands sanctions against those supporting the Government of Iran.

With this order, the Treasury Department, in consultation with the State Department, is authorized to impose sanctions on foreign financial institutions that conduct certain significant transactions for trading in Iran’s currency, the rial, or maintaining significant rial accounts outside Iran. We have seen that the value and stability of the rial is of great importance to the regime. This new measure will limit the use of the rial in international transactions; places additional restrictions on Iran’s ability to gain access to its foreign reserves; and isolates Iran further from the international financial system and commercial markets.

In addition, the executive order targets another major sector of Iran’s economy – its automotive sector. Iran’s automotive industry is a significant contributor to its overall economic activity, generating funds that help prop up the rial and the regime. With this executive order, we will be able to sanction persons and financial institutions that knowingly engage in transactions for the supply of significant goods or services used in connection with the automotive sector of Iran.

This E.O. also positions us to target those who provide material support to the GOI. Now, subject to certain exceptions, anyone who materially assists, sponsors, or provides financial, material, or technological support to persons identified by Treasury as the GOI is exposed to potential sanctions.

In addition to this action, I would like to highlight two executive orders in particular that we have used to target Iran’s sanctions evasion efforts and to put further pressure on its energy exports.

In response to Iran’s continued abuse of the financial sector, the President in February 2012 issued E.O. 13599. Among other things, E.O. 13599 blocks all property of the Government of Iran, including the Central Bank of Iran, and allows us to identify for sanctions any person – Iranian or non-Iranian – who acts for or on behalf of the Iranian government, regardless of the type of activity. Under this executive order we recently identified a Greek businessman, Dmitris Cambis, and a group of front companies for using funds supplied by the Government of Iran to purchase oil tankers, and then disguising the origin of the Iranian oil transported on those vessels.

In July 2012, the President issued E.O. 13622, which enhances the NDAA by authorizing sanctions on foreign banks and persons that facilitate the activities of, or provide material support to, the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) or its energy-trading subsidiary, the Naftiran Intertrade Company (NICO), or that facilitate the acquisition – from any party – of Iranian petroleum, petroleum products, or petrochemicals. This authority also gives us the ability to target those who provide material support to the Central Bank of Iran or who sell gold to the Government of Iran. My colleagues at the State Department imposed sanctions on two petrochemical companies last week under this order, and we have used this measure to important effect in our engagement with foreign partners, warning countries about the risk of undertaking this conduct and, we believe, deterring it.

Expanding Energy, Shipping, and Shipbuilding Sanctions

Last, I would like to discuss a new authority, the Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act of 2012 (IFCA), which was enacted in January 2013 and becomes fully effective on July 1, 2013. IFCA expands our existing sanctions by giving us new tools to target Iran’s ports, energy, shipping, and shipbuilding sectors, as well as Iran’s supply of certain metals and industrial materials. It also provides for additional sanctions on banks that transact with any designated Iranian entity, not just those designated for WMD proliferation, terrorism, or human rights abuses, as well as entities identified as the Government of Iran. To help ensure this new legislation has the greatest impact possible, we have conducted extensive outreach to foreign governments and companies to explain the ever-increasing risks that business, and financial transactions incident to that business, with Iran poses.

RECENT ADMINISTRATION ACTIONS

The pressure we have brought to bear on Iran is the result not only of the creation of additional authorities, but also the aggressive implementation and enforcement of those authorities. Since the beginning of 2012, Treasury, in consultation with our interagency partners, particularly the Department of State, has imposed sanctions on 38 individuals and 77 entities, and has added almost 200 aircraft and ships to the sanctions list. Within the past month alone, we have identified and sanctioned over 40 individuals and entities. I will briefly describe a few recent actions emblematic of our work to expose Iran’s WMD proliferation activities, its sponsorship of international terrorism, its support to the brutal Assad regime, and its abuse of human rights.

WMD Proliferation

Disrupting and disabling Iran’s WMD procurement networks and proliferation activities through the use of the counter-proliferation executive order, E.O. 13382, remains one of our primary objectives. Over the past eight years we have taken hundreds of actions under E.O. 13382. Building on this, less than two weeks ago, we took action against six individuals and entities for their roles in a support and procurement network for Iran Air, which we designated in June 2011 for providing services and support to the IRGC, Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics and Iran’s Aerospace Industries Organization. At the same time we designated an additional eight companies and individuals for their connections to the IRGC and NIOC or Iran’s nuclear or missile programs. Last month, we designated an Iranian financial institution – the Iranian Venezuelan Bi-National Bank – as engaging in financial transactions on behalf of a previously designated Iranian bank. That brought to 28 the number of Iranian financial institutions that have been designated under either E.O. 13382 or the counter-terrorism executive order, E.O. 13224. Notably, each of these designated Iranian-linked financial institutions can trigger CISADA sanctions, meaning that any foreign financial institution that knowingly facilitates significant transactions for any of these 28 financial institutions risks losing its access to the U.S. financial system.

This action follows the designations of some fifteen entities in November and December of last year that targeted the international procurement operations of Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI), the Iran Centrifuge Technology Company (TESA), and Iran’s uranium enrichment efforts.

Terrorism

As we focus on Iran’s WMD programs, we remain mindful that Iran is still the world’s foremost state sponsor of international terrorism, in particular through its Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF). Iran continues to provide financial and military support to several terrorist organizations, including Lebanese Hizballah, which is responsible for the bombing last summer of a tourist bus in Burgas, Bulgaria.

In November 2012 we exposed a senior IRGC-QF officer and senior official of the Iraqi terrorist group Kata’ib Hizballah (KH), which is backed by the IRGC-QF and whose training has been coordinated with Lebanese Hizballah in Iran. KH is responsible for a rocket attack that killed two UN workers in Baghdad and for numerous other acts of violence in Iraq. Treasury also maintains vigilant watch over the activities of al-Qa’ida operatives working out of Iran in an effort to expose and isolate them. In October 2012, for example, we designated a key facilitator for al-Qa’ida, the latest in a series of actions exposing some half a dozen members of al-Qa’ida operating in Iran, under an agreement between Iran and al-Qa’ida.

Syria

Iran’s financial, material and logistical support for the Assad regime’s brutal campaign of violence against its own citizens also remains an area of intensive focus. Last year the President exposed the IRGC-QF for its support to the Syrian General Intelligence Directorate – a key instrument of Assad’s repression – in the Annex to E.O. 13572, which targets those responsible for human rights abuses in Syria. We have also taken action under this authority against the IRGC-QF’s commander Qasem Soleimani and his deputy, as well as the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security, Iran’s primary intelligence organization. As part of the effort to expose Iran’s role in abetting Assad’s atrocities, Treasury has also targeted Iran’s national police, the Law Enforcement Forces, along with its chief Ismail Ahmadi Moghadam and his deputy, which have also aided the Syrian regime’s crackdown.

Iran’s support to the Assad regime also is clearly reflected in Hizballah’s aid to the Assad regime. As we observed last year when we designated Hizballah and its leadership for providing support to the Government of Syria under E.O. 13582, Iran has long provided Hizballah with military, financial, and organizational assistance. Iran’s IRGC-QF has led these efforts, working with Hizballah to train Syrian government forces and establish and equip a pro-Assad militia in Syria that has filled critical gaps in Syria’s military.

We also continue to focus on Syria and Iran’s ongoing proliferation activities. Last year, for instance, we sanctioned Iran’s SAD Import Export Company under E.O. 13382 for acting on behalf of Iran’s Defense Industries Organization, itself sanctioned under this authority, for shipping arms to the Syrian military and supplying goods for the production of mortars.

Human Rights

The people of Syria are only the latest to suffer from Iran’s wanton disregard for human rights. Its own citizens, as we have witnessed for decades, continue to bear the brunt of the regime’s abuses. Under E.O. 13553, Treasury and State have the authority to sanction Iranian officials who are responsible for or complicit in serious human rights abuses against the people of Iran on or after June 12, 2009. E.O. 13606, issued in April 2012, among other things targets serious human rights abuses against the Iranian people by or on behalf of the government of Iran, recognizing these abuses may be facilitated by technology. These executive orders complement other authorities in CISADA, the TRA, and EO 13628 that target persons who transfer goods or technology likely to be used by or on behalf of the Government of Iran in serious human rights abuses or that have engaged in censorship activities against the people of Iran.

Last week we employed these authorities against one individual and two entities that had facilitated abuses of human rights of the Iranian people, including by denying the Iranian people free access to information. These actions included sanctions against the Committee to Determine Instances of Criminal Content (CDICC), , which identifies sites that carry forbidden content and reports them for blocking, and another entity that sought to interfere with outside satellite programming. We further took action against the Supreme Leader’s deputy chief of staff for his role in directing serious violations of human rights by the intelligence and security services. Under E.O. 13628, we have also sanctioned the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting and its managing director, the Iranian Cyber Police, and nearly a dozen other entities and individuals for their involvement in abusing the human and democratic rights of Iran’s citizens.

At the same time we are working to ensure that the Iranian people can exercise their universal human rights. Last week the Treasury Department, in consultation with the State Department and subsequent to a waiver under the Iran Iraq Arms Non Proliferation Act, issued a General License authorizing the exportation from the U.S. or by U.S. persons of certain hardware, software and related services. This license will allow U.S. companies to provide the Iranian people with more secure personal communications technology to connect with each other and with the outside world.

We continue to keep close watch on events in Iran, especially as the upcoming presidential elections draw near, and will not hesitate to expose those who who help the Iranian government to deny Iranians their democratic and human rights.

Sanctions Evasion

As Iran is turned away from reputable international financial institutions and partners, it increasingly relies on deception and concealment to evade international sanctions to meet its financial needs. We have worked tirelessly to expose those who aid these efforts. Just over two weeks ago, we identified for sanctions five senior leaders of NIOC and several of its overseas subsidiaries, including the head of NICO, Seifollah Jashnsaz. These individuals have been deeply involved in Iran’s circumvention of international sanctions on behalf of its energy sector. Earlier last month we designated a UAE exchange house, Al Hilal Exchange, and a trading company, Al Fida International General Trading, for providing services to Iran’s Bank Mellat, which we designated in 2007 for providing banking services to Iran’s nuclear entities. These companies conspired to provide foreign exchange to Bank Mellat in a manner intended to obscure Mellat’s involvement. Earlier last month the Central Bank of the UAE revoked the license of Al Hilal exchange for major regulatory and anti-money laundering compliance violations. And in April the Administration exposed a major network run by Iranian businessman Babak Zanjani, including banks in Malaysia and Tajikistan, that helped move billions of dollars on behalf of the Iranian regime, including tens of millions of dollars to an IRGC company.

IMPACTS ON IRAN

The international sanctions regime – of which our sanctions are just one, albeit very important, part – has had a significant effect on key sectors of the Iranian economy, as well as on the Iranian economy as a whole. More importantly, these economic effects have had an impact on Iran’s leadership. Perhaps the clearest evidence of this comes from the recent negotiating sessions in Almaty, Kazakhstan. During those meetings, the Iranian side sought sanctions relief in exchange for concessions on their nuclear program. They would not have done so had the impact of sanctions not affected their calculus.

Petroleum Sector Impacts

U.S. and EU sanctions on Iran’s petroleum sector have been particularly powerful. Of the more than twenty countries that imported oil when the NDAA went into full effect on June 30, 2012, only a handful continue to do so today. Iran’s crude oil exports have dropped by over one million barrels per day, or some 50%, between the enactment of the NDAA and early 2013. The EU’s decision to ban the import of oil into Europe, effective in mid-2012, contributed in no small part to this fall. These lost sales cost Iran between $3 billion and $5 billion a month.

Shipping Sector Impacts

As our authorities have expanded to encompass Iran’s petroleum sector, we have also used them to target Iran’s ability to export its primary commodity. Under E.O. 13599, we identified Iran’s primary crude shipper, the National Iranian Tanker Company (NITC), over two dozen of its affiliates and over 60 of its vessels. Like the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL), which our sanctions have largely driven out of business, NITC has sought to deceive the world maritime community, by changing the names of its vessels, turning off its transponders and engaging in ship-to-ship transfers to obscure the origin of Iranian oil. While these evasion efforts may work for a short while, they are not sustainable and are eventually detected, as last month’s action against the Cambis network’s Sambouk Shipping FZC clearly demonstrates.

Economic Impacts

As Iran finds it increasingly difficult to earn revenue from petroleum sales and to conduct international financial transactions, Iran’s economy has been severely weakened. Iran’s own economic mismanagement has only exacerbated these effects.

Take, for instance, the broadest measure of Iran’s economic activity, its gross domestic product (GDP). Treasury assesses that in 2012 Iran’s GDP fell by some 5 to 8 percent – the largest drop since 1988, the final year of the Iran-Iraq war, and the first contraction in twenty years. This decline has impacted the Government of Iran’s budget, causing it to run in 2012 its largest deficit in 14 years, which could amount to some 3 percent of GDP. We believe Iran’s GDP will continue to shrink in 2013 in the face of reduced government and consumer spending and declining oil exports, as well as the ramping up of additional sanctions.

Iran’s economic contraction is manifest in its recent budget bill, which projects almost 40 percent less oil revenue than did the previous year’s budget law. To help make up the shortfall, Iran’s parliament is currently considering tax increases of some 38 percent. And in March, Iran’s Supreme Audit Court released figures showing that for the first nine months of the Iranian year only 53 percent of projected budget revenues had been realized.

We have also begun to see the impact of the bilateral trade restriction in Section 504 of the TRA, which went into effect in February. This measure has limited Iran’s access to its foreign exchange reserves and impeded the Government of Iran’s ability to support the rial. Supported by our extensive outreach efforts, this powerful provision is rendering Iran’s reserves increasingly inaccessible.

Iran’s currency also has been hit hard. At the beginning of 2012, one U.S. dollar purchased 16,000 rials in the open market. As of April 30 of this year, one dollar was worth about 36,000 rials. (See Chart 1, appended.) The open market value of the rial has lost over two-thirds of its value in the last two years.

Faced with a rapidly depreciating rial, in September 2012 the Central Bank of Iran established a Currency Trading Center (CTC) to allocate foreign exchange for certain preferred imports at a preferential rate of about 24,000 rials to the dollar. Apparently faced with dwindling supplies of hard currency, just a few weeks ago the CBI substantially limited the list of imported goods that qualified for the CTC’s preferential rate.

Inflation, partly due to the volatility and depreciation of the rial, is another telling metric. As of April 20, 2013, the official Statistics Center of Iran twelve-month average inflation rate was approximately 30 percent, while the point-to-point inflation rate was nearly 39 percent. Independent analysis suggests the actual inflation rate is significantly higher.

These figures become increasingly stark when we compare Iran to its neighbors or similarly situated countries. Compared to groupings of countries in the Middle East and Africa, Iran’s stock of foreign capital, as measured by the Bank of International Settlements, is down 57 percent for the two-year period ending December 2012, representing a reduction in lending of some $9.5 billion. This figure contrasts with a 13 percent increase in BIS banks’ lending exposure to all developing countries. (See Chart 2, appended.) This shortage of capital is at least one reason why Iran’s automobile sector is now encountering significant difficulties, manufacturing at some 50 percent of nominal capacity and facing substantially reduced exports.

NEXT STEPS

Despite our success in increasing pressure on Iran, we have yet to see the regime change its fundamental strategic calculus regarding its nuclear program. Nonetheless, the Administration remains convinced that sanctions pressure has an important role to play in helping to bring about a negotiated resolution. Accordingly, our commitment to the dual-track strategy – and to applying ever more effective and potent economic and financial pressure on Iran – has never been greater.

We look forward to continuing to work with Congress on this endeavor. We have had productive discussions with this Committee on how to best proceed with respect to new legislation, and we support measures that will help us make meaningful progress toward enhancing pressure on the regime. I am confident that this Committee will remain actively engaged with the Administration in shaping a common approach to new legislation. As we move forward to sharpen the choice for the Iranian regime, we stand ready to work hand-in-hand with this Committee and the Congress.

Let me briefly share with you some thoughts on where we go from here.

Increasing the Government of Iran’s Isolation

First, we will continue to identify ways to isolate Iran from the international financial system. We will do so by maintaining our aggressive campaign of applying sanctions against individuals and entities engaged in, or supporting, illicit Iranian activities and by engaging with the private sector and foreign governments to amplify the impact of these measures. As part of this effort we will also target Iran’s attempts to evade international sanctions through the use of non-bank financial institutions, such as exchange houses and money services businesses. And we will explore new measures to expand our ability to target Iran’s remaining links to the global financial sector.

In particular, we are looking carefully at actions that could increase pressure on the value of the rial. In that connection, we will continue to actively investigate any sale of gold to the Government of Iran, which can be used to prop up its currency and to compensate for the difficulty it faces in accessing its foreign reserves. We currently have authority under E.O. 13622 to target those who provide gold to the Iranian government and, as of July 1, IFCA will expand that authority to target for sanctions the knowingly selling gold to or from anyone in Iran for any purpose. Targeting Additional Sources of Revenue

Second, we will continue to target Iran’s primary sources of export revenue. In addition to oil and petroleum products, Iran exports substantial volumes of petrochemicals. Current authorities allow us to target those who purchase or acquire these commodities, as well as the financial institutions that facilitate these transactions. We believe targeting these actors, as well as those on the supply side of the equation in Iran, may offer a meaningful opportunity to gain additional leverage.

Engaging with International Partners

Third, with State, we will maintain our robust engagement and outreach efforts to foreign governments and the private sector. Treasury regularly meets with foreign officials and financial institutions to explain our sanctions, to warn them of the risks of doing business with Iran, and to encourage them to take complementary steps. In response, we have seen jurisdictions and companies the world over respond positively to these overtures, multiplying the force of our sanctions many times over. As we have for CISADA and the NDAA, we have already begun to engage with foreign countries, banks, and businesses on the implications of IFCA, and will continue to do so as we move forward in our implementation of this important legislation.

Aggressive Enforcement

The Administration campaign to target Iran’s proliferation networks, support for terrorism, sanctions evasion, abuse of human rights, and complicit financial institutions is without precedent. It will only continue and grow more robust as Iran’s failure to meet its international obligations persists. As I believe we have amply demonstrated, we are relentless in pursuing those who facilitate Iran’s illicit conduct or otherwise enable the regime. That will continue unabated.

CONCLUSION

Despite our efforts to isolate and pressure Iran, we know there is far more to do.

As Secretary Lew has said, “We will exhaust all diplomatic and economic means we can.” What remains to be seen, he noted, is whether this will “change the mind of the regime so that it [is] ready to, in a diplomatic process, give up the pursuit of nuclear weapons. That is the goal.”

I know this Committee shares this objective, and I look forward to working with you and your colleagues in the Congress to advance our efforts to achieve it.

(1) On May 17, 2013, Treasury removed sanctions on Elaf Islamic Bank following the bank’s significant and demonstrated change in behavior, including an intensive course of action to stop the conduct that led to the CISADA sanction, freezing the designated Iranian bank EDBI’s bank accounts, and reducing its overall exposure to the Iranian financial sector.

US Department of the Treasury Press Release

March 13, 2013 – Regarding Significant Reductions of Iranian Crude Oil Purchases

The United States and the international community remain committed to maintaining pressure on the Iranian regime until it fully addresses concerns about its nuclear program. That is why today I am pleased to announce that based on additional significant reductions in the volume of its crude oil purchases from Iran, Japan has again qualified for an exception to sanctions outlined in Section 1245 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2012.

Additionally, 10 European Union countries – Belgium, the Czech Republic, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Poland, Spain, and the United Kingdom – have also qualified for a renewal of the NDAA exception because they have not purchased Iranian oil since July 1, 2012, pursuant to a decision made by the whole of the European Union in January 2012. As a result, I will report to the Congress that exceptions to sanctions pursuant to Section 1245 of the NDAA for certain transactions will apply to the financial institutions based in these countries for a potentially renewable period of 180 days.

Today’s determination is another example of the international community’s commitment to convince Iran to meet its international obligations. A total of 20 countries and economies have continued to significantly reduce the volume of their crude oil purchases from Iran. The message to the Iranian regime from the international community is clear: take concrete actions to satisfy the concerns of the international community, or face increasing isolation and pressure.

US Department of State Press Release

February 11, 2013 – Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation Imposition of Nonproliferation Measures Against Foreign Persons, Including a Ban on U.S. Government Procurement

A determination has been made that a number of foreign persons have engaged in activities that warrant the imposition of measures pursuant to Section 3 of the Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act. The Act provides for penalties on entities and individuals for the transfer to or acquisition from Iran since January 1, 1999; the transfer to or acquisition from Syria since January 1, 2005; or the transfer to or acquisition from North Korea since January 1, 2006, of goods, services, or technology controlled under multilateral control lists (Missile Technology Control Regime, Australia Group, Chemical Weapons Convention, Nuclear Suppliers Group, Wassenaar Arrangement) or otherwise having the potential to make a material contribution to the development of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or cruise or ballistic missile sytems. The latter category includes (a) items of the same kind as those on multilateral lists but falling below the control list parameters when it is determined that such items have the potential of making a material contribution to WMD or cruise or ballistic missile systems, (b) items on U.S. national control lists for WMD/missile reasons that are not on multilateral lists, and (c) other items with the potential of making such a material contribution when added through case-by-case decisions.

• Dalian Sunny Industries (China);
• Li Fangwei (China) [also known as: Karl Lee];
• Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL) (Iran);
• Shahid Bakeri Industrial Group (SBIG) (Iran); and
• Shahid Sattari Ground Equipment Industries (Iran).

Federal Register – Feb 05, 2013

September 22, 2012 – The United States has denied visas to about 20 Iranian government officials hoping to attend next week’s U.N. General Assembly, including two ministers, Iran’s Fars news agency reported on Saturday. Source: Reuters News Item

May 22, 2012 – Senate passes Iran sanctions bill

• Among the provisions of the legislation is an expansion of U.S. sanctions to include companies involved in joint energy ventures anywhere in the world in which Tehran is a significant partner or investor. The penalties also would apply if Iran receives energy technology or information that wasn’t previously available to the government.
• Penalties also would be imposed on companies involved in a joint venture with Iran in the mining, production or transportation of uranium. Individuals who agree to abandon such projects within six months would be exempt from the penalties.
• The legislation would require the president to identify and designate officials, affiliates and agents of the Revolutionary Guard Corps. These individuals would be subject to sanctions and barred from the United States. Individuals or companies that engage in transactions with the Revolutionary Guard Corps, even through bartering, also would be subject to sanctions.
• Penalties also would be mandatory for shippers or insurers who knowingly aid the shipment of materials that contribute to Iran’s weapons of mass destruction or terrorism-related activities.

Source: Fox News

May 01, 2012 – Executive Order on Foreign Sanctions Evaders – ​Today the President Obama signed an Executive Order (E.O.), Prohibiting Certain Transactions with and Suspending Entry into the United States of Foreign Sanctions Evaders with Respect to Iran and Syria, providing the U.S. Treasury Department with a new authority to tighten further the U.S. sanctions on Iran and Syria.

This E.O. targets foreign individuals and entities that have violated, attempted to violate, conspired to violate, or caused a violation of U.S. sanctions against Iran or Syria, or that have facilitated deceptive transactions for persons subject to U.S. sanctions concerning Syria or Iran. With this new authority, Treasury now has the capability to publicly identify foreign individuals and entities that have engaged in these evasive and deceptive activities, and generally bar access to the U.S. financial and commercial systems.

For more information on this action please see the following fact sheet.

OFAC has also released the following frequently asked questions on this new Executive Order.

March 16, 2012 – Continuation of the National Emergency With Respect to Iran Executive Order 12957

Notice of March 13, 2012 – On March 15, 1995, by Executive Order 12957, the President declared a national emergency with respect to Iran, pursuant to the International Emer- gency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701–1706), to deal with the unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States constituted by the actions and policies of the Government of Iran. On May 6, 1995, the President issued Executive Order 12959, impos- ing more comprehensive sanctions to further respond to this threat; on August 19, 1997, the President issued Executive Order 13059, consolidating and clarifying the previous orders; and I issued Executive Order 13553 of September 28, 2010, Executive Order 13574 of May 23, 2011, Executive Order 13590 of November 20, 2011, and Executive Order 13599 of February 5, 2012, to take additional steps pursuant to this national emergency.

Because the actions and policies of the Government of Iran continue to pose an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States, the national emergency declared on March 15, 1995, must continue in effect beyond March 15, 2012. There- fore, in accordance with section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1622(d)), I am continuing for 1 year the national emergency with respect to Iran. Because the emergency declared by Executive Order 12957 constitutes an emergency separate from that declared on November 14, 1979, by Executive Order 12170, this renewal is distinct from the emer- gency renewal of November 2011. This notice shall be published in the Federal Register and transmitted to the Congress.

US Presidential Document

July 08, 2011 – Washington, DC – Today, the United States and the United Kingdom imposed visa restrictions on, and Canada announced support for increased measures against, officials of the Government of Iran and other individuals who have participated in the commission of human rights abuses related to political repression in Iran. More than 50 Iranian officials would be subject to these new U.S. visa restrictions, including government ministers, military and law enforcement officers, and judiciary and prison officials. The restrictions cover those who have played a role in the ongoing repression of students, human rights defenders, lawyers, artists, civil society representatives, women’s rights leaders, and religious and ethnic minorities.

Secretary Clinton took this action pursuant to the authorities granted her under Section 212(a)(3)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), which renders an alien inadmissible to the United States of America if the Secretary of State has a reasonable ground to believe the alien’s entry or proposed activities in the United States would have potentially serious adverse foreign policy consequences for the United States. The Secretary has determined that such a reasonable ground to believe exists in the cases of these individuals, such that a legal basis would exist for visa refusal if any of these individuals were to apply. The Secretary of State has invoked this authority in the past, including against officials from Libya, Belarus, and Cote d’Ivoire for human rights-related abuses. Under the provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), the U.S. State Department already has been denying and revoking visas of individuals involved in proliferation and terrorism.

Under the INA, visa records are confidential, including the names of those subject to specific visa bans. So we cannot discuss specific cases. Any U.S. visas currently held by persons subject to this policy will be revoked and new visa applications will be refused. Today’s joint action serves as a reminder to the Iranian government that we will continue to hold its officials accountable for human rights abuses against the Iranian people. US Department of State Press Release

OFAC

May 23, 2014 – Iran TRA Designations

The following individual has been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

TAMADDON, Morteza; DOB 1959; POB Shahr Kord-Isfahan, Iran; Additional Sanctions Information – Subject to Secondary Sanctions (individual) [IRAN-TRA].

OFAC recent actions

April 29, 2014 – Iran Sanctions Designations and Removals; Non-proliferation Designations; Iraq-related Sanctions Removals

The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

AL AQILI, Mohamed Saeed (a.k.a. AL MARZOOQI, Mohamed Saeed Mohamed Al Aqili); DOB 23 Jul 1955; POB Dubai, United Arab Emirates; Additional Sanctions Information – Subject to Secondary Sanctions; Executive Order 13645 Determination – Material Support; Passport A2599829 (United Arab Emirates); National ID No. 784-1955-8497107-1; Vice Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Al Aqili Group LLC (individual) [EO13645] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN OIL COMPANY; Linked To: ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS; Linked To: SEYYEDI, Seyed Nasser Mohammad; Linked To: KASB INTERNATIONAL LLC).

NIZAMI, Anwar Kamal; DOB 19 Apr 1980; citizen Pakistan; Additional Sanctions Information – Subject to Secondary Sanctions; Executive Order 13645 Determination – Material Support; Passport AE9855872 (Pakistan); Accounts Manager, First Furat Trading LLC (individual) [EO13645] (Linked To: KASB INTERNATIONAL LLC).

The following entities have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

AL AQILI GROUP LLC (a.k.a. AL AQILI GROUP OF COMPANIES), Oud Metha Tower, 10th Floor, PO Box 1496, Dubai, United Arab Emirates; Website www.aqili.com; Email Address info@aqili.com; Additional Sanctions Information – Subject to Secondary Sanctions [EO13645].

DALIAN ZHENGHUA MAOYI YOUXIAN GONGSI (a.k.a. DALIAN ZENGHUA TRADING CO., LTD.), Dalian, China; Additional Sanctions Information – Subject to Secondary Sanctions [NPWMD] [IFSR].

DALIAN ZHONGCHUANG CHAR-WHITE CO., LTD., 2501-2508 Yuexiu Mansion, No. 82 Xinkai Road, Dalian, Liaoning Province 11601, China; Additional Sanctions Information – Subject to Secondary Sanctions [NPWMD] [IFSR].

KARAT INDUSTRY CO., LTD., No. 110 Baiyun Street, Dalian, Liaoning, China; Additional Sanctions Information – Subject to Secondary Sanctions [NPWMD] [IFSR].

MTTO INDUSTRY AND TRADE LIMITED, No. 9 Hongji Street, Xi Gang District, Dalian City, China; Additional Sanctions Information – Subject to Secondary Sanctions [NPWMD] [IFSR].

SINOTECH DALIAN CARBON AND GRAPHITE MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, Dalian, China; Additional Sanctions Information – Subject to Secondary Sanctions [NPWMD] [IFSR].

SINOTECH INDUSTRY CO., LTD., No. 190 Changjiang Road, Dalian City, China; Additional Sanctions Information – Subject to Secondary Sanctions [NPWMD] [IFSR].

SUCCESS MOVE LTD., No. 1109 Zhongshan Road, Dalian, China; Additional Sanctions Information – Subject to Secondary Sanctions [NPWMD] [IFSR].

TEREAL INDUSTRY AND TRADE LIMITED, No. 9 Hongji Street, Xi Gang District, Dalian City, China; Additional Sanctions Information – Subject to Secondary Sanctions [NPWMD] [IFSR].

The following deletions have been made to OFAC’s SDN List:

ABBAS, Kassim, Lerchesbergring 23A, D-60598, Frankfurt, Germany; DOB 07 Aug 1956; POB Baghdad, Iraq (individual) [IRAQ2].

BAY INDUSTRIES, INC., 10100 Santa Monica Boulevard, Santa Monica, CA [IRAQ2].

EUROMAC TRANSPORTI INTERNATIONAL SRL, Via Ampere 5, Monza 20052, Italy [IRAQ2].

EUROMAC, LTD, 4 Bishops Avenue, Northwood, Middlesex, United Kingdom [IRAQ2].

S.M.I. SEWING MACHINES ITALY S.P.A., Italy [IRAQ2].

LIBRA SHIPPING SA (a.k.a. LIBRA SHIPPING), 3, Xanthou Street, Glyfada 16674, Greece; Additional Sanctions Information – Subject to Secondary Sanctions [IRAN].

LIBRA SHIPPING (a.k.a. LIBRA SHIPPING SA), 3, Xanthou Street, Glyfada 16674, Greece; Additional Sanctions Information – Subject to Secondary Sanctions [IRAN].

OFAC recent actions

April 07, 2014 – Frequently Asked Questions on Iran/TSRA General Licenses

Today, the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued updated FAQs on Iran/TSRA General Licenses, which pertain to a final rule amending the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations (“ITSR”) by expanding an existing general license that authorizes the exportation or reexportation of food to individuals and entities in Iran to include the broader category of agricultural commodities. The rule also clarifies and adds certain definitions in OFAC regulations. Finally, the rule adds a new general license that authorizes the exportation or reexportation of certain replacement parts for certain medical devices.

OFAC Recent Actions

March 20, 2014 – Publication of Iran General License G

Today, the Office of Foreign Assets Control issued Iran General License G authorizing accredited U.S. academic institutions to establish and operate undergraduate and graduate academic exchange agreements with Iranian universities, including the provision of scholarships to participating Iranian students. It also authorizes the export to Iran of certain additional educational services by U.S. academic institutions, including the provision of certain on-line courses, and by U.S. persons for certain academic study or non-for-profit educational activities in Iran, or the administration of university entrance and other examinations for Iranian students.

OFAC Recent Actions – GL G

February 20, 2014 – Iran Sanctions Act Removals

The following deletions have been made to OFAC’s SDN List:

ASSOCIATED SHIPBROKING (a.k.a. ASSOCIATED SHIPBROKING S.A.M.), Gildo Pastor Center – Block C 4.20, 7 rue du Gabian, Fontvieille MC 98000, Monaco; Website www.associated-shipbroking.mc [ISA].

ASSOCIATED SHIPBROKING S.A.M. (a.k.a. ASSOCIATED SHIPBROKING), Gildo Pastor Center – Block C 4.20, 7 rue du Gabian, Fontvieille MC 98000, Monaco; Website www.associated-shipbroking.mc [ISA].

OFAC Recent Actions

February 07, 2014 – Publication of Iran General License D-1 and Related Frequently Asked Questions

The Department of the Treasury, in consultation with the Departments of State and Commerce, issued amended Iranian General License D-1 (“GL D-1”). GL D-1 clarifies certain aspects of General License D, which was issued on May 30, 2013, and adds certain new authorizations relating to the provision to Iran of certain hardware, software, and services incident to personal communications. Effective February 7, 2014, GL D-1 replaces and supersedes in its entirety GL D. OFAC also is publishing today Frequently Asked Questions relating to the provisions of GL D-1.

OFAC Recent Actions

February 06, 2014 – Counter Terrorism Designations; Iran Sanctions Designations; Non-proliferation Designations

The following individual has been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

AFKHAMI RASHIDI, Mahmud (a.k.a. AFKHAMI RASHIDI, Mahmood; a.k.a. AFKHAMI RASHIDI, Mahmoud); DOB 31 Aug 1962; POB Mashhad, Iran; nationality Iran; Passport D9005625 issued 11 Jul 2009 expires 11 Jul 2014 (individual) [SDGT] [IFSR].

CANKO, Ali; DOB 01 Jan 1960; nationality Turkey; Additional Sanctions Information – Subject to Secondary Sanctions; Passport U 04765836 (Turkey); Personal ID Card 58786069032; alt. Personal ID Card AK 8136255 (Italy) (individual) [NPWMD] [IFSR].

HEMMATI, Alireza; DOB Dec 1955 (individual) [SDGT] [IFSR].

ISHAQ, Malik (a.k.a. ISHAQ, Malik Mohammed; a.k.a. ISHAQ, Mohammed), Pakistan; DOB 1958; nationality Pakistan (individual) [SDGT].

KOSARAYANIFARD, Pejman Mahmood (a.k.a. CASARYANIFARD, Pejman; a.k.a. KOSARAYAN FARD, Ali Pejman Mahmud; f.k.a. KOSARIAN FARD; a.k.a. KOSARIAN FARD, Pejman; a.k.a. KOSARIAN, Amir; a.k.a. KOSARYANI-FARD, Pejman), P.O. Box 52404, Dubai, United Arab Emirates; DOB 27 Feb 1973; Passport C20423657 (individual) [SDGT].

MAHMOUDI, Gholamreza (a.k.a. MAHMOUDI, Gholam Reza; a.k.a. MAHMOUDI, Ghulam Reza Khodrat; a.k.a. MAHMUDI, Qolam Reza); DOB 03 Feb 1958; nationality Iran; Passport 5659068 (individual) [SDGT].

MALEKOUTI POUR, Hamidreza (a.k.a. MALAKOTIPOUR, Hamid Reza; a.k.a. MALAKOTIPOUR, Hamidreza; a.k.a. MALAKOUTIPOUR, Hamid Reza; a.k.a. MALAKUTIPUR, Hamid Reza; a.k.a. MALKOTIPOUR, Hamid Reza); DOB 18 Oct 1960; Passport B5660433 (Iran) (individual) [SDGT].

MUSAVI, Sayyed Kamal (a.k.a. JAMALI, Sayyed Kamal); DOB 03 Jan 1958 (individual) [SDGT] [IFSR].

PUNTI, Pere (a.k.a. SANE, Pedro Punti); DOB 27 Aug 1944; nationality Spain; Additional Sanctions Information – Subject to Secondary Sanctions; Passport AAD225212 (Spain) expires 12 May 2020 (individual) [NPWMD] [IFSR].

SADIKOV, Olimzhon Adkhamovich (a.k.a. AL-UZBEK, Jaffar; a.k.a. AL-UZBEKI, Jafar; a.k.a. MUHIDINOV, Jafar; a.k.a. MUIDINOV, Dilshod Alimovich; a.k.a. MUIDINOV, Djafar; a.k.a. MUIDINOV, Jafar); DOB 01 Jan 1977 to 31 Dec 1985; nationality Uzbekistan (individual) [SDGT].

SEYED ALHOSSEINI, Akbar (a.k.a. SAEED HUSAINI, Akbar; a.k.a. SAYED ALHOSSEINI, Akbar; a.k.a. SAYEDOLHUSSEINI, Akbar; a.k.a. SAYYED AL-HOSEINI, Akbar; a.k.a. SEYEDOLHOSEINI, Akbar); DOB 22 Nov 1961; POB Taybad, Iran; Passport D9004309 issued 12 Nov 2008 expires 13 Nov 2013 (individual) [SDGT] [IFSR].

WIPPERMANN, Ulrich; DOB 02 May 1956; Additional Sanctions Information – Subject to Secondary Sanctions; Member of the Board of Directors, DF Deutsche Forfait Aktiengesellschaft (individual) [NPWMD] [IFSR] (Linked To: DF DEUTSCHE FORFAIT AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT).

The following entities have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

ADVANCE ELECTRICAL AND INDUSTRIAL TECHNOLOGIES SL (a.k.a. CLEAR TRADE LINK SL; a.k.a. “AEIT”), Passeig Verdauguer, 120, Igualada (Barcelona) 08700, Spain; Additional Sanctions Information – Subject to Secondary Sanctions [NPWMD] [IFSR].

AVIA TRUST FZE, P.O. Box 54541, Dubai, United Arab Emirates [SDGT].

BLUE SKY AVIATION CO FZE, Al Maktoum Street, al Dana Centre, 3rd Floor, Office No. 306, Dubai, United Arab Emirates [SDGT].

DF DEUTSCHE FORFAIT AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT (a.k.a. DEUTSCHE FORFAIT), Kattenbug 18 – 24, Koln, Nordrhein-Westfalen 50667, Germany; Additional Sanctions Information – Subject to Secondary Sanctions [NPWMD] [IFSR].

DF DEUTSCHE FORFAIT AMERICAS INC., Miami, FL; Additional Sanctions Information – Subject to Secondary Sanctions [NPWMD] [IFSR].

TIVA DARYA, Number 3, 12 Narenjestan Street, Pasdaran Avenue, Tehran, Iran; Bushehr, Iran; Additional Sanctions Information – Subject to Secondary Sanctions [NPWMD] [IFSR].

TIVA KARA CO. LTD. (a.k.a. TIVA KARA GROUP), 3rd Floor, Block No. 3, North Pasdaran Street, 12th Narenjestan Alley, Before Aghdasie T-Junction Aqdaseya Saraya, Tehran, Iran; Number 3, 12th Narenjestan Alley, Pasdaran Avenue, Tehran, Iran; Miyaneh, Iran; Bushehr, Iran; Additional Sanctions Information – Subject to Secondary Sanctions [NPWMD] [IFSR].

TIVA POLYMER CO., Number 3, 12th Narenjestan Street, Pasdaran Avenue, Tehran, Iran; Miyaneh, Iran; Additional Sanctions Information – Subject to Secondary Sanctions [NPWMD] [IFSR].

TIVA SANAT GROUP (a.k.a. TIVA GROUP; a.k.a. TIVA GROUP INDUSTRIES; a.k.a. TIVA SANAT SHIPBUILDING COMPANY), Alley 10 and 3/10, No. 10, Behrestan Street, Sajad Boulevard, Mashhad, Iran; Number 4, 11th Narenjestan, Pasdaran Avenue, Tehran, Iran; Number 3, 12th Narenjestan, Pasdaran, Tehran, Iran; Additional Sanctions Information – Subject to Secondary Sanctions; Registration ID 878 [NPWMD] [IFSR].

The following changes have been made to OFAC’s SDN List:

FERLAND COMPANY LIMITED (a.k.a. FERLAND CO. LTD), 29 A Anna Komnini St., PO Box 2303, Nicosia, Cyprus; 5/7 Sabaneyev Most., Odessa, Ukraine [ISA] [FSE-IR]. -to- FERLAND COMPANY LIMITED (a.k.a. FERLAND CO. LTD), 29 A Anna Komnini St., PO Box 2303, Nicosia, Cyprus; 5/7 Sabaneyev Most., Odessa, Ukraine; Executive Order 13645 Determination – Material Support [ISA] [FSE-IR] [EO13645] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY).

OFAC Recent Actions

February 02, 2014 – OFAC is issuing General License No. 9 under the Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferators Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. Part 544; and the Iranian Transactions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. Part 560, in order to authorize certain transactions related to the arrest, detention, and judicial sale of the MV SININ (IMO No. 9274941), which is a vessel on OFAC’s Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons list. The vessel is currently under arrest in Gulei, Zhoushan, China.

OFAC Recent Actions

January 22, 2014 – Implementation of the Joint Plan of Action Reached On November 24, 2013 Between The P5+1 and The Islamic Republic of Iran

​On January 12, 2014, the P5+1 (the United States, United Kingdom, Germany, France, Russia, and China) and Iran arrived at technical understandings for the Joint Plan of Action (JPOA), and agreed to begin its implementation on January 20, 2014.

The JPOA marks the first time in nearly a decade that the Islamic Republic of Iran has agreed to specific actions that stop the advance of its nuclear program, roll back key aspects of the program, and include unprecedented access for international inspectors. Following International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) verification and confirmation that Iran is implementing its initial commitments, the United States and our international partners also are beginning to take the steps required to implement the JPOA.

Accordingly, the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) today is publishing on its Web site the following key documents to begin implementation of the United States’ commitments under JPOA:

• Guidance Relating to the Provision of Certain Temporary Sanctions Relief in Order to Implement the Joint Plan of Action Reached on November 24, 2013, between the P5+1 and the Islamic Republic of Iran
• Statement of Licensing Policy on Activities Related to the Safety of Iran’s Civil Aviation Industry
• Frequently Asked Questions Relating to the Sanctions Relief Provided for in the Joint Plan of Action between the P5+1 and the Islamic Republic of Iran

US Deapartment of the Treasury Recent Actions

December 12, 2013 – Iran Sanctions Designations; Non-proliferation Designations

The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

AMIDI, Reza; DOB 30 Sep 1962; POB Tehran, Iran; Additional Sanctions Information – Subject to Secondary Sanctions (individual) [NPWMD] [IFSR].

DAYENI, Mahmoud Mohammadi; Additional Sanctions Information – Subject to Secondary Sanctions; Passport J16661804 (Iran) (individual) [NPWMD] [IFSR] (Linked To: NEKA NOVIN).

KAHVARIN, Iradj Mohammadi; Additional Sanctions Information – Subject to Secondary Sanctions; Passport X15232608 (Iran) (individual) [NPWMD] [IFSR] (Linked To: NEKA NOVIN).

SOKOLENKO, Vitaly (a.k.a. SOKOLENKO, Vitalii; a.k.a. SOKOLENKO, Vitaliy); DOB 16 Jun 1968; Executive Order 13645 Determination – Material Support; Passport EH354160; alt. Passport P0329907; General Manager of Ferland Company Limited (individual) [FSE-IR] [EO13645] (Linked To: FERLAND COMPANY LIMITED).

The following entities have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

ERTEBAT GOSTAR NOVIN, Unit 207, No. 20 Salehi Boulevard, Tarasht, Tehran, Iran; Additional Sanctions Information – Subject to Secondary Sanctions [NPWMD] [IFSR].

EYVAZ TECHNIC MANUFACTURING COMPANY (a.k.a. EYVAZ TECHNIC; a.k.a. EYVAZ TECHNIC INDUSTRIAL COMPANY LTD.), Sharia’ati St., Shahid Hamid Sadik Alley, Building 3, Number 3, Tehran, Iran; Additional Sanctions Information – Subject to Secondary Sanctions [NPWMD] [IFSR].

FAN PARDAZAN, P.O. Box 15875-1834, Km 5 Karaj Special Road, Tehran, Iran; Unit (or Suite) 207, Saleh Blvd, Tehran, Iran; Unit 207, Tarajit Maydane Taymori (or Teimori) Square, Basin Building, Tarasht, Tehran, Iran; Additional Sanctions Information – Subject to Secondary Sanctions [NPWMD] [IFSR].

IRAN AVIATION INDUSTRIES ORGANIZATION (a.k.a. SAZMANE SANAYE HAVAI), Karaj Special Road, Mehrabad Airport, Tehran, Iran; Sepahbod Gharani 36, Tehran, Iran; 3th km Karaj Special Road, Aviation Industries Boulevard, Tehran, Iran; Additional Sanctions Information – Subject to Secondary Sanctions [NPWMD] [IFSR].

MARO SANAT COMPANY (a.k.a. MARO SANAT DEVELOPMENT AND DESIGN ENGINEERING COMPANY; a.k.a. MARO SANAT ENGINEERING; a.k.a. MAROU SANAT ENGINEERING COMPANY; a.k.a. MOHANDESI TARH VA TOSEH MARO SANAT COMPANY), North Drive Moftah Street, Zahra Street, Placard 9, Ground Floor, Tehran, Iran; Additional Sanctions Information – Subject to Secondary Sanctions [NPWMD] [IFSR].

MID OIL ASIA PTE LTD, Harbourfront Centre, 1 Maritime Square #09-09 099253, Singapore; Executive Order 13645 Determination – Material Support [EO13645] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY).

NAVID COMPOSITE MATERIAL COMPANY (a.k.a. NAVID COMPOSITE), No. 3, Alley 23, 16th Janbazan Street, North Kargar Avenue, Tehran, Iran; Additional Sanctions Information – Subject to Secondary Sanctions [NPWMD] [IFSR].

NEGIN PARTO KHAVAR (a.k.a. ERTEBATE EGHTESSADE MONIR; a.k.a. NEGIN PARTO; a.k.a. NEGIN PARTO KHAVAR CO. LTD.; a.k.a. PAYAN AVARAN OMRAN), Fatmi Gharabi Street, between Sindokht and Etemad Zadeh, Block 307, Floor 3, Unit 7, Tehran 1411816191, Iran; Unit 7, No. 279 West Fatemi Street, Tehran 1411816191, Iran; Additional Sanctions Information – Subject to Secondary Sanctions [NPWMD] [IFSR].

QODS AVIATION INDUSTRIES (a.k.a. GHODS AVIATION INDUSTRIES; a.k.a. QODS RESEARCH CENTER), P.O. Box 15875-1834, Km 5 Karaj Special Road, Tehran, Iran; Unit (or Suite) 207, Saleh Blvd, Tehran, Iran; Unit 207, Tarajit Maydane Taymori (or Teimori) Square, Basiri Building, Tarasht, Tehran, Iran; Additional Sanctions Information – Subject to Secondary Sanctions [NPWMD] [IFSR].

SINGA TANKERS PTE. LTD., 89 Short Street Number 10-07, Golden Wall Centre 188216, Singapore; Executive Order 13645 Determination – Material Support [EO13645] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY).

SIQIRIYA MARITIME CORP., Zen Towers, 111, Natividad Almeda-Lopez Street, Ermita, 1111, Manila, Philippines; Executive Order 13645 Determination – Material Support [EO13645] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY).

THE EXPLORATION AND NUCLEAR RAW MATERIALS PRODUCTION COMPANY (a.k.a. EMKA; a.k.a. EMKA COMPANY), Tehran, Iran; Additional Sanctions Information – Subject to Secondary Sanctions [NPWMD] [IFSR].

The following vessels have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

ANTHEM Panama flag (Siqiriya Maritime Corp.); Vessel Registration Identification IMO 8310669 (vessel) [EO13645] (Linked To: SIQIRIYA MARITIME CORP.).

JAFFNA Panama flag (Siqiriya Maritime Corp.); Vessel Registration Identification IMO 8609515 (vessel) [EO13645] (Linked To: SIQIRIYA MARITIME CORP.).

OLYSA Panama flag (Siqiriya Maritime Corp.); Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9001605 (vessel) [EO13645] (Linked To: SIQIRIYA MARITIME CORP.).

The following changes have been made to OFAC’s SDN List:

BAIKAL (f.k.a. BLOSSOM; f.k.a. SIMA) (T2DY4) Crude Oil Tanker Tanzania flag; Former Vessel Flag Malta; alt. Former Vessel Flag Tuvalu; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9357353; MMSI 572449210 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY). -to- SUCCESS (f.k.a. BAIKAL; f.k.a. BLOSSOM; f.k.a. SIMA) (T2DY4) Crude Oil Tanker None Identified flag; Former Vessel Flag Malta; alt. Former Vessel Flag Tuvalu; alt. Former Vessel Flag Tanzania; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9357353; MMSI 572449210 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY).

BLACKSTONE (f.k.a. SARV) (9HNZ9) Crude Oil Tanker Seychelles flag; Former Vessel Flag Malta; alt. Former Vessel Flag Tuvalu; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9357377; MMSI 249257000 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY). -to- SPLENDOUR (f.k.a. BLACKSTONE; f.k.a. SARV) (9HNZ9) Crude Oil Tanker None Identified flag; Former Vessel Flag Malta; alt. Former Vessel Flag Tuvalu; alt. Former Vessel Flag Seychelles; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9357377; MMSI 249257000 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY).

CAMELLIA (f.k.a. SAVEH) (5IM 594) Crude Oil Tanker None Identified flag; Former Vessel Flag Malta; alt. Former Vessel Flag Tanzania; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9171462; MMSI 677049400 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY). -to- SWALLOW (f.k.a. CAMELLIA; f.k.a. SAVEH) (5IM 594) Crude Oil Tanker None Identified flag; Former Vessel Flag Malta; alt. Former Vessel Flag Tanzania; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9171462; MMSI 677049400 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY).

CARNATION (f.k.a. SAFE; a.k.a. YARD NO. 1220 SHANGHAI WAIGAOQIAO) Crude Oil Tanker Tanzania flag; Former Vessel Flag Tuvalu; alt. Former Vessel Flag Malta; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9569205 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY). -to- SUNSHINE (f.k.a. CARNATION; f.k.a. SAFE; a.k.a. YARD NO. 1220 SHANGHAI WAIGAOQIAO) Crude Oil Tanker None Identified flag; Former Vessel Flag Tuvalu; alt. Former Vessel Flag Malta; alt. Former Vessel Flag Tanzania; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9569205 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY).

CHRISTINA (f.k.a. AMOL; f.k.a. CASTOR) (T2EM4) Crude/Oil Products Tanker Tanzania flag; Former Vessel Flag Malta; alt. Former Vessel Flag Tuvalu; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9187667; MMSI 256843000 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY). -to- SILVER CLOUD (f.k.a. AMOL; f.k.a. CASTOR; f.k.a. CHRISTINA) (T2EM4) Crude/Oil Products Tanker None Identified flag; Former Vessel Flag Malta; alt. Former Vessel Flag Tuvalu; alt. Former Vessel Flag Tanzania; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9187667; MMSI 256843000 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY).

CLOVE (f.k.a. SEMNAN) (5IM 595) Crude Oil Tanker None Identified flag; Former Vessel Flag Malta; alt. Former Vessel Flag Tanzania; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9171450; MMSI 677049500 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY). -to- SPARROW (f.k.a. CLOVE; f.k.a. SEMNAN) (5IM 595) Crude Oil Tanker None Identified flag; Former Vessel Flag Malta; alt. Former Vessel Flag Tanzania; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9171450; MMSI 677049500 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY).

COMPANION (f.k.a. DAVAR) (5IM 593) Crude Oil Tanker None Identified flag; Former Vessel Flag Cyprus; alt. Former Vessel Flag Tanzania; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9357717; MMSI 677049300 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY). -to- DAL LAKE (f.k.a. COMPANION; f.k.a. DAVAR) (5IM 593) Crude Oil Tanker None Identified flag; Former Vessel Flag Cyprus; alt. Former Vessel Flag Tanzania; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9357717; MMSI 677049300 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY).

CRYSTAL (f.k.a. ABADEH) (9HDQ9) Crude/Oil Products Tanker Tanzania flag; Former Vessel Flag Malta; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9187655; MMSI 256842000 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY). -to- SUNDIAL (f.k.a. ABADEH; f.k.a. CRYSTAL) (9HDQ9) Crude/Oil Products Tanker None Identified flag; Former Vessel Flag Malta; alt. Former Vessel Flag Tanzania; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9187655; MMSI 256842000 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY).

DAISY (f.k.a. SUSANGIRD) (5IM584) Crude Oil Tanker None Identified flag; Former Vessel Flag Malta; alt. Former Vessel Flag Tanzania; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9172038; MMSI 677048400 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY). -to- SUPERIOR (f.k.a. DAISY; f.k.a. SUSANGIRD) (5IM584) Crude Oil Tanker None Identified flag; Former Vessel Flag Malta; alt. Former Vessel Flag Tanzania; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9172038; MMSI 677048400 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY).

EXPLORER (f.k.a. HODA; f.k.a. PRECIOUS) (T2EH4) Crude Oil Tanker Tanzania flag; Former Vessel Flag Cyprus; alt. Former Vessel Flag Tuvalu; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9362059; MMSI 572458210 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY). -to- HYDRA (f.k.a. EXPLORER; f.k.a. HODA; f.k.a. PRECIOUS) (T2EH4) Crude Oil Tanker None Identified flag; Former Vessel Flag Cyprus; alt. Former Vessel Flag Tuvalu; alt. Former Vessel Flag Tanzania; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9362059; MMSI 572458210 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY).

FREEDOM (f.k.a. HARAZ) (5IM 597) Crude Oil Tanker None Identified flag; Former Vessel Flag Cyprus; alt. Former Vessel Flag Tanzania; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9357406; MMSI 677049700 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY). -to- AMBER (f.k.a. FREEDOM; f.k.a. HARAZ) (5IM 597) Crude Oil Tanker None Identified flag; Former Vessel Flag Cyprus; alt. Former Vessel Flag Tanzania; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9357406; MMSI 677049700 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY).

JANUS (f.k.a. HONAR; f.k.a. VICTORY) (T2EA4) Crude Oil Tanker Tanzania flag; Former Vessel Flag Cyprus; alt. Former Vessel Flag Tuvalu; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9362061; MMSI 209511000 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY). -to- DOVE (f.k.a. HONAR; f.k.a. JANUS; f.k.a. VICTORY) (T2EA4) Crude Oil Tanker None Identified flag; Former Vessel Flag Cyprus; alt. Former Vessel Flag Tuvalu; alt. Former Vessel Flag Tanzania; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9362061; MMSI 209511000 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY).

JASHNSAZ, Seifollah (a.k.a. JASHN SAZ, Seifollah; a.k.a. JASHNSAZ, Seyfollah); DOB 01 Mar 1958 to 31 Mar 1958; nationality Iran; Additional Sanctions Information – Subject to Secondary Sanctions; Passport R17589399 (Iran); Chairman & Director, Naftiran Intertade Co. (NICO) Sarl; Chairman & Director, Naft Iran Intertade Company Ltd.; Director, Hong Kong Intertrade Company; Chairman & Director, Petro Suisse Intertrade Company (individual) [IRAN]. -to- JASHNSAZ, Seifollah (a.k.a. JASHN SAZ, Seifollah; a.k.a. JASHNSAZ, Seyfollah); DOB 22 Mar 1958; POB Behbahan, Iran; nationality Iran; Additional Sanctions Information – Subject to Secondary Sanctions; Passport R17589399 (Iran); alt. Passport T23700825 (Iran); Chairman & Director, Naftiran Intertrade Co. (NICO) Sarl; Chairman & Director, Naft Iran Intertrade Company Ltd.; Director, Hong Kong Intertrade Company; Chairman of the Board of Directors, Iranian Oil Company (U.K.) Limited; Chairman & Director, Petro Suisse Intertrade Company (individual) [IRAN].

JUPITER (f.k.a. ASTARA) (9HDS9) Crude/Oil Products Tanker None Identified flag; Former Vessel Flag Tuvalu; alt. Former Vessel Flag Malta; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9187631; MMSI 256845000 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY). -to- ABELIA (f.k.a. ASTARA; f.k.a. JUPITER) (9HDS9) Crude/Oil Products Tanker None Identified flag; Former Vessel Flag Tuvalu; alt. Former Vessel Flag Malta; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9187631; MMSI 256845000 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY).

KASB INTERNATIONAL LLC, United Arab Emirates; Additional Sanctions Information – Subject to Secondary Sanctions [IRAN]. -to- KASB INTERNATIONAL LLC (a.k.a. FIRST FURAT TRADING LLC), 10th Floor, Citi Bank Building, Oud Metha Road, Oud Metha, Dubai, United Arab Emirates; Additional Sanctions Information – Subject to Secondary Sanctions; Telephone Number: (971) (4) (3248000) [IRAN].

LANTANA (f.k.a. SANANDAJ) (5IM591) Crude Oil Tanker None Identified flag; Former Vessel Flag Malta; alt. Former Vessel Flag Tanzania; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9172040; MMSI 677049100 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY). -to- SPOTLESS (f.k.a. LANTANA; f.k.a. SANANDAJ) (5IM591) Crude Oil Tanker None Identified flag; Former Vessel Flag Malta; alt. Former Vessel Flag Tanzania; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9172040; MMSI 677049100 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY).

LEADERSHIP (f.k.a. DANESH) (5IM 592) Crude Oil Tanker None Identified flag; Former Vessel Flag Cyprus; alt. Former Vessel Flag Tanzania; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9356593; MMSI 677049200 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY). -to- DECESIVE (f.k.a. DANESH; f.k.a. LEADERSHIP) (5IM 592) Crude Oil Tanker None Identified flag; Former Vessel Flag Cyprus; alt. Former Vessel Flag Tanzania; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9356593; MMSI 677049200 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY).

MAESTRO (f.k.a. FAEZ; f.k.a. SATEEN) (T2DM4) Chemical/Products Tanker Tanzania flag; Former Vessel Flag Malta; alt. Former Vessel Flag Tuvalu; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9283760; MMSI 572438210 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY). -to- FIANGA (f.k.a. FAEZ; f.k.a. MAESTRO; f.k.a. SATEEN) (T2DM4) Chemical/Products Tanker None Identified flag; Former Vessel Flag Malta; alt. Former Vessel Flag Tuvalu; alt. Former Vessel Flag Tanzania; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9283760; MMSI 572438210 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY).

MAGNOLIA (f.k.a. SARVESTAN) (5IM590) Crude Oil Tanker None Identified flag; Former Vessel Flag Malta; alt. Former Vessel Flag Tanzania; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9172052; MMSI 677049000 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY). -to- SABRINA (f.k.a. MAGNOLIA; f.k.a. SARVESTAN) (5IM590) Crude Oil Tanker None Identified flag; Former Vessel Flag Malta; alt. Former Vessel Flag Tanzania; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9172052; MMSI 677049000 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY).

MARIGOLD (f.k.a. BRAWNY; f.k.a. NABI) (T2DS4) Crude Oil Tanker Tanzania flag; Former Vessel Flag Malta; alt. Former Vessel Flag Tuvalu; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9079080; MMSI 572443210 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY). -to- NYOS (f.k.a. BRAWNY; f.k.a. MARIGOLD; f.k.a. NABI) (T2DS4) Crude Oil Tanker None Identified flag; Former Vessel Flag Malta; alt. Former Vessel Flag Tuvalu; alt. Former Vessel Flag Tanzania; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9079080; MMSI 572443210 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY).

MIDSEA (f.k.a. MOTION; f.k.a. NAJM) (T2DR4) Crude Oil Tanker Tanzania flag; Former Vessel Flag Malta; alt. Former Vessel Flag Tuvalu; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9079092; MMSI 572442210 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY). -to- NAINITAL (f.k.a. MIDSEA; f.k.a. MOTION; f.k.a. NAJM) (T2DR4) Crude Oil Tanker None Identified flag; Former Vessel Flag Malta; alt. Former Vessel Flag Tuvalu; alt. Former Vessel Flag Tanzania; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9079092; MMSI 572442210 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY).

MILLIONAIRE (f.k.a. HIRMAND; f.k.a. HONESTY) (T2DZ4) Crude Oil Tanker Tanzania flag; Former Vessel Flag Cyprus; alt. Former Vessel Flag Tuvalu; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9357391; MMSI 572450210 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY). -to- HONESTY (f.k.a. HIRMAND; f.k.a. HONESTY; f.k.a. MILLIONAIRE) (T2DZ4) Crude Oil Tanker None Identified flag; Former Vessel Flag Cyprus; alt. Former Vessel Flag Tuvalu; alt. Former Vessel Flag Tanzania; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9357391; MMSI 572450210 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY).

NEKA NOVIN (a.k.a. NIKSA NIROU), Unit 7, No. 12, 13th Street, Mir-Emad St., Motahary Avenue, Tehran 15875-6653, Iran; No. 2, 3rd Floor, Simorgh St., Dr. Shariati Avenue, Tehran, Iran; Additional Sanctions Information – Subject to Secondary Sanctions [NPWMD] [IFSR]. -to- NEKA NOVIN (a.k.a. BLOCK NIROU SUN CO; a.k.a. BNSA CO; a.k.a. KIA NIROU; a.k.a. NEKU NIROU TAVAN CO; a.k.a. NIKSA NIROU), Unit 7, No. 12, 13th Street, Mir-Emad St., Motahary Avenue, Tehran 15875-6653, Iran; No. 2, 3rd Floor, Simorgh St., Dr. Shariati Avenue, Tehran, Iran; Additional Sanctions Information – Subject to Secondary Sanctions [NPWMD] [IFSR].

OCEANIC (f.k.a. NESA; f.k.a. TRUTH) (T2DP4) Crude Oil Tanker Tanzania flag; Former Vessel Flag Malta; alt. Former Vessel Flag Tuvalu; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9079107; MMSI 572440210 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY). -to- NATIVE LAND (f.k.a. NESA; f.k.a. OCEANIC; f.k.a. TRUTH) (T2DP4) Crude Oil Tanker Tanzania flag; Former Vessel Flag Malta; alt. Former Vessel Flag Tuvalu; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9079107; MMSI 572440210 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY).

PIONEER (f.k.a. HADI) (T2EJ4) Crude Oil Tanker None Identified flag; Former Vessel Flag Cyprus; alt. Former Vessel Flag Tuvalu; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9362073; MMSI 572459210 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY). -to- ZEUS (f.k.a. HADI; f.k.a. PIONEER) (T2EJ4) Crude Oil Tanker None Identified flag; Former Vessel Flag Cyprus; alt. Former Vessel Flag Tuvalu; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9362073; MMSI 572459210 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY).

RAINBOW (f.k.a. SOUVENIR; a.k.a. YARD NO. 1221 SHANGHAI WAIGAOQIAO) Crude Oil Tanker Tanzania flag; Former Vessel Flag Malta; alt. Former Vessel Flag Tuvalu; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9569619 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY). -to- DOJRAN (f.k.a. RAINBOW; f.k.a. SOUVENIR; a.k.a. YARD NO. 1221 SHANGHAI WAIGAOQIAO) Crude Oil Tanker Tanzania flag; Former Vessel Flag Malta; alt. Former Vessel Flag Tuvalu; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9569619 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY).

SCORPIAN (f.k.a. HORMOZ) (9HEK9) Crude Oil Tanker Tanzania flag; Former Vessel Flag Tuvalu; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9212890; MMSI 256870000 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY). -to- HORIZON (f.k.a. HORMOZ; f.k.a. SCORPIAN) (9HEK9) Crude Oil Tanker None Identified flag; Former Vessel Flag Tuvalu; alt. Former Vessel Flag Tanzania; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9212890; MMSI 256870000 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY).

SEAHORSE (f.k.a. GARDENIA; f.k.a. SEPID) (T2EF4) Crude Oil Tanker Tanzania flag; Former Vessel Flag Malta; alt. Former Vessel Flag Tuvalu; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9356608; MMSI 572455210 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY). -to- SANCHI (f.k.a. GARDENIA; f.k.a. SEAHORSE; f.k.a. SEPID) (T2EF4) Crude Oil Tanker None Identified flag; Former Vessel Flag Malta; alt. Former Vessel Flag Tuvalu; alt. Former Vessel Flag Tanzania; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9356608; MMSI 572455210 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY).

SEAPRIDE (f.k.a. ASTANEH; f.k.a. NEPTUNE) (T2ES4) Crude/Oil Products Tanker Tanzania flag; Former Vessel Flag Malta; alt. Former Vessel Flag Tuvalu; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9187643; MMSI 572467210 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY). -to- ALERT (f.k.a. ASTANEH; f.k.a. NEPTUNE; f.k.a. SEAPRIDE) (T2ES4) Crude/Oil Products Tanker None Identified flag; Former Vessel Flag Malta; alt. Former Vessel Flag Tuvalu; alt. Former Vessel Flag Tanzania; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9187643; MMSI 572467210 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY).

SMOOTH (a.k.a. YARD NO. 1225 SHANGHAI WAIGAOQIAO) Crude Oil Tanker Malta flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9569657 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY). -to- SMOOTH (a.k.a. YARD NO. 1225 SHANGHAI WAIGAOQIAO) Crude Oil Tanker None Identified flag; Former Vessel Flag Malta; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9569657 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY).

SONATA (a.k.a. YARD NO. 1222 SHANGHAI WAIGAOQIAO) Crude Oil Tanker None Identified flag; Former Vessel Flag Malta; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9569633 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY). -to- FORTUN (f.k.a. SONATA; a.k.a. YARD NO. 1222 SHANGHAI WAIGAOQIAO) Crude Oil Tanker None Identified flag; Former Vessel Flag Malta; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9569633 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY).

SONGBIRD (a.k.a. YARD NO. 1224 SHANGHAI WAIGAOQIAO) Crude Oil Tanker None Identified flag; Former Vessel Flag Malta; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9569645 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY). -to- SALALEH (f.k.a. SONGBIRD; a.k.a. YARD NO. 1224 SHANGHAI WAIGAOQIAO) Crude Oil Tanker None Identified flag; Former Vessel Flag Malta; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9569645 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY).

TAMAR (f.k.a. HAMOON; f.k.a. LENA) (T2EQ4) Crude Oil Tanker Tanzania flag; Former Vessel Flag Malta; alt. Former Vessel Flag Tuvalu; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9212929; MMSI 572465210 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY). -to- HALISTIC (f.k.a. HAMOON; f.k.a. LENA; f.k.a. TAMAR) (T2EQ4) Crude Oil Tanker None Identified flag; Former Vessel Flag Malta; alt. Former Vessel Flag Tuvalu; alt. Former Vessel Flag Tanzania; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9212929; MMSI 572465210 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY).

TULAR (f.k.a. HENGAM; f.k.a. LOYAL) (T2ER4) Crude Oil Tanker Tanzania flag; Former Vessel Flag Malta; alt. Former Vessel Flag Tuvalu; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9212905; MMSI 256875000 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY). -to- HAPPINESS (f.k.a. HENGAM; f.k.a. LOYAL; f.k.a. TULAR) (T2ER4) Crude Oil Tanker None Identified flag; Former Vessel Flag Malta; alt. Former Vessel Flag Tuvalu; alt. Former Vessel Flag Tanzania; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9212905; MMSI 256875000 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY).

VALOR (f.k.a. HARSIN) (5IM600) Crude Oil Tanker None Identified flag; Former Vessel Flag Malta; alt. Former Vessel Flag Tanzania; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9212917; MMSI 677050000 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY). -to- MARINA (f.k.a. HARSIN; f.k.a. VALOR) (5IM600) Crude Oil Tanker None Identified flag; Former Vessel Flag Malta; alt. Former Vessel Flag Tanzania; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9212917; MMSI 677050000 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY).

VOYAGER (f.k.a. ELITE; f.k.a. NOAH) (T2DQ4) Crude Oil Tanker Tanzania flag; Former Vessel Flag Malta; alt. Former Vessel Flag Tuvalu; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9079078; MMSI 572441210 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY). -to- NAPOLI (f.k.a. ELITE; f.k.a. NOAH; f.k.a. VOYAGER) (T2DQ4) Crude Oil Tanker None Identified flag; Former Vessel Flag Malta; alt. Former Vessel Flag Tuvalu; alt. Former Vessel Flag Tanzania; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9079078; MMSI 572441210 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY).

OFAC Recent Actions

November 29, 2013 – General License No. 8 Issued Under the Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferators Sanctions Regulations

General License No. 8 Issued Under the Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferators Sanctions Regulations – Today, OFAC is issuing General License No. 8 under the Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferators Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. Part 544; and the Iranian Transactions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. Part 560, in order to authorize certain transactions related to the arrest, detention, and judicial sale of the MV AMIN (a.k.a. AMIN 2, IMO No. 9422366), which is a vessel on OFAC’s Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons list. The vessel is currently under arrest in Zhangzhou port, Gulei, China.

For more information on this specific action, please visit OFAC’s Recent Actions page.

October 30, 2013 – Replacement of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferators Sanctions Regulations General License 5b with 5c

Today, OFAC is issuing General License No. 5c and reissuing the general license under the Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferators Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. Part 544; and the Iranian Transactions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. Part 560, in order to authorize certain transactions related to the arrest, detention, and judicial sale of the MV Dianthe (f.k.a. Horsham, f.k.a. Iran Bam, IMO No. 9323833), which is a vessel on OFAC’s Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons list. The vessel remains under arrest in Mundra, India.

OFAC Recent Actions

September 10, 2013 – OFAC Issues Iranian General Licenses to Support Humanitarian Activity and Athletic Exchanges with Iran

Today, the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued two general licenses that authorize certain humanitarian-related activities by nongovernmental organizations in Iran and athletic exchanges involving Iran and the United States. General License E authorizes the exportation of services and funds transfers by nongovernmental organizations in support of certain not-for-profit humanitarian activities designed to benefit the people of Iran, including activities related to humanitarian projects to meet basic human needs; non-commercial reconstruction projects in response to natural disasters for a period of up to two years; environmental and wildlife conservation projects; and human rights and democracy building projects. General License F authorizes the importation and exportation of certain services in support of professional and amateur sporting activities and exchanges involving the United States and Iran.

OFAC Recent Actions

September 06, 2013 – Treasury sanctions companies based in the United Arab Emirates controlled by Mr. Seyed Seyyedi and assisting the national oil company of Iran and Naftiran to evade sanctions

Today’s action targets the network of Seyed Seyyedi, an Iranian businessman and the director of Sima General Trading, an entity previously sanctioned by Treasury; a network of companies based in the UAE that Seyyedi controls; and representatives of NIOC and NICO based in the UK and Switzerland.

The Treasury identified

• Sima General Trading – Company previously penalized by the Treasury and connected to Dimitris Cambis
• KASB International – Trading Company in UAE,United Arab Emirates. KASB PETROLEUM is provide Base Oil, Rpo, Heavy White Oil, Dop, Xylene and related aspects services to the customers.
• Petro Royal FZE – Founded in 2013 as a private owned Company. Our principal activities are focused on Trading, Bunkering and distribution of petrochemical products in the Middle East, GCC and CIS countries.
• AA Energy FZCO
• Swiss Management Services Sarl – Used by NICO, and Mohammad Moinie, who works for Sarl in Switzerland

The Treasury also identified a number of individuals representing Swiss Management Services, NIOC-International Affairs in London and the Iranian Oil Company UK as helping the Iranian government evade oil sanctions.

According to Treasury, Seyyedi acted on behalf of various Iranian entities such as National Iranian Oil Co and Naftiran Intertrade Co (NICO). In particular, Sima General Trading financed a front company to buy oil tankers on behalf of National Iranian Tanker Co and obscured Iranian ownership of ships capable of carrying roughly $200 million worth of oil.

Meanwhile, it said Reza Parsaei and Seyyed Mohamad Ali Khatibi Tabatabei, directors at NIOC International Affairs Ltd, ran a scheme to deceptively import Iranian oil into the EU that involved two directors of Iranian Oil Co Ltd: Seyed Mohaddes and Mohammed Ziracchian Zadeh.

July 25, 2013 – Update to the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR Part 560 (The “ITSR”), Section 560.530(a)(3)(i), Adding Additional Items to the Basic Medical Supplies General License, and Publication of Related Frequently Asked Questions

​The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) is updating section 560.530(a)(3)(i), of the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. part 560 (the “ITSR”), to add additional items to the basic medical supplies list defined under section 560.530(a)(3)(ii) and referenced in the general license originally issued on October 22, 2012 for the export of basic medical supplies to Iran.

In addition, OFAC is publishing related frequently asked questions on the general license to provide guidance on the scope and limitations of this general license and the issued update. OFAC has also released new guidance on the sale of food, agricultural commodities, medicine, and medical devices by non-U.S. persons to Iran.

OFAC Recent Actions

July 03, 2013 – Iran Freedom and Counter Proliferation Act-related SDN updates; ​Anti-terrorism Designations

Specially Designated Nationals List Update – ​Section 1244(c) of the Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act of 2012 (“IFCA”) requires the President to block and prohibit all transactions in all property and interests in property of persons that the President determines, on and after the date that is 180 days after the date of its enactment, (a) is part of the energy, shipping, or ship building sectors of Iran; or (b) operates a port in Iran. Those persons determined to meet the above criteria will have either “IFCA Determination – Involved in Energy Sector”; “IFCA Determination – Involved in the Shipbuilding Sector”; “IFCA Determination – Involved in the Shipping Sector”; or “IFCA Determination – Port Operator” annotated in their SDN listing.

The following names have been updated to include this additional information. <sort> ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES (a.k.a. IRI SHIPPING LINES; a.k.a. IRISL; a.k.a. IRISL GROUP), No. 37, Aseman Tower, Sayyade Shirazee Square, Pasdaran Ave., P.O. Box 19395-1311, Tehran, Iran; No. 37, Corner of 7th Narenjestan, Sayad Shirazi Square, After Noboyand Square, Pasdaran Ave., Tehran, Iran; Additional Sanctions Information – Subject to Secondary Sanctions [NPWMD] [IFSR]. -to- ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES (a.k.a. IRI SHIPPING LINES; a.k.a. IRISL; a.k.a. IRISL GROUP), No. 37, Aseman Tower, Sayyade Shirazee Square, Pasdaran Ave., P.O. Box 19395-1311, Tehran, Iran; No. 37, Corner of 7th Narenjestan, Sayad Shirazi Square, After Noboyand Square, Pasdaran Ave., Tehran, Iran; IFCA Determination – Involved in the Shipping Sector; Additional Sanctions Information – Subject to Secondary Sanctions [NPWMD] [IFSR]. NATIONAL IRANIAN OIL COMPANY (a.k.a. NIOC), Hafez Crossing, Taleghani Avenue, P.O. Box 1863 and 2501, Tehran, Iran; National Iranian Oil Company Building, Taleghani Avenue, Hafez Street, Tehran, Iran; Website www.nioc.ir; Additional Sanctions Information – Subject to Secondary Sanctions; all offices worldwide [IRAN] [NPWMD] [IRGC] [IFSR]. -to- NATIONAL IRANIAN OIL COMPANY (a.k.a. NIOC), Hafez Crossing, Taleghani Avenue, P.O. Box 1863 and 2501, Tehran, Iran; National Iranian Oil Company Building, Taleghani Avenue, Hafez Street, Tehran, Iran; Website www.nioc.ir; IFCA Determination – Involved in Energy Sector; Additional Sanctions Information – Subject to Secondary Sanctions; all offices worldwide [IRAN] [NPWMD] [IRGC] [IFSR]. NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY (a.k.a. NITC), NITC Building, 67-88, Shahid Atefi Street, Africa Avenue, Tehran, Iran; Website www.nitc.co.ir; Email Address info@nitc.co.ir; alt. Email Address administrator@nitc.co.ir; Additional Sanctions Information – Subject to Secondary Sanctions; Telephone (98)(21)(66153220); Telephone (98)(21)(23803202); Telephone (98)(21)(23803303); Telephone (98)(21)(66153224); Telephone (98)(21)(23802230); Telephone (98)(9121115315); Telephone (98)(9128091642); Telephone (98)(9127389031); Fax (98)(21)(22224537); Fax (98)(21)(23803318); Fax (98)(21)(22013392); Fax (98)(21)(22058763) [IRAN]. -to- NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY (a.k.a. NITC), NITC Building, 67-88, Shahid Atefi Street, Africa Avenue, Tehran, Iran; Website www.nitc.co.ir; Email Address info@nitc.co.ir; alt. Email Address administrator@nitc.co.ir; IFCA Determination – Involved in the Shipping Sector; Additional Sanctions Information – Subject to Secondary Sanctions; Telephone (98)(21)(66153220); Telephone (98)(21)(23803202); Telephone (98)(21)(23803303); Telephone (98)(21)(66153224); Telephone (98)(21)(23802230); Telephone (98)(9121115315); Telephone (98)(9128091642); Telephone (98)(9127389031); Fax (98)(21)(22224537); Fax (98)(21)(23803318); Fax (98)(21)(22013392); Fax (98)(21)(22058763) [IRAN]. SOUTH SHIPPING LINE IRAN (a.k.a. SOUTH SHIPPING LINES IRAN COMPANY), Qaem Magham Farahani St., Tehran, Iran; Apt. No. 7, 3rd Floor, No. 2, 4th Alley, Gandi Ave., Tehran, Iran; Additional Sanctions Information – Subject to Secondary Sanctions [NPWMD] [IFSR]. -to- SOUTH SHIPPING LINE IRAN (a.k.a. SOUTH SHIPPING LINES IRAN COMPANY), Qaem Magham Farahani St., Tehran, Iran; Apt. No. 7, 3rd Floor, No. 2, 4th Alley, Gandi Ave., Tehran, Iran; IFCA Determination – Involved in the Shipping Sector; Additional Sanctions Information – Subject to Secondary Sanctions [NPWMD] [IFSR]. TIDEWATER MIDDLE EAST CO. (a.k.a. TIDE WATER COMPANY; a.k.a. TIDE WATER MIDDLE EAST MARINE SERVICE; a.k.a. TIDEWATER CO. (MIDDLE EAST MARINE SERVICES)), No. 80, Tidewater Building, Vozara Street, Next to Saie Park, Tehran, Iran; Website www.tidewaterco.com; Email Address info@tidewaterco.com; alt. Email Address info@tidewaterco.ir; Business Registration Document # 18745 (Iran); Telephone: 982188553321; Alt. Telephone: 982188554432; Fax: 982188717367; Alt. Fax: 982188708761; Alt. Fax: 982188708911 [NPWMD] [IRGC]. -to- TIDEWATER MIDDLE EAST CO. (a.k.a. TIDE WATER COMPANY; a.k.a. TIDE WATER MIDDLE EAST MARINE SERVICE; a.k.a. TIDEWATER CO. (MIDDLE EAST MARINE SERVICES)), No. 80, Tidewater Building, Vozara Street, Next to Saie Park, Tehran, Iran; Website www.tidewaterco.com; Email Address info@tidewaterco.com; alt. Email Address info@tidewaterco.ir; IFCA Determination – Port Operator; Business Registration Document # 18745 (Iran); Telephone: 982188553321; Alt. Telephone: 982188554432; Fax: 982188717367; Alt. Fax: 982188708761; Alt. Fax: 982188708911 [NPWMD] [IRGC]. </sort> OFAC Recent Actions

July 02, 2013 – Iran Freedom and Counter Proliferation Act-related SDN updates

To assist foreign financial institutions (FFIs) in identifying which persons on the OFAC Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons (SDN) list fall into the category of persons with whom a FFI may face exposure to sanctions on their U.S. correspondent or payable-through accounts the phrase “Additional Sanctions Information – Subject to Secondary Sanctions” will be applied to appropriate SDN listings. To see a list of SDNs affected by this update, please review the July 2, 2013 section in OFAC’s SDN Changes file.

OFAC Recent Actions

July 01, 2013 – OFAC Releases Additional Frequently Asked Questions Relating to the Implementation of the Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act of 2012 (IFCA) and Executive Order 13645 ​ Today Executive Order 13645 and certain provisions of the Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act of 2012 (IFCA) become effective. The Office of Foreign Assets Control is posting additional guidance regarding the implementation of IFCA and the Executive Order and relating to transactions involving Iran’s automotive sector and ports (see FAQs 315-317).

OFAC Recent Actions

June 04, 2013 – Iran Designations

Click here for more information about the Execution of Imam Khomeini’s Order (EIKO) International Financial Network

The following entities have been added to OFAC’s SDN List: <sort> AMIN INVESTMENT BANK (a.k.a. AMINIB), No. 51 Ghobadiyan Street, Valiasr Street, Tehran 1968917173, Iran; Website http://www.aminib.com [IRAN]. BEHSAZ KASHANE TEHRAN CONSTRUCTION CO. (a.k.a. BEHSAZ KASHANEH CO.), No. 40, East Street Journal, North Shiraz Street, Sadra Avenue, Tehran, Iran; Website http://www.behsazco.ir [IRAN]. COMMERCIAL PARS OIL CO., 9th Floor, No. 346, Mirdamad Avenue, Tehran, Iran [IRAN]. CYLINDER SYSTEM L.T.D. (a.k.a. CILINDER SISTEM D.O.O.; a.k.a. CILINDER SISTEM D.O.O. ZA PROIZVODNJU I USLUGE), Dr. Mile Budaka 1, Slavonski Brod 35000, Croatia; 1 Mile Budaka, Slavonski Brod 35000, Croatia; Website http://www.csc-sb.hr; Registration ID 050038884 (Croatia); Tax ID No. 27694384517 (Croatia) [IRAN]. EXECUTION OF IMAM KHOMEINI’S ORDER (a.k.a. EIKO; a.k.a. SETAD; a.k.a. SETAD EJRAEI EMAM; a.k.a. SETAD-E EJRAEI-E FARMAN-E HAZRAT-E EMAM; a.k.a. SETAD-E FARMAN-EJRAEI-YE EMAM), Khaled Stamboli St., Tehran, Iran [IRAN]. GHADIR INVESTMENT COMPANY, 341 West Mirdamad Boulevard, Tehran, Iran; P.O. Box 19696, Tehran, Iran; Website http://www.ghadir-invest.com [IRAN]. GHAED BASSIR PETROCHEMICAL PRODUCTS COMPANY (a.k.a. GHAED BASSIR), No. 15, Palizvani (7th) Street, Gandhi (South) Avenue, Tehran 1517655711, Iran; Km 10 of Khomayen Road, Golpayegan, Iran; Website http://www.gbpc.net [IRAN]. GOLDEN RESOURCES TRADING COMPANY L.L.C. (a.k.a. “GRTC”), 9th Floor, Office No. 905, Khalid Al Attar Tower 1, Sheikh Zayed Road, After Crown Plaza Hotel, Al Wasl Area, Dubai, United Arab Emirates; Postal Box 34489, Dubai, United Arab Emirates; Postal Box 14358, Dubai, United Arab Emirates [IRAN]. HORMOZ OIL REFINING COMPANY, Next to the Current Bandar Abbas Refinery, Bandar Abbas City, Iran [IRAN]. IRAN & SHARGH COMPANY (a.k.a. IRAN AND EAST COMPANY; a.k.a. IRAN AND SHARGH COMPANY; a.k.a. IRANOSHARGH COMPANY; a.k.a. SHERKAT-E IRAN VA SHARGH), 827, North of Seyedkhandan Bridge, Shariati Street, P.O. Box 13185-1445, Tehran 16616, Iran; No. 41, Next to 23rd Alley, South Gandi St., Vanak Square, Tehran 15179, Iran; Website http://www.iranoshargh.com [IRAN]. IRAN & SHARGH LEASING COMPANY (a.k.a. IRAN AND EAST LEASING COMPANY; a.k.a. IRAN AND SHARGH LEASING COMPANY; a.k.a. SHERKAT-E LIZING-E IRAN VA SHARGH), 1st Floor, No. 33, Shahid Atefi Alley, Opposite Mellat Park, Vali-e-Asr Street, Tehran 1967933759, Iran; Website http://www.isleasingco.com [IRAN]. MARJAN PETROCHEMICAL COMPANY (a.k.a. MARJAN METHANOL COMPANY), Ground Floor, No. 39, Meftah/Garmsar West Alley, Shiraz (South) Street, Molla Sadra Avenue, Tehran, Iran; Post Office Box 19935-561, Tehran, Iran [IRAN]. MCS ENGINEERING (a.k.a. EFFICIENT PROVIDER SERVICES GMBH), Karlstrasse 21, Dinslaken, Nordrhein-Westfalen 46535, Germany [IRAN]. MCS INTERNATIONAL GMBH (a.k.a. MANNESMAN CYLINDER SYSTEMS; a.k.a. MCS TECHNOLOGIES GMBH), Karlstrasse 23-25, Dinslaken, Nordrhein-Westfalen 46535, Germany; Website http://www.mcs-tch.com [IRAN]. MELLAT INSURANCE COMPANY, No. 48, Haghani Street, Vanak Square, Before Jahan-Kodak Cross, Tehran 1517973913, Iran; No. 40, Shahid Haghani Express Way, Vanak Square, Tehran, Iran; No. 9, Niloofar Street, Sharabyani Avenue, Taavon Boulevard, Shahr-e-Ziba, Tehran, Iran; 72 Hillview Court, Woking, Surrey GU22 7QW, United Kingdom; No. 697 Saeeidi Alley, Crossroads College, Enghelab St., Tehran, Iran; Website http://www.mellatinsurance.com [IRAN]. MODABER (a.k.a. MODABER INVESTMENT COMPANY; a.k.a. TADBIR INDUSTRIAL HOLDING COMPANY) [IRAN]. OIL INDUSTRY INVESTMENT COMPANY (a.k.a. “O.I.I.C.”), No. 83, Sepahbod Gharani Street, Tehran, Iran; Website http://www.oiic-ir.com [IRAN]. OMID REY CIVIL & CONSTRUCTION COMPANY (a.k.a. OMID DEVELOPMENT AND CONSTRUCTION; a.k.a. OMID REY CIVIL AND CONSTRUCTION COMPANY; a.k.a. OMID REY RENOVATION AND DEVELOPMENT CO.); Website http://www.omidrey.com [IRAN]. ONE CLASS PROPERTIES (PTY) LTD. (a.k.a. ONE CLASS INCORPORATED), Cape Town, South Africa [IRAN]. ONE VISION INVESTMENTS 5 (PTY) LTD. (a.k.a. ONE VISION 5), 3rd Floor, Tygervalley Chambers, Bellville, Cape Town 7530, South Africa; Canal Walk, P.O. Box 17, Century City, Milnerton 7446, South Africa; Registration ID 2002/022757/07 (South Africa) [IRAN]. PARDIS INVESTMENT COMPANY (a.k.a. SHERKAT-E SARMAYEGOZARI-E PARDIS), Iran; Unit D4 and C4, 4th Floor, Building 29 Africa, Corner of 25th Street, Africa Boulevard, Tehran, Iran [IRAN]. PARS MCS (a.k.a. PARS MCS CO.; a.k.a. PARS MCS COMPANY), 2nd Floor, No. 4, Sasan Dead End, Afriqa Avenue, After Esfandiar, Crossroads, Tehran, Iran; No. 5 Sasan Alley, Atefi Sharghi St., Afrigha Boulevard, Tehran, Iran; Oshtorjan Industrial Zone, Zob-e Ahan Highway, Isafahan, Iran; Website http://www.parsmcs.com [IRAN]. PARS OIL CO. (a.k.a. PARS OIL; a.k.a. SHERKAT NAFT PARS SAHAMI AAM), Iran; No. 346, Pars Oil Company Building, Modarres Highway, East Mirdamad Boulevard, Tehran 1549944511, Iran; Postal Box 14155-1473, Tehran 159944511, Iran; Website http://www.parsoilco.com [IRAN]. PERSIA OIL & GAS INDUSTRY DEVELOPMENT CO. (a.k.a. PERSIA OIL AND GAS INDUSTRY DEVELOPMENT CO.; a.k.a. TOSE SANAT-E NAFT VA GAS PERSIA), 7th Floor, No. 346, Mirdamad Avenue, Tehran, Iran; Ground Floor, No. 14, Saba Street, Africa Boulevard, Tehran, Iran; Website http://www.pogidc.com [IRAN]. POLYNAR COMPANY, No. 58, St. 14, Qanbarzadeh Avenue, Resalat Highway, Tehran, Iran; Website http://www.polynar.com [IRAN]. REY INVESTMENT COMPANY, 2nd and 3rd Floors, No. 14, Saba Boulevard, After Esfandiar Crossroad, Africa Boulevard, Tehran 1918973657, Iran; Website http://www.rey-co.com [IRAN]. REY NIRU ENGINEERING COMPANY (a.k.a. REY NIROO ENGINEERING COMPANY); Website http://www.reyniroo.com [IRAN]. REYCO GMBH. (a.k.a. REYCO GMBH GERMANY), Karlstrasse 19, Dinslaken, Nordrhein-Westfalen 46535, Germany [IRAN]. RISHMAK PRODUCTIVE & EXPORTS COMPANY (a.k.a. RISHMAK COMPANY; a.k.a. RISHMAK EXPORT AND MANUFACTURING P.J.S.; a.k.a. RISHMAK PRODUCTION AND EXPORT COMPANY; a.k.a. RISHMAK PRODUCTIVE AND EXPORTS COMPANY; a.k.a. SHERKAT-E TOLID VA SADERAT-E RISHMAK), Rishmak Cross Rd., 3rd Km. of Amir Kabir Road, Shiraz 71365, Iran [IRAN]. ROYAL ARYA CO. (a.k.a. ARIA ROYAL CONSTRUCTION COMPANY), Iran [IRAN]. SADAF PETROCHEMICAL ASSALUYEH COMPANY (a.k.a. SADAF ASALUYEH CO.; a.k.a. SADAF CHEMICAL ASALUYEH COMPANY; a.k.a. SADAF PETROCHEMICAL ASSALUYEH INVESTMENT SERVICE), Assaluyeh, Iran; South Pars Special Economy/Energy Zone, Iran [IRAN]. TADBIR BROKERAGE COMPANY (a.k.a. SHERKAT-E KARGOZARI-E TADBIRGARAN-E FARDA; a.k.a. TADBIRGARAN FARDA BROKERAGE COMPANY; a.k.a. TADBIRGARAN-E FARDA BROKERAGE COMPANY; a.k.a. TADBIRGARANE FARDA MERCANTILE EXCHANGE CO.), Unit C2, 2nd Floor, Building No. 29, Corner of 25th Street, After Jahan Koudak, Cross Road Africa Street, Tehran 15179, Iran; Website http://www.tadbirbroker.com [IRAN]. TADBIR CONSTRUCTION DEVELOPMENT COMPANY (a.k.a. GORUH-E TOSE-E SAKHTEMAN-E TADBIR; a.k.a. TADBIR BUILDING EXPANSION GROUP; a.k.a. TADBIR HOUSING DEVELOPMENT GROUP), Block 1, Mehr Passage, 4th Street, Iran Zamin Boulevard, Shahrak Qods, Tehran, Iran [IRAN]. TADBIR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT GROUP (a.k.a. TADBIR GROUP), 16 Avenue Bucharest, Tehran, Iran [IRAN]. TADBIR ENERGY DEVELOPMENT GROUP CO., 6th Floor, Mirdamad Avenue, No. 346, Tehran, Iran; Website http://www.tadbirenergy.com [IRAN]. TADBIR INVESTMENT COMPANY, Tehran, Iran [IRAN]. TOSEE EQTESAD AYANDEHSAZAN COMPANY (a.k.a. TEACO; a.k.a. TOSEE EGHTESAD AYANDEHSAZAN COMPANY), 39 Gandhi Avenue, Tehran 1517883115, Iran [IRAN]. ZARIN RAFSANJAN CEMENT COMPANY (a.k.a. RAFSANJAN CEMENT COMPANY; a.k.a. ZARRIN RAFSANJAN CEMENT COMPANY), 2nd Floor, No. 67, North Sindokht Street, West Dr. Fatemi Avenue, Tehran 1411953943, Iran; Website http://www.zarrincement.com [IRAN]. </sort> OFAC Recent Actions

June 03, 2013 – Executive Order Authorizing the Implementation of Certain Sanctions Set Forth in the Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act of 2012 (IFCA) and Additional Sanctions With Respect to Iran and Guidance Related to IFCA and the Executive Order

Today the President has signed an Executive Order entitled “Authorizing the Implementation of Certain Sanctions Set Forth in the Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act of 2012 and Additional Sanctions With Respect to Iran (IFCA)”. Concurrently with the issuance of the Executive Order, the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) is posting these frequently asked questions relating to the implementation of IFCA and the Executive Order.

OFAC Recent Actions

May 31, 2013 – Foreign Sanctions Evaders Designations; Executive Order 13622 Designations; Iran Sanctions Designations; Non-proliferation Designations; Counter Terrorism Designations

The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List: <sort> ARABNEJAD, Hamid; DOB 16 Apr 1961; alt. DOB 03 May 1956; nationality Iran; Passport E1929795 (Iran) expires 25 May 2010; alt. Passport V08716254 (Iran) expires 15 Jul 2011; alt. Passport V11630399 (Iran) expires 20 Jun 2012; alt. Passport U8356901 (Iran) expires 09 May 2011; alt. Passport H10395121 (Iran) expires 18 Jan 2012; alt. Passport K11946257 (Iran) expires 27 Oct 2012; alt. Passport X13567677 (Iran) expires 02 Jul 2013; alt. Passport D14818825 (Iran) expires 16 Mar 2014; alt. Passport F16438158 (Iran) expires 18 Nov 2014; alt. Passport R19234531 (Iran) expires 02 Nov 2015; alt. Passport L95280222 (Iran) expires 23 Jul 2016; alt. Passport L95273714 (Iran) expires 22 Aug 2016; alt. Passport P95418009 (Iran) expires 27 Apr 2017 (individual) [SDGT] [IFSR]. KIM, Lidia (a.k.a. KIM, Lidia Egorovna; a.k.a. KIM, Lidiia; a.k.a. KIM, Lidiya); DOB 23 Mar 1955; citizen Kyrgyzstan; Passport 02NO133036 (Russia); alt. Passport AN1912357 (individual) [SDGT] [IFSR]. MERHEJ, Rodrigue Elias (a.k.a. MERKHEZH, Rodrig); DOB 1970; alt. DOB 1969; alt. DOB 1971; POB Lebanon (individual) [SDGT] [IFSR]. </sort> The following entities have been added to OFAC’s SDN List: <sort> BANDAR IMAM PETROCHEMICAL COMPANY, North Kargar Street, Tehran, Iran; Mahshahr, Bandar Imam, Khuzestan Province, Iran [IRAN]. BOU ALI SINA PETROCHEMICAL COMPANY (a.k.a. BUALI SINA PETROCHEMICAL COMPANY), No. 17, 1st Floor, Daman Afshar St., Vanak Sq., Vali-e-Asr Ave, Tehran 19697, Iran; Petrochemical Special Economic Zone (PETZONE), Iran [IRAN]. FERLAND COMPANY LIMITED (a.k.a. FERLAND CO. LTD), 29 A Anna Komnini St., PO Box 2303, Nicosia, Cyprus; 5/7 Sabaneyev Most., Odessa, Ukraine [ISA] [FSE-IR]. JAM PETROCHEMICAL COMPANY, Pars Special Economic Zone, Assaluyeh, Boushehr Province, Iran [EO13622]. KYRGYZ TRANS AVIA (a.k.a. KYRGYZTRANSAVIA AIRLINES), Bulvar Erkindik 35, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan; 32 Razzakova Street, Bishkek 720040, Kyrgyzstan [SDGT] [IFSR]. MOBIN PETROCHEMICAL COMPANY, South Pars Special Economic Energy Zone, Postal Box: 75391-418, Assaluyeh, Bushehr, Iran; PO Box, Mashhad, Iran [IRAN]. NIKSIMA FOOD AND BEVERAGE JLT, Dubai, United Arab Emirates [EO13622]. NOURI PETROCHEMICAL COMPANY (a.k.a. BORZUYEH PETROCHEMICAL COMPANY; a.k.a. NOURI PETROCHEMICAL COMPLEX), Pars Special Economic Energy Zone, Assaluyeh Port, Bushehr, Iran [IRAN]. PARS PETROCHEMICAL COMPANY, Pars Special Economic Energy Zone, PO Box 163-75391, Assaluyeh, Bushehr, Iran [IRAN]. PRYVATNE AKTSIONERNE TOVARYSTVO AVIAKOMPANIYA BUKOVYNA (a.k.a. AVIAKOMPANIYA BUKOVYNA; a.k.a. AVIAKOMPANIYA BUKOVYNA, PRYVATNE AT; a.k.a. BUKOVYNA AE; a.k.a. BUKOVYNA AIRLINES; a.k.a. BUKOVYNA AVIATION ENTERPRISE), Bud.30 vul.Chkalova Pershotravnevy R-N, Chernivtsi 58009, Ukraine [NPWMD] [IFSR]. SHAHID TONDGOOYAN PETROCHEMICAL COMPANY (a.k.a. SHAHID TONDGUYAN PETROCHEMICAL COMPANY), Petrochemical Special Economic Zone (PETZONE), Iran [IRAN]. SHAZAND PETROCHEMICAL COMPANY (a.k.a. AR.P.C.; a.k.a. ARAK PETROCHEMICAL COMPANY; a.k.a. SHAZAND PETROCHEMICAL CORPORATION), No. 68, Taban St., Vali Asr Ave., Tehran, Iran [IRAN]. SIRJANCO TRADING L.L.C., 17th Floor, Office 1701, Al Moosa Tower 1, Sheikh Zayed Road, Dubai, United Arab Emirates [SDGT] [IFSR]. TABRIZ PETROCHEMICAL COMPANY, Off Km 8, Azarshahr Road, Kojuvar Road, Tabriz, Iran [IRAN]. UKRAINIAN-MEDITERRANEAN AIRLINES (a.k.a. UKRAINSKE-TSCHERMOMORSKIE AVIALINII; a.k.a. UM AIR), 7 Shulyavska Street, Kiev 03055, Ukraine; Building Negin Sai Apartment 105, Valiasr Street, Tehran, Iran; 29 Ayar Street, Julia Dumna Building, Damascus, Syria; 38 Chkalova Street, building 1, office 10, Minsk, Belarus [SDGT] [IFSR]. </sort> The following aircraft have been added to OFAC’s SDN List: <sort> UR-BHJ; Aircraft Construction Number (also called L/N or S/N or F/N) 2088; Aircraft Manufacture Date Jul 1994; Aircraft Model MD-83; Aircraft Operator Bukovyna AE; Aircraft Manufacturer’s Serial Number (MSN) 53184 (aircraft) [NPWMD] [IFSR] (Linked To: PRYVATNE AKTSIONERNE TOVARYSTVO AVIAKOMPANIYA BUKOVYNA). UR-BXN; Aircraft Construction Number (also called L/N or S/N or F/N) 1405; Aircraft Manufacture Date 08 Apr 1987; Aircraft Model MD-83; Aircraft Operator Bukovyna AE; Aircraft Manufacturer’s Serial Number (MSN) 49569 (aircraft) [NPWMD] [IFSR] (Linked To: PRYVATNE AKTSIONERNE TOVARYSTVO AVIAKOMPANIYA BUKOVYNA). UR-CIX; Aircraft Construction Number (also called L/N or S/N or F/N) 2167; Aircraft Manufacture Date Nov 1996; Aircraft Model MD-88; Aircraft Operator Bukovyna AE; Aircraft Manufacturer’s Serial Number (MSN) 53546 (aircraft) [NPWMD] [IFSR] (Linked To: PRYVATNE AKTSIONERNE TOVARYSTVO AVIAKOMPANIYA BUKOVYNA). UR-CIY; Aircraft Construction Number (also called L/N or S/N or F/N) 2176; Aircraft Manufacture Date Mar 1997; Aircraft Model MD-88; Aircraft Operator Bukovyna AE; Aircraft Manufacturer’s Serial Number (MSN) 53547 (aircraft) [NPWMD] [IFSR] (Linked To: PRYVATNE AKTSIONERNE TOVARYSTVO AVIAKOMPANIYA BUKOVYNA). UR-CJA; Aircraft Construction Number (also called L/N or S/N or F/N) 1181; Aircraft Manufacture Date 04 Jan 1985; Aircraft Model MD-82; Aircraft Operator Bukovyna AE; Aircraft Manufacturer’s Serial Number (MSN) 49277 (aircraft) [NPWMD] [IFSR] (Linked To: PRYVATNE AKTSIONERNE TOVARYSTVO AVIAKOMPANIYA BUKOVYNA). UR-CJK; Aircraft Construction Number (also called L/N or S/N or F/N) 2180; Aircraft Manufacture Date Apr 1997; Aircraft Model MD-88; Aircraft Manufacturer’s Serial Number (MSN) 53548 (aircraft) [NPWMD] [IFSR] (Linked To: PRYVATNE AKTSIONERNE TOVARYSTVO AVIAKOMPANIYA BUKOVYNA). UR-CJW; Aircraft Construction Number (also called L/N or S/N or F/N) 358; Aircraft Manufacture Date 12 Sep 1999; Aircraft Model BAe-146 Avro RJ100; Aircraft Manufacturer’s Serial Number (MSN) 3358 (aircraft) [SDGT] [IFSR]. UR-CKF; Aircraft Construction Number (also called L/N or S/N or F/N) 341; Aircraft Manufacture Date 20 Dec 1998; Aircraft Model BAe-146 Avro RJ100; Aircraft Operator Mahan Air; Aircraft Manufacturer’s Serial Number (MSN) 3341 (aircraft) [SDGT] [IFSR]. UR-CKG; Aircraft Construction Number (also called L/N or S/N or F/N) 362; Aircraft Manufacture Date 16 Nov 1999; Aircraft Model BAe-146 Avro RJ100; Aircraft Operator Mahan Air; Aircraft Manufacturer’s Serial Number (MSN) 3362 (aircraft) [SDGT] [IFSR]. UR-CKJ; Aircraft Construction Number (also called L/N or S/N or F/N) 343; Aircraft Manufacture Date 04 Sep 1999; Aircraft Model BAe-146 Avro RJ100; Aircraft Operator Mahan Air; Aircraft Manufacturer’s Serial Number (MSN) 3343 (aircraft) [SDGT] [IFSR]. UR-CKX; Aircraft Construction Number (also called L/N or S/N or F/N) 131; Aircraft Manufacture Date 25 May 1989; Aircraft Model BAe-146 Avro RJ300; Aircraft Operator Ukrainian-Mediterranean Airlines; alt. Aircraft Operator Ukrainian-Mediterranean Airlines; Aircraft Manufacturer’s Serial Number (MSN) 3131 (aircraft) [SDGT] [IFSR]. UR-CKY; Aircraft Construction Number (also called L/N or S/N or F/N) 146; Aircraft Manufacture Date 08 Jan 1990; Aircraft Model BAe-146 Avro RJ100; Aircraft Operator Mahan Air; Aircraft Manufacturer’s Serial Number (MSN) 3146 (aircraft) [SDGT] [IFSR]. UR-CKZ; Aircraft Construction Number (also called L/N or S/N or F/N) 159; Aircraft Manufacture Date 01 Jan 1990; Aircraft Model BAe-146 Avro RJ300; Aircraft Operator Ukrainian-Mediterranean Airlines; Aircraft Manufacturer’s Serial Number (MSN) 3159 (aircraft) [SDGT] [IFSR]. </sort> OFAC Recent Actions

May 30, 2013 – OFAC issues Iranian General License D – United States Takes Action to Facilitate Communications by the Iranian People and Targets Iranian Government Censorship

​Today, the Office of Foreign Assets Control issued Iranian General License D authorizing the exportation or reexportation, directly or indirectly, from the United States or by U.S. persons, wherever located, to persons in Iran of certain services, software, and hardware incident to personal communications.

OFAC Recent actions

The United States is taking a number of coordinated actions today that target persons contributing to human rights abuses in Iran and enhance the ability of the Iranian people to access communication technology. As the Iranian government attempts to silence its people by cutting off their communication with each other and the rest of the world, the United States will continue to take action to help the Iranian people exercise their universal human rights, including the right to freedom of expression.

The people of Iran should be able to communicate and access information without being subject to reprisals by their government. To help facilitate the free flow of information in Iran and with Iranians, the Department of the Treasury, in consultation with the Department of State, is issuing a General License today authorizing the exportation to Iran of certain services, software, and hardware incident to personal communications. This license allows U.S. persons to provide the Iranian people with safer, more sophisticated personal communications equipment to communicate with each other and with the outside world. This General License aims to empower the Iranian people as their government intensifies its efforts to stifle their access to information. The General License would not authorize the export of any equipment to the Iranian government or to any individual or entity on the Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) list. The license can be found on OFAC’s Web site here.

The U.S. Department of the Treasury today also designated an individual and entities in Iran for contributing to serious human rights abuses committed by the Iranian regime, including through the use of communications technology to silence and intimidate the Iranian people. Those designated include the Committee to Determine Instances of Criminal Content, the government entity charged with filtering the flow of information to the Iranian people as well Asghar Mir-Hejazi, the Deputy Chief of Staff to the Supreme Leader, who has used his influence behind the scenes to empower elements from Iran’s intelligence services in carrying out violent crackdowns against the Iranian people. U.S. persons are generally prohibited from engaging in any transactions with those designated today, and any assets of those persons subject to U.S. jurisdiction are frozen.

Also today, the State Department imposed visa restrictions on nearly 60 other officials of the Government of Iran and other individuals who participated in the commission of human rights abuses related to political repression in Iran. The individuals subject to these new U.S. visa restrictions include government ministers; military, intelligence, and law enforcement officers; judiciary and prison officials; and authorities from Iran’s information technology sector. These restrictions cover those who have played a role in the ongoing repression of students, human rights defenders, lawyers, artists, journalists, religious and ethnic minorities, and other members of Iranian civil society. The State Department previously imposed the same restrictions on more than 50 Iranian officials and other individuals involved in similar activities.

The Committee to Determine Instances of Criminal Content

The Department of the Treasury designated the Committee to Determine Instances of Criminal Content (CDICC) pursuant to E.O. 13628 because it has engaged in censorship or other activities with respect to Iran on or after June 12, 2009, that prohibit, limit, or penalize the exercise of freedom of expression or assembly by citizens of Iran or that limit access to print or broadcast media.

The CDICC, which falls under the Ministry of Justice of Iran, replaced a previous oversight committee after the adoption of the Cyber Crimes Law of 2009. With the creation of the CDICC, the filtering process in Iran has become more systematic and uniform. The Iranian authorities apply filtering on information they deem against the regime’s national beliefs and safety, and the filtering usually occurs without warning.

Abdolsamad Khorramabadi, the head of the CDICC, said in May 2012 that the only legal authority in the country with decision-making powers on the matter of filtering was the CDICC, even though he had denied the very existence of the CDICC a month earlier.

In a February 2013 meeting, the CDICC has assembled a list of “examples of cyber crimes” related to the upcoming presidential election. Some of the crimes listed include vague notions such as:

• Disturbing the public and creating conflict in society;
• Promotion of boycotting the election;
• Publishing insulting content about the election and candidates;
• Publishing any contents against the regime, government, judicial, legislature, and governmental organizations; and
• Publishing untrue information regarding election results.

The CDICC is empowered to identify sites that carry forbidden content and report the information to the Telecommunication Company of Iran and other major Internet service providers (ISP) for blocking. The CDICC is headed by the prosecutor general and other members are representatives from 12 government bodies. Laws identifying violations that might result in a website being marked for filtering are very broadly defined and range from insulting religious figures and government officials to distributing pornographic content and illegal circumvention tools.

The CDICC’s expert council ordered the filtering of content surrounding the Majlis elections and Valentine’s Day in early February 2012. The CDICC’s council approved the proposal to filter content and ISPs and website administrators were warned via e-mail about their obligation to block this illegal content on their networks.

Also, the CDICC’s expert council ordered the filtering of a popular Persian-language financial website, meshgal.org, in January 2012.

This action was taken pursuant to E.O. 13628, which implements the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010, as amended by the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (TRA), by giving Treasury the authority to designate those who engage in censorship or other activities that limit the freedom of expression of the Iranian people.

Ofogh Saberin Engineering Development Company

Ofogh Saberin was designated pursuant to E.O. 13628 because it has provided material support to censorship or other activities with respect to Iran on or after June 12, 2009, that prohibit, limit, or penalize the exercise of freedom of expression or assembly by citizens of Iran or that limit access to print or broadcast media, including the facilitation or support of international frequency manipulation by the Government of Iran or an entity owned or controlled by the Government of Iran that would jam or restrict an international signal.

The Iranian Ministry of Communications and Information Technology and the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) placed the electronic warfare entity Ofogh Saberin in charge of a project to override and spoof commercial satellite communication frequencies emanating from what the Iranian government deemed were subversive Western media sources.

Asghar Mir-Hejazi

Asghar Mir-Hejazi is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13553 for supporting the commission of serious human rights abuses in Iran on or after June 12, 2009, as well as providing material support to the IRGC and the Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS). Mir-Hejazi is the Deputy Chief of Staff to the Supreme Leader, and is closely involved in all discussions and deliberations related to military and foreign affairs. After the disputed 2009 election, Mir-Hejazi played a leading role in suppressing the unrest in Iran.

Following the disputed June 12, 2009 presidential election and the massive protests it provoked, the government unleashed the most widespread crackdown in a decade. Both ordinary protestors and prominent opposition figures faced detention without trial, harsh treatment including sexual violence and denial of due process. Security forces were responsible for at least 30 deaths, according to official sources. Security forces also arrested dozens of leading government critics, including human rights lawyers, whom the government held without charge, many of them in solitary confinement. Security forces used beatings, threats against family members, sleep deprivation, and fake executions to intimidate detainees and to force them to confess that they instigated post-election riots and were plotting a coup. The IRGC, Basij, and the MOIS were responsible for many serious human rights violations.

Mir-Hejazi, since the beginning of Khamenei’s leadership, has been chief of the Supreme Leader’s Office’s Intelligence and Security Division, and is considered the working brain behind the scenes of important events. He is considered one of the primary officials in the oppression following the June 2009 post-election unrest. On March 23, 2012, the European Union added Mir-Hejazi to its restrictive measures (sanctions) list directed against certain persons and entities in view of the situation following the June 2009 elections in Iran. .

Identifying Information

• Entity: OFOGH SABERIN ENGINEERING DEVELOPMENT COMPANY – AKA: OFOGH TOSE-EH SABERIN ENGINEERING) – ADDRESS: Shahid Malek Lu Street, No. 86, Tehran, Iran [IRAN-TRA]
• Entity: COMMITTEE TO DETERMINE INSTANCES OF CRIMINAL CONTENT
• Individual: Asghar Mir-Hejazi

US Department of State Press Release

May 23, 2013 – Government of Iran Listings; Non-proliferation Designations; Iranian Financial Sanctions Regulations Identifications​

Actions Target Iran’s Nuclear and Missile Proliferation Activities – The U.S. Department of the Treasury is taking action today against 20 individuals and entities for their involvement in Iran’s nuclear and missile proliferation networks and Iran’s continued attempts to circumvent sanctions. These networks are responsible for moving supplies and providing essential services to Iran’s clandestine nuclear and weapons programs. These actions are designed to increase pressure on the Iranian regime by tightening sanctions against Iran’s energy sector and exposing key proliferation related networks that span the globe from Europe to Asia.

“As long as Iran continues to pursue a nuclear and ballistic missile program in defiance of multiple UN Security Council Resolutions, the U.S. will target and disrupt those involved in Iran’s illicit activities,” said Treasury Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence David S. Cohen. “We will continue to work with our international partners to intensify this pressure and tighten sanctions on Iran’s energy sector as it provides much needed financial support for the Iranian regime’s proliferation activity.”

Fourteen of the entities and individuals being designated today are part of Iran’s international procurement and proliferation operations. These designations are being made pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13382, which targets weapons of mass destruction proliferators and their supporters. The designations focus on entities and individuals supporting previously designated entities within Iran’s proliferation network as well as Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), Naftiran Intertrade Company (NICO), and Iran’s Ministry of Defense for Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL). These organizations are at the center of Iran’s continued proliferation activities. Today’s designations include companies supporting IRGC attempts to clandestinely ship illicit cargo around the world, including to Syria. They also target the Deputy Defense Minister and Dean of Malek Ashtar University, who is responsible for significant contributions to Iran’s missile program, as well as companies and individuals supporting Iran’s nuclear program.

Today Treasury is identifying Seifollah Jashnsaz, Chairman of NICO and director of Hong Kong Intertrade Company and Petro Suisse Intertrade Company SA as well as five individuals holding other leadership positions in Iran’s energy sector who have been involved in Iranian attempts to evade international sanctions. These individuals work for the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC), NICO, and previously-identified Iranian front companies. Specifically, they are being identified today as subject to sanctions under E.O. 13599, which, among other things, targets the Government of Iran (GOI) and persons acting for or on behalf of the GOI. In addition to Seifollah Jashnsaz, the following individuals are being identified today: Ahmad Ghalebani, managing director of NIOC and a director of both Petro Suisse Intertrade Company SA and Hong Kong Intertrade Company; Farzad Bazargan, managing director of Hong Kong Intertrade Company; Hashem Pouransari, NICO official and managing director of Asia Energy General Trading LLC; and Mahmoud Nikousokhan, NIOC finance director and a director of Petro Suisse Intertrade Company SA.

In 2008, the Treasury Department identified NIOC and NICO, both centrally involved in the sale of Iranian oil, as entities that are owned or controlled by the GOI. Additionally, NIOC was determined to be an agent or affiliate of the IRGC in November 2012 and NICO was designated under E.O. 13382 in April 2013 for being owned or controlled by NIOC. In order to prevent the circumvention of the international community’s sanctions on oil trade with Iran, the Department of the Treasury later identified, among others, Switzerland-based Petro Suisse Intertrade Company SA, United Arab Emirates (U.A.E.)-based Asia Energy General Trading LLC, and Hong Kong-based Hong Kong Intertrade Company as front companies for NIOC or NICO.

U.S. persons are generally prohibited from engaging in any transactions with the entities and individuals listed today, and any assets of those persons subject to U.S. jurisdiction are frozen. Additionally, today’s designations under E.O. 13382 carry consequences under the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (CISADA). Foreign financial institutions that knowingly facilitate significant transactions or provide significant financial services for these sanctioned entities or individuals are exposed to potential loss of access to the U.S. financial system.

Proliferation Designations Related to the IRGC

• The IRGC continues to be a primary focus of U.S. and international sanctions against Iran because of the central role it plays in Iran’s ballistic missile and nuclear programs and its involvement in serious human rights abuses. The IRGC was designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 in October 2007 for having engaged in proliferation-related activities.
• Iran Air was designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 in June 2011 for providing support and services to Iran’s, IRGC, MODAFL, and Iran’s Air Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO). Today, the U.S. Department of the Treasury is designating several individuals and entities that have provided support to Iran Air and are part of an Iran Air aircraft procurement and support network. This network is also related to Mahan Air and the IRGC-Qods Force (IRGC-QF) and has provided the support needed by these airlines to continue their operations. These activities have included ferrying military and crowd control equipment to the Assad regime as it carries out its campaign of violence against the people of Syria. Mahan Air was designated pursuant to E.O. 13224 for providing financial, material and technological support to the IRGC-QF.

Three Iran based companies being designated today have an international footprint – Aban Air, DFS Worldwide and Everex – and are actively assisting Iran Air by providing it with financial services, aviation related procurement and freight forwarding.

Also being designated today are senior officials of the companies – Ali Mahdavi of Aban Air, DFS Worldwide and Everex, Bahareh Mirza Hossein Yazdi of DFS Worldwide and Everex. <sort> Aban Air has offices in Iran, the United Kingdom (U.K.), and the U.A.E. It is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 for providing financial, material, and technological support to Iran Air. Aban Air pays the salaries of Iran Air employees and provides them with training. Aban Air has also attempted to acquire aircraft and aircraft parts for Iran Air, carried international freight and cargo for Iran Air, provided Iran Air pilots with non-Iranian pilot licenses and attempted to help Iran Air register its planes outside of Iran. Additionally, the IRGC used Aban Air to clandestinely ship cargo to and from Iran and Aban Air has held a contract with Mahan Air to carry international freight and cargo for Mahan Air. Ali Mahdavi is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 for acting for or on behalf of Aban Air. Mahdavi is the chairman and 50% owner of Aban Air and also leads DFS Worldwide and Everex, which were also designated today for their links to Aban Air. Everex has offices in Iran, the U.K., and the U.A.E. It is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 because it acts or purports to act for or on behalf of Aban Air. Everex conspired with Iran Air to import aviation parts into Iran in contravention of sanctions by falsifying end-user certificates and airway bills. Everex also worked with Aban Air to ship cargo on Iran Air from Iran to Sudan. DFS Worldwide has offices in Iran, South Africa, the U.A.E., the U.K., and Germany. It is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 for acting for or on behalf of Everex and providing services and support to Iran Air and the IRGC. It was founded as a result of the renaming of Everex with no changes concerning addresses, clients, or personnel. DFS Worldwide is a front company for the shipment of equipment from the U.A.E. to Iran. DFS Worldwide carried international freight for Iran Air and regularly booked cargoes for Iran Air. In addition, DFS Worldwide also served as an expeditor of air cargo for the IRGC and the IRGC used DFS Worldwide to covertly ship cargo to and from Iran. The IRGC-QF repeatedly used DFS Worldwide to ship goods from Dubai to Tehran. DFS Worldwide carried international freight for Mahan Air. DFS Worldwide served as a general cargo and sales agent for Mahan Air, booking and issuing airway bills for Mahan Air. Bahareh Mirza Hossein Yazdi is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 for acting or purporting to act for or on behalf of DFS Worldwide and Everex through her position as a director for DFS Worldwide and Everex. Farhad Parvaresh is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 for acting for or on behalf of Iran Air by serving as the chairman and managing director of Iran Air. </sort> Designations Related to the IRGC and NIOC <sort> Petro Green, located in Malaysia, is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 for providing or attempting to provide goods and services to Khatam Ol-Anbiya (KOA), a construction and engineering firm connected to the IRGC. Since at least 2009, Petro Green has been a primary procurement agent for KOA in its attempt to circumvent U.S. sanctions. KOA was designated by Treasury pursuant to E.O. 13382 on October 25, 2007 for being owned or controlled by the IRGC. Hossein Vaziri is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 for acting or purporting to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, the IRGC. Vaziri was the Managing Director of Petro Green, Energy Global International Fze, located in the U.A.E. and Global Sea Line Company Ltd. which located in Singapore. These two companies were also designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 today for being owned or controlled by, or acting for or on behalf of Vaziri, or providing services and support to KOA. Vaziri utilizes Energy Global International and Global Sea Line to facilitate the movement of hundreds of millions of dollars on behalf of NICO. </sort> Designation related to Iran’s Nuclear Program <sort> Farhad Bujar is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 for acting for or on behalf of the Iranian Centrifuge Technology Company (TESA). TESA was designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 on November 21, 2011 and plays a crucial role in Iran’s uranium enrichment nuclear program. TESA is in charge of the production of the IR-1centrifuge, the type of centrifuge Iran has used to enrich uranium. Farhad Bujar is the Managing Director of TESA. Through his role as Managing Director of TESA, Bujar is in charge of reviewing TESA’s budget figures, including TESA’s goals for optimizing first- and second generation centrifuge production lines and production of 3,000 advanced IR-2M centrifuges. Zolal Iran Company is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 for providing services or support to Iran’s Modern Industries Technique Company (MITEC). MITEC was designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 on November 21, 2011 by Treasury for being owned or controlled by and providing services to the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI). Zolal Iran Company specializes on a project at Iran’s IR-40 heavy water research reactor. Zolal Iran Company is compensated by MITEC for its work on the purification packages for Iran’s IR-40 heavy water research reactor. Andisheh Zolal is beingdesignated pursuant to E.O. 13382 because it is owned or controlled by Zolal Iran Company. Andishel Zolal is a sister company of Zolal Iran Company and is co-located with Zolal Iran Company. </sort> Designation related to Iran’s Ministry of Defense for Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL)

• Reza Mozaffarinia is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 for acting for or on behalf of MODAFL. Mozaffarinia is MODAFL’s Deputy Defense Minister and Dean of Malek Ashtar University (MUT). He is responsible for significant contributions to Iran’s missile program. Mozaffarinia has been the head of MUT since at least 2009. MUT was designated on July 12, 2012 pursuant to E.O. 13382 for being owned or controlled by MODAFL. MUT was identified in the Annex to UNSCR 1929 because it is a subordinate of the Defense Technology and Science Research Center within MODAFL. During an interview by a network correspondent regarding the first satellite Iran successfully launched into space, the Omid satellite, Mozaffarinia stated that during the next ten years, a number of other satellites would be launched as a result of the National Aerospace Organization’s research and development efforts. In addition, Mozaffarinia claims MUT has introduced some special graduate courses which focus on research in order to train students to develop special technology targets.

US Department of the Treasury Press Release

The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List: <sort> BAHADORI, Masoud; nationality Iran; Passport T12828814 (Iran); Managing Director, Petro Suisse Intertrade Company (individual) [IRAN]. BAZARGAN, Farzad; DOB 03 Jun 1956; Passport D14855558 (Iran); alt. Passport Y21130717 (Iran); Managing Director, Hong Kong Intertrade Company (individual) [IRAN]. BUJAR, Farhad (a.k.a. BOUJAR, Farhad); nationality Iran; Passport R10789966; Managing Director, TESA (individual) [NPWMD] [IFSR]. GHALEBANI, Ahmad (a.k.a. GHALEHBANI, Ahmad; a.k.a. QALEHBANI, Ahmad); DOB 01 Jan 1953 to 31 Dec 1954; Passport H20676140 (Iran); Managing Director, National Iranian Oil Company; Director, Hong Kong Intertrade Company; Director, Petro Suisse Intertrade Company (individual) [IRAN]. JASHNSAZ, Seifollah (a.k.a. JASHN SAZ, Seifollah; a.k.a. JASHNSAZ, Seyfollah); DOB 01 Mar 1958 to 31 Mar 1958; nationality Iran; Passport R17589399 (Iran); Chairman & Director, Naftiran Intertade Co. (NICO) Sarl; Chairman & Director, Naft Iran Intertade Company Ltd.; Director, Hong Kong Intertrade Company; Chairman & Director, Petro Suisse Intertrade Compay (individual) [IRAN]. MAHDAVI, Ali; DOB 21 Apr 1967; citizen Iran (individual) [NPWMD] [IFSR]. MOZAFFARINIA, Reza (a.k.a. MOZAFARI-NIYA, Reza; a.k.a. MOZAFARNIA, Reza; a.k.a. MOZAFFARI NIA, Reza; a.k.a. MOZAFFARINIA HOSEIN, Reza; a.k.a. MOZAFFARI-NIA, Reza; a.k.a. MOZAFFARI-NIYA, Reza; a.k.a. MOZZAFARNIA, Dr. Reza); DOB 1959; POB Isfahan, Iran; Deputy Defense Minister and Dean of Malek Ashtar University (individual) [NPWMD] [IFSR]. NIKOUSOKHAN, Mahmoud; DOB 01 Jan 1961 to 31 Dec 1962; nationality Iran; Passport U14624657 (Iran); Finance Director, National Iranian Oil Company; Director, Hong Kong Intertrade Company; Director, Petro Suisse Intertrade Company (individual) [IRAN]. PARVARESH, Farhad Ali; DOB Dec 1957; nationality Iran (individual) [NPWMD] [IFSR]. POURANSARI, Hashem; nationality Iran; Passport B19488852 (Iran); Managing Director, Asia Energy General Trading (individual) [IRAN]. VAZIRI, Hossein Nosratollah (a.k.a. VAZIRI, Ahmad; a.k.a. VAZIRI, Ahmed), 3-C-C Impiana Condo Jalan, Ulu Klang, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia; DOB 21 Mar 1961; POB Damghan, Iran; nationality Iran; Passport R19246338 (Iran) (individual) [NPWMD] [IFSR]. YAZDI, Bahareh Mirza Hossein (a.k.a. YAZDI, Betty); DOB 26 Jun 1978; citizen United Kingdom (individual) [NPWMD] [IFSR]. </sort> The following entities have been added to OFAC’s SDN List: <sort> ABAN AIR (a.k.a. ABAN AIR CO JPS), No.14, Imam Khomeini Airport, Airport Cargo Terminal, Tehran, Iran; No.1267, Vali Asr Avenue, Tehran 1517736511, Iran; Unit 7, Marlin Park, Central Way, Feltham TW14 OXD, United Kingdom; No.53 Molla Sadra St. Vanak Square, Tehran 19916 14661, Iran; No 7 & 8, Main Dnata Building, Dubai Airport Free Zone, Dubai, United Arab Emirates; Website www.abanair.com; Email Address info@abanair.com [NPWMD] [IFSR]. ANDISHEH ZOLAL, 42 Niam Street, Shariati Avenue, P.O. Box 15875-4159, Tehran 19481, Iran [NPWMD] [IFSR]. DFS WORLWIDE (a.k.a. DFS WORLDWIDE FZCO), No.53 Mollasadra Avenue, P.O. Box 1991614661, Tehran, Iran; Unit 7, Marlin Park, Central Way, Feltham, Middlesex TW14 0XD, United Kingdom; Warehouse No.J-01, Dubai Airport Free Zone, Dubai, United Arab Emirates; P.O. Box 293020 Dubai Airport Free Zone, Dubai, United Arab Emirates; Cargo City South, Building 543, Frankfurt 60549, Germany; S.A. Pty Ltd Unit 8, the Meezricht Business Park, 33 Kelly Road, Jet Park, Boksburg North 1460, South Africa; Website www.dfsworldwide.com; Email Address irsales@dfsworldwide.com; DFS WORLWIDE, (a.k.a. DFS WORLDWIDE FZCO) is a separate and distinct entity from DFS Worldwide of Houston, Texas, USA and from Deutsche Financial Services, of Germany. [NPWMD] [IFSR]. ENERGY GLOBAL INTERNATIONAL FZE, P.O. Box 1245, Dubai, United Arab Emirates; Email Address MD@energyglobal.info [NPWMD] [IFSR]. EVEREX (a.k.a. EVEREX GLOBAL CARRIER AND CARGO; a.k.a. EVEREX LIMITED; a.k.a. SUN GROUP; a.k.a. SUN GROUP AIR TRAVEL AND AIR CARGO AND AIRPORT SERVICES LTD), Office 14, Cargo Terminal, Imam Khomeini International Airport, Tehran, Iran; 1267 Vali-E-Asr Avenue, Tehran, Iran; No.53 Mollasadra St, Vanak Square, Tehran, Iran; Office# J01, Dubai Airport Free Zone, Dubai, United Arab Emirates; P.O. Box 293020, Dubai, United Arab Emirates; Unit 7, Marlin Park, Central Way, Feltham TW14 OXD, United Kingdom; Website www.everexglobal.com; Email Address irsales@everexglobal.com; alt. Email Address uksales@everexglobal.com [NPWMD] [IFSR]. GLOBAL SEA LINE CO LTD, 10 Anson Road #31-10 International Plaza, Singapore; Email Address globalsealine@gmail.com [NPWMD] [IFSR]. PETRO GREEN (a.k.a. PETRO DIAMOND; a.k.a. PETROGREEN), B-8-1 Block B Megan Ave. II, 12 Jalan Yap Kwan Seng, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia [NPWMD] [IFSR]. ZOLAL IRAN COMPANY, No. 2 Shariati Avenue, Niyam Street, Tehran, Iran [NPWMD] [IFSR]. </sort> OFAC Recent Actions

May 17, 2013 – The List of Foreign Financial Institutions Subject to Part 561 (the “Part 561 List”) Name Removal – Treasury Removes Sanctions on Iraqi Bank

Action Follows a Verified Change of Behavior from the Elaf Islamic Bank

The Department of the Treasury today lifted sanctions against the Elaf Islamic Bank in Iraq following the bank’s significant and demonstrated change in behavior.

On July 31, 2012 the Treasury Department imposed sanctions under the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (CISADA), against Elaf Islamic Bank, a privately-owned Iraqi financial institution, for knowingly facilitating significant transactions and providing significant financial services for the U.S. and EU-designated Export Development Bank of Iran (EDBI). Following the CISADA finding, Elaf immediately engaged the Treasury Department and began an intensive course of action to stop the conduct that led to the CISADA sanction, including freezing EDBI accounts at Elaf and reducing its overall exposure to the Iranian financial sector. Following today’s action U.S. financial institutions are once again permitted to open or maintain correspondent accounts or payable-through accounts in the United States for Elaf Islamic Bank.

“Today we welcome Elaf Islamic Bank back into the U.S. financial system, and we urge other designated individuals and entities around the world to follow its positive example. As today’s delisting demonstrates, our sanctions are flexible and can be lifted if the conduct that led to the sanction terminates,” said Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence David S. Cohen. “As we increase our sanctions against Iran, we will continue to target any financial institution that works with designated Iranian banks or attempts to assist Iran in evading sanctions.”

Sanctions may be, and regularly are, lifted when circumstances warrant, which includes ceasing the sanctionable activity. Any sanctioned party may petition OFAC for sanctions to be lifted. In general, demonstrating changes in circumstances or behavior are essential to the lifting of sanctions.

Treasury will continue to use all tools at its disposal to target entities or individuals engaging in sanctionable activity related to Iran. CISADA was signed into law by President Obama in July 2010. Among other things, CISADA provides the Secretary of the Treasury with the authority to impose strict conditions on, or prohibit the opening or maintaining of, correspondent accounts or payable-through accounts in the United States for foreign financial institutions that knowingly facilitate a significant transaction or provide significant financial services for a person whose property and interests in property are blocked under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act in connection with Iran’s proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or delivery systems for WMD, or for Iran’s support for international terrorism.

US Department of the Treasury Press Release

The following deletions have been made to OFAC’s Part 561 List:

• ELAF ISLAMIC BANK, PO Box 3440, Building No. 14, Street 99, Hai Al Wehda-Mahala 902, Alweih, Baghdad, Iraq; SWIFT/BIC ELAF IQ BA; Note: The entity being designated, “Elaf Islamic Bank, Iraq” is separate and distinct from the similarly named entity, “Elaf Bank, Bahrain” [561LIST].

OFAC Recent Actions

May 15, 2013 – OFAC Designation of Dubai entities

The following entities have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

• AL FIDA INTERNATIONAL GENERAL TRADING, Emirates Concord Hotel, Office Tower 16th Floor Flat 1065, P.O. Box: 28774, Dubai, United Arab Emirates [NPWMD] [IFSR].
• AL HILAL EXCHANGE, P.O. Box 28774, Shop # 9 & 10 Ground Floor, Emirates Concorde Hotel, Al Maktoum Road, Deira Dubai, United Arab Emirates; Emirates Concorde Hotel & Residence, Almaktoum Street, P.O. Box 28774, Dubai, United Arab Emirates [NPWMD] [IFSR].

OFAC Recent Actions

May 09, 2013 – Iran Sanctions Designations; Non-Proliferation Sanctions Designations; Iran Sanctions Designations Updates

Today the Secretary of State imposed sanctions on four Iranian nuclear support companies and one individual as Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferators and their Supporters pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13382. These entities and individual were designated because they provide the Iranian government goods, technology, and services that increase Iran’s ability to enrich uranium and/or construct a heavy water moderated research reactor, both of which are activities prohibited by UN Security Council Resolutions. These designations generally prohibit transactions between the named entities and any U.S. person, and freeze any assets the designees may have under U.S. jurisdiction. This action was taken in light of the ongoing concerns that the international community has with respect to Iran’s nuclear program, which Iran continues to refuse to address .

The designations of these entities and individual pursuant to E.O. 13382, an executive authority that targets entities in connection with Iran’s support for proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their supporters, carry consequences under the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (CISADA). Foreign financial institutions that facilitate significant transactions to or from the sanctioned entities and individual are exposed to potential loss of access to the U.S. financial sector. We urge financial institutions to act in a manner that preserves their access to the U.S. financial system by cutting financial ties to these companies and individual.

Iranian private sector firms should heed the risks incurred by conducting business with those who support Iran’s proscribed nuclear activities and should choose to focus their activities on legitimate international commerce. The United States will continue to investigate and research similar activities, and additional companies making material contributions to the Iranian government’s proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or their means of delivery will likely be designated.

The Individuals and Entities Designated Today by the Department of State Pursuant to E.O. 13382 include:

Aluminat

• AKA: Aluminat Production and Industrial Company
• Address: Unit 38, 5th Floor, No. 9, Golfam Avenue, Africa Avenue, Tehran, Iran
• Address: Factory – Kilometer 13, Arak Road, Parcham Street, Arak, Iran
• Aluminat is an Iranian entity involved in the procurement of aluminum products for Iran’s nuclear program. For several years Aluminat has provided centrifuge components to sanctioned Iranian entities Kalaye Electric Company and Iran Centrifuge Technology Company (TESA). In mid-June 2012, Aluminat attempted to procure a tube-rolling machine with direct applications for Iran’s proscribed heavy water-related activities.

Pars Amayesh Sanaat Kish

• AKA: PASK
• AKA: Vacuumkaran
• AKA: Vacuum Karan
• AKA: Vacuum Karan Co.
• Address: 3rd Floor, No. 6, East 2nd, North Kheradmand, Karimkhan Street, Tehran, Iran
• In late 2012, Pars Amayesh Sanaat Kish (PASK) worked with the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) to procure vacuum equipment, which is an essential component for the Iranian nuclear program. PASK is known to supply sanctioned items to Iranian industries. From late 2012 through early 2013, PASK has sought Western-origin vacuum pumps and accessories through Asia-based intermediaries.

Parviz Khaki

• AKA: Martin
• DOB: 26 August 1968
• POB: Tehran, Iran
• Parviz Khaki is an Iranian citizen who has procured and attempted to procure goods for Iran’s nuclear program that can be used to construct, operate, and maintain gas centrifuges to enrich uranium. Since at least 2008, Khaki attempted to procure C-350 maraging steel, 7075-O aluminum alloy rods, Arnokrome III (magnetic tape), mass spectrometers, magnetic gauging and vacuum system equipment, including certain pumps, accessories, valves, and gauges. These items can be used to construct a device capable of producing or utilizing atomic energy materials, such as a gas centrifuge to enrich uranium.

Pishro Systems Research Company

• AKA: Pishro Company
• AKA: Advanced Systems Research Company
• AKA: ASRC
• AKA: Center for Advanced Systems Research
• AKA: CRAS
• Location: Tehran, Iran
• Pishro Systems Research Company (Pishro) is responsible for research and development efforts across the breadth of Iran’s nuclear program. The company is understood to be the replacement for the Kalaye Electric Company’s Research and Development Department, although it is not restricted to “enrichment research.” Pishro is a subsidiary of Novin Energy, which was designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 by the Department of the Treasury on January 4, 2006. Pishro likely has or will have a facility in the Pars District of Tehran.

Taghtiran Kashan Company

• AKA: Taghtiran Kashan Company
• AKA: Taghtiran P.J.S.
• Address: Flat 2, No. 3, 2nd Street, Azad-Abadi Avenue, Tehran, Iran 14316
• Address: KM 44 Kashan-Delijan Road, P.O. Box Kashan 87135/1987, Iran
• Taghtiran Kashan Company (Taghtiran) is an Iranian entity involved in the procurement of sensitive material for Iran’s proscribed nuclear activities. Taghtiran was involved in the procurement of uranium hexafluoride (UF6) containers on behalf of UN- and U.S.-designated Kalaye Electric Company. Taghtiran also has worked on behalf of U.S.-designated Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group (SHIG) and Iran Centrifuge Technology Company (TESA). In 2010, Taghtiran attempted to procure a flange heater for use at Iran’s Heavy Water Research Reactor, also known as the IR-40.

The Department of the Treasury is today also designating the Iranian Venezuelan Bi-National Bank (IVBB) pursuant to E.O. 13382 for WMD proliferation-related activity. More details are available here

The following individual has been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

• KHAKI, Parviz (a.k.a. “MARTIN”); DOB 26 Aug 1968; POB Tehran, Iran (individual) [NPWMD] [IFSR].

The following entities have been added to OFAC’s SDN List: <sort> ALUMINAT (a.k.a. ALUMINAT PRODUCTION AND INDUSTRIAL COMPANY), Unit 38, 5th Floor, No. 9, Golfam Avenue, Africa Avenue, Tehran, Iran; Factory-Kilometer 13, Arak Road, Parcham Street, Arak, Iran [NPWMD] [IFSR]. IRANIAN-VENEZUELAN BI-NATIONAL BANK (a.k.a. “IVBB”), Tosee Building Ground Floor, Bokharest Street 44-46, Tehran, Iran; SWIFT/BIC IVBBIRT1; all offices worldwide [NPWMD] [IFSR]. PARS AMAYESH SANAAT KISH (a.k.a. PASK; a.k.a. VACUUM KARAN; a.k.a. VACUUM KARAN CO.; a.k.a. VACUUMKARAN), 3rd Floor, No. 6, East 2nd, North Kheradmand, Karimkhan Street, Tehran, Iran [NPWMD] [IFSR]. PISHRO SYSTEMS RESEARCH COMPANY (a.k.a. ADVANCED SYSTEMS RESEARCH COMPANY; a.k.a. ASRC; a.k.a. CENTER FOR ADVANCED SYSTEMS RESEARCH; a.k.a. CRAS; a.k.a. PISHRO COMPANY), Tehran, Iran [NPWMD] [IFSR]. SAMBOUK SHIPPING FZC, FITCO Building No. 3, Office 101, 1st Floor, P.O. Box 50044, Fujairah, United Arab Emirates; Office 1202, Crystal Plaza, PO Box 50044, Buhaira Corniche, Sharjah, United Arab Emirates [IRAN] (Linked To: CAMBIS, Dimitris). TAGHTIRAN KASHAN COMPANY (a.k.a. TAGHTIRAN P.J.S.), Flat 2, No. 3, 2nd Street, Azad-Abadi Avenue, Tehran 14316, Iran; KM 44 Kashan-Delijan Road, P.O. Box Kashan 87135/1987, Kashan, Iran [NPWMD] [IFSR]. </sort> Treasury Targets Iranian Attempts to Evade Sanctions – Action Identifies Front Company and Vessels Attempting to Obscure Iranian Oil Deals Using Ship-to-Ship Transfers and Designates Iranian Bank

WASHINGTON – The U.S. Department of the Treasury is taking a number of actions today against Iranian attempts to circumvent international financial sanctions. As part of the Treasury Department’s continuing vigilance against Iran’s efforts to use front companies and deceptive business practices to sell their oil on the international market, today Treasury identified Sambouk Shipping FZC as subject to sanctions under Executive Order (E.O.) 13599, which, among other things, targets the Government of Iran (GOI) and persons acting for or on behalf of the GOI. Sambouk Shipping is tied to Dr. Dimitris Cambis who, along with a network of front companies, were sanctioned in March 2013 under E.O. 13599 and the Iran Threat Reduction Act and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (TRA) after the U.S. government uncovered Dr. Cambis’s scheme to evade international oil sanctions against Iran. In an attempt to continue his scheme, Dr. Cambis is using the recently formed Sambouk Shipping to manage eight of the vessels that he operates on behalf of the National Iranian Tanker Company (NITC). These vessels have been used to execute ship-to-ship transfers of Iranian oil in the Persian Gulf. These transfers are intended to facilitate deceptive sales of Iranian oil by obscuring the origin of that oil.

Today, the Treasury Department also imposed sanctions against Iranian Venezuelan Bi-National Bank (IVBB). IVBB was designated pursuant to E.O. 13382, which targets proliferators of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their supporters, for engaging in financial transactions on behalf of the previously sanctioned Export Development Bank of Iran (EDBI).

“As Iran becomes increasingly isolated from the international financial system and energy markets, it is turning increasingly to convoluted schemes and shady actors to maintain its access to the global financial system,” said Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence David S. Cohen. “As long as Iran tries to evade our sanctions, we will continue to expose their deceptive maneuvers.”

Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control is also updating its list of Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons (SDN List) entries today for eight vessels blocked due to the interest of National Iranian Tanker Company in the vessels. Since their original identification these vessels have been renamed and/or reflagged. Treasury is also identifying eight previously unidentified vessels as blocked property in which NITC has an interest. Including today’s additions, Treasury has identified 64 vessels as blocked property in which NITC has an interest.

U.S. persons are generally prohibited from engaging in any transactions with the entities listed today, and any assets those entities may have subject to U.S. jurisdiction are frozen.

The Iranian Venezuelan Bi-National Bank

• The Iranian Venezuelan Bi-National Bank (IVBB) is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 for its activities on behalf of EDBI. EDBI was designated under E.O. 13382 on October 22, 2008, for providing financial services to Iran’s Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL).
• IVBB has been processing funds transfers on behalf of EDBI since at least January 2012. EDBI has used IVBB to act as a proxy to fund export activities and to transfer millions of dollars worth of funds from China’s Bank of Kunlun to EDBI. Additionally, senior EDBI staff is entitled to authorize transaction instructions to Bank of Kunlun on behalf of IVBB.
• Bank of Kunlun was sanctioned by the U.S. Treasury Department under Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (CISADA) on July 31, 2012, for providing financial services to more than six Iranian banks that were designated by the U.S. in connection with Iran’s WMD programs or its support for international terrorism. Prior to the sanctions imposed against it under the CISADA, Bank of Kunlun was engaged in a significant amount of direct of business with EDBI, handling the equivalent of tens of millions of dollars worth of funds for EDBI.
• IVBB was originally established as a joint venture between Iran and Venezuela, and EDBI was the Iranian party tasked with creating the joint venture with Venezuela. However, there is no evidence Venezuela retains any ties to this bank.

The following vessels have been added to OFAC’s SDN List: <sort> ATLANTIS (5IM316) Crude Oil Tanker Tanzania flag (NITC); Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9569621 (vessel) [IRAN]. BADR (EQJU) Iran flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 8407345 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY). DEMOS (5IM656) Crude Oil Tanker Tanzania flag (NITC); Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9569683 (vessel) [IRAN]. INFINITY (5IM411) Crude Oil Tanker Tanzania flag (NITC); Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9569671 (vessel) [IRAN]. JUSTICE Crude Oil Tanker None Identified flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9357729 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY). SKYLINE (5IM632) Crude Oil Tanker Tanzania flag (NITC); Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9569669 (vessel) [IRAN]. SUNRISE LPG Tanker None Identified flag (NITC); Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9615092 (vessel) [IRAN]. YOUNES (EQYY) Platform Supply Ship Iran flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 8212465 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY). </sort> The following changes have been made to OFAC’s SDN List: <sort> ALPHA (f.k.a. ABADAN) (T2EU4) Crude/Oil Products Tanker None Identified flag; Former Vessel Flag Malta; alt. Former Vessel Flag Tuvalu; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9187629; MMSI 572469210 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY). -to- SHONA (f.k.a. ABADAN; f.k.a. ALPHA) (T2EU4) Crude/Oil Products Tanker Tanzania flag; Former Vessel Flag Malta; alt. Former Vessel Flag Tuvalu; alt. Former Vessel Flag None Identified; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9187629; MMSI 572469210 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY). AZALEA (f.k.a. SINA) (9HNY9) Crude Oil Tanker None Identified flag; Former Vessel Flag Malta; alt. Former Vessel Flag Tuvalu; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9357365; MMSI 249256000 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY). -to- SUNEAST (f.k.a. AZALEA; f.k.a. SINA) (9HNY9) Crude Oil Tanker Seychelles flag; Former Vessel Flag Malta; alt. Former Vessel Flag Tuvalu; alt. Former Vessel Flag None Identified; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9357365; MMSI 249256000 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY). DAMAVAND (9HEG9) Crude Oil Tanker Malta flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9218478; MMSI 256865000 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY). -to- DAMAVAND (9HEG9) Crude Oil Tanker None Identified flag; Former Vessel Flag Malta; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9218478; MMSI 256865000 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY). DARAB (9HEE9) Crude Oil Tanker Malta flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9218492; MMSI 256862000 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY). -to- DARAB (9HEE9) Crude Oil Tanker None Identified flag; Former Vessel Flag Malta; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9218492; MMSI 256862000 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY). DAYLAM (9HEU9) Crude Oil Tanker Malta flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9218466; MMSI 256872000 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY). -to- DAYLAM (9HEU9) Crude Oil Tanker None Identified flag; Former Vessel Flag Malta; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9218466; MMSI 256872000 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY). DELVAR (9HEF9) Crude Oil Tanker Malta flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9218454; MMSI 256864000 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY). -to- DELVAR (9HEF9) Crude Oil Tanker None Identified flag; Former Vessel Flag Malta; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9218454; MMSI 256864000 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY). DENA (9HED9) Crude Oil Tanker Malta flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9218480; MMSI 256861000 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY). -to- DENA (9HED9) Crude Oil Tanker None Identified flag; Former Vessel Flag Malta; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9218480; MMSI 256861000 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY). HUWAYZEH (9HEJ9) Crude Oil Tanker Malta flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9212888; MMSI 256869000 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY). -to- HUWAYZEH (9HEJ9) Crude Oil Tanker None Identified flag; Former Vessel Flag Malta; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9212888; MMSI 256869000 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY). </sort> OFAC Sanctions

April 12, 2013 & April 15, 2013 – Delisting Companies Sanctioned under the Iran Sanctions Act

Today, the United States is lifting sanctions applied almost two years ago to Tanker Pacific Management (TPM), Société Anonyme Monégasque D’Administration Maritime Et Aérienne (SAMAMA), and Allvale Maritime Inc. (AMI), under the Iran Sanctions Act (ISA). All three companies have been engaged in extensive consultations with the State Department and have provided reliable assurances that they will not knowingly engage in such sanctionable activity in the future.

The three companies were sanctioned in May 2011 for their respective roles in a September 2010 transaction that provided a tanker valued at $8.65 million to the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL), an entity that has been designated by the United States and the European Union for its role in supporting Iran’s proliferation activities. Since sanctions were applied, these companies have taken significant steps to ensure that their operations are in compliance with U.S. sanctions law and policy, and have provided reliable assurances that they will not knowingly engage in such sanctionable activity in the future. As a result, the Secretary of State has decided to lift sanctions at this time.

Sanctions are essential to changing the Iranian regime’s calculus on its nuclear program and have had a powerful impact on Iran’s economy. By making significant changes to their operations and adjusting their behavior, TPM, SAMAMA, and AMI have demonstrated the success that sanctions can have at deterring irresponsible conduct.

The following ISA sanctioned names have been removed:

• Allvale Maritime Inc., 80 Broad Street, Monrovia, Liberia
• Société Anonyme Monégasque D’Administration Maritime Et Aérienne (a.k.a. S.A.M.A.M.A., a.k.a. SAMAMA), Villa Saint Jean, 3 Ruelle Saint Jean, MC 98000, Monaco
• Tanker Pacific Management (Singapore) Pte Ltd, 1 Temasek Avenue, #38-01,Millenia Tower, Singapore 039192

US Department of State Press Release & OFAC Recent Actions

April 11, 2013 – Treasury Targets Network Attempting to Evade Iran Sanctions

Designations include an Iranian Businessman as well as Affiliated Companies and Banks Around the World

WASHINGTON – The U.S. Department of the Treasury today designated Babak Zanjani, an Iranian businessman, along with a Malaysian bank and an international network of front companies for moving billions of dollars on behalf of the Iranian regime, including tens of millions of dollars to an Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) company. Today’s actions were taken pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13382, which targets proliferators of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their supporters.

“As international sanctions have become increasingly stifling, Iran has resorted to criminal money laundering techniques, moving its oil and money under false names and pretenses,” said Treasury Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence David S. Cohen. “Whether through Babak Zanjani, Dimitri Cambis, or tomorrow’s chosen accomplice, we will be relentless in exposing and thwarting Iran’s attempts to evade international sanctions and abuse the global financial system.”

Treasury today also designated the Swiss-based Iranian oil trading company, Naftiran Intertrade Company Ltd. (NICO), for being owned or controlled by the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC). NIOC has been designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 and identified as an agent or affiliate of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, which is itself designated under E.O. 13382.

The designation of NICO, as well as Babak Zanjani and his affiliated entities, under E.O. 13382 generally prohibits transactions between the designees and any U.S. person, and freezes any assets they may currently have or that come under U.S. jurisdiction. Additionally, today’s designations under E.O. 13382 carry consequences under the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (CISADA). Foreign financial institutions that knowingly facilitate significant transactions or provide significant financial services for these sanctioned entities or individual are exposed to potential loss of access to the U.S. financial system.

Babak Morteza Zanjani was designated for providing financial, material, technological or other support for NIOC and NICO. Zanjani is the chairman of Sorinet Group, a group of companies and financial institutions that have been used by the Iranian government to finance its sales of oil around the world.

International Safe Oil (ISO) was designated for providing financial, material, technological or other support for NIOC and NICO. ISO is a part of the Sorinet Group, and operates in Malaysia. ISO purchased over tens of millions barrels of Iranian crude oil from NICO in 2012 in a deal that was negotiated between Zanjani and the leadership of NICO.

Sorinet Commercial Trust Bankers (SCT Bankers) and First Islamic Investment Bank (FIIB) – Dubai-based Sorinet Commercial Trust Bankers (SCT Bankers) and Malaysia-based First Islamic Investment Bank (FIIB) were designated for providing financial, material, technological or other support for NIOC and NICO.

In August 2012, FIIB issued a letter of credit for Hong Kong Intertrade Company (HKICO) for almost $600 million in relation to an oil contract. HKICO was identified by Treasury as a NIOC front company in July 2012. A May 2012 oil contract negotiated by Zanjani on behalf of ISO worth over $200 million was financed by both FIIB and SCT Bankers.

NICO has used FIIB and SCT Bankers to facilitate transactions worth tens of millions of dollars between Pars Oil and Gas, a South Pars Gas field development contractor, and the US-designated Iranian Marine Industrial Company SADRA in 2012. SADRA was designated in March 2012 pursuant to E.O. 13382 for being owned or controlled by Khatam al-Anbiya, the engineering arm of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC). Khatam al-Anbiya was designated in October 2007 under E.O. 13382 as an engineering arm of the IRGC that it uses to generate income and fund its operations.

On December 21, 2012, the European Union imposed sanctions under its Iran-related authority against Zanjani, International Safe Oil, Sorinet Commercial Trust Bankers, and First Islamic Investment Bank.

Kont Kosmetik and Kont Investment Bank – Turkey-based Kont Kozmetik was designated for being owned or controlled by Babak Zanjani. Kont Kozmetik was founded in 2007 by Zanjani. In 2011 Kont Kozmetik bought Kont Investment Bank in Tajikistan. Treasury is designating Kont Investment Bank for being owned or controlled by Kont Kozmetik.

Naftiran Intertrade Company Ltd. – NICO was designated for being owned or controlled by the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC). NIOC has been identified as an agent or affiliate of Iran’s IRGC and was designated pursuant to E.O. 13882 in November 2012. NICO is one of NIOC’s subsidiaries and functions as its oil trading arm as well as its source of funds and foreign exchange for NIOC. In mid-2012, NICO directed the Central Bank of Iran (CBI) to transfer the equivalent of 300 million euros to an SCT Bankers. NICO’s involvement in the transaction was concealed.

The following individual has been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

• ZANJANI, Babak Morteza; DOB 12 Mar 1974; alt. DOB 12 Mar 1971; citizen Iran; Passport L18597666 (Iran); alt. Passport L95279398 (Iran) (individual) [NPWMD] [IFSR].

The following entities have been added to OFAC’s SDN List: <sort> FIRST ISLAMIC INVESTMENT BANK LTD. (a.k.a. FIIB), Unit 13(C) Main Office Tower, Financial Park Labuan Complex, Jalan Merdeka Federal Territory of Labuan, Labuan 87000, Malaysia; 19A-31-3A, Level 31, Business Suite, Wisma UOA, No. 19 Jalan Pinang, Kuala Lumpur, 50450, Malaysia; SWIFT/BIC FIIB MY KA; alt. SWIFT/BIC FIIB MY KA KUL [NPWMD] [IFSR]. INTERNATIONAL SAFE OIL (a.k.a. “ACCOUNT INTERNATIONAL SAFE OIL”), Tazunit Level 13, Main Office Tower Financial Park, Labuan, Jalan Merdeka Federal Territory of Labuan 87000, Malaysia [NPWMD] [IFSR]. KONT INVESTMENT BANK (a.k.a. KONT BANK), Kont Bank Head Office, No. 43, St Bukhara,, Dushanbe 734025, Tajikistan [NPWMD] [IFSR]. KONT KOSMETIK (a.k.a. KONT GROUP VE KOZMETIK SANAYI DIS TICARET LTD STI KONT KOSMETIK VE DIS TICARET LTD STI KONT COSMETIC), Istanbul World Trade Center (IDTM), Block: A2 Floor: 6 No:234 Postal Code: 34149, Yesilkoy, Istanbul, Turkey [NPWMD] [IFSR]. SORINET COMMERCIAL TRUST (SCT) BANKERS (a.k.a. SCT BANKERS), 1808, 18th Floor, Grosvenor House Commercial Tower, Sheik Zayed Road, Dubai, United Arab Emirates; Kish Island, Iran; SWIFT/BIC SCER AE A1; alt. SWIFT/BIC SCTS AE A1 [NPWMD] [IFSR]. </sort> More information on the Labuan / Sorinet – FIIB incident.

The following deletion has been made to OFAC’s SDN List:

• UMAR, Madhat Mursi Al-Sayyid; DOB 19 Oct 1953; POB Alexandria, Egypt; nationality Egypt (individual) [SDGT].

The following changes have been made to OFAC’s SDN List: <sort> AHMAD, Farhad Kanabi (a.k.a. HAMAWANDI, Kawa; a.k.a. OMAR ACHMED, Kaua), Lochhamer Str. 115, Munich 81477, Germany; Kempten Prison, Germany; DOB 01 Jul 1971; POB Arbil, Iraq; nationality Iraq; Travel Document Number A0139243 (Germany) (individual) [SDGT]. -to- AHMAD, Farhad Kanabi (a.k.a. HAMAWANDI, Kawa; a.k.a. OMAR ACHMED, Kaua), Lochhamer Str. 115, Munich 81477, Germany; Iraq; DOB 01 Jul 1971; POB Arbil, Iraq; nationality Iraq; Travel Document Number A0139243 (Germany) (individual) [SDGT]. HUSSEIN, Mazen Ali (a.k.a. SALAH MUHAMAD, Issa), Branderstrasse 28, Augsburg 86154, Germany; Schwabisch Hall Prison, Germany; DOB 01 Jan 1982; alt. DOB 01 Jan 1980; POB Baghdad, Iraq; nationality Iraq; Travel Document Number A0144378 (Germany) (individual) [SDGT]. -to- HUSSEIN, Mazen Ali (a.k.a. SALAH MUHAMAD, Issa), Branderstrasse 28, Augsburg 86154, Germany; Hauzenberg 94051, Germany; DOB 01 Jan 1982; alt. DOB 01 Jan 1980; POB Baghdad, Iraq; nationality Iraq; Travel Document Number A0144378 (Germany) (individual) [SDGT]. NAFTIRAN INTERTRADE CO. (NICO) LIMITED (a.k.a. NAFT IRAN INTERTRADE COMPANY LTD; a.k.a. NAFTIRAN INTERTRADE COMPANY (NICO); a.k.a. NAFTIRAN INTERTRADE COMPANY LTD; a.k.a. NICO), 41, 1st Floor, International House, The Parade, St Helier JE2 3QQ, Jersey; Petro Pars Building, Saadat Abad Ave, No 35, Farhang Blvd, Tehran, Iran; all offices worldwide [IRAN]. -to- NAFTIRAN INTERTRADE CO. (NICO) LIMITED (a.k.a. NAFT IRAN INTERTRADE COMPANY LTD; a.k.a. NAFTIRAN INTERTRADE COMPANY (NICO); a.k.a. NAFTIRAN INTERTRADE COMPANY LTD; a.k.a. NICO), 41, 1st Floor, International House, The Parade, St Helier JE2 3QQ, Jersey; Petro Pars Building, Saadat Abad Ave, No 35, Farhang Blvd, Tehran, Iran; all offices worldwide [IRAN] [NPWMD] [IFSR] (Linked To: NIOC INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS (LONDON) LIMITED). </sort> OFAC Recent Actions & Treasury Press Release

March 15, 2013 – Publication of Iranian Financial Sanctions Regulations Amendments

Today, the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control published a final rule in the Federal Register (78 FR 16403), amending the Iranian Financial Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. part 561 (the “IFSR”), to implement sections 503 and 504 of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (the “TRA”) and certain provisions of Executive Order 13622 of July 30, 2012. On February 6, 2013, OFAC published Frequently Asked Questions on the implementation of section 504 of the TRA, which explain some of the changes made by this final rule.

May 31, 2013 – Companies Sanctioned under Iran Sanctions Authorities

The Administration took action today under a variety of authorities against companies helping Iran to evade U.S. sanctions and doing illicit business with Iran.

Executive Orders 13622 and 13599:

The Administration imposed sanctions today under Executive Orders (E.O.) 13622 and 13599 on a series of companies related to Iran’s petrochemical industry. These actions underscore U.S. resolve to cut off funds from the Iranian petrochemical sector as the second largest revenue source for Iran’s illicit nuclear program.

The Department of State imposed sanctions on Jam Petrochemical Company and Niksima Food and Beverage JLT pursuant to E.O. 13622 for knowingly engaging in a significant transaction for the purchase or acquisition of petrochemical products from Iran. Jam Petrochemical Company is an Iranian manufacturer and seller of petrochemicals. Niksima Food and Beverage JLT received payments on behalf of Jam Petrochemical Company. The sanctions selected for both companies prohibit: financial transactions subject to U.S. jurisdiction, transactions with respect to property and interests in property under U.S. jurisdiction, and foreign exchange transactions subject to U.S. jurisdiction.

In addition to these entities, the Department of the Treasury also identified eight Iranian petrochemical companies as owned or controlled by the Government of Iran.

Iran Sanctions Act and Executive Order 13608:

Also today, the Department of State and the Department of the Treasury took actions to impose sanctions, including a visa ban on corporate officers, on Ferland Company Limited (Ferland) under both the Iran Sanctions Act, as amended by the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (TRA), and Executive Order 13608 for efforts to evade U.S. sanctions on Iran.

In March 2013, Ferland and the National Iranian Tanker Company (NITC) cooperated in a scheme to sell Iranian crude oil deceptively in order to help Iran evade international sanctions. This operation involved a vessel owned by Dimitris Cambis, a Greek national sanctioned by the Department of State and identified by the Department of the Treasury in March 2013 (for more details on that action click here). The details of the ship-to-ship operations were arranged by a NITC manager and a representative of Ferland. Ferland later furnished a falsified certificate of origin as part of its cargo documentation, claiming that the crude oil loaded onto the Aldawha was a “product of Iraq.”

The sanctions imposed by the Department of State against Ferland prohibit: U.S. visas for corporate officers, loans from U.S. financial institutions, financial transactions subject to U.S. jurisdiction, transactions with respect to property and interests in property under U.S. jurisdiction, and foreign exchange transactions subject to U.S. jurisdiction. Separately, the sanctions imposed by the Department of the Treasury on Ferland generally prohibit U.S. persons from engaging in any transactions with that entity.

Our decision makes clear the risks involved in helping Iran evade sanctions and reaffirms that the only relief Iran will get from sanctions must come through negotiations. Iran continues to ignore its international nuclear obligations, and the result of these actions has been an unprecedented international sanctions effort aimed at convincing Iran to change its behavior. The sanctions announced today represent an important step toward that goal, as they target the individual companies that help Iran evade these efforts.

These sanctions today send a stark message that the United States will act resolutely against attempts to circumvent U.S. sanctions. Any business that continues irresponsibly to support Iran’s energy sector or to help facilitate the nation’s efforts to evade U.S. sanctions will face serious consequences.

US Department of State Press Release

March 14, 2013 – Iran Designations; Iran Sanctions Act Action – Companies Sanctioned Under the Iran Sanctions Act and the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act

Today, the United States imposed sanctions on Greek national Dr. Dimitris Cambis and Impire Shipping for disguising the Iranian origin of crude oil by concealing the control of a vessel by the National Iranian Tanker Company (NITC). The United States also imposed sanctions on Kish Protection and Indemnity Club (Kish P&I), and Bimeh Markazi-Central Insurance of Iran (CII) for providing insurance or reinsurance to NITC. The Department of State is acting under the Iran Sanctions Act, as amended by the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (TRA), and the TRA. The United States imposed a visa ban on the corporate officers of Impire Shipping, Kish P&I, and CII identified as:

Impire Shipping:

• Dimitris Cambis -President

Kish P & I:

• Mohammad Reza Mohammadi Banaei – Managing Director

CII:

• Seyed Mohammad Karimi – President
• Rahim Mosaddegh – Vice President
• Mina Sadigh Noohi – Vice President
• Esmaeil Mahdavi Nia – Vice President
• Seyed Morteza Hasani Aghda – Superintendent

The Department of the Treasury has also imposed sanctions against Cambis and entities under his control pursuant to its own separate authorities.

According to information available to the U.S. Government, Dr. Cambis, president of Impire Shipping, helped the National Iranian Tanker Company (NITC) obtain eight tankers in late 2012. While these vessels were purchased and are controlled by Dr. Cambis and Impire Shipping, they are operated on behalf of NITC. U.S. law prohibits knowingly owning or controlling a vessel that operates in a manner that conceals the Iranian origin of crude oil by obscuring or concealing the ownership, operation, or control of the vessel by NITC.

Kish P&I provides insurance for NITC, the main carrier of Iranian petroleum. Kish P&I is reinsured by CII, thus CII is providing reinsurance services for NITC. U.S. law provides for sanctions on persons knowingly providing insurance or reinsurance for NITC.

These sanctions make clear the risks involved in working on behalf of certain Iranian entities, and will further hamper Iran’s ability to circumvent sanctions. Iran is failing to meet its international nuclear obligations, and as a result there has been an unprecedented international sanctions effort aimed at convincing Iran to change its behavior. The sanctions announced today represent an important step toward that goal.

Today’s sanctions action sends a clear message: the United States will act resolutely against attempts to circumvent U.S. sanctions. Moreover, any business that continues to support Iran’s energy sector, enable the movement of its oil tankers or facilitate Iran’s efforts to evade U.S. sanctions could face serious consequences.

US Department of State Press Release

The following individual has been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

• CAMBIS, Dimitris (a.k.a. KAMPIS, Dimitrios Alexandros; a.k.a. KLIMT, Gustav); DOB 14 Oct 1963 (individual) [IRAN] [ISA].

The following entities have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

• ASIA ENERGY GENERAL TRADING (LLC), Suite 703, Twin Tower, Baniyas Street, Deira, Dubai, United Arab Emirates [IRAN].
• BLUE TANKER SHIPPING SA, c/o Libra Shipping SA, 3, Xanthou Street, Glyfada, Athens 16674, Greece [IRAN].
• CENTRAL INSURANCE OF IRAN (a.k.a. BIMEH MARKAZI; a.k.a. BIMEH MARKAZI IRAN; a.k.a. CENTRAL INSURANCE OF IR IRAN; a.k.a. CENTRAL INSURANCE OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN), No. 223 N. East St., Africa Ave., Tehran, Iran [IRAN-TRA].
• GARBIN NAVIGATION LTD, c/o Libra Shipping SA, 3, Xanthou Street, Glyfada, Athens 16674, Greece [IRAN].
• GRACE BAY SHIPPING INC, c/o Libra Shipping SA, 3, Xanthou Street, Glyfada, Athens 16674, Greece [IRAN].
• HERCULES INTERNATIONAL SHIP, c/o Libra Shipping SA, 3, Xanthou Street, Glyfada, Athens 16674, Greece [IRAN].
• HERMIS SHIPPING SA, c/o Libra Shipping SA, 3, Xanthou Street, Glyfada, Athens 16674, Greece [IRAN].
• IMPIRE SHIPPING COMPANY (a.k.a. IMPIRE SHIPPING; a.k.a. IMPIRE SHIPPING LIMITED), Greece [IRAN] [ISA].
• JUPITER SEAWAYS SHIPPING, c/o Libra Shipping SA, 3, Xanthou Street, Glyfada, Athens 16674, Greece [IRAN].
• KISH PROTECTION & INDEMNITY (a.k.a. KISH MUTUAL PROTECTION & INDEMNITY; a.k.a. KISH P&I), Flt No. 9, No. 78, Vaali Nejad Alley, Africa Blvd, Tehran, Iran [IRAN-TRA].
• KONING MARINE CORP, c/o Libra Shipping SA, 3, Xanthou Street, Glyfada, Athens 16674, Greece [IRAN].
• LIBRA SHIPPING SA (a.k.a. LIBRA SHIPPING), 3, Xanthou Street, Glyfada 16674, Greece [IRAN].
• MONSOON SHIPPING LTD, c/o Libra Shipping SA, 3, Xanthou Street, Glyfada, Athens 16674, Greece [IRAN].
• POLINEX GENERAL TRADING LLC, Health Care City, Umm Hurair Rd., Oud Mehta Offices, Block A, 4th Floor 420, Dubai, United Arab Emirates [IRAN].
• SIMA GENERAL TRADING CO FZE (a.k.a. SIMA GENERAL TRADING & INDUSTRIALS FOR BUILDING MATERIAL CO FZE), Office No. 703 Office Tower, Twin Tower, Baniyas Rd., Deira, P.O. Box 49754, Dubai, United Arab Emirates [IRAN].
• SYNERGY GENERAL TRADING FZE, Sharjah – Saif Zone, Sharjah Airport International Free Zone, United Arab Emirates [IRAN].

The following vessels have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

• GLAROS Crude Oil Tanker Liberia flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9077850 (vessel) [IRAN].
• LEYCOTHEA Crude Oil Tanker Panama flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9183934 (vessel) [IRAN].
• NEREYDA Crude Oil Tanker Panama flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9011246 (vessel) [IRAN].
• OCEAN NYMPH Crude Oil Tanker Panama flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9180281 (vessel) [IRAN].
• OCEAN PERFORMER Crude Oil Tanker Liberia flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9013749 (vessel) [IRAN].
• SEAGULL Crude Oil Tanker Liberia flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9107655 (vessel) [IRAN].
• ULYSSES 1 Crude Oil Tanker Liberia flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9177155 (vessel) [IRAN].
• ZAP Crude Oil Tanker Liberia flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9005235 (vessel) [IRAN].

OFAC Recent Actions

February 20, 2013 – OFAC today published a notice adding 110 vessels , banks and entities to the SDN List prevoiusly announced in July

The listing for these entities (banks) is as follows: <sort> ANSAR BANK (a.k.a. ANSAR FINANCE AND CREDIT FUND; a.k.a. ANSAR FINANCIAL AND CREDIT INSTITUTE; a.k.a. BANK-E ANSAR; f.k.a. “ANSAR AL-MOJAHEDIN NO-INTEREST LOAN INSTITUTE; f.k.a. “ANSAR INSTITUTE; f.k.a. “ANSAR SAVING AND INTEREST FREE-LOANS FUND), Building No. 539, North Pasdaran Street, Tehran 19575-497, Iran; North Pasdaran St., No. 539, Before Sahebgharanieh, corner of Narenjestan dahom, Tehran, Iran [NPWMD] [IFSR] [IRAN] BANK-E SHAHR, Sepahod Gharani, Corner of Khosro St., No. 147, Tehran, Iran [IRAN] CREDIT INSTITUTION FOR DEVELOPMENT, 53 Saanee, Jahan-e Koodak, Crossroads Africa St., Tehran, Iran [IRAN] DEY BANK (a.k.a. BANK-E DEY), Bokharest St., 1st St., No. 13, Tehran, Iran [IRAN] EGHTESAD NOVIN BANK (a.k.a. BANK-E EGHTESAD NOVIN; a.k.a. EN BANK PJSC), Vali Asr Street, Above Vanak Circle, across Niayesh, Esfandiari Blvd., No. 24, Tehran, Iran; SWIFT/BIC BEGN IR TH [IRAN]. FUTURE BANK B.S.C. (a.k.a. BANK-E AL-MOSTAGHBAL; a.k.a. FUTURE BANK), P.O. Box 785, City Centre Building, Government Avenue, Manama, Bahrain; Block 304, City Centre Building, Building 199, Government Avenue, Road 383, Manama, Bahrain; Free Trade Zone, Sanaati-e Kish, Vilay-e Ferdos 2, Corner of Klinik-e Khanevadeh, No 1/5 and 3/5, Kish, Iran; Business Registration Document 54514-1 (Bahrain) expires 9 Jun 2009; Trade License No. 13388 (Bahrain); All branches worldwide [NPWMD] [IFSR] [IRAN] HEKMAT IRANIAN BANK (a.k.a. BANK-E HEKMAT IRANIAN), Argentine Circle, beginning of Africa St., Corner of 37th St., (Dara Cul-de-sac), No.26, Tehran, Iran [IRAN] IRAN ZAMIN BANK (a.k.a. BANK-E IRAN ZAMIN), Seyyed Jamal-oldin Asadabadi St., Corner of 68th St., No. 472, Tehran, Iran [IRAN] ISLAMIC REGIONAL COOPERATION BANK (a.k.a. BANK-E TAAWON MANTAGHEEY-E ESLAMI; a.k.a. REGIONAL COOPERATION OF THE ISLAMIC BANK FOR DEVELOPMENT & INVESTMENT), Tohid Street, Before Tohid Circle, No. 33, Upper Level of Eghtesad-e Novin Bank, Tehran 1419913464, Iran; Building No. 59, District 929, Street No. 17, Arsat Al-Hindia, Al Masbah, Baghdad, Iraq; SWIFT/BIC RCDF IQ BA [IRAN] JOINT IRAN-VENEZUELA BANK (a.k.a. BANK MOSHTAREK-E IRAN VENEZUELA), Ahmad Ghasir St. (Bokharest), Corner of 15th St., Tose Tower, No.44-46, Tehran 1013830711, Iran [IRAN] KARAFARIN BANK (a.k.a. BANK-E KARAFARIN), Zafar St. No. 315, Between Vali Asr and Jordan, Tehran, Iran; SWIFT/BIC KBID IR TH [IRAN] MEHR IRAN CREDIT UNION BANK (a.k.a. BANK-E GHARZOLHASANEH MEHR IRAN; a.k.a. GHARZOLHASANEH MEHR IRAN BANK), Taleghani St., No.204, Before the intersection of Mofateh, across from the former U.S. embassy, Tehran, Iran [IRAN] PARSIAN BANK (a.k.a. BANK-E PARSIAN), Keshavarz Blvd., No. 65, Corner of Shahid Daemi St., P.O. Box 141553163, Tehran 15983111, Iran; No. 4 Zarafshan St, Farahzadi Blvd., Shahrak-e Ghods, 1467793811, Tehran, Iran; SWIFT/ BIC BKPA IR TH [IRAN]. PASARGAD BANK (a.k.a. BANK-E PASARGAD), Valiasr St., Mirdamad St., No. 430, Tehran, Iran; SWIFT/BIC BKBP IR TH [IRAN] POST BANK OF IRAN (a.k.a. PBI; a.k.a. SHERKAT-E DOLATI-E POST BANK), 237 Motahari Avenue, Tehran 1587618118, Iran; Motahari Street, No. 237, Past Darya-e Noor, Tehran, Iran [NPWMD] [IFSR] [IRAN] SAMAN BANK (a.k.a. BANK-E SAMAN), Vali Asr. St. No. 3, Tehran, Iran, Before Vey Park intersection, corner of Tarakesh Dooz St; SWIFT/BIC SABC IR TH [IRAN] SARMAYEH BANK (a.k.a. BANK-E SARMAYEH), Sepahod Gharani No. 24, Corner of Arak St., Tehran, Iran [IRAN] TAT BANK, Shahid Ahmad Ghasir (Bocharest), Shahid Ahmadian (15th) St., No. 1, Tehran, Iran; No. 1 Ahmadian Street, Bokharest Avenue, Tehran, Iran; SWIFT/BIC TATB IR TH [IRAN] TOSEE TAAVON BANK (a.k.a. BANK-E TOSE’E TA’AVON; a.k.a. COOPERATIVE DEVELOPMENT BANK), Mirdamad Blvd., North East Corner of Mirdamad Bridge, No. 271, Tehran, Iran [IRAN] TOURISM BANK (a.k.a. BANK-E GARDESHGARI), Vali Asr St., above Vey Park, Shahid Fiazi St., No. 51, first floor, Tehran, Iran [IRAN] </sort> The listing for these vessels & shippers is as follows: <sort> NOOR ENERGY (MALAYSIA) LTD., Labuan, Malaysia; Company Number LL08318 [IRAN]. PETRO SUISSE INTERTRADE COMPANY SA, 6 Avenue de la Tour-Haldimand, Pully 1009, Switzerland [IRAN]. PETRO ENERGY INTERTRADE COMPANY, Dubai, United Arab Emirates [IRAN]. HONG KONG INTERTRADE COMPANY, Hong Kong [IRAN]. DANESH SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED, Diagoras House, 7th Floor, 16 Panteli Katelari Street, Nicosia 1097, Cyprus; Telephone (357)(22660766); Fax (357)(22668608) [IRAN] Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY. DAVAR SHIPPING CO LTD, Diagoras House, 7th Floor, 16 Panteli Katelari Street, Nicosia 1097, Cyprus; Telephone (357)(22660766); Fax (357)(22678777) [IRAN] Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY. HADI SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED, Diagoras House, 7th Floor, 16 Panteli Katelari Street, Nicosia 1097, Cyprus; Telephone (357)(22660766); Fax (357)(22668608) [IRAN] Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY. HARAZ SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED, Diagoras House, 7th Floor, 16 Panteli Katelari Street, Nicosia 1097, Cyprus; Telephone (357)(22660766); Fax (357)(22668608) [IRAN] Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY. HATEF SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED, Diagoras House, 7th Floor, 16 Panteli Katelari Street, Nicosia 1097, Cyprus; Telephone (357)(22660766); Fax (357)(22668608) [IRAN] Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY. HIRMAND SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED, Diagoras House, 7th Floor, 16 Panteli Katelari Street, Nicosia 1097, Cyprus; Telephone (357)(22660766); Fax (357)(22668608) [IRAN] Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY. HODA SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED, Diagoras House, 7th Floor, 16 Panteli Katelari Street, Nicosia 1097, Cyprus; Telephone (357)(22660766); Fax (357)(22668608) [IRAN] Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY. HOMA SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED, Diagoras House, 7th Floor, 16 Panteli Katelari Street, Nicosia 1097, Cyprus; Telephone (357)(22660766); Fax (357)(22668608) [IRAN] Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY. HONAR SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED, Diagoras House, 7th Floor, 16 Panteli Katelari Street, Nicosia 1097, Cyprus; Telephone (357)(22660766); Fax (357)(22668608) [IRAN] Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY. TC SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED, Diagoras House, 7th Floor, 16 Panteli Katelari Street, Nicosia 1097, Cyprus; Telephone (357)(22660766); Fax (357)(22668608) [IRAN] Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY. MEHRAN SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED, Diagoras House, 7th Floor, 16 Panteli Katelari Street, Nicosia 1097, Cyprus; Telephone (357)(22660766); Fax (357)(22668608) [IRAN] Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY. MERSAD SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED, Diagoras House, 7th Floor, 16 Panteli Katelari Street, Nicosia 1097, Cyprus; Telephone (357)(22660766); Fax (357)(22668608) [IRAN] Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY. SAMAN SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED, Diagoras House, 7th Floor, 16 Panteli Katelari Street, Nicosia 1097, Cyprus; Telephone (357)(22660766); Fax (357)(22668608) [IRAN] Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY. ASAN SHIPPING ENTERPRISE LIMITED, 85 St. John Street, Valletta VLT 1165, Malta; Telephone (356)(21241817); Fax (356)(25990640) [IRAN] Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY. SARV SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED, 198 Old Bakery Street, Valletta VLT 1455, Malta; Telephone (356)(21241232) [IRAN] Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY. SEPID SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED, 198 Old Bakery Street, Valletta VLT 1455, Malta; Telephone (356)(21241232) [IRAN] Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY. SIMA SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED, 198 Old Bakery Street, Valletta VLT 1455, Malta; Telephone (356)(21241232) [IRAN] Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY. SINA SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED, 198 Old Bakery Street, Valletta VLT 1455, Malta; Telephone (356)(21241232) [IRAN] Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY. CASPIAN MARITIME LIMITED, Fortuna Court, Block B, 284 Archbishop Makarios II Avenue, Limassol 3105, Cyprus; Telephone (357)(25800000); Fax (357)(25588055) [IRAN] Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY. MINAB SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED (f.k.a. MIGHAT SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED), Diagoras House, 7th Floor, 16 Panteli Katelari Street, Nicosia 1097, Cyprus; Telephone (357)(22660766); Fax (357)(22668608) [IRAN] Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY. NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY (a.k.a. NITC), NITC Building, 67-88, Shahid Atefi Street, Africa Avenue, Tehran, Iran; Web site www.nitc.co.ir; Email Address info@nitc.co.ir; alt. Email Address administrator@nitc.co.ir; Telephone (98)(21)(66153220); Telephone (98)(21)(23803202); Telephone (98)(21)(23803303); Telephone (98)(21)(66153224); Telephone (98)(21)(23802230); Telephone (98)(9121115315); Telephone (98)(9128091642); Telephone (98)(9127389031); Fax (98)(21)(22224537); Fax (98)(21)(23803318); Fax (98)(21)(22013392); Fax (98)(21)(22058763) [IRAN]. NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY LLC (a.k.a. NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY LLC SHARJAH BRANCH; a.k.a. NITC SHARJAH), Al Wahda Street, Street No. 4, Sharjah, United Arab Emirates; P.O. Box 3267, Sharjah, United Arab Emirates; Web site http://nitcsharjah.com/index.html; Telephone +97165030600; Telephone + 97165749996; Telephone +971506262258; Fax +97165394666; Fax +97165746661 [IRAN] Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY. N.I.T.C. REPRESENTATIVE OFFICE (a.k.a. NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY), Droogdokweg 71, Rotterdam 3089 JN, Netherlands; Email Address nitcrdam@tiscali.net; Telephone +31 010-4951863; Telephone +31 10-4360037; Fax +31 10-4364096 [IRAN] Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY. ARTA SHIPPING ENTERPRISES LIMITED, Diagoras House, 7th Floor, 16 Panteli Katelari Street, Nicosia 1097, Cyprus; Telephone (357)(22660766); Fax (357)(22678777) [IRAN] Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY. ARASH SHIPPING ENTERPRISES LIMITED, Diagoras House, 7th Floor, 16 Panteli Katelari Street, Nicosia 1097, Cyprus; Telephone (357)(22660766); Fax (357)(22678777) [IRAN] Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY. PROTON PETROCHEMICALS SHIPPING LIMITED (a.k.a. PROTON SHIPPING CO; a.k.a. “PSC), Diagoras House, 7th Floor, 16 Panteli Katelari Street, Nicosia 1097, Cyprus; Telephone (357)(22660766); Fax (357)(22668608) [IRAN] Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY. PARS PETROCHEMICAL SHIPPING COMPANY, 1st Floor, No. 19, Shenasa Street, Vali E Asr Avenue, Tehran, Iran; Web site www.parsshipping.com [IRAN] Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY. DENA TANKERS FZE, Free Zone, P.O. Box 5232, Fujairah, United Arab Emirates [IRAN] Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY. ABADEH (9HDQ9) Crude/Oil Products Tanker Malta flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9187655; MMSI 256842000 (vessel) [IRAN] Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY. CASTOR (f.k.a. AMOL) (T2EM4) Crude/Oil Products Tanker Tuvalu flag; Former Vessel Flag Malta; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9187667; MMSI 256843000 (vessel) [IRAN] Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY. NEPTUNE (f.k.a. ASTANEH) (T2ES4) Crude/Oil Products Tanker Tuvalu flag; Former Vessel Flag Malta; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9187643; MMSI 572467210 (vessel) [IRAN] Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY. DAMAVAND (9HEG9) Crude Oil Tanker Malta flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9218478; MMSI 256865000 (vessel) [IRAN] Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY. LEADERSHIP (f.k.a. DANESH) (5IM 592) Crude Oil Tanker Tanzania flag; Former Vessel Flag Cyprus; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9356593; MMSI 677049200 (vessel) IRAN] Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY. DARAB (9HEE9) Crude Oil Tanker Malta flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9218492; MMSI 256862000 (vessel) [IRAN] Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY. COMPANION (f.k.a. DAVAR) (5IM 593) Crude Oil Tanker Tanzania flag; Former Vessel Flag Cyprus; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9357717; MMSI 677049300 (vessel) [IRAN] Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY. DAYLAM (9HEU9) Crude Oil Tanker Malta flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9218466; MMSI 256872000 (vessel) [IRAN] Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY. DELVAR (9HEF9) Crude Oil Tanker Malta flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9218454; MMSI 256864000 (vessel) [IRAN] Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY. DENA (9HED9) Crude Oil Tanker Malta flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9218480; MMSI 256861000 (vessel) [IRAN] Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY. SATEEN (f.k.a. FAEZ) (T2DM4) Chemical/Products Tanker Tuvalu flag; Former Vessel Flag Malta; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9283760; MMSI 572438210 (vessel) [IRAN] Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY. PIONEER (f.k.a. HADI) (T2EJ4) Crude Oil Tanker Tuvalu flag; Former Vessel Flag Cyprus; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9362073; MMSI 572459210 (vessel) [IRAN] Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY. LENA (f.k.a. HAMOON) (T2EQ4) Crude Oil Tanker Tuvalu flag; Former Vessel Flag Malta; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9212929; MMSI 572465210 (vessel) [IRAN] Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY. FREEDOM (f.k.a. HARAZ) (5IM 597) Crude Oil Tanker Tanzania flag; Former Vessel Flag Cyprus; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9357406; MMSI 677049700 (vessel) [IRAN] Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY. VALOR (f.k.a. HARSIN) (5IM600) Crude Oil Tanker Tanzania flag; Former Vessel Flag Malta; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9212917; MMSI 677050000 (vessel) [IRAN] Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY. GLORY (f.k.a. HATEF) (T2EG4) Crude Oil Tanker Tuvalu flag; Former Vessel Flag Cyprus; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9357183; MMSI 212256000 (vessel) [IRAN] Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY. LOYAL (f.k.a. HENGAM) (T2ER4) Crude Oil Tanker Tuvalu flag; Former Vessel Flag Malta; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9212905; MMSI 256875000 (vessel) [IRAN] Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY. HONESTY (f.k.a. HIRMAND) (T2DZ4) Crude Oil Tanker Tuvalu flag; Former Vessel Flag Cyprus; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9357391; MMSI 572450210 (vessel) [IRAN] Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY. HORMOZ (9HEK9) Crude Oil Tanker Malta flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9212890; MMSI 256870000 (vessel) [IRAN] Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY. HUWAYZEH (9HEJ9) Crude Oil Tanker Malta flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9212888; MMSI 256869000 (vessel) [IRAN] Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY. IMICO NEKA 455 (a.k.a. YARD NO. 455 IRAN MARINE) Shuttle Tanker Iran flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9404546 (vessel) [IRAN] Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY. IMICO NEKA 456 (a.k.a. YARD NO. 456 IRAN MARINE) Shuttle Tanker Iran flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9404558 (vessel) [IRAN] Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY. IMICO NEKA 457 (a.k.a. YARD NO. 457 IRAN MARINE) Shuttle Tanker Iran flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9404560 (vessel) [IRAN] Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY. IRAN FAHIM Chemical/Products Tanker Iran flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9286140 (vessel) [IRAN] Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY. IRAN FALAGH Chemical/Products Tanker Iran flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9286152 (vessel) [IRAN] Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY. MARIVAN (EQKH) Tanker 640DWT 478GRT Iran flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 8517243; MMSI 422143000 (vessel) [IRAN] Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY. BRAWNY (f.k.a. NABI) (T2DS4) Crude Oil Tanker Tuvalu flag; Former Vessel Flag Malta; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9079080; MMSI 572443210 (vessel) [IRAN] Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY. MOTION (f.k.a. NAJM) (T2DR4) Crude Oil Tanker Tuvalu flag; Former Vessel Flag Malta; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9079092; MMSI 572442210 (vessel) [IRAN] Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY. TRUTH (f.k.a. NESA) (T2DP4) Crude Oil Tanker Tuvalu flag; Former Vessel Flag Malta; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9079107; MMSI 572440210 (vessel) [IRAN] Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY. ELITE (f.k.a. NOAH) (T2DQ4) Crude Oil Tanker Tuvalu flag; Former Vessel Flag Malta; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9079078; MMSI 572441210 (vessel) [IRAN] Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY. NOOR (9HES9) Crude Oil Tanker Malta flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9079066; MMSI 256882000 (vessel) [IRAN] Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY. SAFE (a.k.a. YARD NO. 1220 SHANGHAI WAIGAOQIAO) Crude Oil Tanker Malta flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9569205 (vessel) [IRAN] Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY. LANTANA (f.k.a. SANANDAJ) (5IM591) Crude Oil Tanker Tanzania flag; Former Vessel Flag Malta; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9172040; MMSI 677049100 (vessel) [IRAN] Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY. SARDASHT (EQKG) Landing Craft 640DWT 478GRT Iran flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 8517231; MMSI 422142000 (vessel) [IRAN] Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY. SARV (9HNZ9) Crude Oil Tanker Malta flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9357377; MMSI 249257000 (vessel) [IRAN] Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY. MAGNOLIA (f.k.a. SARVESTAN) (5IM590) Crude Oil Tanker Tanzania flag; Former Vessel Flag Malta; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9172052; MMSI 677049000 (vessel) [IRAN] Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY. CAMELLIA (f.k.a. SAVEH) (5IM 594) Crude Oil Tanker Tanzania flag; Former Vessel Flag Malta; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9171462; MMSI 677049400 (vessel) [IRAN] Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY. CLOVE (f.k.a. SEMNAN) (5IM 595) Crude Oil Tanker Tanzania flag; Former Vessel Flag Malta; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9171450; MMSI 677049500 (vessel) [IRAN] Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY. GARDENIA (f.k.a. SEPID) (T2EF4) Crude Oil Tanker Tuvalu flag; Former Vessel Flag Malta; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9356608; MMSI 572455210 (vessel) [IRAN] Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY. BLOSSOM (f.k.a. SIMA) (T2DY4) Crude Oil Tanker Tuvalu flag; Former Vessel Flag Malta; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9357353; MMSI 572449210 (vessel) [IRAN] Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY. SINA (9HNY9) Crude Oil Tanker Malta flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9357365; MMSI 249256000 (vessel) [IRAN] Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY. SMOOTH (a.k.a. YARD NO. 1225 SHANGHAI WAIGAOQIAO) Crude Oil Tanker Malta flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9569657 (vessel) [IRAN] Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY. SONATA (a.k.a. YARD NO. 1222 SHANGHAI WAIGAOQIAO) Crude Oil Tanker Malta flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9569633 (vessel) [IRAN] Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY. SONGBIRD (a.k.a. YARD NO. 1224 SHANGHAI WAIGAOQIAO) Crude Oil Tanker Malta flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9569645 (vessel) [IRAN] Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY. SOUVENIR (a.k.a. YARD NO. 1221 SHANGHAI WAIGAOQIAO) Crude Oil Tanker Malta flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9569619 (vessel) [IRAN] Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY. DAISY (f.k.a. SUSANGIRD) (5IM584) Crude Oil Tanker Tanzania flag; Former Vessel Flag Malta; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9172038; MMSI 677048400 (vessel) [IRAN] Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY. TOLOU (EQOD) Crew/Supply Vessel 250DWT 178GRT Iran flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 8318178 (vessel) [IRAN] Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY. VALFAJR2 (EQOX) Tug 650DWT 419GRT Iran flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 8400103 (vessel) [IRAN] Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY. YAGHOUB (EQOE) Platform Supply Ship 950DWT Iran flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 8316168; MMSI 422150000 (vessel) [IRAN] Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY. YANGZHOU DAYANG DY905 (a.k.a. YARD NO. DY905 YANGZHOU D.) LPG Tanker Iran flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9575424 (vessel) [IRAN] Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY. YOUSEF (EQOG) Offshore Tug/Supply Ship 584GRT Iran flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 8316106; MMSI 422144000 (vessel) [IRAN] Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY. ALPHA (f.k.a. ABADAN) (T2EU4) Crude/Oil Products Tanker Tuvalu flag; Former Vessel Flag Malta; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9187629; MMSI 572469210 (vessel) [IRAN] Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY. ASTARA (9HDS9) Crude/Oil Products Tanker Malta flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9187631; MMSI 256845000 (vessel) [IRAN] Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY. BANEH (EQKF) Landing Craft 640DWT 478GRT Iran flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 8508462; MMSI 422141000 (vessel) [IRAN] Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY. PRECIOUS (f.k.a. HODA) (T2EH4) Crude Oil Tanker Tuvalu flag; Former Vessel Flag Cyprus; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9362059; MMSI 572458210 (vessel) [IRAN] Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY. COURAGE (f.k.a. HOMA) (5IM 596) Crude Oil Tanker Tanzania flag; Former Vessel Flag Cyprus; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9357389; MMSI 677049600 (vessel) [IRAN] Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY. VICTORY (f.k.a. HONAR) (T2EA4) Crude Oil Tanker Tuvalu flag; Former Vessel Flag Cyprus; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9362061; MMSI 209511000 (vessel) [IRAN] Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY. IRAN FAZEL (9BAC) Chemical/Products Tanker Iran flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9283746; MMSI 422303000 (vessel) [IRAN] Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY. </sort> US Federal Register

February 06, 2013 – Iran/TRA Designations; Iran Designation Updates

Specially Designated Nationals List Update

​The following individual has been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

• ZARGHAMI, Ezzatollah (a.k.a. ZARGHAMI, Ezatollah); DOB 1959; POB Dezful, Khuzentan Province, Iran; Title Director, Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (individual) [IRAN-TRA].

The following entities have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

• IRANIAN COMMUNICATIONS REGULATORY AUTHORITY (a.k.a. “SAZMAN-E TANZIM MOGHARARAT”), Ministry of Information and Communications Technology, P.O. Box 15598-4415, 1631713761, Tehran, Iran; Website http://www.cra.ir [IRAN-TRA].
• IRANIAN CYBER POLICE (a.k.a. FATA POLICE); Website http://www.cyberpolice.ir [IRAN-TRA].
• ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN BROADCASTING (a.k.a. ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN BROADCASTING ORG.; a.k.a. NATIONAL IRANIAN RADIO AND TELEVISION; a.k.a. “IRIB”), Jamejam Street, Valiasr Avenue, Tehran, Iran; Satellite Department, IRIB, Jame Jam St., Tehran, Iran; Department of IT-IRIB, P.O. Box 19395-333, Jaame Jam. St, Valiasr Ave, Tehran, Iran; IT Department, Fanni Building No 3, Jame jam, Valiasr St., Tehran, Iran; 200 Mosaddegh Avenue, Jaame Jam Street, Vali Asr Ave, P.O. Box 1333, Tehran 193933333, Iran; Fatemi Building, P.O. Box 15875 / 4333, Tehran, Iran; Website www.irib.ir; alt. Website http://iransat.irib.ir; Registration ID 1792 [IRAN-TRA].

The following changes have been made to OFAC’s SDN List: <sort> ABADEH (9HDQ9) Crude/Oil Products Tanker Malta flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9187655; MMSI 256842000 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY). -to- CRYSTAL (f.k.a. ABADEH) (9HDQ9) Crude/Oil Products Tanker Tanzania flag; Former Vessel Flag Malta; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9187655; MMSI 256842000 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY). ALPHA (f.k.a. ABADAN) (T2EU4) Crude/Oil Products Tanker Tuvalu flag; Former Vessel Flag Malta; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9187629; MMSI 572469210 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY). -to- ALPHA (f.k.a. ABADAN) (T2EU4) Crude/Oil Products Tanker None Identified flag; Former Vessel Flag Malta; alt. Former Vessel Flag Tuvalu; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9187629; MMSI 572469210 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY).

ASTARA (9HDS9) Crude/Oil Products Tanker Malta flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9187631; MMSI 256845000 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY). -to- JUPITER (f.k.a. ASTARA) (9HDS9) Crude/Oil Products Tanker None Identified flag; Former Vessel Flag Tuvalu; alt. Former Vessel Flag Malta; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9187631; MMSI 256845000 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY).

BLOSSOM (f.k.a. SIMA) (T2DY4) Crude Oil Tanker Tuvalu flag; Former Vessel Flag Malta; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9357353; MMSI 572449210 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY). -to- BAIKAL (f.k.a. BLOSSOM; f.k.a. SIMA) (T2DY4) Crude Oil Tanker Tanzania flag; Former Vessel Flag Malta; alt. Former Vessel Flag Tuvalu; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9357353; MMSI 572449210 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY).

BRAWNY (f.k.a. NABI) (T2DS4) Crude Oil Tanker Tuvalu flag; Former Vessel Flag Malta; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9079080; MMSI 572443210 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY). -to- MARIGOLD (f.k.a. BRAWNY; f.k.a. NABI) (T2DS4) Crude Oil Tanker Tanzania flag; Former Vessel Flag Malta; alt. Former Vessel Flag Tuvalu; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9079080; MMSI 572443210 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY).

CAMELLIA (f.k.a. SAVEH) (5IM 594) Crude Oil Tanker Tanzania flag; Former Vessel Flag Malta; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9171462; MMSI 677049400 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY). -to- CAMELLIA (f.k.a. SAVEH) (5IM 594) Crude Oil Tanker None Identified flag; Former Vessel Flag Malta; alt. Former Vessel Flag Tanzania; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9171462; MMSI 677049400 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY).

CASTOR (f.k.a. AMOL) (T2EM4) Crude/Oil Products Tanker Tuvalu flag; Former Vessel Flag Malta; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9187667; MMSI 256843000 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY). -to- CHRISTINA (f.k.a. AMOL; f.k.a. CASTOR) (T2EM4) Crude/Oil Products Tanker Tanzania flag; Former Vessel Flag Malta; alt. Former Vessel Flag Tuvalu; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9187667; MMSI 256843000 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY).

CLOVE (f.k.a. SEMNAN) (5IM 595) Crude Oil Tanker Tanzania flag; Former Vessel Flag Malta; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9171450; MMSI 677049500 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY). -to- CLOVE (f.k.a. SEMNAN) (5IM 595) Crude Oil Tanker None Identified flag; Former Vessel Flag Malta; alt. Former Vessel Flag Tanzania; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9171450; MMSI 677049500 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY).

COMPANION (f.k.a. DAVAR) (5IM 593) Crude Oil Tanker Tanzania flag; Former Vessel Flag Cyprus; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9357717; MMSI 677049300 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY). -to- COMPANION (f.k.a. DAVAR) (5IM 593) Crude Oil Tanker None Identified flag; Former Vessel Flag Cyprus; alt. Former Vessel Flag Tanzania; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9357717; MMSI 677049300 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY).

COURAGE (f.k.a. HOMA) (5IM 596) Crude Oil Tanker Tanzania flag; Former Vessel Flag Cyprus; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9357389; MMSI 677049600 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY). -to- COURAGE (f.k.a. HOMA) (5IM 596) Crude Oil Tanker None Identified flag; Former Vessel Flag Cyprus; alt. Former Vessel Flag Tanzania; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9357389; MMSI 677049600 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY).

DAISY (f.k.a. SUSANGIRD) (5IM584) Crude Oil Tanker Tanzania flag; Former Vessel Flag Malta; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9172038; MMSI 677048400 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY). -to- DAISY (f.k.a. SUSANGIRD) (5IM584) Crude Oil Tanker None Identified flag; Former Vessel Flag Malta; alt. Former Vessel Flag Tanzania; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9172038; MMSI 677048400 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY).

ELITE (f.k.a. NOAH) (T2DQ4) Crude Oil Tanker Tuvalu flag; Former Vessel Flag Malta; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9079078; MMSI 572441210 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY). -to- VOYAGER (f.k.a. ELITE; f.k.a. NOAH) (T2DQ4) Crude Oil Tanker Tanzania flag; Former Vessel Flag Malta; alt. Former Vessel Flag Tuvalu; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9079078; MMSI 572441210 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY).

FREEDOM (f.k.a. HARAZ) (5IM 597) Crude Oil Tanker Tanzania flag; Former Vessel Flag Cyprus; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9357406; MMSI 677049700 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY). -to- FREEDOM (f.k.a. HARAZ) (5IM 597) Crude Oil Tanker None Identified flag; Former Vessel Flag Cyprus; alt. Former Vessel Flag Tanzania; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9357406; MMSI 677049700 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY).

GARDENIA (f.k.a. SEPID) (T2EF4) Crude Oil Tanker Tuvalu flag; Former Vessel Flag Malta; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9356608; MMSI 572455210 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY). -to- SEAHORSE (f.k.a. GARDENIA; f.k.a. SEPID) (T2EF4) Crude Oil Tanker Tanzania flag; Former Vessel Flag Malta; alt. Former Vessel Flag Tuvalu; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9356608; MMSI 572455210 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY).

GLORY (f.k.a. HATEF) (T2EG4) Crude Oil Tanker Tuvalu flag; Former Vessel Flag Cyprus; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9357183; MMSI 212256000 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY). -to- MAJESTIC (f.k.a. GLORY; f.k.a. HATEF) (T2EG4) Crude Oil Tanker Tanzania flag; Former Vessel Flag Cyprus; alt. Former Vessel Flag Tuvalu; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9357183; MMSI 212256000 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY).

HONESTY (f.k.a. HIRMAND) (T2DZ4) Crude Oil Tanker Tuvalu flag; Former Vessel Flag Cyprus; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9357391; MMSI 572450210 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY). -to- MILLIONAIRE (f.k.a. HIRMAND; f.k.a. HONESTY) (T2DZ4) Crude Oil Tanker Tanzania flag; Former Vessel Flag Cyprus; alt. Former Vessel Flag Tuvalu; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9357391; MMSI 572450210 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY).

HORMOZ (9HEK9) Crude Oil Tanker Malta flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9212890; MMSI 256870000 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY). -to- SCORPIAN (f.k.a. HORMOZ) (9HEK9) Crude Oil Tanker Tanzania flag; Former Vessel Flag Tuvalu; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9212890; MMSI 256870000 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY).

IRAN ELECTRONICS INDUSTRIES (a.k.a. IEI; a.k.a. SANAYE ELECTRONIC IRAN; a.k.a. SASAD IRAN ELECTRONICS INDUSTRIES; a.k.a. SHERKAT SANAYEH ELECTRONICS IRAN), P.O. Box 19575-365, Shahied Langari Street, Noboniad Sq, Pasdaran Ave, Saltanad Abad, Tehran, Iran; P.O. Box 71365-1174, Hossain Abad/Ardakan Road, Shiraz, Iran; Business Registration Document # 829 [NPWMD] [IFSR]. -to- IRAN ELECTRONICS INDUSTRIES (a.k.a. SAIRAN; a.k.a. SANAYE ELECTRONIC IRAN; a.k.a. SASAD IRAN ELECTRONICS INDUSTRIES; a.k.a. SHERKAT SANAYEH ELECTRONICS IRAN; a.k.a. “IEI”), P.O. Box 19575-365, Shahied Langari Street, Noboniad Sq, Pasdaran Ave, Saltanad Abad, Tehran, Iran; P.O. Box 71365-1174, Hossain Abad/Ardakan Road, Shiraz, Iran; Hossein Abad/Ardakan Road, P.O. Box 555, Shiraz 71365/1174, Iran; Shahid Langari Street, Nobonyad Square, Tehran, Iran; Website www.ieimil.ir; alt. Website www.ieicorp.com; Business Registration Document # 829 [NPWMD] [IFSR] [IRAN-TRA].

LANTANA (f.k.a. SANANDAJ) (5IM591) Crude Oil Tanker Tanzania flag; Former Vessel Flag Malta; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9172040; MMSI 677049100 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY). -to- LANTANA (f.k.a. SANANDAJ) (5IM591) Crude Oil Tanker None Identified flag; Former Vessel Flag Malta; alt. Former Vessel Flag Tanzania; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9172040; MMSI 677049100 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY).

LEADERSHIP (f.k.a. DANESH) (5IM 592) Crude Oil Tanker Tanzania flag; Former Vessel Flag Cyprus; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9356593; MMSI 677049200 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY). -to- LEADERSHIP (f.k.a. DANESH) (5IM 592) Crude Oil Tanker None Identified flag; Former Vessel Flag Cyprus; alt. Former Vessel Flag Tanzania; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9356593; MMSI 677049200 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY).

LENA (f.k.a. HAMOON) (T2EQ4) Crude Oil Tanker Tuvalu flag; Former Vessel Flag Malta; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9212929; MMSI 572465210 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY). -to- TAMAR (f.k.a. HAMOON; f.k.a. LENA) (T2EQ4) Crude Oil Tanker Tanzania flag; Former Vessel Flag Malta; alt. Former Vessel Flag Tuvalu; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9212929; MMSI 572465210 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY).

LOYAL (f.k.a. HENGAM) (T2ER4) Crude Oil Tanker Tuvalu flag; Former Vessel Flag Malta; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9212905; MMSI 256875000 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY). -to- TULAR (f.k.a. HENGAM; f.k.a. LOYAL) (T2ER4) Crude Oil Tanker Tanzania flag; Former Vessel Flag Malta; alt. Former Vessel Flag Tuvalu; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9212905; MMSI 256875000 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY).

MAGNOLIA (f.k.a. SARVESTAN) (5IM590) Crude Oil Tanker Tanzania flag; Former Vessel Flag Malta; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9172052; MMSI 677049000 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY). -to- MAGNOLIA (f.k.a. SARVESTAN) (5IM590) Crude Oil Tanker None Identified flag; Former Vessel Flag Malta; alt. Former Vessel Flag Tanzania; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9172052; MMSI 677049000 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY).

MOTION (f.k.a. NAJM) (T2DR4) Crude Oil Tanker Tuvalu flag; Former Vessel Flag Malta; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9079092; MMSI 572442210 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY). -to- MIDSEA (f.k.a. MOTION; f.k.a. NAJM) (T2DR4) Crude Oil Tanker Tanzania flag; Former Vessel Flag Malta; alt. Former Vessel Flag Tuvalu; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9079092; MMSI 572442210 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY).

NEPTUNE (f.k.a. ASTANEH) (T2ES4) Crude/Oil Products Tanker Tuvalu flag; Former Vessel Flag Malta; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9187643; MMSI 572467210 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY). -to- SEAPRIDE (f.k.a. ASTANEH; f.k.a. NEPTUNE) (T2ES4) Crude/Oil Products Tanker Tanzania flag; Former Vessel Flag Malta; alt. Former Vessel Flag Tuvalu; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9187643; MMSI 572467210 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY).

NOOR (9HES9) Crude Oil Tanker Malta flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9079066; MMSI 256882000 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY). -to- MAHARLIKA (f.k.a. NOOR) (9HES9) Crude Oil Tanker Tanzania flag; Former Vessel Flag Malta; alt. Former Vessel Flag Tuvalu; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9079066; MMSI 256882000 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY).

PIONEER (f.k.a. HADI) (T2EJ4) Crude Oil Tanker Tuvalu flag; Former Vessel Flag Cyprus; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9362073; MMSI 572459210 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY). -to- PIONEER (f.k.a. HADI) (T2EJ4) Crude Oil Tanker None Identified flag; Former Vessel Flag Cyprus; alt. Former Vessel Flag Tuvalu; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9362073; MMSI 572459210 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY).

PRECIOUS (f.k.a. HODA) (T2EH4) Crude Oil Tanker Tuvalu flag; Former Vessel Flag Cyprus; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9362059; MMSI 572458210 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY). -to- EXPLORER (f.k.a. HODA; f.k.a. PRECIOUS) (T2EH4) Crude Oil Tanker Tanzania flag; Former Vessel Flag Cyprus; alt. Former Vessel Flag Tuvalu; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9362059; MMSI 572458210 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY).

SAFE (a.k.a. YARD NO. 1220 SHANGHAI WAIGAOQIAO) Crude Oil Tanker Malta flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9569205 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY). -to- CARNATION (f.k.a. SAFE; a.k.a. YARD NO. 1220 SHANGHAI WAIGAOQIAO) Crude Oil Tanker Tanzania flag; Former Vessel Flag Tuvalu; alt. Former Vessel Flag Malta; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9569205 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY).

SARV (9HNZ9) Crude Oil Tanker Malta flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9357377; MMSI 249257000 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY). -to- BLACKSTONE (f.k.a. SARV) (9HNZ9) Crude Oil Tanker Seychelles flag; Former Vessel Flag Malta; alt. Former Vessel Flag Tuvalu; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9357377; MMSI 249257000 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY).

SATEEN (f.k.a. FAEZ) (T2DM4) Chemical/Products Tanker Tuvalu flag; Former Vessel Flag Malta; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9283760; MMSI 572438210 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY). -to- MAESTRO (f.k.a. FAEZ; f.k.a. SATEEN) (T2DM4) Chemical/Products Tanker Tanzania flag; Former Vessel Flag Malta; alt. Former Vessel Flag Tuvalu; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9283760; MMSI 572438210 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY).

SINA (9HNY9) Crude Oil Tanker Malta flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9357365; MMSI 249256000 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY). -to- AZALEA (f.k.a. SINA) (9HNY9) Crude Oil Tanker None Identified flag; Former Vessel Flag Malta; alt. Former Vessel Flag Tuvalu; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9357365; MMSI 249256000 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY).

SONATA (a.k.a. YARD NO. 1222 SHANGHAI WAIGAOQIAO) Crude Oil Tanker Malta flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9569633 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY). -to- SONATA (a.k.a. YARD NO. 1222 SHANGHAI WAIGAOQIAO) Crude Oil Tanker None Identified flag; Former Vessel Flag Malta; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9569633 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY).

SONGBIRD (a.k.a. YARD NO. 1224 SHANGHAI WAIGAOQIAO) Crude Oil Tanker Malta flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9569645 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY). -to- SONGBIRD (a.k.a. YARD NO. 1224 SHANGHAI WAIGAOQIAO) Crude Oil Tanker None Identified flag; Former Vessel Flag Malta; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9569645 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY).

SOUVENIR (a.k.a. YARD NO. 1221 SHANGHAI WAIGAOQIAO) Crude Oil Tanker Malta flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9569619 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY). -to- RAINBOW (f.k.a. SOUVENIR; a.k.a. YARD NO. 1221 SHANGHAI WAIGAOQIAO) Crude Oil Tanker Tanzania flag; Former Vessel Flag Malta; alt. Former Vessel Flag Tuvalu; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9569619 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY).

TRUTH (f.k.a. NESA) (T2DP4) Crude Oil Tanker Tuvalu flag; Former Vessel Flag Malta; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9079107; MMSI 572440210 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY). -to- OCEANIC (f.k.a. NESA; f.k.a. TRUTH) (T2DP4) Crude Oil Tanker Tanzania flag; Former Vessel Flag Malta; alt. Former Vessel Flag Tuvalu; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9079107; MMSI 572440210 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY).

VALOR (f.k.a. HARSIN) (5IM600) Crude Oil Tanker Tanzania flag; Former Vessel Flag Malta; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9212917; MMSI 677050000 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY). -to- VALOR (f.k.a. HARSIN) (5IM600) Crude Oil Tanker None Identified flag; Former Vessel Flag Malta; alt. Former Vessel Flag Tanzania; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9212917; MMSI 677050000 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY).

VICTORY (f.k.a. HONAR) (T2EA4) Crude Oil Tanker Tuvalu flag; Former Vessel Flag Cyprus; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9362061; MMSI 209511000 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY). -to- JANUS (f.k.a. HONAR; f.k.a. VICTORY) (T2EA4) Crude Oil Tanker Tanzania flag; Former Vessel Flag Cyprus; alt. Former Vessel Flag Tuvalu; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9362061; MMSI 209511000 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY). </sort> OFAC Recent Sanctions

January 18, 2013 – Revocation of General License No. 7 under the Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferators Sanctions Regulation

Today, OFAC is revoking General License No. 7 under the Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferators Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. Part 544, effective 12:01 AM Eastern Standard Time, January 19, 2013. General License No. 7 authorized certain transactions related to the arrest, detention, and judicial sale of the MV Amina (f.k.a. Shere, a.k.a. Iran Tabas, IMO No. 9305192), a vessel on OFAC’s List of Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons. Accordingly, any such transactions are no longer authorized by OFAC.

OFAC Sanctions

January 10, 2013 – Advisory on the Use of Exchange Houses and Trading Companies to Evade U.S. Economic Sanctions Against Iran

The Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) has issued an Advisory on the Use of Exchange Houses and Trading Companies to Evade U.S. Economic Sanctions Against Iran.

As the international community has increasingly barred or restricted Iranian financial institutions from accessing the international financial system, Iran is relying more heavily on third-country exchange houses and trading companies to move funds. OFAC is issuing this Advisory to highlight some of the practices used to circumvent U.S. and international economic sanctions concerning Iran. The practices involve the use of third-country exchange houses or trading companies that are acting as money transmitters to process funds transfers through the United States in support of business with Iran that is not exempt or otherwise authorized by OFAC. Such entities frequently lack their own U.S. correspondent accounts and instead rely on their banks’ correspondent accounts to access the U.S. financial system; often are located in jurisdictions considered to be high-risk for transactions implicating OFAC sanctions; and appear to process primarily commercial transactions rather than personal remittances.

OFAC Recent Actions

January 09, 2013 – Release of General License No. 7 under the Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferators Sanctions Regulations

​Today, OFAC is issuing General License No. 7 under the Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferators Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. Part 544, authorizing certain transactions related to the arrest, detention, and judicial sale of the MV Amina (f.k.a. Shere, a.k.a. Iran Tabas, IMO No. 9305192), which is a vessel on OFAC’s Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons list. The vessel is currently under arrest in Galle, Sri Lanka.

OFAC Recent Actions

December 27, 2012 – Recent Action Notice for Publication of ITSR Amendment

​The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control published a final rule in the Federal Register on December 26, 2012, amending the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. part 560 (the “ITSR”), to implement section 218 of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (“TRA”) and sections of Executive Order 13622 of July 30, 2012, and Executive Order 13628 of October 9, 2012. This final rule can be found at 77 Fed. Reg. 75845 (December 26, 2012). The ITSR amendments prohibit certain transactions by entities owned or controlled by a United States person and established or maintained outside the United States (“foreign subsidiaries”). They also provide for civil penalties to be imposed on a United States person if its foreign subsidiary violates this new prohibition, unless the United States person divests or terminates its business with the subsidiary by February 6, 2013, such that the U.S. person no longer owns or controls the subsidiary, as defined in the regulations. In addition, the final rule adds two general licenses to the ITSR and amends several existing licenses to address activities by foreign subsidiaries. Finally, the amendments expand the categories of persons whose property and interests in property are blocked to include any person determined by the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, to have materially assisted or provided other support for certain Government of Iran-related entities or certain activities by the Government of Iran.

December 21, 2012 – Non-proliferation Designations – Designations Include a Company Providing Weaponry to the Asad Regime

The U.S. Department of the Treasury today designated four companies and one individual pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13382, which targets proliferators of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their supporters. The SAD Import Export Company, Chemical Industries and Development of Materials Group, and Marine Industries Organization were designated for their ties to Iran’s Defense Industries Organization (DIO) or Iran’s Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL). Mustafa Esbati, the director of Marine Industries Organization, was also designated today. In addition, Doostan International Company was designated for its support to Iran’s Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO) which was identified as a WMD proliferator by the President in the Annex to E.O. 13382. The United Nations Sanctions Committee also designated the SAD Import Export Company yesterday under the U.N. asset freeze authority of Security Council Resolution 1737 dealing with Iran.

DIO has been linked by the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) to Iran’s centrifuge production and was previously designated in March 2007 pursuant to E.O. 13382 for its involvement in the Iranian nuclear program. DIO is also identified in the Annex to U.N. Security Council Resolution 1737. In addition to its involvement in Iran’s WMD program, DIO has been used by the Iranian government to assist the Asad regime’s violent crackdown in Syria. SAD Import Export Company shipped weapons to the Syrian Armed Forces, on behalf of DIO. These shipments were designed to assist the Syrian government’s production of mortars and missiles, which have been used against the civilian population of Syria.

“We will continue to expose the companies and individuals involved in Iran’s illicit weapons program,” said Treasury Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence David S. Cohen. “We will also continue to work to hold Iran accountable for its failure to meet its international non-proliferation obligations and to expose its support of the Asad regime’s violence.”

These designations generally prohibit transactions between the named entities and any U.S. person, and freeze any assets the designees may have under U.S. jurisdiction. The designations of these entities and individual under E.O. 13382 also carry consequences under the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (CISADA). As of today’s actions, foreign financial institutions that facilitate significant transactions or provide significant financial services for the sanctioned entities and individual can face the loss of their access to the U.S. financial system.

SAD Import Export Company – SAD Import Export Company was designated pursuant E.O. 13382 for acting on behalf of DIO.

In addition to shipping arms to the Syrian armed forces in 2011, SAD Import Export sent aluminum and other goods, on behalf of DIO, to Syria’s Mechanical Construction Factory, a front company for the Scientific Studies and Research Center (SSRC). The goods were part of a larger contract between DIO and other Syria’s Industrial Establishment for Defense to provide fuel, fuses, charges, aluminum, and other goods necessary for the production of full mortar projectiles to Syria. In 2010, SAD Import Export Company shipped materials and equipment to Syria’s Mechanical Construction Factory for the ultimate benefit of the SSRC, on behalf of DIO. These goods were likely used in the manufacture of solid propellant for rockets and missiles.

The SSRC was listed in the Annex to E.O. 13382 in June 2005 for its ties to Syria’s WMD proliferation activities. The SSRC is the Syrian government agency responsible for developing and producing non-conventional weapons and the missiles to deliver them. The SSRC also has a public civilian research function; however, its activities focus on the development of biological weapons, chemical weapons, and missiles.

Marine Industries Organization – Marine Industries Organization was designated pursuant to E.O. 13882 because it is owned or controlled by Iran’s Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL).

MODAFL was designated under E.O. 13382 on October 25, 2007 for its WMD proliferation-related activities. Marine Industries Organization is responsible for marine military acquisitions for Iran’s Navy, as well as MODAFL and Iran Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).

Mustafa Esbati – Mustafa Esbati was designated pursuant to E.O. 13882 because he acts on behalf of Marine Industries Organization, by virtue of his position as the Director of Marine Industries Organization.

Chemical Industries and Development of Materials Group – Iran’s Chemical Industries and Development of Materials Group (CIDMG) was designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 because it is owned or controlled by DIO. CIDMG is one of the major industries overseen by DIO. CIDMG produces military and civil chemical products and materials for the production of powders, propellant charges, and mine explosive materials.

Doostan International Company – Doostan International Company was designated pursuant to E.O. 13882 for providing services to Iran’s Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO). AIO is the Iranian organization that oversees all of Iran’s missile industries, including those involved in Iran’s ballistic missile program, and was listed in the Annex to E.O. 13382.

The following individual has been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

• ESBATI, Mostafa; DOB 17 Jul 1961; Passport D9004869 (Iran) (individual) [NPWMD] [IFSR].

The following entities have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

• CHEMICAL INDUSTRIES & DEVELOPMENT OF MATERIALS GROUP (a.k.a. CHEMICAL GROUP; a.k.a. CHEMICAL INDUSTRIES GROUP; a.k.a. CIDMG), P.O. Box 19585/311, Tehran, Iran, Tehran, Iran; Pasdaran Street, Tehran 19585311, Iran; Khavarah Road Km 35, Parchin, Iran; Zarrin Shah, P.O. Box 81465-363, Esfahan, Iran; P.O. Box 16765-368, Department 146-42, Parchin, Iran [NPWMD] [IFSR] (Linked To: DEFENSE INDUSTRIES ORGANIZATION).
• DOOSTAN INTERNATIONAL COMPANY, 16 (former 14) Fajr Street, Ostad Motahari Avenue, Tehran 15875-4649, Iran [NPWMD] [IFSR].
• MARINE INDUSTRIES ORGANIZATION, Pasdaran Av., PO Box 19585/777, Tehran, Iran [NPWMD] [IFSR].
• SAD IMPORT EXPORT COMPANY, Haftom Tir Square, South Mofteh Ave., PO Box 1584864813, Tehran, Iran [NPWMD] [IFSR].

OFAC Recent Actions & US Department of the Treasury

December 20, 2012 – General License on MV Uppercourt (a.k.a. Iran Bojnoord, IMO No. 9305207)

Release of General License No. 6 under the Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferators Sanctions Regulations ​ Today, OFAC is issuing General License No. 6 under the Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferators Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. Part 544, authorizing certain transactions related to the arrest, detention, and judicial sale of the MV Uppercourt (a.k.a. Iran Bojnoord, IMO No. 9305207), which is a vessel on OFAC’s Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons list. The vessel is currently under arrest in Quinhuangdao, China.

December 13, 2012 – United States Increases Sanctions Against Iranian Proliferation Networks – Non-proliferation Designations; Iranian Financial Sanctions Regulations Identifications

Treasury and State Department Actions Target Iran’s Nuclear Enrichment and Proliferation Program

The United States announced today it is imposing additional sanctions on Iran’s nuclear proliferation networks, targeting international procurement operations of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI), the Iran Centrifuge Technology Company (TESA), and Iran’s uranium enrichment program. Given Iran’s continued intransigence on its nuclear program, most recently demonstrated at last month’s International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors meeting, it is essential to continue to expose and target Iran’s continued proliferation activities. Today’s actions shed more light on persistent illicit activities and deceptive behavior of the AEOI and the Government of Iran.

Seven companies and five individuals were designated by the U.S. Departments of the Treasury and State today pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13382 because they provide the Iranian government unique goods, technology and services that increase the regime’s ability to enrich uranium and/or to construct a heavy water research reactor. Both of these activities are prohibited by UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs). These designations generally prohibit transactions between the named entities and any U.S. person, and freeze any assets the designees may have under U.S. jurisdiction.

“So long as Iran continues to pursue a nuclear program in defiance of multiple UN Security Council Resolutions, the U.S. will target those involved in Iran’s illicit enrichment activities. The entire world has made it clear that these activities are unacceptable and only serve to increase Iran’s isolation,” said Treasury Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence David S. Cohen. “We will continue to work with our international partners to intensify the pressure on Iran as long as it continues these types of activities.”

The designations of these entities and individuals under E.O. 13382, the executive authority to sanction entities in connection with Iran’s support for proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, carry consequences under the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (CISADA). Foreign financial institutions that facilitate significant transactions to or from the sanctioned entities and individuals are exposed to potential loss of access to the U.S. financial sector.

The AEOI was identified in the Annex to E.O. 13382 of June 28, 2005, for its pivotal role as the main Iranian organization for research and development of nuclear technology and management of fissile material production programs. The AEOI reports directly to the Iranian President and was sanctioned by the United Nations under UNSCR 1737. TESA was designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 on November 21, 2011 because it plays a crucial role in Iran’s uranium enrichment nuclear program. It is involved in the production of IR-1 centrifuges, the type of centrifuge Iran has used to enrich uranium. These centrifuges have been used in facilities belonging to the U.S.- and UN-designated Kalaye Electric Company, an AEOI entity. They have also been used in the AEOI enrichment plant in Natanz, where TESA also operates an assembly complex.

View the fact sheet for the individuals and entities designated today: FACT SHEET-Treasury State Designation of Iran Nuclear Enrichment and Proliferation Program- 13 December 2012​​​

The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

• ABBASI-DAVANI, Fereidoun (a.k.a. ABBASI DAVANI, Fereidoon; a.k.a. ABBASI DAVANI, Fereydoon; a.k.a. ABBASI, Fereidoun; a.k.a. ABBASI, Fereydoon; a.k.a. ABBASI-DAVANI, Fereidun; a.k.a. “DR. ABBASI”); DOB 1958; alt. DOB 1959; POB Abadan, Iran (individual) [NPWMD] [IFSR].
• BEHZAD, Morteza Ahmadali (a.k.a. BEHDAD, Morteza; a.k.a. BEHZAD, Morteza); DOB 07 Jun 1959 (individual) [NPWMD] [IFSR].
• RAHIMYAR, Amir Hossein, #15, Golestan Alley, Baradaran Shahid Rahimi St., Imam Khomeini Ave., Lavasan, Tehran, Iran; DOB 31 Jan 1974; POB Tehran, Iran (individual) [NPWMD] [IFSR].
• REZVANIANZADEH, Mohammed Reza; DOB 11 Dec 1969; Identification Number 118-984105-3 (individual) [NPWMD] [IFSR].
• SAFDARI, Seyed Jaber (a.k.a. SAFDARI, Dr. S.J.; a.k.a. SAFDARI, Sayyed Jaber; a.k.a. SAFDARI, Seyyid Jaber); DOB 1968; alt. DOB 1969; POB Navahand, Hamadan Province, Iran (individual) [NPWMD] [IFSR].

The following entities have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

• ARIA NIKAN MARINE INDUSTRY (a.k.a. ARIA NIKAN; a.k.a. PERGAS ARIA MOVALLED LTD.), Suite 1, 59 Azadi Ali North Sohrevardi Avenue, Tehran, Iran; No. 1 alloy 7 koy-e-nasr street, Tehran 144875, Iran; Aria Nikan Tehran PJS, Suite 59, No 2 Azadi Alley, North Sohrevardi Street, Tehran, Iran; Suite 4, No. 8 Iraj Alley, Mozafarikhah Avenue, Golha Street, Golha Square, Tehran, Iran; Website www.arianikan.com [NPWMD] [IFSR].
• FARATECH (a.k.a. FARATECH COMPANY), Ghezelbash 15, Tohid St., Isfahan, Iran [NPWMD] [IFSR].
• IRAN POOYA (a.k.a. IRAN POUYA; a.k.a. IRAN PUYA), No. 8, Haqani Exp. Way, Vanak Sq., 15187, Tehran, Iran; Main Office: Vanak Square, Shahid Haghaei Road after the Jahan-E-Kudak Junction, Block 33, Tehran, Iran; Plant: Kadim Karaj Road, Metri-E-Zarand 45 Boulevard, Tehran, Iran; Business Registration Document # 5566 [NPWMD] [IFSR].
• NEDA INDUSTRIAL GROUP, Address Number 10 & 12, 64th Street, Yousef Abad Avenue, Tehran, Iran [NPWMD] [IFSR].
• POUYA CONTROL (a.k.a. NAM-AVARAN-E POUYA CONTROL; a.k.a. TEJERAT GOSTAR NIKAN IRANIAN COMPANY), No. 2, Sharif Alley, Before Yakchal St., After Golhak St., Shariati St., Tehran, Iran; No. 2, Sharif Street, Golhak, Shariati Street, Tehran, Iran; Website www.pouyacontrol.com [NPWMD] [IFSR].
• TARH O PALAYESH, Tehran, Iran [NPWMD] [IFSR].
• TOWLID ABZAR BORESHI IRAN (a.k.a. IRAN CUTTING TOOLS COMPANY; a.k.a. TABA; a.k.a. TABA COMPANY), Northwest of Karaj at Km 55 Qazvin (alt. Ghazvin) Highway, Haljerd, Iran; No. 66 Sarhang Sakhaei St., Hafez Avenue, Tehran, Iran [NPWMD] [IFSR].

OFAC Recent Sanctions

December 07, 2012 – Regarding Significant Reductions of Iranian Crude Oil Purchases

The United States and the international community remain committed to maintaining pressure on the Iranian regime until it fully addresses concerns about its nuclear program. That’s why today I am pleased to announce that China, India, Malaysia, Republic of Korea, Singapore, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Turkey, and Taiwan have again qualified for an exception to sanctions outlined in Section 1245 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2012, based on additional reductions in the volume of their crude oil purchases from Iran. As a result, I will report to the Congress that exceptions to sanctions pursuant to Section 1245 of the NDAA for certain transactions will apply to the financial institutions based in these countries for a potentially renewable period of 180 days.

A total of 20 countries and economies have continued to significantly reduce the volume of their crude oil purchases from Iran. According to the latest U.S. Energy Information Administration report to Congress, Iran’s oil production fell by one million barrels per day in September and October 2012, compared to the same period in 2011. This has reduced Iran’s export volumes and oil revenues, which fund not only the nuclear program but its support for terror and destabilizing actions in the region. The message to the Iranian regime from the international community is clear: take concrete actions to satisfy the concerns of the international community through negotiations with the P5+1, or face increasing isolation and pressure.

US Department of State Press Release

December 06, 2012 – U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission Issues Answers to FAQs on Iran Reporting Requirements

The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) yesterday issued some answers to frequently asked questions on the new reporting requirement contained in section 219 of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (TRA) (H.R. 1905, enacted as Public Law 112-158) that was signed into law on August 10, 2012 and requires issuers” to disclose certain activities in Iran starting on February 6, 2013.

SEC Q&A

November 29, 2012 – General License 5B – Specified transactions involving certain blocked property authorized

Today, OFAC is issuing General License No. 5b under the Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferators Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. Part 544, authorizing certain transactions related to the arrest, detention, and judicial sale of the MV Dianthe (f.k.a. Horsham, f.k.a. Iran Bam, IMO No. 9323833), which is a vessel on OFAC’s Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons list. The vessel is currently under arrest in Mundra, India.

November 13, 2012 – The Department of State clarified in guidance published Tuesday what types of “sensitive technology” U.S. individuals and entities are barred from shipping to Iran and Syria

The State Department guidance, published Tuesday on the Federal Register, represents the government’s most complete effort thus far to help U.S. companies and individuals tread a sometimes dangerous line.

General definition of “sensitive technology” is hardware, software, telecommunications equipment, or any other technology used to restrict the free flow of information or disrupt, monitor, or otherwise restrict speech.

US Department of State Guidance (open for comment)

November 08, 2012 – Action Targets the Iranian Regime’s Continued Human Rights Abuses, WMD Proliferation, and Support for Terrorism

The U.S. Department of the Treasury today announced a set of targeted sanctions against 17 individuals and entities related to the Iranian government’s human rights abuses, its support of terrorism, and Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). These designations are part of the United States government’s commitment to intensify sanctions against the Iranian government so long as it refuses to address in a meaningful and productive way the international community’s concerns about its nuclear program as well as the Iranian government’s continued abuse of human rights and support for terrorism. Today’s actions coincide with amendments to the Iranian Financial Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR Part 561, which further strengthen financial sanctions against the Iranian government and fulfill a number of requirements set forth in the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (TRA), which was signed into law by the President on August 10, 2012.

“Today’s designations further demonstrate our resolve to put a stop to the Iranian regime’s continued efforts to deny the Iranian people access to information and the ability to speak freely,” said Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence David S. Cohen. “We will continue to expose this repressive behavior, as well as Iran’s continued proliferation activities and support to terrorists worldwide.”

Today’s actions are being taken under three different Executive Orders (E.O.). Any property or interests in property in the United States or in the possession or control of U.S. persons in which the designated entities or individuals have an interest are blocked, and U.S. persons are generally prohibited from engaging in transactions with them.

The first set of designations is being taken pursuant to E.O. 13628, which implements the TRA by sanctioning individuals and entities who have engaged in censorship or other activities with respect to Iran on or after June 12, 2009, that prohibit, limit, or penalize the exercise of freedom of expression or assembly by citizens of Iran, or that limit access to print or broadcast media. These sanctions target those in Iran who restrict or deny the free flow of information to or from the Iranian people, and who limit or prohibit the exercise of freedoms of expression or assembly. These designations include, Reza Taghipour the Minister of Communications and Information Technology, the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance as well as a number of officials and other entities involved in the Iranian regime’s ongoing attempts to repress and silence Iran’s people.

The second set of actions is being taken pursuant to E.O. 13224, which target terrorists and supporters of terrorism around the world. These sanctions further expose the nefarious activities of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF) as it coordinates terrorist operations in the region, particularly by supporting Kata’ib Hizballah (KH) officials who operate out of Iran and Iraq. KH, which was listed as a Foreign Terrorist Organization by the U.S. Department of State in June 2009, has conducted attacks against Iraqi, U.S. and Coalition forces in Iraq and continues to act as a destabilizing force in Iraq and the region.

The final set of actions today is being taken pursuant to E.O. 13382, which targets proliferators of weapons of mass destruction and their support networks. Today’s action targets the support network of Iran’s IRGC, which was designated by the U.S. Department of State in October 2007 for having engaged, or attempted to engage, in proliferation related activities. The IRGC is a powerful actor in Iran’s economy, dominating the energy, construction, banking and other key sectors. Today’s designations include two IRGC-linked universities and companies, including the National Iranian Oil Company, which was determined by the U.S. Treasury Department in September 2012 to be an agent or affiliate of the IRGC. These entities are being designated for the important technological and commercial support they provide to the IRGC.

For more information on today’s designations, please see the fact sheet.

The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

• AL-GHANIMI, Karim Ja’far Muhsin (a.k.a. AL-GHANIMI, Karim Mansur; a.k.a. AL-ZIRJAWI, Karim Jafar Hasan; a.k.a. “ABU ISLAM, Karim”); DOB 1968; alt. DOB 1969; POB al-Amarah, Iraq; citizen Iraq (individual) [SDGT].
• AL-HAMIDAWI, Riyad Yunis Jasim (a.k.a. “TAQI, Abu”; a.k.a. “TUQA, Abu”); DOB 16 Jan 1974; POB Baghdad, Iraq; Passport G1751672 expires 08 Feb 2016 (individual) [SDGT].
• AL-MAKSUSI, Sayyid Salah Mahdi Hantush (a.k.a. AL-MUSAWI, Sayyid Salah; a.k.a. “HAWRA, Abu”; a.k.a. “SALAH, Sayyid”); DOB 1973; alt. DOB 1971; nationality Iraq (individual) [SDGT].
• FAZLI, Ali; DOB 20 Apr 1961; alt. DOB 1951; POB Sarkan, Hamedan Province, Iran; Rank Brigadier General; Title Basij Deputy Commander (individual) [IRAN-TRA].
• JALILI, Rasool (a.k.a. JALILI, RASOUL), 90 Park Ave, Farahzadi St, Tehran, Iran; DOB 19 Aug 1961; POB Eghlid, Fars Province, Iran; Website http://www.jalili.ir; alt. Website http://sharif.edu/jalili; Email Address jalili@sharif.edu; alt. Email Address rjalili@yahoo.com; alt. Email Address rasoul.jalili@peykasa.ir; Passport N15792968; Associate Professor, Department of Computer Engineering, Sharif University of Technology; Alternate Title, Editor-In-Chief of ISeCure; Alternate Title, Dean of Scientific and International Cooperation, Sharif University of Technology; Alternate Title, Head, Information Technology Group, Sharif University of Technology (individual) [IRAN-TRA].
• MINA’I, Mohammad (a.k.a. MINAEE, Muhamed); DOB 1964; POB Iran; citizen Iran (individual) [SDGT] [IRGC] [IFSR].
• TAGHIPOUR, Reza (a.k.a. TAGHIPOUR ANVARI, Reza); DOB 1957; POB Maragheh, Iran; Minister of Communications and Information Technology; Minister for Information and Communications (individual) [IRAN-TRA].

The following entities have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

• AMNAFZAR GOSTAR-E SHARIF (a.k.a. AMNAFZAR; a.k.a. AMNAFZAR CORPORATION; a.k.a. SHARIF SECUREWARE), 5th Floor, No. 35, Qasemi St, North Side of Sharif University, Azadi Avenue, Tehran, Iran; No. 131, Pardis Technology Park, Pardis, Iran; Unit 3, 2nd Floor, No. 1176, Between 52, 54 VakilAbadi Blvd, Mashhad, Iran; Shahid Beheshti Ave, Sahand St., No. 20, 3rd, Tehran 1587677518, Iran; Website http://www.amnafzar.com; Email Address info@amnafzar.com [IRAN-TRA].
• BAQIYATTALLAH UNIVERSITY OF MEDICAL SCIENCES (a.k.a. BAGHIATOLLAH MEDICAL SCIENCES UNIVERSITY; a.k.a. BAGHYATOLLAH MEDICAL SCIENCES UNIVERSITY; a.k.a. BAGIATOLLAH MEDICAL SCIENCES UNIVERSITY; a.k.a. BAQIATOLLAH MEDICAL SCIENCES UNIVERSITY; a.k.a. BAQIYATALLAH MEDICAL SCIENCES UNIVERSITY; a.k.a. BAQIYATALLAH UNIVERSITY OF MEDICAL SCIENCES; a.k.a. BAQYATOLLAH MEDICAL SCIENCES UNIVERSITY), Vanak Square, Molla-Sadra Avenue, Box number: 19945, Tehran, Iran; Website http://www.bmsu.ac.ir/ [NPWMD].
• CENTER TO INVESTIGATE ORGANIZED CRIME (a.k.a. CENTER FOR INSPECTING ORGANISED CRIMES; a.k.a. CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF ORGANIZED CRIME; a.k.a. CYBER CRIME OFFICE), Tehran, Iran; Website http://www.gerdab.ir [IRAN-TRA].
• IMAM HOSSEIN UNIVERSITY (a.k.a. EMAM HOSEYN COMPREHENSIVE UNIVERSITY; a.k.a. IHU; a.k.a. IMAAM HOSSEIN UNIVERSITY; a.k.a. IMAM HOSEYN UNIVERSITY; a.k.a. IMAM HOSSEIN UNIVERSITY COMPLEX; a.k.a. IMAM HUSSEIN UNIVERSITY; a.k.a. UNIVERSITY OF IMAM HOSEYN), Near Fourth Square, Tehran Pars, Shahid Babaie Highway, near Hakimiyeh and Mini-city, Tehran, Iran; Kilometer 11, Shahid Babaei Highway, Tehran, Iran; Website www.ihu.ac.ir [NPWMD].
• MINISTRY OF CULTURE AND ISLAMIC GUIDANCE, Bahrestan Square, Avenue Kamalolmolik, Tehran, Iran [IRAN-TRA].
• NATIONAL IRANIAN OIL COMPANY (a.k.a. NIOC), National Iranian Oil Company Building, Taleghani Avenue, Hafez Street, Tehran, Iran; Website www.nioc.ir [NPWMD].
• PEYKASA (a.k.a. PEYKASA MESSAGE-WARE CO.), No. 10, #4 Alley, Sadeghi Street, West Corner of Sharif University, Zazadi Avenue, Tehran, Iran; Website http://peykasa.com; Email Address info@peykasa.ir; alt. Email Address rasoul.jalili@peykasa.ir [IRAN-TRA].
• PRESS SUPERVISORY BOARD (a.k.a. IRANIAN PRESS SUPERVISORY BOARD), Tehran, Iran [IRAN-TRA].
• TEHRAN GOSTARESH COMPANY PJS, No. 24, 5th Alley, Khaled Eslamboli Street, Tehran 1513643811, Iran [NPWMD].

Many Changes have been made to OFAC’s SDN List

November 08, 2012 -Federal Register published a final Office of Foreign Assets Control rule amending the Iranian Financial Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 561, to implement sections 214 through 216 of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012. These changes add additional categories of sanctionable activities for which foreign financial institutions may lose their ability to establish correspondent account relationships with United States financial institutions.

Amendments to the Iranian Financial Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR Part 561 – Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control is amending the Iranian Financial Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. Part 561 (the “IFSR”), to incorporate changes made by the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012. These changes strengthen the sanctions imposed against the Iranian Government by expanding the categories of activities for which foreign financial institutions could be subjected to sanctions under the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (“CISADA”). For example, the amendments to subsection (2)(E)(ii) of section 104(c) of CISADA now allow the imposition of sanctions on a foreign financial institution that knowingly facilitates significant transactions or provides significant financial services for a “person” whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to either E.O. 13882 or 13224 in connection with Iran’s proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (“WMD”) or delivery systems for WMD or support for international terrorism; whereas, formerly, the sanctions under this subsection could be imposed only for facilitating significant transactions or providing significant financial services for an Iranian-linked “financial institution” blocked under those orders.

Federal Register / Vol. 77, No. 217 / Thursday, November 8, 2012 / Rules and Regulations

October 22, 2012 – Publication Of Iranian Transactions And Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR Part 560 (The “ITSR”) And Statement Of Licensing Procedure And Related Frequently Asked Questions, And Actions Concerning Iranian General License A And General License B

​The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) published a final rule in the Federal Register on October 22, 2012, changing the heading of the Iranian Transactions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. part 560, to the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. part 560 (the “ITSR”), and amending the renamed ITSR to implement Executive Order 13599 (other than section 11) and sections 1245(c) and (d)(1)(B) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012. These new regulations block the Government of Iran and all Iranian financial institutions and add numerous new sections to the ITSR, including prohibitions, definitions, interpretations, and licensing provisions. Also, a few general licenses that had been included in the Iranian Transactions Regulations have now been removed.

In addition, OFAC is publishing on the Iran section of its Web site a Statement of Licensing Procedure on Support of Human Rights-, Humanitarian-, and Democracy-Related Activities with Respect to Iran. The Statement of Licensing Procedure reflects procedures established pursuant to the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, which was signed into law by the President on August 10, 2012. OFAC is providing a list of frequently asked questions pertaining to the ITSR and the Statement of Licensing Procedure.

In addition, OFAC is publishing a list of the basic medical supplies that are eligible for exportation or reexporation to Iran, subject to certain restrictions, under a new general license set forth in the ITSR. Finally, OFAC is removing General License A and General License B to reflect the changes set forth in the ITSR.

October 18, 2012 – The Department’s Rewards for Justice program is offering rewards for information on two key Iran-based facilitators and financiers of the al-Qaida terrorist organization

The U.S. Department of State has authorized a reward of up to $7 million for information leading to the location of Iran-based senior facilitator and financier Muhsin al-Fadhli and up to $5 million for information leading to the location of his deputy, Adel Radi Saqr al-Wahabi al-Harbi.

Al-Fadhli and al-Harbi facilitate the movement of funds and operatives through Iran on behalf of the al-Qaida terrorist network. Both men are wanted by Saudi authorities in connection with their terrorist activities, and al-Fadhli is wanted by authorities in Kuwait on terrorism-related charges.

Al-Fadhli reportedly has replaced Ezedin Abdel Aziz Khalil (better known as Yasin al-Suri) as al-Qaida’s senior facilitator and financier in Iran. Al-Fadhli was among the few trusted al-Qaida leaders who received advance notification that terrorists would strike the United States on September 11, 2001. He raised money to finance the October 6, 2002 attack on the French ship MV Limburg off the coast of Yemen, which killed one, injured four crew members, and released 50,000 barrels of crude oil along 45 miles of coastline. Department of State Press Release

October 09, 2012 – Non-U.S. Subsidiaries of U.S. Companies Now Prohibited From Engaging in Unlicensed Transactions With Iran

Today President Obama issued an Executive Order that contains the framework for implementing various provisions of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012. HR 1905, which has variously been referred to as ITRSHRA, ITRA or TRA, was passed by Congress on August 1, 2012 and signed into law by the President on August 10, 2012 (Public Law 112-158).

The provision of ITRA that has generated the most interest and will have the most significant impact on U.S. companies is section 218, which prohibits entities owned or controlled by a U.S. person and established or maintained outside the U.S. (i.e., non-U.S. subsidiaries) from knowingly engaging in any transaction, directly or indirectly, with the Government of Iran or any person subject to the jurisdiction of the Government of Iran, if the transaction is prohibited by any U.S. laws or regulations. In other words, ITRA prohibits non-U.S. subsidiaries from engaging in unlicensed transactions with Iran, even if no U.S. persons are involved in the transaction. Section 4 of today’s Executive Order implements the foreign subsidiary provision of ITRA and authorizes the imposition of penalties on U.S. parent companies that own or control the non-U.S. entity that engaged in the prohibited transaction. 

The Treasury Department has been delegated by the President to implement this provision and the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) will be responsible for implementing and enforcing this new aspect of the long-standing U.S. sanctions on Iran.

As a result of today’s action, Iran now joins Cuba as the only U.S. sanctions programs that apply to non-U.S. subsidiaries of U.S. companies.

In accordance with ITRA, the Executive Order states that penalties for violations of the subsidiary prohibition in will not apply if the U.S. person that owns or controls the entity divests or terminates its business with the entity not later than February 6, 2013.

In connection with the issuance of the Executive Order OFAC today issued three Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ) on its website (reprinted below) that provide additional guidance on OFAC’s policy regarding the new prohibitions applicable to foreign subsidiaries of U.S. companies. Importantly, the Executive Order and FAQ 239 state that the U.S. parent liability prohibitions will not apply in cases where general or specific licenses have been issued by OFAC authorizing the foreign subsidiary to engage in the transaction. As a result, U.S. companies that export medicine and medical devices to Iran under licenses issued under the Trade Sanctions Reform Act should review their licenses to ensure that the licenses cover the activities by their foreign subsidiaries.

OFAC QA

QA 238. What is the new prohibition on foreign subsidiaries of U.S. persons, and how does it work?

Section 4 of the Order prohibits an entity owned or controlled by a U.S. person and established or maintained outside the United States (a “foreign subsidiary”) from knowingly engaging in any transaction, directly or indirectly, with the Government of Iran or any person subject to the jurisdiction of the Government of Iran, if that transaction would be prohibited by certain Executive orders prohibiting trade and other dealings with, and investment in, Iran and blocking the Government of Iran and Iranian financial institutions, or any regulation issued pursuant to the foregoing, if the transaction were engaged in by a United States person or in the United States. Civil penalties for the foreign subsidiary’s violation shall be applied to the U.S. parent company to the same extent that they would apply to a U.S. person for the same conduct.

QA 239. Are foreign subsidiaries of U.S. companies covered under OFAC general licenses and/or permitted to apply for specific licenses from OFAC?

To the extent a transaction is exempt from the prohibitions of the Iranian Transactions Regulations, E.O. 13599, section 5 of E.O. 13622, or Section 12 of the Order, or is authorized by a general license issued pursuant to these authorities if engaged in by a U.S. person, it would not be prohibited for a foreign subsidiary (as defined above) to engage in the transaction, provided that it satisfies all the conditions and requirements of the exemption or general license. Similarly, if the transaction is one for which a U.S. person might apply for a specific license — for example, the exportation of medical devices to Iran — a foreign subsidiary or its U.S. parent may apply for a specific license for the foreign subsidiary to engage in the transaction. Note: Whether a U.S. parent company’s specific license covers transactions by its foreign subsidiary that are otherwise prohibited by section 4 of the Order will depend on the terms of that license and the scope of the authorized activities.

QA 240. Is there a wind-down or safe harbor provision in Section 4 of the Order?

Consistent with Section 218(d) of the TRA, Subsection 4(c) of the Order provides that civil penalties shall not apply if the U.S. person divests or terminates its business with the foreign subsidiary (as defined above) not later than February 6, 2013.

Source: International Trade Law News – posted by Douglas N. Jacobson

October 09, 2012 – Release of Iranian General License C-1 – Funds Transfers Related to Earthquake Relief Efforts, To or For the Benefit of Persons in Iran, Authorized until November 19, 2012

The Office of Foreign Assets Control has issued Amended Iranian General License C-1, which authorizes, for an additional 45-day period, U.S.-based non-governmental organizations to raise funds and send those funds to Iran to be used for earthquake relief efforts in response to the August 11, 2012 earthquake in northwestern Iran.

OFAC Recent Actions

October 09, 2012 – Release of Iran Executive Order Implementing the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 and Frequently Asked Questions​ Related to Section 4 of the Executive Order

Today the President signed a new Executive Order (E.O.) “Authorizing the Implementation of Certain Sanctions Set Forth in the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 and Additional Sanctions with Respect to Iran.” OFAC is providing a list of frequently asked questions pertaining to section 4 of the new E.O., which prohibits foreign subsidiaries of United States persons from knowingly violating the Iranian Transactions Regulations, E.O. 13599, section 5 of E.O. 13622, or Section 12 of the new E.O., and provides for civil penalties on the U.S. parent company for any such violations.

OFAC Recent Actions

September 24, 2012 – Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act Determination

The U.S. Department of the Treasury today submitted its report to Congress, as required by the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (ITRSHRA), informing the Congress that the Treasury Department has determined that the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) is an agent or affiliate of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and that, at this time, there is insufficient information to determine whether the National Iranian Tanker Company (NITC) is an agent or affiliate of the IRGC.

The IRGC and NIOC

The IRGC is Iran’s most powerful economic actor, dominating many sectors of the economy, including energy, construction, and banking. The IRGC, long a target of U.S. sanctions, has a history of attempting to circumvent sanctions by maintaining a complex network of front companies. The IRGC and certain IRGC-related entities and individuals have been sanctioned for activities related to Iran’s nuclear program, support for terrorism, commission of serious human rights abuses, and most recently for activities related to human rights abuses in Syria, including repression against the Syrian people.

Recently, the IRGC has been coordinating a campaign to sell Iranian oil in an effort to evade international sanctions, specifically those imposed by the European Union that prohibit the import, shipping, and purchase of Iranian oil, which went into full effect on July 1, 2012. NIOC, which is owned by the Government of Iran through the Ministry of Petroleum, is responsible for the exploration, production, refining, and export of oil and petroleum products in Iran.

Under the current Iranian regime, the IRGC’s influence has grown within NIOC. For example, on August 3, 2011, Iran’s parliament approved the appointment of Rostam Qasemi, a Brigadier General in the IRGC, as Minister of Petroleum. Prior to his appointment, Qasemi was the commander of Khatam Al-Anbia, a construction and development wing of the IRGC that generates income and funds operations for the IRGC. Even in his new role as Minister of Petroleum, Qasemi has publicly stated his allegiance to the IRGC. As the IRGC has become increasingly influential in Iran’s energy sector, Khatam Al-Anbia has obtained billions of dollars worth of contracts with Iranian energy companies, including NIOC, often without participating in a competitive bidding process.

Effects of Today’s Determination

As a result of this ITRSHRA section 312 determination, NIOC now is also a person – the legal definition of an individual or an entity – described under section 104(c)(2)(E)(i) of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (CISADA) as an agent or affiliate of the IRGC whose property or interests in property are blocked pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA). This means that foreign financial institutions determined to knowingly facilitate significant transactions or provide significant financial services for NIOC will be subject to CISADA sanctions, including the prohibition or the imposition of strict conditions on the opening or maintaining of correspondent or payable-through accounts in the United States.

The Treasury Department’s determination that NIOC is an agent or affiliate of the IRGC also implicates section 302 of ITRSHRA, which requires the imposition of sanctions on foreign persons determined to have knowingly provided certain material support to, or engaged in significant transactions with, the IRGC or its officials, agents, or affiliates whose property or interest in property is blocked. ITRSHRA Section 312 provides for an exception to these sanctions for those transactions or services involving NIOC for the purchase of petroleum or petroleum products from Iran if the Secretary of State has determined that the country is significantly reducing its purchases of Iranian oil.

Because both NIOC and NITC are part of the Government of Iran, they are both blocked under Executive Order 13599.

Specially Designated Nationals List Update & Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act Determination

The following changes have been made to OFAC’s SDN List:

• NATIONAL IRANIAN OIL COMPANY (a.k.a. NIOC), Hafez Crossing, Taleghani Avenue, P.O. Box 1863 and 2501, Tehran, Iran; all offices worldwide [IRAN]. -to- NATIONAL IRANIAN OIL COMPANY (a.k.a. NIOC), Hafez Crossing, Taleghani Avenue, P.O. Box 1863 and 2501, Tehran, Iran; all offices worldwide [IRAN] [IRGC].

OFAC Recent Actions & OFAC Press Release

September 22, 2012 – The majority of the designated aircrafts are not U.S. origin in nature. Follow the link to see which types of aircraft were designated

May 31, 2013 – The following aircraft have been added to OFAC’s SDN List: <sort> UR-BHJ; Aircraft Construction Number (also called L/N or S/N or F/N) 2088; Aircraft Manufacture Date Jul 1994; Aircraft Model MD-83; Aircraft Operator Bukovyna AE; Aircraft Manufacturer’s Serial Number (MSN) 53184 (aircraft) [NPWMD] [IFSR] (Linked To: PRYVATNE AKTSIONERNE TOVARYSTVO AVIAKOMPANIYA BUKOVYNA). UR-BXN; Aircraft Construction Number (also called L/N or S/N or F/N) 1405; Aircraft Manufacture Date 08 Apr 1987; Aircraft Model MD-83; Aircraft Operator Bukovyna AE; Aircraft Manufacturer’s Serial Number (MSN) 49569 (aircraft) [NPWMD] [IFSR] (Linked To: PRYVATNE AKTSIONERNE TOVARYSTVO AVIAKOMPANIYA BUKOVYNA). UR-CIX; Aircraft Construction Number (also called L/N or S/N or F/N) 2167; Aircraft Manufacture Date Nov 1996; Aircraft Model MD-88; Aircraft Operator Bukovyna AE; Aircraft Manufacturer’s Serial Number (MSN) 53546 (aircraft) [NPWMD] [IFSR] (Linked To: PRYVATNE AKTSIONERNE TOVARYSTVO AVIAKOMPANIYA BUKOVYNA). UR-CIY; Aircraft Construction Number (also called L/N or S/N or F/N) 2176; Aircraft Manufacture Date Mar 1997; Aircraft Model MD-88; Aircraft Operator Bukovyna AE; Aircraft Manufacturer’s Serial Number (MSN) 53547 (aircraft) [NPWMD] [IFSR] (Linked To: PRYVATNE AKTSIONERNE TOVARYSTVO AVIAKOMPANIYA BUKOVYNA). UR-CJA; Aircraft Construction Number (also called L/N or S/N or F/N) 1181; Aircraft Manufacture Date 04 Jan 1985; Aircraft Model MD-82; Aircraft Operator Bukovyna AE; Aircraft Manufacturer’s Serial Number (MSN) 49277 (aircraft) [NPWMD] [IFSR] (Linked To: PRYVATNE AKTSIONERNE TOVARYSTVO AVIAKOMPANIYA BUKOVYNA). UR-CJK; Aircraft Construction Number (also called L/N or S/N or F/N) 2180; Aircraft Manufacture Date Apr 1997; Aircraft Model MD-88; Aircraft Manufacturer’s Serial Number (MSN) 53548 (aircraft) [NPWMD] [IFSR] (Linked To: PRYVATNE AKTSIONERNE TOVARYSTVO AVIAKOMPANIYA BUKOVYNA). UR-CJW; Aircraft Construction Number (also called L/N or S/N or F/N) 358; Aircraft Manufacture Date 12 Sep 1999; Aircraft Model BAe-146 Avro RJ100; Aircraft Manufacturer’s Serial Number (MSN) 3358 (aircraft) [SDGT] [IFSR]. UR-CKF; Aircraft Construction Number (also called L/N or S/N or F/N) 341; Aircraft Manufacture Date 20 Dec 1998; Aircraft Model BAe-146 Avro RJ100; Aircraft Operator Mahan Air; Aircraft Manufacturer’s Serial Number (MSN) 3341 (aircraft) [SDGT] [IFSR]. UR-CKG; Aircraft Construction Number (also called L/N or S/N or F/N) 362; Aircraft Manufacture Date 16 Nov 1999; Aircraft Model BAe-146 Avro RJ100; Aircraft Operator Mahan Air; Aircraft Manufacturer’s Serial Number (MSN) 3362 (aircraft) [SDGT] [IFSR]. UR-CKJ; Aircraft Construction Number (also called L/N or S/N or F/N) 343; Aircraft Manufacture Date 04 Sep 1999; Aircraft Model BAe-146 Avro RJ100; Aircraft Operator Mahan Air; Aircraft Manufacturer’s Serial Number (MSN) 3343 (aircraft) [SDGT] [IFSR]. UR-CKX; Aircraft Construction Number (also called L/N or S/N or F/N) 131; Aircraft Manufacture Date 25 May 1989; Aircraft Model BAe-146 Avro RJ300; Aircraft Operator Ukrainian-Mediterranean Airlines; alt. Aircraft Operator Ukrainian-Mediterranean Airlines; Aircraft Manufacturer’s Serial Number (MSN) 3131 (aircraft) [SDGT] [IFSR]. UR-CKY; Aircraft Construction Number (also called L/N or S/N or F/N) 146; Aircraft Manufacture Date 08 Jan 1990; Aircraft Model BAe-146 Avro RJ100; Aircraft Operator Mahan Air; Aircraft Manufacturer’s Serial Number (MSN) 3146 (aircraft) [SDGT] [IFSR]. UR-CKZ; Aircraft Construction Number (also called L/N or S/N or F/N) 159; Aircraft Manufacture Date 01 Jan 1990; Aircraft Model BAe-146 Avro RJ300; Aircraft Operator Ukrainian-Mediterranean Airlines; Aircraft Manufacturer’s Serial Number (MSN) 3159 (aircraft) [SDGT] [IFSR]. </sort> OFAC Recent Actions

September 19, 2012 – Designation of Aircrafts Operated by Iran Air, Mahan Air, and Yas Air

The Treasury Department is dentifying as blocked property 117 aircraft operated by Iran Air, Mahan Air, and Yas Air. In the summer of 2012, Iran used Iran Air and Mahan Air flights between Tehran and Damascus to send military and crowd control equipment to the Syrian regime. This activity was coordinated with Hizballah, which in mid-August was designated pursuant to E.O. 13582 for providing support to the Government of Syria.

Iran has used deceptive measures when shipping such items to Syria, by using a combination of passenger and cargo flights and declaring illicit cargo as humanitarian and other licit goods. In the case of Yas Air, the Iranian cargo airline has moved IRGC-QF personnel and weapons under the cover of humanitarian aid. For example, a Turkish inspection in March 2011 of a Yas Air flight bound for Syria – which listed “auto spare parts” on its cargo manifest – found weapons including Kalashnikov AK-47 assault rifles, machine guns, nearly 8,000 rounds of ammunition, as well as an assortment of mortar shells.

• Iran Air was designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 on June 23, 2011 for providing support and services to Iran’s MODAFL, Iran’s Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO), and the IRGC, which are tied to Iran’s ballistic missile program. On numerous occasions since 2000, Iran Air has shipped military-related equipment on behalf of MODAFL and IRGC.

• Mahan Air was designated pursuant to E.O. 13224 on October 12, 2011 for providing financial, material, and technological support to the IRGC-QF. Based in Tehran, Mahan Air has provided transportation, funds transfers and personnel travel services to the IRGC-QF, including IRGC-QF personnel flown to and from Iran and Syria for military training.

• Yas Air was designated pursuant to E.O. 13224 on March 27, 2012. Based in Tehran, Yas Air is an Iranian cargo airline that acts for or on behalf of the IRGC-QF to transport illicit cargo – including weapons – to Iran’s clients in the Levant. Yas Air has moved IRGC-QF personnel and weapons under the cover of humanitarian aid.

The recently enacted Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (ITRSHRA) provides significant sanctions for foreign financial institutions that knowingly facilitate transactions or provide significant financial services to persons whose property or interests in property are blocked in connection with Iran’s support for the proliferation of WMD or for international terrorism, including prohibitions or the imposition of strict conditions on the opening or maintaining in the United States of correspondent accounts or payable-through accounts. As a result of ITRSHRA, foreign financial institutions that knowingly engage in significant transactions with Syria’s Army Supply Bureau, BVPS, Iran Air, Mahan Air, or Yas Air, including any of 117 aircraft operated by any of these airlines, risk losing access to the U.S. banking system.

Today’s designations and identifications build upon a number of actions that the U.S. government has taken to disrupt the Assad regime’s procurement network. In addition, today’s actions support the United States Government’s effort over the past 18 months against the Syrian regime for its human rights abuses and repression of the Syrian people.

September 19, 2012 – Designated IRAN Aircrafts

Registration Construction number Manufacture date Model Operator Serial number Linked to EK-30064 Aircraft Construction Number (also called L/N or S/N or F/N) 464 Aircraft Manufacture Date 17 May 1988 Aircraft Model A300B4-605R Aircraft Operator MAHAN AIR (Aircraft) [SDGT] Linked To: MAHAN AIR. EP-CFD Aircraft Manufacture Date 19 Feb 1993 Aircraft Model F.28-0100 Aircraft Operator IRAN AIR Aircraft Manufacturer’s Serial Number (MSN) 11442 (Aircraft) [NPWMD] Linked To: IRAN AIR. EP-CFE Aircraft Manufacture Date 10 Jun 1992 Aircraft Model F.28-0100 Aircraft Operator IRAN AIR Aircraft Manufacturer’s Serial Number (MSN) 11422 (Aircraft) [NPWMD] Linked To: IRAN AIR. EP-CFH Aircraft Manufacture Date 24 Feb 1993 Aircraft Model F.28-0100 Aircraft Operator IRAN AIR Aircraft Manufacturer’s Serial Number (MSN) 11443 (Aircraft) [NPWMD] Linked To: IRAN AIR. EP-CFI Aircraft Manufacture Date 22 Jan 1996 Aircraft Model F.28-0100 Aircraft Operator IRAN AIR Aircraft Manufacturer’s Serial Number (MSN) 11511 (Aircraft) [NPWMD] Linked To: IRAN AIR. EP-CFJ Aircraft Manufacture Date 09 Jan 1996 Aircraft Model F.28-0100 Aircraft Operator IRAN AIR Aircraft Manufacturer’s Serial Number (MSN) 11516 (Aircraft) [NPWMD] Linked To: IRAN AIR. EP-CFK Aircraft Manufacture Date 18 Feb 1986 Aircraft Model F.28-0100 Aircraft Operator IRAN AIR Aircraft Manufacturer’s Serial Number (MSN) 11518 (Aircraft) [NPWMD] Linked To: IRAN AIR. EP-CFL Aircraft Manufacture Date 28 Jun 1991 Aircraft Model F.28-0100 Aircraft Operator IRAN AIR Aircraft Manufacturer’s Serial Number (MSN) 11343 (Aircraft) [NPWMD] Linked To: IRAN AIR. EP-CFM Aircraft Manufacture Date 27 Apr 1992 Aircraft Model F.28-0100 Aircraft Operator IRAN AIR Aircraft Manufacturer’s Serial Number (MSN) 11394 (Aircraft) [NPWMD] Linked To: IRAN AIR. EP-CFO Aircraft Manufacture Date 03 Apr 1992 Aircraft Model F.28-0100 Aircraft Operator IRAN AIR Aircraft Manufacturer’s Serial Number (MSN) 11389 (Aircraft) [NPWMD] Linked To: IRAN AIR. EP-CFP Aircraft Manufacture Date 24 Jul 1992 Aircraft Model F.28-0100 Aircraft Operator IRAN AIR Aircraft Manufacturer’s Serial Number (MSN) 11409 (Aircraft) [NPWMD] Linked To: IRAN AIR. EP-CFQ Aircraft Manufacture Date 02 Dec 1992 Aircraft Model F.28-0100 Aircraft Operator IRAN AIR Aircraft Manufacturer’s Serial Number (MSN) 11429 (Aircraft) [NPWMD] Linked To: IRAN AIR. EP-CFR Aircraft Manufacture Date 31 Mar 1992 Aircraft Model F.28-0100 Aircraft Operator IRAN AIR Aircraft Manufacturer’s Serial Number (MSN) 11383 (Aircraft) [NPWMD] Linked To: IRAN AIR. EP-GOL Aircraft Construction Number (also called L/N or S/N or F/N) 8305 Aircraft Manufacture Date 1991 Aircraft Model IL-76TD Aircraft Operator YAS AIR Aircraft Manufacturer’s Serial Number (MSN) 1013409297 (Aircraft) [SDGT] Linked To: YAS AIR. EP-GOM Aircraft Construction Number (also called L/N or S/N or F/N) 8401 Aircraft Manufacture Date 1992 Aircraft Model IL76-TD Aircraft Operator YAS AIR Aircraft Manufacturer’s Serial Number (MSN) 1023409321 (Aircraft) [SDGT] Linked To: YAS AIR. EP-GOQ Aircraft Construction Number (also called L/N or S/N or F/N) 2006 Aircraft Manufacture Date 1998 Aircraft Model An-74T-200 Aircraft Operator YAS AIR Aircraft Manufacturer’s Serial Number (MSN) 365470991032 (Aircraft) [SDGT] Linked To: YAS AIR. EP-GOX Aircraft Construction Number (also called L/N or S/N or F/N) 2101 Aircraft Manufacture Date 1998 Aircraft Model An-74T-200 Aircraft Operator YAS AIR Aircraft Manufacturer’s Serial Number (MSN) 3654701211048 (Aircraft) [SDGT] Linked To: YAS AIR. EP-GOY Aircraft Construction Number (also called L/N or S/N or F/N) 2105 Aircraft Manufacture Date 2002 Aircraft Model An-74TK-200 Aircraft Operator YAS AIR Aircraft Manufacturer’s Serial Number (MSN) 3654701211058 (Aircraft) [SDGT] Linked To: YAS AIR. EP-IAA Aircraft Construction Number (also called L/N or S/N or F/N) 275 Aircraft Manufacture Date 20 Feb 1976 Aircraft Model B.747SP-86 Aircraft Operator IRAN AIR Aircraft Manufacturer’s Serial Number (MSN) 20998 (Aircraft) [NPWMD] Linked To: IRAN AIR. EP-IAB Aircraft Construction Number (also called L/N or S/N or F/N) 278 Aircraft Manufacture Date 22 Apr 1976 Aircraft Model B747SP-86 Aircraft Operator IRAN AIR Aircraft Manufacturer’s Serial Number (MSN) 20999 (Aircraft) [NPWMD] Linked To: IRAN AIR. EP-IAC Aircraft Construction Number (also called L/N or S/N or F/N) 307 Aircraft Manufacture Date 16 May 1977 Aircraft Model B.747SP-86 Aircraft Operator IRAN AIR Aircraft) [NPWMD] Linked To: IRAN AIR. EP-IAD Aircraft Construction Number (also called L/N or S/N or F/N) 371 Aircraft Manufacture Date 26 Apr 1979 Aircraft Model B.747SP-86 Aircraft Operator IRAN AIR Aircraft Manufacturer’s Serial Number (MSN) 21758 (Aircraft) [NPWMD] Linked To: IRAN AIR. EP-IAG Aircraft Construction Number (also called L/N or S/N or F/N) 291 Aircraft Manufacture Date 21 Jul 1976 Aircraft Model B.747-286B(SCD) Aircraft Operator IRAN AIR Aircraft Manufacturer’s Serial Number (MSN) 21217 (Aircraft) [NPWMD] Linked To: IRAN AIR. EP-IAH Aircraft Construction Number (also called L/N or S/N or F/N) 300 Aircraft Manufacture Date 22 Dec 1976 Aircraft Model B.747-286B(SCD) Aircraft Operator IRAN AIR Aircraft Manufacturer’s Serial Number (MSN) 21218 (Aircraft) [NPWMD] Linked To: IRAN AIR. EP-IAI Aircraft Construction Number (also called L/N or S/N or F/N) 550 Aircraft Manufacture Date 01 Dec 1981 Aircraft Model B.747-286B(SCD) Aircraft Operator IRAN AIR Aircraft Manufacturer’s Serial Number (MSN) 22670 (Aircraft) [NPWMD] Linked To: IRAN AIR. EP-IAM Aircraft Construction Number (also called L/N or S/N or F/N) 381 Aircraft Manufacture Date 20 Jun 1979 Aircraft Model B.747-186B Aircraft Operator IRAN AIR Aircraft Manufacturer’s Serial Number (MSN) 21759 (Aircraft) [NPWMD] Linked To: IRAN AIR. EP-IBA Aircraft Construction Number (also called L/N or S/N or F/N) 723 Aircraft Manufacture Date 21 Dec 1993 Aircraft Model A300B4-605R Aircraft Operator IRAN AIR (Aircraft) [NPWMD] Linked To: IRAN AIR. EP-IBB Aircraft Construction Number (also called L/N or S/N or F/N) 727 Aircraft Manufacture Date 27 Dec 1994 Aircraft Model A300B4-605R Aircraft Operator IRAN AIR (Aircraft) [NPWMD] Linked To: IRAN AIR. EP-IBC Aircraft Construction Number (also called L/N or S/N or F/N) 632 Aircraft Manufacture Date 11 Mar 1992 Aircraft Model A300B4-605R Aircraft Operator IRAN AIR (Aircraft) [NPWMD] Linked To: IRAN AIR. EP-IBD Aircraft Construction Number (also called L/N or S/N or F/N) 696 Aircraft Manufacture Date Apr 1993 Aircraft Model A300B4-605R Aircraft Operator IRAN AIR (Aircraft) [NPWMD] Linked To: IRAN AIR. EP-IBG Aircraft Construction Number (also called L/N or S/N or F/N) 299 Aircraft Manufacture Date 09 Aug 1984 Aircraft Model A300B4-203 Aircraft Operator Iran Air (Aircraft) [NPWMD] Linked To: IRAN AIR. EP-IBH Aircraft Construction Number (also called L/N or S/N or F/N) 302 Aircraft Manufacture Date 14 Nov 1984 Aircraft Model A300B4-203 Aircraft Operator IRAN AIR (Aircraft) [NPWMD] Linked To: IRAN AIR. EP-IBI Aircraft Construction Number (also called L/N or S/N or F/N) 151 Aircraft Manufacture Date 09 Jun 1981 Aircraft Model A300B4-2C Aircraft Operator IRAN AIR (Aircraft) [NPWMD] Linked To: IRAN AIR. EP-IBJ Aircraft Construction Number (also called L/N or S/N or F/N) 256 Aircraft Manufacture Date 18 May 1983 Aircraft Model A300B4-203 Aircraft Operator IRAN AIR (Aircraft) [NPWMD] Linked To: IRAN AIR. EP-IBK Aircraft Construction Number (also called L/N or S/N or F/N) 671 Aircraft Manufacture Date 19 Feb 1993 Aircraft Model A310-304 Aircraft Operator IRAN AIR (Aircraft) [NPWMD] Linked To: IRAN AIR. EP-IBL Aircraft Construction Number (also called L/N or S/N or F/N) 436 Aircraft Manufacture Date 02 May 1987 Aircraft Model A310-304 Aircraft Operator IRAN AIR (Aircraft) [NPWMD] Linked To: IRAN AIR. EP-IBM Aircraft Construction Number (also called L/N or S/N or F/N) 338 Aircraft Manufacture Date 05 Apr 1985 Aircraft Model A310-203 Aircraft Operator IRAN AIR (Aircraft) [NPWMD] Linked To: IRAN AIR. EP-IBN Aircraft Construction Number (also called L/N or S/N or F/N) 375 Aircraft Manufacture Date 16 Apr 1985 Aircraft Model A310-203 Aircraft Operator IRAN AIR (Aircraft) [NPWMD] Linked To: IRAN AIR. EP-IBP Aircraft Construction Number (also called L/N or S/N or F/N) 370 Aircraft Manufacture Date 06 Jan 1986 Aircraft Model A310-203 Aircraft Operator IRAN AIR (Aircraft) [NPWMD] Linked To: IRAN AIR. EP-IBQ Aircraft Construction Number (also called L/N or S/N or F/N) 389 Aircraft Manufacture Date 20 Jan 1986 Aircraft Model A310-203 Aircraft Operator IRAN AIR (Aircraft) [NPWMD] Linked To: IRAN AIR. EP-IBS Aircraft Construction Number (also called L/N or S/N or F/N) 80 Aircraft Manufacture Date 13 Feb 1980 Aircraft Model A300B2-203 Aircraft Operator IRAN AIR (Aircraft) [NPWMD] Linked To: IRAN AIR. EP-IBT Aircraft Construction Number (also called L/N or S/N or F/N) 185 Aircraft Manufacture Date 09 Mar 1982 Aircraft Model A300B2-203 Aircraft Operator IRAN AIR (Aircraft) [NPWMD] Linked To: IRAN AIR. EP-IBV Aircraft Construction Number (also called L/N or S/N or F/N) 187 Aircraft Manufacture Date 23 Mar 1982 Aircraft Model A300B2-203 Aircraft Operator IRAN AIR (Aircraft) [NPWMD] Linked To: IRAN AIR. EP-IBZ Aircraft Construction Number (also called L/N or S/N or F/N) 226 Aircraft Manufacture Date 13 Dec 1982 Aircraft Model A300B2-203 Aircraft Operator IRAN AIR (Aircraft) [NPWMD] Linked To: IRAN AIR. EP-ICD Aircraft Construction Number (also called L/N or S/N or F/N) 712 Aircraft Manufacture Date 15 Sep 1988 Aircraft Model B.747-21AC Aircraft Operator IRAN AIR Aircraft Manufacturer’s Serial Number (MSN) 24134 (Aircraft) [NPWMD] Linked To: IRAN AIR. EP-ICE Aircraft Construction Number (also called L/N or S/N or F/N) 139 Aircraft Manufacture Date 11 Mar 1981 Aircraft Model A300B4-203 Aircraft Operator IRAN AIR (Aircraft) [NPWMD] Linked To: IRAN AIR. EP-ICF Aircraft Construction Number (also called L/N or S/N or F/N) 173 Aircraft Manufacture Date 14 Dec 1981 Aircraft Model A300B4-203 Aircraft Operator IRAN AIR (Aircraft) [NPWMD] Linked To: IRAN AIR. EP-IDA Aircraft Manufacture Date 12 Jun 1990 Aircraft Model F.28-0100 Aircraft Operator IRAN AIR Aircraft Manufacturer’s Serial Number (MSN) 11292 (Aircraft) [NPWMD]. Linked To: IRAN AIR. EP-IDD Aircraft Manufacture Date 31 Oct 1990 Aircraft Model F.28-0100 Aircraft Operator IRAN AIR Aircraft Manufacturer’s Serial Number (MSN) 11294 (Aircraft) [NPWMD] Linked To: IRAN AIR. EP-IDF Aircraft Manufacture Date 07 Nov 1990 Aircraft Model F.28-0100 Aircraft Operator IRAN AIR Aircraft Manufacturer’s Serial Number (MSN) 11298 (Aircraft) [NPWMD] Linked To: IRAN AIR. EP-IDG Aircraft Manufacture Date 30 Jan 1991 Aircraft Model F.28-0100 Aircraft Operator IRAN AIR Aircraft Manufacturer’s Serial Number (MSN) 11302 (Aircraft) [NPWMD] Linked To: IRAN AIR. EP-IEB Aircraft Construction Number (also called L/N or S/N or F/N) 575 Aircraft Manufacture Date 26 Jan 1996 Aircraft Model A320-232 Aircraft Operator IRAN AIR (Aircraft) [NPWMD] Linked To: IRAN AIR. EP-IEC Aircraft Construction Number (also called L/N or S/N or F/N) 857 Aircraft Manufacture Date 18 Jun 1998 Aircraft Model A320-232 Aircraft Operator IRAN AIR (Aircraft) [NPWMD] Linked To: IRAN AIR. EP-IED Aircraft Construction Number (also called L/N or S/N or F/N) 345 Aircraft Manufacture Date 18 Jun 1992 Aircraft Model A320-212 Aircraft Operator IRAN AIR (Aircraft) [NPWMD] Linked To: IRAN AIR. EP-IEE Aircraft Construction Number (also called L/N or S/N or F/N) 303 Aircraft Manufacture Date 14 Feb 1992 Aircraft Model A320-211 Aircraft Operator IRAN AIR (Aircraft) [NPWMD] Linked To: IRAN AIR. EP-IEF Aircraft Construction Number (also called L/N or S/N or F/N) 312 Aircraft Manufacture Date 05 Mar 1992 Aircraft Model A320-211 Aircraft Operator IRAN AIR (Aircraft) [NPWMD] Linked To: IRAN AIR. EP-IEG Aircraft Construction Number (also called L/N or S/N or F/N) 2054 Aircraft Manufacture Date 06 Jun 2003 Aircraft Model A320-211 Aircraft Operator IRAN AIR (Aircraft) [NPWMD] Linked To: IRAN AIR. EP-IRK Aircraft Construction Number (also called L/N or S/N or F/N) 541 Aircraft Manufacture Date 04 Dec 1966 Aircraft Model B.707-321C Aircraft Operator IRAN AIR Aircraft Manufacturer’s Serial Number (MSN) 19267 (Aircraft) [NPWMD] Linked To: IRAN AIR. EP-IRL Aircraft Construction Number (also called L/N or S/N or F/N) 832 Aircraft Manufacture Date 15 Dec 1969 Aircraft Model B.707-386C Aircraft Operator IRAN AIR Aircraft Manufacturer’s Serial Number (MSN) 20287 (Aircraft) [NPWMD] Linked To: IRAN AIR. EP-IRM Aircraft Construction Number (also called L/N or S/N or F/N) 839 Aircraft Manufacture Date 04 Mar 1970 Aircraft Model B.707-386C Aircraft Operator IRAN AIR Aircraft Manufacturer’s Serial Number (MSN) 20288 (Aircraft) [NPWMD] Linked To: IRAN AIR. EP-IRN Aircraft Construction Number (also called L/N or S/N or F/N) 866 Aircraft Manufacture Date 18 Apr 1973 Aircraft Model B.707-386C Aircraft Operator IRAN AIR Aircraft Manufacturer’s Serial Number (MSN) 20741 (Aircraft) [NPWMD] Linked To: IRAN AIR. EP-IRR Aircraft Construction Number (also called L/N or S/N or F/N) 1052 Aircraft Manufacture Date 24 Jun 1974 Aircraft Model B.727-286 Aircraft Operator IRAN AIR Aircraft Manufacturer’s Serial Number (MSN) 20946 (Aircraft) [NPWMD] Linked To: IRAN AIR. EP-IRS Aircraft Construction Number (also called L/N or S/N or F/N) 1070 Aircraft Manufacture Date 12 Sep 1974 Aircraft Model B.727-286 Aircraft Operator IRAN AIR Aircraft Manufacturer’s Serial Number (MSN) 20947 (Aircraft) [NPWMD] Linked To: IRAN AIR. EP-IRT Aircraft Construction Number (also called L/N or S/N or F/N) 1114 Aircraft Manufacture Date 03 Mar 1975 Aircraft Model B.727-286 Aircraft Operator IRAN AIR Aircraft Manufacturer’s Serial Number (MSN) 21078 (Aircraft) [NPWMD] Linked To: IRAN AIR. EP-MDD Aircraft Construction Number (also called L/N or S/N or F/N) 1959 Aircraft Manufacture Date Jul 1992 Aircraft Model MD-82 Aircraft Operator IRAN AIR TOURS Aircraft Manufacturer’s Serial Number (MSN) 49852 (Aircraft) [NPWMD] Linked To: IRAN AIR. EP-MDE Aircraft Construction Number (also called L/N or S/N or F/N) 1724 Aircraft Manufacture Date Dec 1990 Aircraft Model MD-82 Aircraft Operator IRAN AIR TOURS Aircraft Manufacturer’s Serial Number (MSN) 49523 (Aircraft) [NPWMD] Linked To: IRAN AIR. EP-MHA Aircraft Construction Number (also called L/N or S/N or F/N) 160 Aircraft Manufacture Date 17 Sep 1981 Aircraft Model A300B2K-3C Aircraft Operator MAHAN AIR (Aircraft) [SDGT] Linked To: MAHAN AIR. EP-MHF Aircraft Construction Number (also called L/N or S/N or F/N) 55 Aircraft Manufacture Date 01 Mar 1978 Aircraft Model A300B4-103 Aircraft Operator MAHAN AIR (Aircraft) [SDGT] Linked To: MAHAN AIR. EP-MHG Aircraft Construction Number (also called L/N or S/N or F/N) 204 Aircraft Manufacture Date 29 Jul 1982 Aircraft Model A300B4-203 Aircraft Operator MAHAN AIR (Aircraft) [SDGT] Linked To: MAHAN AIR. EP-MHJ Aircraft Construction Number (also called L/N or S/N or F/N) 857 Aircraft Manufacture Date 18 Jun 1998 Aircraft Model A320-232 Aircraft Operator MAHAN AIR (Aircraft) [SDGT] Linked To: MAHAN AIR. EP-MHL Aircraft Construction Number (also called L/N or S/N or F/N) 175 Aircraft Manufacture Date 02 Feb 1982 Aircraft Model A300B4-203 Aircraft Operator MAHAN AIR (Aircraft) [SDGT] Linked To: MAHAN AIR. EP-MHM Aircraft Construction Number (also called L/N or S/N or F/N) 90 Aircraft Manufacture Date 05 Nov 1980 Aircraft Model A300B2K-3C Aircraft Operator MAHAN AIR (Aircraft) [SDGT] Linked To: MAHAN AIR. EP-MHO Aircraft Construction Number (also called L/N or S/N or F/N) 488 Aircraft Manufacture Date 13 Jan 1989 Aircraft Model A310-304 Aircraft Operator MAHAN AIR (Aircraft) [SDGT] Linked To: MAHAN AIR. EP-MHP Aircraft Construction Number (also called L/N or S/N or F/N) 244 Aircraft Manufacture Date 09 Mar 1983 Aircraft Model A300B2K-3C Aircraft Operator MAHAN AIR (Aircraft) [SDGT] Linked To: MAHAN AIR. EP-MNA Aircraft Construction Number (also called L/N or S/N or F/N) 811 Aircraft Manufacture Date 18 Feb 1993 Aircraft Model B.747-422 Aircraft Operator MAHAN AIR Aircraft Manufacturer’s Serial Number (MSN) 24383 (Aircraft) [SDGT] Linked To: MAHAN AIR. EP-MNB Aircraft Construction Number (also called L/N or S/N or F/N) 740 Aircraft Manufacture Date 20 Jul 1989 Aircraft Model B.747-422 Aircraft Operator MAHAN AIR Aircraft Manufacturer’s Serial Number (MSN) 24363 (Aircraft) [SDGT] Linked To: MAHAN AIR. EP-MNC Aircraft Construction Number (also called L/N or S/N or F/N) 973 Aircraft Manufacture Date 12 Apr 1993 Aircraft Model B.747-422 Aircraft Operator MAHAN AIR Aircraft Manufacturer’s Serial Number (MSN) 26879 (Aircraft) [SDGT] Linked To: MAHAN AIR. EP-MND Aircraft Construction Number (also called L/N or S/N or F/N) 632 Aircraft Manufacture Date 23 Jan 1986 Aircraft Model B747-3B3 Aircraft Operator MAHAN AIR Aircraft Manufacturer’s Serial Number (MSN) 23413 (Aircraft) [SDGT] Linked To: MAHAN AIR. EP-MNE Aircraft Construction Number (also called L/N or S/N or F/N) 641 Aircraft Manufacture Date 14 Apr 1986 Aircraft Model B747-3B3 Aircraft Operator MAHAN AIR Aircraft Manufacturer’s Serial Number (MSN) 23480 (Aircraft) [SDGT] Linked To: MAHAN AIR. EP-MNG Aircraft Construction Number (also called L/N or S/N or F/N) 401 Aircraft Manufacture Date 02 Feb 1987 Aircraft Model A300B4-603 Aircraft Operator MAHAN AIR (Aircraft) [SDGT] Linked To: MAHAN AIR. EP-MNH Aircraft Construction Number (also called L/N or S/N or F/N) 405 Aircraft Manufacture Date 03 Feb 1987 Aircraft Model A300B4-603 Aircraft Operator MAHAN AIR (Aircraft) [SDGT] Linked To: MAHAN AIR. EP-MNI Aircraft Construction Number (also called L/N or S/N or F/N) 408 Aircraft Manufacture Date 23 Feb 1987 Aircraft Model A300B4-603 Aircraft Operator MAHAN AIR (Aircraft) [SDGT] Linked To: MAHAN AIR. EP-MNJ Aircraft Construction Number (also called L/N or S/N or F/N) 380 Aircraft Manufacture Date 31 Dec 1986 Aircraft Model A300B4-603 Aircraft Operator MAHAN AIR (Aircraft) [SDGT] Linked To: MAHAN AIR. EP-MNK Aircraft Construction Number (also called L/N or S/N or F/N) 618 Aircraft Manufacture Date 04 Sep 1991 Aircraft Model A300B4-603 Aircraft Operator MAHAN AIR (Aircraft) [SDGT] Linked To: MAHAN AIR. EP-MNL Aircraft Construction Number (also called L/N or S/N or F/N) 623 Aircraft Manufacture Date 23 Oct 1991 Aircraft Model A300B4-603 Aircraft Operator MAHAN AIR (Aircraft) [SDGT] Linked To: MAHAN AIR. EP-MNM Aircraft Construction Number (also called L/N or S/N or F/N) 773 Aircraft Manufacture Date 13 Nov 1986 Aircraft Model A300B4-605R Aircraft Operator MAHAN AIR (Aircraft) [SDGT] Linked To: MAHAN AIR. EP-MNN Aircraft Construction Number (also called L/N or S/N or F/N) 701 Aircraft Manufacture Date 17 May 1993 Aircraft Model A300B4-605R Aircraft Operator MAHAN AIR (Aircraft) [SDGT] Linked To: MAHAN AIR. EP-MNO Aircraft Construction Number (also called L/N or S/N or F/N) 595 Aircraft Manufacture Date 30 Aug 1991 Aircraft Model A310-308 Aircraft Operator MAHAN AIR (Aircraft) [SDGT] Linked To: MAHAN AIR. EP-MNP Aircraft Construction Number (also called L/N or S/N or F/N) 620 Aircraft Manufacture Date 08 Nov 1991 Aircraft Model A310-308 Aircraft Operator MAHAN AIR (Aircraft) [SDGT] Linked To: MAHAN AIR. EP-MNQ Aircraft Construction Number (also called L/N or S/N or F/N) 553 Aircraft Manufacture Date 08 Dec 1989 Aircraft Model A300B4-603 Aircraft Operator MAHAN AIR (Aircraft) [SDGT] Linked To: MAHAN AIR. EP-MNR Aircraft Construction Number (also called L/N or S/N or F/N) 411 Aircraft Manufacture Date 27 Mar 1987 Aircraft Model A300B4-603 Aircraft Operator MAHAN AIR (Aircraft) [SDGT] Linked To: MAHAN AIR. EP-MNS Aircraft Construction Number (also called L/N or S/N or F/N) 414 Aircraft Manufacture Date 17 Apr 1987 Aircraft Model A300B4-603 alt. Aircraft Operator MAHAN AIR (Aircraft) [SDGT] Linked To: MAHAN AIR. EP-MNT Aircraft Construction Number (also called L/N or S/N or F/N) 546 Aircraft Manufacture Date 06 Nov 1989 Aircraft Model A300B4-603 Aircraft Operator MAHAN AIR (Aircraft) [SDGT] Linked To: MAHAN AIR. EP-MNU Aircraft Construction Number (also called L/N or S/N or F/N) 608 Aircraft Manufacture Date 10 Apr 1991 Aircraft Model A300B4-605R Aircraft Operator MAHAN AIR (Aircraft) [SDGT] Linked To: MAHAN AIR. EP-MNV Aircraft Construction Number (also called L/N or S/N or F/N) 567 Aircraft Manufacture Date 03 Jan 1991 Aircraft Model A310-304 Aircraft Operator MAHAN AIR (Aircraft) [SDGT] Linked To: MAHAN AIR. EP-MNX Aircraft Construction Number (also called L/N or S/N or F/N) 564 Aircraft Manufacture Date 22 Nov 1990 Aircraft Model A310-304 Aircraft Operator MAHAN AIR (Aircraft) [SDGT] Linked To: MAHAN AIR. EP-MOA Aircraft Construction Number (also called L/N or S/N or F/N) 216 Aircraft Manufacture Date 18 Feb 1993 Aircraft Model B.146-300 Aircraft Operator MAHAN AIR Aircraft Manufacturer’s Serial Number (MSN) 3216 (Aircraft) [SDGT] Linked To: MAHAN AIR. EP-MOB Aircraft Construction Number (also called L/N or S/N or F/N) 212 Aircraft Manufacture Date 31 Jul 1992 Aircraft Model B.146-300 Aircraft Operator MAHAN AIR Aircraft Manufacturer’s Serial Number (MSN) 3212 (Aircraft) [SDGT] Linked To: MAHAN AIR. EP-MOC Aircraft Construction Number (also called L/N or S/N or F/N) 158 Aircraft Manufacture Date 18 May 1990 Aircraft Model B.146-300 Aircraft Operator MAHAN AIR Aircraft Manufacturer’s Serial Number (MSN) 3158 (Aircraft) [SDGT] Linked To: MAHAN AIR. EP-MOE Aircraft Construction Number (also called L/N or S/N or F/N) 129 Aircraft Manufacture Date 24 May 1989 Aircraft Model B.146-300 Aircraft Operator MAHAN AIR Aircraft Manufacturer’s Serial Number (MSN) 3129 (Aircraft) [SDGT] Linked To: MAHAN AIR. EP-MOF Aircraft Construction Number (also called L/N or S/N or F/N) 149 Aircraft Manufacture Date 19 Dec 1989 Aircraft Model B.146-300 Aircraft Operator MAHAN AIR Aircraft Manufacturer’s Serial Number (MSN) 3149 (Aircraft) [SDGT] Linked To: MAHAN AIR. EP-MOG Aircraft Construction Number (also called L/N or S/N or F/N) 165 Aircraft Manufacture Date 12 May 1990 Aircraft Model B.146-300 Aircraft Operator MAHAN AIR Aircraft Manufacturer’s Serial Number (MSN) 3165 (Aircraft) [SDGT] Linked To: MAHAN AIR. EP-VIP Aircraft Construction Number (also called L/N or S/N or F/N) 499 Aircraft Manufacture Date 20 Apr 1989 Aircraft Model A310-304 Aircraft Operator MAHAN AIR (Aircraft) [SDGT] Linked To: MAHAN AIR. EX-301 Aircraft Construction Number (also called L/N or S/N or F/N) 524 Aircraft Manufacture Date 27 Sep 1989 Aircraft Model A310-304 Aircraft Operator MAHAN AIR (Aircraft) [SDGT] Linked To: MAHAN AIR. EX-35011 Aircraft Construction Number (also called L/N or S/N or F/N) 838 Aircraft Manufacture Date 28 Aug 2002 Aircraft Model A300B4-622R Aircraft Operator MAHAN AIR (Aircraft) [SDGT] Linked To: MAHAN AIR. F-OJHH Aircraft Construction Number (also called L/N or S/N or F/N) 586 Aircraft Manufacture Date 29 Mar 1991 Aircraft Model A310-304 Aircraft Operator MAHAN AIR (Aircraft) [SDGT] Linked To: MAHAN AIR. F-OJHI Aircraft Construction Number (also called L/N or S/N or F/N) 537 Aircraft Manufacture Date 19 Jan 1990 Aircraft Model A310-304 Aircraft Operator MAHAN AIR (Aircraft) [SDGT] Linked To: MAHAN AIR. UR-BXI Aircraft Construction Number (also called L/N or S/N or F/N) 2065 Aircraft Manufacture Date Jun 1993 Aircraft Model MD-82 Aircraft Operator IRAN AIR TOURS Aircraft Manufacturer’s Serial Number (MSN) 53170 (Aircraft) [NPWMD] Linked To: IRAN AIR. UR-BXL Aircraft Construction Number (also called L/N or S/N or F/N) 1548 Aircraft Manufacture Date Jun 1989 Aircraft Model MD-82 Aircraft Operator IRAN AIR TOURS Aircraft Manufacturer’s Serial Number (MSN) 49512 (Aircraft) [NPWMD] Linked To: IRAN AIR. UR-BXM Aircraft Construction Number (also called L/N or S/N or F/N) 1381 Aircraft Manufacture Date Jan 1988 Aircraft Model MD-82 Aircraft Operator IRAN AIR TOURS Aircraft Manufacturer’s Serial Number (MSN) 49505 (Aircraft) [NPWMD] Linked To: IRAN AIR. UR-CGS Aircraft Construction Number (also called L/N or S/N or F/N) 1240 Aircraft Model MD-82 Aircraft Operator IRAN AIR TOURS Aircraft Manufacturer’s Serial Number (MSN) 49425 (Aircraft) [NPWMD] Linked To: IRAN AIR. UR-CGT Aircraft Construction Number (also called L/N or S/N or F/N) 1241 Aircraft Model MD-82 Aircraft Operator Iran Air Tours Aircraft Manufacturer’s Serial Number (MSN) 49428 (Aircraft) [NPWMD] Linked To: IRAN AIR. UR-CHW Aircraft Construction Number (also called L/N or S/N or F/N) 1514 Aircraft Manufacture Date Mar 1989 Aircraft Model MD-82 Aircraft Operator IRAN AIR TOURS Aircraft Manufacturer’s Serial Number (MSN) 49510 (Aircraft) [NPWMD] Linked To: IRAN AIR. UR-CHX Aircraft Construction Number (also called L/N or S/N or F/N) 2010 Aircraft Manufacture Date Jul 1992 Aircraft Model MD-82 Aircraft Operator IRAN AIR TOURS Aircraft Manufacturer’s Serial Number (MSN) 53162 (Aircraft) [NPWMD] Linked To: IRAN AIR. UR-CHY Aircraft Construction Number (also called L/N or S/N or F/N) 2067 Aircraft Manufacture Date Jun 1993 Aircraft Model MD-82 Aircraft Operator IRAN AIR TOURS Aircraft Manufacturer’s Serial Number (MSN) 53171 (Aircraft) [NPWMD] Linked To: IRAN AIR. UR-CHZ Aircraft Construction Number (also called L/N or S/N or F/N) 2063 Aircraft Manufacture Date May 1993 Aircraft Model MD-82 Aircraft Operator IRAN AIR TOURS Aircraft Manufacturer’s Serial Number (MSN) 53169 (Aircraft) [NPWMD] Linked To: IRAN AIR. UR-CJQ Aircraft Construction Number (also called L/N or S/N or F/N) 1300 Aircraft Manufacture Date Jun 1987 Aircraft Model MD-82 Aircraft Operator IRAN AIR TOURS Aircraft Manufacturer’s Serial Number (MSN) 49502 (Aircraft) [NPWMD] Linked To: IRAN AIR.

Iranian Airline Companies (some (not all) are designated) <sort> Aram Air Aria Air Arsh Air Arvand Airlines Ata Airlines Atlas Air Bonyad Airlines Caspian Airlines Chabahar Airlines Eram Air Fars Qeshm Air Ilam Airline Iran Air Iran Air Tours Iran Aseman Airlines Iranian Air Transport Kish Air Mahan Air Naft Air Navid Air Pariz Air Payam Air Photros Air Qeshm Air Safat Airlines Safiran Airlines Saha Airlines Sahand Airlines Simorgh Air TA-Air Airline Taban Air Tara Airlines Tehran Airlines Yas Air Zagros Airlines </sort>

OFAC Recent Actions

September 17, 2012 – US Extends Iran Sanctions Waivers for EU Countries, Japan

The U.S. State Department said late Friday that it would extend a waiver on sanctions against Iran for Japan and 10 European countries.

The nations–Belgium, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain and the U.K.–qualified in March for an exception to Iran sanctions because they significantly reduced their oil purchases from Tehran, as required by U.S. law signed last year. The extension lasts another 180 days, when it’s up for renewal again.

Source: WSJ News Item – Sep 17, 2012

September 14, 2012 – The United States is determined to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon and has pursued a dual-track policy to do so. Yesterday, the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) Board of Governors overwhelmingly adopted a resolution that clearly reflects the international community’s concerns regarding Iran’s nuclear program. Iran must take concrete steps to address those concerns. Iran must cooperate fully and immediately with the IAEA on all outstanding issues. We welcome the resolve of the international community to make clear the onus is on Iran to abide by its international obligations, honor its commitments to the IAEA, and prove that its intentions are peaceful.

Statement on Iran US Department of State Press Release

August 21, 2012 – Release of Iranian General License C – Funds Tranfers Related to Earthquake Relief Efforts, To or For the Benefit of Persons in Iran Authorized until October 5, 2012

The Office of Foreign Assets Control has issued Iranian General License C, which authorizes, for a 45-day period, U.S.- based non-governmental organizations to raise funds and send those funds to Iran to be used for earthquake relief efforts in response to the August 11, 2012 earthquake in northwestern Iran. OFAC Resource Center

The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) today announced the issuance of a temporary general license to ease financial transactions related to earthquake relief in Iran. Since the August 11, 2012 earthquake that hit northwestern Iran, the United States has made it clear that it would offer assistance to the Iranian people as they recover and rebuild. The Iranian government has not accepted the U.S. offer of assistance, but non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have been assisting in the relief efforts. To assist their efforts, OFAC issued a temporary general license today, which authorizes, for the next 45 days, NGOs with 501(c)(3) status to collect funds to be used in direct support of humanitarian relief and reconstruction activities in response to the earthquake. The general license is a demonstration of the Administration’s commitment to supporting the Iranian people affected by this tragedy, and responds to the American people’s desire to provide immediate assistance.

Under the general license, which will remain in effect until October 5, 2012, an NGO can transfer funds up to $300,000 during the 45-day period to Iran to be used for humanitarian relief and reconstruction activities related to the earthquake response. NGOs interested in transferring more than $300,000 during the 45-day period may apply for a specific license. It is important to note that the general license specifically forbids any dealings or involvement with individuals or entities designated for support for the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or terrorism, such as the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), as listed on the Treasury Department’s List of Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons (SDN List).

Donations of food and medicine to Iran already do not require a license from OFAC. These donations, when intended to be used to relieve human suffering, are exempt from the sanctions on trade between the U.S. and Iran, as long as the donations are not being sent to the Government of Iran or any Iranian individual or entity on the Treasury Department’s SDN List. For all practical purposes, such donations to the Iranian people, including transactions needed to ship permissible donations, can occur without a specific license from OFAC.

August 14, 2012 – United States Extends and Tightens Iran Sanctions

In unprecedented ways, the ITRA and the 31 July Order strengthen the posture of the United States in the two main areas of Iran sanctions. First, they take the embargo on Iran-related activity by U.S. companies and individuals about as far as it can go. Second, they expand the types of activity by non-U.S. companies and individuals that can trigger secondary boycott sanctions by the U.S. government. Secondary boycott sanctions are sanctions imposed extraterritorially against particular non-U.S. companies and individuals in response to specified types of activity related to Iran. Secondary boycott sanctions do not involve traditional civil or criminal penalties but instead are measures designed to prevent non-U.S. persons from accessing the U.S. market or conducting business with U.S. persons. In this way, the U.S. “boycotts” these entities based on their involvement with Iran.

Please see full alert- follow the link JDSupra Background Article

August 14, 2012 – Clarifying Guidance on Humanitarian Assistance to Iran

OFAC has published clarifying guidance on humanitarian assistance to Iran in the aftermath of the tragic earthquake in northeastern Iran.

July 31, 2012 – US to take additional steps with respect to the national emergency declared in Executive Order 12957 of March 15, 1995, as relied upon for additional steps in subsequent Executive Orders, particularly in light of the Government of Iran’s use of revenues from petroleum, petroleum products, and petrochemicals for illicit purposes, Iran’s continued attempts to evade international sanctions through deceptive practices, and the unacceptable risk posed to the international financial system by Iran’s activities. To read the order in detail please follow the link Executive Order Authorizing Additional Sanctions With Respect to Iran

July 31, 2012 – Release of Iran Executive Order; Addition of names to the The List of Foreign Financial Institutions Subject to Part 561 (the “Part 561 List”)​

WASHINGTON – The U.S. Department of the Treasury today announced the imposition of sanctions under the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (CISADA), against two financial institutions for knowingly facilitating significant transactions and providing significant financial services for designated Iranian banks. The financial institutions sanctioned today are Bank of Kunlun in China and Elaf Islamic Bank in Iraq.

Acting to expose and isolate Iranian financial institutions connected to Iran’s WMD proliferation or support for terrorism, the Treasury Department has imposed sanctions against two dozen Iranian banks. As financial institutions around the world have cut ties with these designated Iranian banks, Bank of Kunlun and Elaf Islamic Bank took the opposite approach by providing financial services to designated Iranian banks and facilitating the movement of millions of dollars worth of international transactions.

“Our actions to cut off Kunlun and Elaf from the U.S. financial system underscore Treasury’s commitment to use all the tools at its disposal to intensify financial pressure against Iran while protecting the U.S. financial system from illicit activity,” said Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence David S. Cohen. “Any bank, anywhere, that seeks to provide a financial lifeline to Iran’s designated financial institutions should know that it will be held accountable and its activity will be exposed.”

Today’s action against Bank of Kunlun and Elaf Islamic Bank effectively bars them from directly accessing the U.S. financial system. As a result of the sanctions imposed today under CISADA, financial institutions may not open correspondent or payable-through accounts for Bank of Kunlun or Elaf Islamic Bank in the United States and any financial institutions that currently hold such accounts must close them within 10 days.

Bank of Kunlun has provided significant financial services to more than six Iranian banks that were designated by the United States in connection with Iran’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs or its support for international terrorism.

Bank of Kunlun has provided hundreds of millions of dollars worth of financial services to these designated banks, including holding accounts, making transfers, and paying their letters of credit.

In early 2012, Bank of Kunlun transferred hundreds of payments totaling roughly $100 million dollars from accounts it holds for designated Bank Tejarat. This activity happened after Bank Tejarat was designated by the United States (and the European Union) in January 2012 for providing financial services to several Iranian banks and firms already subject to sanctions for their involvement in Iran’s illicit proliferation activities.

In addition to these transfers, in early 2012 Bank of Kunlun made at least one payment for an affiliate of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps pursuant to a letter of credit opened by Bank Tejarat.

Elaf Islamic Bank, privately-owned Iraqi financial institution, has facilitated significant financial transactions and provided significant financial services for a designated Iranian bank. Iraq’s Elaf Islamic Bank has engaged in activity during the past year worth tens of millions of dollars with the Export Development Bank of Iran, which was designated by the United States in October 2008 and also designated by the European Union in July 2010 for its support of Iran’s proliferation activities.

Financial Provisions of CISADA

CISADA was signed into law by President Obama in July 2010. It provides the Secretary of the Treasury with the authority to impose strict conditions on, or prohibit the opening or maintaining of, correspondent accounts or payable-through accounts in the United States for foreign financial institutions that the Secretary finds knowingly:

Facilitate the efforts of the Government of Iran, including Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), to acquire WMD or delivery systems for WMD or to support international terrorism. Facilitate the activities of a person subject to financial sanctions under certain United Nations Security Council Resolutions related to Iran. Engage in money laundering, or facilitate the efforts of the Central Bank of Iran or any other Iranian financial institution, to carry out the activities described above. Facilitate a significant transaction or provide significant financial services for the IRGC or its agents or affiliates whose property and interests in property are blocked under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA); or a financial institution whose property and interests in property are blocked under IEEPA in connection with Iran’s proliferation of WMD or delivery systems for WMD or Iran’s support for international terrorism. The Treasury Department has issued the Iranian Financial Sanctions Regulations (IFSR) to implement these and other provisions of CISADA.

To view more information on the IFSR, click here

Identifying Information:

• Bank of Kunlun Co. Ltd., FKA: Karamay Urban Credit Cooperatives, FKA: Karamay City Commercial Bank Co Ltd.
• Elaf Islamic Bank, Address: PO Box 3440, Bldg No. 14, Street 99, Hai Al Wehda-Mahala 902, Alweih, Baghdad, Iraq

• Frequently Asked Questions related to the Executive Order
• List of Foreign Financial Institutions Subject to Part 561 (the “Part 561 List”)

July 19, 2012 – OFAC has released an Important Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL) Advisory

The Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) is issuing this Advisory to alert the maritime industry that IRISL has recently been operating vessels despite their flags having been revoked. International sanctions, and IRISL’s efforts to evade them through deceptive practices, have led to increased vigilance by the maritime industry and prompted an increasing number of countries to revoke or refuse to issue a flag to vessels in which IRISL or its affiliates have an interest (“IRISL vessels”). For example, Sierra Leone is the latest country to take such action. On June 25, 2012, Sierra Leone took action to revoke its flag for the Irano-Hind vessel AMIN.

As more jurisdictions refuse to flag IRISL vessels, it is increasingly likely that persons will encounter IRISL vessels that are not properly flagged. Therefore, maritime authorities should be alert to the presentation by IRISL of potentially fabricated vessel registration and flag credentials at ports of call and canal entrances. We urge state port control and canal authorities to thoroughly scrutinize the certificates of registry of IRISL vessels, to ensure that such documentation is not expired or fraudulent and, if they are found lacking, to take action appropriate and consistent with domestic and international law. Maritime authorities and other persons in the maritime industry should be aware that assisting IRISL or its blocked affiliates to re-flag their vessels may constitute the provision of services to a person whose property is blocked and may be considered a basis for designation pursuant to Executive Order 13382.

July 12, 2012 – U.S. TREASURY DEPARTMENT OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE: July 12, 2012 – FACT SHEET: Increasing Sanctions Against Iran (WebSite) & Increasing Sanctions Against Iran (PDF)

July 12, 2012 – United States Increases Sanctions Against The Government Of Iran And Its Proliferation Networks

Today, the United States is imposing additional sanctions on Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile proliferation networks, and is also taking additional steps to prevent the evasion of sanctions by publicly identifying a group of Iranian front companies and banks. These actions are part of the United States government’s dual-track approach of increasing pressure to convince Iran to engage seriously and address the international community’s concerns about its nuclear program.

“Iran today is under intense, multilateral sanctions pressure, and we will continue to ratchet up the pressure so long as Iran refuses to address the international community’s well-founded concerns about its nuclear program,” said Treasury Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence David S. Cohen. “Today’s actions are our next step on that path, taking direct aim at disrupting Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs as well as its deceptive efforts to use front companies to sell and move its oil.”

Targeting Iran’s Nuclear and Missile Proliferation Activities

Since 2005, the United States has imposed a series of targeted, conduct-based sanctions under Executive Order (E.O.) 13382, “Blocking Property of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferators and Their Supporters,” on persons, firms and financial institutions involved in Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs. This sustained sanctions effort has both disrupted the progress of Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile program and imposed significant pressure on the Iranian government.

Continuing the effort to target Iran’s nuclear and missile proliferation activities, the U.S. Departments of the Treasury and State are today designating 11 entities and four individuals under E.O. 13382. As described in more detail in the accompanying Fact Sheet, many of the individuals and entities designated today are part of a network of proliferators headed by Iran’s Ministry of Defense for Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL) and its subsidiary, Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO). A number of additional designations are related to Iran’s national maritime carrier, Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL), and Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), both of which have been the target of a numerous sanctions actions by the United States and our partners around the world.

Preventing the Circumvention of International Sanctions on Iran

The Treasury Department is also acting today to prevent the circumvention of international sanctions on Iran – including sanctions on oil trade with Iran – by publicly exposing numerous Iranian front companies, ships and banks that are part of the Government of Iran. The specific entities identified in today’s action are described in the accompanying Fact Sheet.

Treasury is identifying these Government of Iran entities pursuant to E.O. 13599, which blocks all property and interests in property within U.S. jurisdiction of the Government of Iran and of all Iranian financial institutions, and prohibits U.S. persons or those within U.S. jurisdiction from having dealings with them. To assist U.S. persons in complying with their obligation to freeze the assets of, and not to deal with, any such entities, the Treasury Department from time to time identifies entities that are owned or controlled by, or acting for or on behalf of, the Government of Iran.

Today’s identifications include four front companies for the Naftiran Intertrade Company (NICO) or the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) — Petro Suisse Intertrade Company SA; Hong Kong Intertrade Company; Noor Energy (Malaysia) Ltd.; and Petro Energy Intertrade Company. NICO intended to use Petro Energy Intertrade to evade western sanctions. The Treasury Department identified NICO and NIOC, both of which are centrally involved in the sale of Iranian oil, in 2008 as entities that are owned or controlled by the Government of Iran.

The Treasury Department is also identifying today the National Iranian Tanker Company (NITC) as a Government of Iran entity and, for the first time, the NITC fleet and various front companies belonging to NITC. In addition, the Treasury Department is also identifying 20 Iranian financial institutions for inclusion on its List of Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons (SDN List).

These identifications highlight Iran’s attempts to evade sanctions through the use of front companies, as well as its attempts to conceal its tanker fleet by repainting, reflagging, or disabling GPS devices. They will assist U.S. persons in complying with E.O. 13599, and will also assist persons and entities around the world in complying with U.S. and international sanctions, including the European Union’s prohibition on the import of Iranian oil that went into effect on July 1, 2012.

U.S. persons are generally prohibited from engaging in any transactions with individuals or entities blocked pursuant to E.O 13382 or E.O. 13599, and any assets such persons may have under U.S. jurisdiction are blocked. Entry into the United States of aliens designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 is suspended under Presidential Proclamation 8693, Suspension of Entry of Aliens Subject to U.S. Security Council Travel Ban and International Emergency Economic Powers Act Sanctions.

For more information on today’s designations, please see the fact sheet & US Department of State Press Release & Increasing Sanctions Against Iran – Fact Sheet – US Department of State

July 12, 2012 – SDN Added or Changed Financial Institutions

<sort> BANK-E SHAHR, Sepahod Gharani, Corner of Khosro St., No. 147, Tehran, Iran [IRAN]. CREDIT INSTITUTION FOR DEVELOPMENT, 53 Saanee, Jahan-e Koodak, Crossroads Africa St., Tehran, Iran [IRAN]. DEY BANK (a.k.a. BANK-E DEY), Bokharest St., 1st St., No. 13, Tehran, Iran [IRAN]. HEKMAT IRANIAN BANK (a.k.a. BANK-E HEKMAT IRANIAN), Argentine Circle, beginning of Africa St., Corner of 37th St., (Dara Cul-de-sac), No.26, Tehran, Iran [IRAN]. IRAN ZAMIN BANK (a.k.a. BANK-E IRAN ZAMIN), Seyyed Jamal-oldin Asadabadi St., Corner of 68th St., No. 472, Tehran, Iran [IRAN]. JOINT IRAN-VENEZUELA BANK (a.k.a. BANK MOSHTAREK-E IRAN VENEZUELA), Ahmad Ghasir St. (Bokharest), Corner of 15th St., Tose Tower, No.44-46, Tehran 1013830711, Iran [IRAN]. KARAFARIN BANK (a.k.a. BANK-E KARAFARIN), Zafar St. No. 315, Between Vali Asr and Jordan, Tehran, Iran; SWIFT/BIC KBID IR TH [IRAN]. MEHR IRAN CREDIT UNION BANK (a.k.a. BANK-E GHARZOLHASANEH MEHR IRAN; a.k.a. GHARZOLHASANEH MEHR IRAN BANK), Taleghani St., No.204, Before the intersection of Mofateh, across from the former U.S. embassy, Tehran, Iran [IRAN]. PARSIAN BANK (a.k.a. BANK-E PARSIAN), Keshavarz Blvd., No. 65, Corner of Shahid Daemi St., P.O. Box 141553163, Tehran 1415983111, Iran; No. 4 Zarafshan St, Farahzadi Blvd, Shahrak-e Ghods, 1467793811, Tehran, Iran; SWIFT/BIC BKPA IR TH [IRAN]. PASARGAD BANK (a.k.a. BANK-E PASARGAD), Valiasr St., Mirdamad St., No. 430, Tehran, Iran; SWIFT/BIC BKBP IR TH [IRAN]. SAMAN BANK (a.k.a. BANK-E SAMAN), Vali Asr. St. No. 3, Before Vey Park intersection, corner of Tarakesh Dooz St., Tehran, Iran; SWIFT/BIC SABC IR TH [IRAN]. SARMAYEH BANK (a.k.a. BANK-E SARMAYEH), Sepahod Gharani No. 24, Corner of Arak St., Tehran, Iran [IRAN]. TAT BANK (a.k.a. BANK-E TAT), Shahid Ahmad Ghasir (Bocharest), Shahid Ahmadian (15th) St., No. 1, Tehran, Iran; No. 1 Ahmadian Street, Bokharest Avenue, Tehran, Iran; SWIFT/BIC TATB IR TH [IRAN]. TOSEE TAAVON BANK (a.k.a. BANK-E TOSE’E TA’AVON; a.k.a. COOPERATIVE DEVELOPMENT BANK), Mirdamad Blvd., North East Corner of Mirdamad Bridge, No. 271, Tehran, Iran [IRAN]. TOURISM BANK (a.k.a. BANK-E GARDESHGARI), Vali Asr St., above Vey Park, Shahid Fiazi St., No. 51, first floor, Tehran, Iran [IRAN]. ANSAR BANK (a.k.a. ANSAR FINANCE AND CREDIT FUND; a.k.a. ANSAR FINANCIAL AND CREDIT INSTITUTE; f.k.a. “ANSAR AL-MOJAHEDIN NO-INTEREST LOAN INSTITUTE”; f.k.a. “ANSAR INSTITUTE”; f.k.a. “ANSAR SAVING AND INTEREST FREE-LOANS FUND”), Building No. 539, North Pasdaran Street, Tehran 19575-497, Iran [NPWMD] [IFSR]. -to- ANSAR BANK (a.k.a. ANSAR FINANCE AND CREDIT FUND; a.k.a. ANSAR FINANCIAL AND CREDIT INSTITUTE; a.k.a. BANK-E ANSAR; f.k.a. “ANSAR AL-MOJAHEDIN NO-INTEREST LOAN INSTITUTE”; f.k.a. “ANSAR INSTITUTE”; f.k.a. “ANSAR SAVING AND INTEREST FREE-LOANS FUND”), Building No. 539, North Pasdaran Street, Tehran 19575-497, Iran; North Pasdaran St., No. 539, Before Sahebgharanieh, corner of Narenjestan dahom, Tehran, Iran [IRAN] [NPWMD] [IFSR]. FUTURE BANK B.S.C., P.O. Box 785, City Centre Building, Government Avenue, Manama, Bahrain; Block 304, City Centre Building, Building 199, Government Avenue, Road 383, Manama, Bahrain; Business Registration Document # 54514-1 (Bahrain) expires 09 Jun 2009; Trade License No. 13388 (Bahrain); All branches worldwide [NPWMD] [IFSR]. -to- FUTURE BANK B.S.C. (a.k.a. BANK-E AL-MOSTAGHBAL; a.k.a. FUTURE BANK), P.O. Box 785, City Centre Building, Government Avenue, Manama, Bahrain; Block 304, City Centre Building, Building 199, Government Avenue, Road 383, Manama, Bahrain; Free Trade Zone, Sanaati-e Kish, Vilay-e Ferdos 2, Corner of Klinik-e Khanevadeh, No 1/5 and 3/5, Kish, Iran; Business Registration Document # 54514-1 (Bahrain) expires 09 Jun 2009; Trade License No. 13388 (Bahrain); All branches worldwide [IRAN] [NPWMD] [IFSR]. POST BANK OF IRAN, 237 Motahari Avenue, Tehran 1587618118, Iran [NPWMD] [IFSR]. -to- POST BANK OF IRAN (a.k.a. SHERKAT-E DOLATI-E POST BANK; a.k.a. “PBI”), 237 Motahari Avenue, Tehran 1587618118, Iran; Motahari Street, No. 237, Past Darya-e Noor, Tehran, Iran [IRAN] [NPWMD] [IFSR]. </sort>

April 23, 2012 – New Executive Order Targeting Human Rights Abuses via Information Technology

The President announced an Executive Order, “Blocking the Property and Suspending Entry into the United States of Certain Persons with Respect to Grave Human Rights Abuses by the Governments of Iran and Syria Via Information Technology” (“the GHRAVITY E.O.” or the “Order”). The Order targets, among others, persons determined to have operated, or to have directed the operation of, information and communications technology that facilitates computer or network disruption, monitoring or tracking that could assist in or enable human rights abuses by or on behalf of the Government of Syria or the Government of Iran.

Pursuant to this order sanctions were imposed on:

• Syrian General Intelligence Directorate (GID)
• GID’s Director Ali Mamluk
• Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS)
• Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)
• Iran’s Law Enforcement Forces (LEF)
• Iranian Internet service provider Datak Telecom
• Syrian communication firm Syriatel.

Fact Sheet & Press Release – Executive Order

April 23, 2012 – Release of GHRAVITY Executive Order FAQs ​ On April 22, 2012, the President signed an Executive Order Blocking The Property And Suspending Entry into the United States of Certain Persons with Respect to Grave Human Rights Abuses by the Governments of Iran and Syria Via Information Technology (the “GHRAVITY E.O.”). Effective 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time on April 23, 2012, the GHRAVITY E.O. blocks all property and interests in property of persons listed in its Annex, and all persons determined by the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with or at the recommendation of the Secretary of State, to meet the criteria in the order.

For more information on this Executive Order, please see these Frequently Asked Questions.

March 28, 2012 – Treasury Announces Additional Sanctions Against Iranian Engineering and Shipping Firms

The U.S. Department of the Treasury announced today additional sanctions against two entities connected to the network of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and two individuals and two entities affiliated with Iran’s national maritime carrier, the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL). Today’s actions further expose IRGC and IRISL continued involvement in illicit activities and deceptive behavior.

Pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13382 – an authority aimed at freezing the assets of proliferators of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their supporters and thereby isolating them from the U.S. financial and commercial systems – Treasury today designated the following entities and individuals.

1. Iran Maritime Industrial Company SADRA (SADRA), an entity owned by the IRGC’s Khatam al-Anbiya
2. Deep Offshore Technology PJS, a subsidiary of SADRA
3. Malship Shipping Agency Ltd., an IRISL affiliate
4. Modality Limited, an IRISL affiliate
5. Seyed Alaeddin Sadat Rasool, an IRISL official
6. Ali Ezati, an IRISL official

By designating the individuals and entities today, Treasury is sending a clear signal to the international community that Iran’s attempts to evade international sanctions will not go unnoticed. We will continue to target the Iranian regime and specifically the IRGC as it attempts to continue its nefarious infiltration of the Iranian economy,” said Adam Szubin, Director of Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC).

The IRGC continues to be a primary focus of U.S. and international sanctions against Iran because of the central role the IRGC plays in Iran’s missile and nuclear programs, its support for terrorism, and its involvement in serious human rights abuses. Similarly, IRISL has played a key role in Iran’s efforts to advance its missile programs and transport other military cargoes. The IRGC has continued to expand its control over the Iranian economy – in particular in the defense production, construction, and oil and gas industries – subsuming increasing numbers of Iranian businesses and pressing them into service in support of the IRGC’s illicit conduct.

OFAC Press Release

March 27, 2012 – Anti-Terrorism Designations​

Both Iranian companies are hit with sanctions for helping Iranian special forces export arms. The Treasury Department said Yas Air and Quds officials Esmail Ghani, Sayyid Ali Akbar Tabatabaei and Hosein Aghajani shipped weapons to the Mideast and Africa as Iran sought to “evade international sanctions and export violence.” The airline moved assault rifles and mortar shells to Syria under cover of humanitarian aid. The department cited Behineh Trading’s involvement in a shipment of grenades, rockets and mortars seized in Nigeria in 2010. Nigerian shipping agent Ali Abbas Usman Jega was described as complicit.

The following entities have been added to OFAC’s SDN list:

• BEHINEH TRADING, Tehran, Iran [SDGT]
• YAS AIR (a.k.a. YAS AIR KISH; a.k.a. YASAIR CARGO AIRLINE), Mehrabad International Airport, Next to Terminal No. 6, Tehran, Iran [SDGT]

The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN list:

• AGHAJANI, Hosein (a.k.a. ADHAJANI, Azim; a.k.a. AGAJANY, Azimi; a.k.a. AGHAJANI, Asim; a.k.a. AGHAJANI, Azim; a.k.a. AGHAJANI, Azimi; a.k.a. AQAJANI, Azim); DOB 1967; nationality Iran (individual) [SDGT]
• GHANI, Esmail (a.k.a. AKBARNEJAD, Esmaeil Ghaani; a.k.a. GHA’ANI, Esma’il; a.k.a. GHAANI, Esmail; a.k.a. NEZHAD, Ismail Akbar; a.k.a. QA’ANI, Esma’il; a.k.a. QANI, Esmail); DOB 8 Aug 1957; POB Mashhad, Iran; Passport D9003033 (Iran); alt. Passport D9008347 (Iran) issued 18 Jul 2010 expires 18 Jul 2015 (individual) [SDGT]
• JEGA, Ali Abbas Usman (a.k.a. HASSAN, Ali Abbas Othman; a.k.a. JEGA, Abbas), 6B Nouakchott Street, Wuse Zone 1, Abuja, Nigeria; DOB 1965; nationality Nigeria (individual) [SDGT]
• TABATABAEI, Sayyid Ali Akbar (a.k.a. TABATABAEE, Sayyed Ali; a.k.a. TABATABAEI, Ali Akbar; a.k.a. TABATABAEI, Seyed Akbar; a.k.a. TABATABAEI, Syed; a.k.a. TABATABA’I, Seyed Akbar; a.k.a. TABATABA’IE, Sayyed Ali; a.k.a. TAHMAESEBI, Seyed Akbar; a.k.a. TAHMASEBI, Akbar; a.k.a. TAHMASEBI, Seyed); nationality Iran; Passport 6620505; alt. Passport 9003213 (individual) [SDGT]

OFAC Resource Center & US Treas Press Release

March 20, 2012 – Iranian Transactions Regulations Amendment – ​On March 20, 2012, the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control amended the Iranian Transactions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. part 560, to redefine the term “entity owned or controlled by the Government of Iran” to substantially conform to the definition in the amended Iranian Financial Sanctions Regulations.

March 20, 2012 – Fact Sheet: Treasury Issues Interpretive Guidance and Statement of Licensing Policy on Internet Freedom in Iran

The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) today issued guidance and licensing information to further support the free flow of information to citizens of Iran – a freedom the Iranian regime has consistently denied to its people. It is essential that people have the freedom to seek, receive and impart information through a variety of mediums, including the Internet. These freedoms empower individuals to make informed decisions about the world around them, to express their concerns and aspirations, and to hold their government accountable for its actions. To that end, the United States has consistently defended the right of people around the world to enjoy fundamental freedoms, such as the freedom of expression, assembly and association both offline and online. By jamming satellites and censoring the Internet, the Iranian regime has erected an electronic curtain that prevents the Iranian people from communicating with the outside world and with each other.

In March 2010, in order to foster and support the free flow of information to individual Iranian citizens, OFAC amended the Iranian Transactions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. part 560 (the “ITR”), to authorize the exportation to Iran of certain services and software incident to the exchange of personal communications over the Internet.

Specifically, section 560.540 of the ITR authorizes the exportation from the United States or by U.S. persons, wherever located, to persons in Iran of services incident to the exchange of personal communications over the Internet, such as instant messaging, chat and email, social networking, sharing of photos and movies, web browsing, and blogging, provided that such services are publicly available at no cost to the user.

Section 560.540 of the ITR also authorizes the exportation from the United States or by U.S. persons, wherever located, to persons in Iran of software necessary to enable such services, provided that the software is classified as “EAR99” under the Export Administration Regulations (the “EAR”), is not subject to the EAR, or is classified by the Department of Commerce as mass market software under export control classification number 5D992, and is publicly available at no cost to the user.

Today, OFAC issued Interpretive Guidance regarding the scope of this authorization. OFAC has determined that the categories of services and software listed below fall within the scope of services incident to the exchange of personal communications over the Internet or software necessary to enable such services, as described in section 560.540 of the ITR.

1. Personal Communications (e.g., Yahoo Messenger, Google Talk, Microsoft Live, Skype (non-fee based))
2. Updates to Personal Communications Software
3. Personal Data Storage (e.g., Dropbox)
4. Browsers/Updates (e.g., Google Chrome, Firefox, Internet Explorer)
5. Plug-ins (e.g., Flashplayer, Shockwave, Java)
6. Document Readers (e.g., Acrobat Readers)
7. Free Mobile Apps Related to Personal Communications
8. RSS Feed Readers and Aggregators (e.g., Google Feed Burner).

In addition, OFAC is clarifying its existing Statement of Licensing Policy (“SLP”) that establishes a favorable licensing policy through which U.S. persons can request OFAC approval to export to Iran certain services and software not covered by section 560.540 of the ITR that directly benefit the Iranian people. This SLP applies to services and software such as web hosting, online advertising, fee-based mobile apps, and fee-based Internet communication services.

To view the OFAC guidance concerning Iran, visit this link Internet freedom

March 20, 2012 – Publication of Statement of Licensing Policy on Internet Freedom In Iran – On March 20, 2012, the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) issued Interpretive Guidance regarding the scope of the personal communications general license in section 560.540 of the Iranian Transactions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. part 560 (the “ITR”), which authorizes the exportation of certain services and software incident to the exchange of personal communications over the Internet. In addition, OFAC is clarifying its existing Statement of Licensing Policy (“SLP”) that establishes a favorable licensing policy through which U.S. persons can request OFAC approval to export to Iran certain services and software not covered by section 560.540 of the ITR that directly benefit the Iranian people. This SLP applies to services and software such as web hosting, online advertising, fee-based mobile apps, and fee-based Internet communication services.

March 15, 2012 – Statement by Under Secretary David Cohen on Action by the EU and Swift to Terminate Service for Sanctioned Iranian Banks

WASHINGTON – Treasury Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence David S. Cohen issued the following statement today:

“The United States welcomes today’s action by the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT) to terminate services for designated Iranian banks, which we understand includes the Central Bank of Iran. We commend the EU for directing that no specialized financial messaging services can be provided by any entity in the EU for sanctioned Iranian entities and for the prompt response by the Belgian Treasury and SWIFT to the EU’s action.

“Today’s decision reflects the growing international consensus that substantially increased pressure is needed to convince the Iranian regime to address the international community’s concerns about its illicit nuclear activities. Taken in the context of increasingly powerful sanctions applied by the United States, the EU, and many others in the international community, today’s action reinforces the isolation of designated Iranian banks from the international financial sector.

“The United States will continue to work closely with our European and other partners in the international community to increase further the pressure on Iran and to strengthen the impact of our sanctions.”

OFAC Press Release

March 07, 2012 – Kingpin Act Designation – Specially Designated Nationals Update – Treasury Designates Iranian Qods Force General Overseeing Afghan Heroin Trafficking Through Iran

The U.S. Department of the Treasury today designated Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Qods Force (IRGC-QF) General Gholamreza Baghbani as a Specially Designated Narcotics Trafficker pursuant to the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act (Kingpin Act). This is the first use of the Kingpin Act against an Iranian official.

“Today’s action exposes IRGC-QF involvement in trafficking narcotics, made doubly reprehensible here because it is done as part of a broader scheme to support terrorism. Treasury will continue exposing narcotics traffickers and terrorist supporters wherever they operate,” said Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence David S. Cohen.

General Gholamreza Baghbani is an IRGC-QF officer and the current chief of the IRGC-QF office in Zahedan, Iran in southeastern Iran, near the Afghan border. General Baghbani allowed Afghan narcotics traffickers to smuggle opiates through Iran in return for assistance. For example, Afghan narcotics traffickers moved weapons to the Taliban on behalf of Baghbani. In return, General Baghbani has helped facilitate the smuggling of heroin precursor chemicals through the Iranian border. He also helped facilitate shipments of opium into Iran.

As a result of today’s action, U.S. persons are prohibited from conducting financial or commercial transactions with General Baghbani, and any assets he may have under U.S. jurisdiction are frozen.

The Treasury Department continues to target the financial networks of significant foreign narcotics traffickers and their organizations worldwide using the authorities in the Kingpin Act. Treasury has designated more than 1,000 individuals and entities linked to drug kingpins since June 2000. Penalties for violations of the Kingpin Act range from civil penalties of up to $1.075 million per violation to more severe criminal penalties. Criminal penalties for corporate officers may include up to 30 years in prison and fines up to $5 million. Criminal fines for corporations may reach $10 million. Other individuals face up to 10 years in prison and fines pursuant to Title 18 of the United States Code for criminal violations of the Kingpin Act.

The following individual has been added to OFAC’s SDN list:

• BAGHBANI, Gholamreza (a.k.a. BAQBANI, Mohammad Akhusa; a.k.a. BAQBANI, Qolam Reza); DOB 5 Jan 1961; alt. DOB 1947; POB Zabol, Iran; citizen Iran; Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps – Qods Force General (individual) [SDNTK]

OFAC Recent Actions & Chart of General Baghbani’s activities

February 27, 2012 – Amendment to the Iranian Financial Sanctions Regulations – Implementing subsection 1245(d) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (“NDAA”)

​On February 27, 2012, the Office of Foreign Assets Control amended the Iranian Financial Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. part 561 (the “IFSR”), and republished them in their entirety, to implement subsection 1245(d) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (“NDAA”). The amended IFSR provide for sanctions on foreign financial institutions that knowingly conduct or facilitate certain significant financial transactions with the Central Bank of Iran or a U.S.-designated Iranian financial institution. In addition, the amended IFSR contain various time-based triggers for the imposition of sanctions, beginning February 29, 2012, subject to certain exceptions authorized by the NDAA.

February 23, 2012 – OFAC is amending General License No. 5a and reissuing the general license under the Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferators Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. Part 544; the Iranian Transactions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. Part 560; and Executive Order 13599, in order to authorize certain transactions related to the arrest, detention, and judicial sale of the MV Dianthe (f.k.a. Horsham, f.k.a. Iran Bam, IMO No. 9323833), which is a vessel on OFAC’s Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons list. The vessel is currently under arrest in Mundra, India.

February 16, 2012 – Anti-Terrorism Designation; Syria Designation; Iran Human Rights Designation

Specially Designated Nationals Update

The following entity has been added to OFAC’s SDN list:

• IRANIAN MINISTRY OF INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY (a.k.a. VEZARAT-E ETTELA’AT VA AMNIAT-E KESHVAR; a.k.a. “MOIS”; a.k.a. “VEVAK”), bounded roughly by Sanati Street on the west, 30th Street on the south, and Iraqi Street on the east, Tehran, Iran; Ministry of Intelligence, Second Negarestan Street, Pasdaran Avenue, Tehran, Iran [SDGT] [SYRIA] [IRAN-HR]

OFAC Resource Center

February 14, 2012 – Treasury Issues Guidance Concerning National Defense Authorization Act Sanctions on Iran

Today the Department of the Treasury issued guidance concerning the implementation of section 1245 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA).

The guidance clarifies a number of issues related to the implementation of the NDAA provision as it relates to foreign governments, financial institutions, and other interested parties. Among other topics, the guidance addresses the scope of institutions that may be subject to sanctions under the NDAA, the nature of the transactions that are covered, and how the Administration will approach the determination of what qualifies as a “significant reduction” in a country’s purchases of crude oil from Iran.

Executive Order 13599 delegates to the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, authority to determine whether a foreign financial institution has engaged in significant transactions of the type that trigger sanctions under the Act. The Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Energy, and the Director of National Intelligence, is delegated authority to determine whether any country has significantly reduced the volume of its crude oil purchases from Iran.

US Department of Treasury Guidance Notification

Treasury Issues Guidance Concerning National Defense Authorization Act Sanctions on Iran

WASHINGTON – Today the U.S. Department of the Treasury issued guidance concerning the implementation of section 1245 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA).

The guidance clarifies a number of issues related to the implementation of the NDAA provision as it relates to foreign governments, financial institutions, and other interested parties. Among other topics, the guidance addresses the scope of institutions that may be subject to sanctions under the NDAA, the nature of the transactions that are covered, and how the Administration will approach the determination of what qualifies as a “significant reduction” in a country’s purchases of crude oil from Iran.

Executive Order 13599 delegates to the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, authority to determine whether a foreign financial institution has engaged in significant transactions of the type that trigger sanctions under the Act. The Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Energy, and the Director of National Intelligence, is delegated authority to determine whether any country has significantly reduced the volume of its crude oil purchases from Iran.

“We are working intensively to implement the NDAA’s financial sanctions as part of our broad-based efforts to stop Iran’s illicit nuclear activities,” said Treasury Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, David S. Cohen. “We urge banks worldwide to act quickly to terminate their ties to the Central Bank of Iran, both to protect themselves from the CBI’s illicit financial activities and to isolate the CBI from the international financial system.”

President Obama signed E.O. 13599 on February 5, 2012. The E.O. takes a number of actions in furtherance of the Administration’s Iran sanctions program, including measures to implement section 1245 of the NDAA which was signed by the President December 31, 2011.

February 06, 2011 – Executive Order Blocking the Property and Interests in Property of the Government of Iran and Iranian Financial Institutions

The President has signed a new Executive Order blocking the property and interests in property of the Government of Iran and Iranian financial institutions. The E.O. requires U.S. persons to block all property and interests in property of the Government of Iran (including the Central Bank of Iran), of all Iranian financial institutions, and of all persons determined by the Secretary of the Treasury to be owned by, controlled by, or acting for or on behalf of any of those parties, when that property comes within the United States or within the possession or control of U.S. persons. The E.O. builds upon the Iranian Transactions Regulations (“ITR”) and does not apply to certain Iranian property that was blocked in November 1979 and made subject to transfer directives in 1981. Transactions involving the Government of Iran or Iranian financial institutions that previously needed to be rejected, now must be blocked, except that OFAC has issued two General Licenses which, subject to certain exceptions, continue to allow transactions that were previously authorized by OFAC or not prohibited, including the transfer of personal remittances by U.S. depository institutions to and from Iran. Please see the E.O., General License A and General License B, and “Frequently Asked Questions related to the Executive Order” for more information.

Users of OFAC’s Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons (SDN) List are encouraged to review this FAQ for guidance on how these changes affect the records on the SDN list.

Fact Sheet: Implementation of National Defense Authorization Act Sanctions on Iran (2/6/2012)

WASHINGTON – Yesterday, President Obama signed an Executive Order (E.O.) that takes a number of actions in furtherance of the Administration’s Iran sanctions program, including measures to implement section 1245 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). Among other things, the E.O. freezes all property of the Central Bank of Iran and all other Iranian financial institutions, as well as all property of the Government of Iran, further tightening the already broad-based and stringent U.S. sanctions on Iran.

These actions underscore the Administration’s resolve to hold the Iranian regime accountable for its failure to meet its international obligations. Iran now faces an unprecedented level of pressure due to intensified sanctions applied by the United States and complementary actions by many others around the world. The new E.O. issued today reemphasizes this Administration’s message to the Government of Iran – it will face ever-increasing economic and diplomatic pressure until it addresses the international community’s well-founded and well-documented concerns regarding the nature of its nuclear program.

Additional information describing the implementation of section 1245 of the NDAA pursuant to the authorities delegated under this E.O. will be made available in the near term.

Sanctions under the New Executive Order:

On February 5, President Obama signed a new E.O. effective at 12:01 a.m. on February 6, that blocks (i.e., “freezes”) all property of the Government of Iran as well as all property of Iranian financial institutions, including the Central Bank of Iran.

1. The E.O. blocks all property and interests in property of the Government of Iran, the Central Bank of Iran and all Iranian financial institutions (regardless of whether the financial institution is part of the Government of Iran) that are in the United States, that come within the United States, or that come within the possession or control of U.S. persons. Previously, U.S. persons were required to “reject,” rather than “block,” Iranian transactions.
   1. Under the order, the Government of Iran, the Central Bank of Iran, and all Iranian financial institutions are now blocked (i.e. their assets within the jurisdiction of U.S. persons are frozen).
   2. The U.S. sanctions in place since 1995 have required most transactions involving the Government of Iran, the Central Bank of Iran and all Iranian financial institutions to be rejected – that is, they could not pass through the U.S. financial system, but instead were turned back. Under the new E.O., transactions involving the Government of Iran, the Central Bank of Iran and all Iranian financial institutions that previously would have been rejected will now be blocked.
   3. All entities that meet the existing definition of “Government of Iran,” such as Iranian ministries, state-owned entities and commercial firms owned or controlled by the Government of Iran, are blocked. This includes entities bearing the [IRAN] tag on the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control’s (OFAC) List of Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons (SDN List). Transactions by U.S. persons involving such entities are now blocked unless exempt or otherwise authorized. OFAC will continue to update the SDN List and may add, delete, or edit existing entries as appropriate.
   4. The E.O. does not change the sanctions that may be applied against foreign financial institutions engaging in arms-length transactions with certain Iranian financial institutions, including the Central Bank of Iran. Those foreign financial institutions remain at risk of U.S. sanctions if they engage in certain significant financial transactions with the Central Bank of Iran or certain other designated Iranian financial institutions pursuant to the NDAA, or the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (CISADA).
2. Treasury is issuing general licenses to maintain existing authorizations for certain transactions that advance U.S. foreign policy interests.
   1. Persons who currently use general or specific licenses from OFAC for transactions involving the Government of Iran or Iranian financial institutions should consult the OFAC website for new general licenses and other information on whether those transactions remain authorized under the new E.O.

Delegations of Authority under the New Executive Order:

• The E.O. also delegates other authorities provided in section 1245(d) of the NDAA.
• The E.O. delegates a number of other authorities provided in section 1245(d) of the NDAA, primarily to the Departments of the Treasury and State. These delegations will facilitate the implementation of section 1245 of the NDAA.
• Additional information describing the implementation of the NDAA under these delegated authorities will be made available in the near term.

This information can be found in the Treasury Department’s “Fact Sheet: Implementation of National Defense Authorization Act Sanctions on Iran.”

January 23, 2012 – OFAC action strikes at one of Iran’s few remaining access points to the Global Financial System

WASHINGTON – The U.S. Department of the Treasury today designated Iran’s third-largest bank, Bank Tejarat, for providing financial services to several Iranian banks and firms already subject to international sanctions for their involvement in Iran’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation activities. With today’s action, 23 Iranian-linked financial institutions, including all of Iran’s largest state-owned banks, have been sanctioned by the U.S. based on their involvement in Iran’s illicit activities.

“At a time when banks around the world are cutting off Iran and its currency is depreciating rapidly, today’s action against Bank Tejarat strikes at one of Iran’s few remaining access points to the international financial system,” said Treasury Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, David S. Cohen. “Today’s sanction against Bank Tejarat will deepen Iran’s financial isolation, make its access to hard currency even more tenuous, and further impair Iran’s ability to finance its illicit nuclear program.”

Bank Tejarat was designated pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13382 (Blocking Property of WMD Proliferators and Their Supporters) for providing financial services to Bank Mellat, the Export Development Bank of Iran (EDBI), the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL), and the Ministry of Defense for Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL), all of which were previously designated by the the Treasury Department or the Department of State for their involvement in Iran’s WMD proliferation activities. Trade Capital Bank also was designated today for providing financial services to EDBI and for being owned or controlled by Bank Tejarat.

Today’s designations of Bank Tejarat and Trade Capital Bank could result in sanctions under the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability and Divestment Act of 2010 (CISADA) for foreign financial institutions that conduct business with Bank Tejarat or Trade Capital Bank. Under CISADA, foreign financial institutions that knowingly facilitate significant transactions or provide significant financial services for an Iranian-linked financial institution designated by the U.S. – such as Bank Tejarat or Trade Capital Bank – face the loss of their direct access to the U.S. financial system.

Bank Tejarat has nearly 2,000 branches throughout Iran, as well as foreign branches in Paris, France and Dushanbe, Tajikistan. Trade Capital Bank is a Minsk, Belarus-based bank that is owned by Bank Tejarat.

Bank Tejarat has directly facilitated Iran’s illicit nuclear efforts. For example, in 2011, Bank Tejarat facilitated the movement of tens-of-millions of dollars in an effort to assist the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran’s (AEOI) ongoing effort to acquire uranium. The AEOI, which reports directly to the Iranian president, is the main Iranian organization for research and development of nuclear technology, and manages fissile material production programs. In addition to being identified in the Annex to E.O. 13382, AEOI is sanctioned by the United Nations under Security Council Resolution 1737.

Bank Tejarat has repeatedly assisted U.S.-designated banks in circumventing international sanctions. In providing financial services to Bank Mellat and EDBI in the past few years, Bank Tejarat has also supported the activities of subsidiaries and subordinates of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, the Defense Industries Organization and MODAFL. Like Bank Tejarat, Trade Capital Bank facilitates Iranian access to the euro by bypassing European regulators.

Bank Tejarat has also provided banking services for IRISL and its U.S. designated affiliates Safiran Payam Darya Shipping Co., South Shipping Line Iran and Khazar Sea Shipping Lines. South Shipping Line was also designated for sanctions by the United Nations in UNSCR 1929.

To date, the U.S. has designated 23 Iranian-linked financial institutions under E.O. 13382 and E.O. 13224, as detailed in the attached fact sheet.

FACT SHEET: OVERVIEW OF IRANIAN-LINKED FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS – DESIGNATED BY THE UNITED STATES – All designations include all offices of the listed bank worldwide:

January 9, 2007

• Bank Sepah – Designated under Executive Order (E.O.) 13382 for providing services to Iran’s missile program, Aerospace Industries Organization.
• Bank Sepah International Plc., UK – Designated under E.O. 13382 for being owned or

controlled by Bank Sepah.

October 25, 2007

• Bank Melli – Designated under E.O.13382 for providing services to the Ministry of Defense for Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL) and Iran’s nuclear program, Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI).
• Melli Bank PLC – Designated under E.O.13382 for being owned or controlled by Bank Melli.
• Arian Bank – Designated under E.O.13382 for being owned or controlled by Bank Melli.
• Kargoshaee Bank – Designated under E.O.13382 for being owned or controlled by Bank Melli.
• Mir Business Bank (f.k.a. Bank Melli ZAO ) – Designated under E.O.13382 for being owned

or controlled by Bank Melli.

• Bank Mellat – Designated under E.O.13382 for providing financial services to AEOI and Novin Energy Company (AEOI financial conduit).
• Mellat Bank SB CSJC – Designated under E.O.13382 for being owned or controlled by Bank

Mellat.

• Persia International Bank PLC – Designated under E.O.13382 for being owned or controlled

by Bank Mellat.

• Bank Saderat – Designated under E.O.13224 for providing services to terrorist organizations, including Hizballah.

October 22, 2008

• Export Development Bank of Iran (EDBI) – Designated under E.O.13382 for providing

financial services to MODAFL.

• Banco Internacional de Desarrollo – Designated under E.O.13382 for being owned or

controlled by EDBI.

November 5, 2009

• First East Export Bank – Designated under E.O.13382 for being owned or controlled by Bank Mellat.

June 16, 2010

• Post Bank of Iran – Designated under E.O.13382 for providing services to Bank Sepah.

September 7, 2010

• Europaisch-Iranische Handelsbank (EIH) – Designated under EO 13382 for providing

financial services to Bank Sepah, Bank Mellat, EDBI, Persia International Bank, and Post Bank.

December 21, 2010

• Ansar Bank – Designated under E.O.13382 for providing services to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).
• Mehr Bank – Designated under E.O.13382 for providing services to the IRGC.
• Moallem Insurance Company – Designated under E.O. 13382 on December 21, 2010 for

providing marine insurance to IRISL vessels.

February 17, 2011

• Bank Refah Kargaran – Designated under E.O.13382 for providing services to MODAFL.

May 17, 2011

• Bank of Industry and Mine (of Iran) – Designated under E.O.13382 for providing services to Bank Mellat and EDBI.

January 23, 2012

• Bank Tejarat – Designated under E.O.13382 for providing services to Bank Mellat, EDBI, the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL) and MODAFL.
• Trade Capital Bank – Designated under E.O.13382 for providing financial services to EDBI

and for being owned or controlled by Bank Tejarat

Treasury Press Release & [http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Documents/012312_Fact_Sheet_-_Designated_Iranian_Financial%20Institutions.pdf FACT SHEET: OVERVIEW OF IRANIAN-LINKED FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS DESIGNATED BY THE UNITED STATES]

January 12, 2012 – Three Companies Sanctioned Under the Amended Iran Sanctions Act

The United States is working with international partners to maintain pressure on the Government of Iran to comply with its international nuclear obligations. UN Security Council Resolution 1929 recognized the potential connection between Iran’s revenues derived from its energy sector and the funding of its proliferation sensitive nuclear activities. In recognition of that connection, the United States adopted CISADA, which makes sanctionable certain activities in Iran’s energy sector, including the provision of refined petroleum products to Iran. The European Union, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Canada, and Australia have also adopted their own sanctions that target Iran’s energy sector. The result of these actions has been an unprecedented international sanctions effort aimed at convincing Iran to change its behavior. The sanctions announced today are an important step toward that goal, as they target the individual companies that help Iran evade these efforts.

Zhenrong is based in China, and is the largest supplier of refined petroleum product to Iran. The United States has determined that Zhenrong brokered the delivery of over $500 million in gasoline to Iran between July 2010 and January 2011, with individual deals entered into worth significantly more than the $1 million threshold under U.S. law and the total value of the transactions well above the $5 million threshold for sanctionable activities within a 12-month period.

Kuo is an energy trading firm based in Singapore. The United States has determined that Kuo provided over $25 million in refined petroleum to Iran between late 2010 and early 2011, worth significantly more than the $1 million threshold under U.S. law and the total value of the transactions well above the $5 million threshold for sanctionable activities within a 12-month period.

FAL is a large independent energy trader based in the UAE. The United States has determined that FAL provided over $70 million in refined petroleum to Iran over multiple shipments in late 2010, with individual deliveries worth significantly more than the $1 million threshold under U.S. law and the total value of the transactions well above the $5 million threshold for sanctionable activities within a 12-month period.

Under the sanctions imposed today, all three companies are barred from receiving U.S. export licenses, U.S. Export Import Bank financing, and loans over $10 million from U.S. financial institutions. These sanctions apply only to the sanctioned companies, and not to their governments or countries.

OFAC Resource Center & US Department of State Press Release

December 31, 2011 – US Targets Iran’s Central Bank – Bank Markazi – (not sanctioned yet)

The White House – Office of the Press Secretary – For Immediate Release – December 31, 2011 – Statement by the President on H.R. 1540

Today I have signed into law H.R. 1540, the “National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012.” I have signed the Act chiefly because it authorizes funding for the defense of the United States and its interests abroad, crucial services for service members and their families, and vital national security programs that must be renewed.

Statement by the President on H.R. 1540

H.R. 1540 – Sec. 1245. – Imposition of sanctions with respect to the financial sector of Iran

(a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following findings:

1. On November 21, 2011, the Secretary of the Treasury issued a finding under section 5318A of title 31, United States Code, that identified Iran as a jurisdiction of primary money laundering concern.
2. In that finding, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network of the Department of the Treasury wrote, ‘‘The Central Bank of Iran, which regulates Iranian banks, has assisted designated Iranian banks by transferring billions of dollars to these banks in 2011. In mid-2011, the CBI transferred several billion dollars to designated banks, including Saderat, Mellat, EDBI and Melli, through a variety of payment schemes. In making these transfers, the CBI attempted to evade sanctions by minimizing the direct involvement of large international banks with both CBI and designated Iranian banks.’’.
3. On November 22, 2011, the Under Secretary of the Treasury for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, David Cohen, wrote, ‘‘Treasury is calling out the entire Iranian banking sector, including the Central Bank of Iran, as posing terrorist financing, proliferation financing, and money laundering risks for the global financial system.’’.

(b) DESIGNATION OF FINANCIAL SECTOR OF IRAN AS OF PRIMARY MONEY LAUNDERING CONCERN.—

The financial sector of Iran, including the Central Bank of Iran, is designated as a primary money laundering concern for purposes of section 5318A of title 31, United States Code, because of the threat to government and financial institutions resulting from the illicit activities of the Government of Iran, including its pursuit of nuclear weapons, support for international terrorism, and efforts to deceive responsible financial institutions and evade sanctions.

(c) FREEZING OF ASSETS OF IRANIAN FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS.—

The President shall, pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.), block and prohibit all transactions in all property and interests in property of an Iranian financial institution if such property and interests in property are in the United States, come within the United States, or are or come within the possession or control of a United States person.

(d) IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE CENTRAL BANK OF IRAN AND OTHER IRANIAN FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—

Except as specifically provided in this subsection, beginning on the date that is 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President—

(A) shall prohibit the opening, and prohibit or impose strict conditions on the maintaining, in the United States of a correspondent account or a payable-through account by a foreign financial institution that the President determines has knowingly conducted or facilitated any significant financial transaction with the Central Bank of Iran or another Iranian financial institution designated by the Secretary of the Treasury for the imposition of sanctions pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.); and

(B) may impose sanctions pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) with respect to the Central Bank of Iran.

(2) EXCEPTION FOR SALES OF FOOD, MEDICINE, AND MEDICAL DEVICES.—

The President may not impose sanctions under paragraph (1) with respect to any person for conducting or facilitating a transaction for the sale of food, medicine, or medical devices to Iran.

(3) APPLICABILITY OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO FOREIGN CENTRAL BANKS.—

Except as provided in paragraph (4), sanctions imposed under paragraph (1)(A) shall apply with respect to a foreign financial institution owned or controlled by the government of a foreign country, including a central bank of a foreign country, only insofar as it engages in a financial transaction for the sale or purchase of petroleum or petroleum products to or from Iran conducted or facilitated on or after that date that is 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act.

(4) APPLICABILITY OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO PETROLEUM TRANSACTIONS.—

(A) REPORT REQUIRED.—Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 60 days thereafter, the Administrator of the Energy Information Administration, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of State, and the Director of National Intelligence, shall submit to Congress a report on the availability and price of petroleum and petroleum products produced in countries other than Iran in the 60-day period preceding the submission of the report.

(B) DETERMINATION REQUIRED.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter, the President shall make a determination, based on the reports required by subparagraph (A), of whether the price and supply of petroleum and petroleum products produced in countries other than Iran is sufficient to permit purchasers of petroleum and petroleum products from Iran to reduce significantly in volume their purchases from Iran . (C) APPLICATION OF SANCTIONS.—Except as provided in subparagraph (D), sanctions imposed under paragraph (1)(A) shall apply with respect to a financial transaction conducted or facilitated by a foreign financial institution on or after the date that is 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act for the purchase of petroleum or petroleum products from Iran if the President determines pursuant to subparagraph (B) that there is a sufficient supply of petroleum and petroleum products from countries other than Iran to permit a significant reduction in the volume of petroleum and petroleum products purchased from Iran by or through foreign financial institutions . (D) EXCEPTION.—Sanctions imposed pursuant to paragraph (1) shall not apply with respect to a foreign financial institution if the President determines and reports to Congress, not later than 90 days after the date on which the President makes the determination required by subparagraph (B), and every 180 days thereafter, that the country with primary jurisdiction over the foreign financial institution has significantly reduced its volume of crude oil purchases from Iran during the period beginning on the date on which the President submitted the last report with respect to the country under this subparagraph.

(5) WAIVER.—

The President may waive the imposition of sanctions under paragraph (1) for a period of not more than 120 days, and may renew that waiver for additional periods of not more than 120 days, if the President— (A) determines that such a waiver is in the national security interest of the United States; and (B) submits to Congress a report— (i) providing a justification for the waiver; and (ii) that includes any concrete cooperation the President has received or expects to receive as a result of the waiver.

(e) MULTILATERAL DIPLOMACY INITIATIVE.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The President shall— (A) carry out an initiative of multilateral diplomacy to persuade countries purchasing oil from Iran—

(i) to limit the use by Iran of revenue from purchases of oil to purchases of non-luxury consumers goods from the country purchasing the oil; and

(ii) to prohibit purchases by Iran of—

(I) military or dual-use technology, including items— (aa) in the Annex to the Missile Technology Control Regime Guidelines; (bb) in the Annex on Chemicals to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction, done at Paris January 13, 1993, and entered into force April 29, 1997 (commonly known as the ‘‘Chemical Weapons Convention’’); (cc) in Part 1 or 2 of the Nuclear Suppliers Group Guidelines; or (dd) on a control list of the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies; or (II) any other item that could contribute to Iran’s conventional, nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons program; and

(B) conduct outreach to petroleum-producing countries to encourage those countries to increase their output of crude oil to ensure there is a sufficient supply of crude oil from countries other than Iran and to minimize any impact on the price of oil resulting from the imposition of sanctions under this section.

(2) REPORT REQUIRED.—

Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter, the President shall submit to Congress a report on the efforts of the President to carry out the initiative described in paragraph

(1)(A) and conduct the outreach described in paragraph (1)(B) and the results of those efforts.

(f) FORM OF REPORTS.—

Each report submitted under this section shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may contain a classified annex.

(g) IMPLEMENTATION; PENALTIES.—

(1) IMPLEMENTATION.—The President may exercise all authorities provided under sections 203 and 205 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1702 and 1704) to carry out this section.

(2) PENALTIES.—The penalties provided for in subsections (b) and (c) of section 206 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1705) shall apply to a person that violates, attempts to violate, conspires to violate, or causes a violation of this section or regulations prescribed under this section to the same extent that such penalties apply to a person that commits an unlawful act described in section 206(a) of that Act.

(h) DEFINITIONS.—

In this section:

1. ACCOUNT; CORRESPONDENT ACCOUNT; PAYABLE-THROUGH ACCOUNT.—The terms ‘‘account’’, ‘‘correspondent account’’, and ‘‘payable-through account’’ have the meanings given those terms in section 5318A of title 31, United States Code.
2. FOREIGN FINANCIAL INSTITUTION.—The term ‘‘foreign financial institution’’ has the meaning of that term as determined by the Secretary of the Treasury pursuant to section 104(i) of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 8513(i)).
3. UNITED STATES PERSON.—The term ‘‘United States person’’ means— (A) a natural person who is a citizen or resident of the United States or a national of the United States (as defined in section 101(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a))); and (B) an entity that is organized under the laws of the United States or a jurisdiction within the United States.

HR 1540 – Sec 1245

December 20, 2011 – Treasury Designates 10 Shipping Companies and Chief Executive Tied to IRISL and Irano Hind – OFAC Recent Updates & OFAC Press Release

The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN list:

• KHALILI, Jamshid, Third Floor, Number 143, Dr. Lavasani Avenue, Farmanieh Avenue, Tehran, Iran; DOB 23 Sep 1957; nationality Iran; Passport R1451357 (Iran) (individual) [NPWMD]

The following entities have been added to OFAC’s SDN list:

• BIIS MARITIME LIMITED, 147/1 St. Lucia Street, Valletta, VLT 1185, Malta; c/o Irano Hind Shipping Company, PO Box 15875, Mehrshad Street, Sadaghat Street, Opposite of Park Mellat, Vali-e-Asr Ave., Tehran, Iran; Business Registration Document # C31530 (Malta); Website www.iranohind.com [NPWMD]
• ISIM AMIN LIMITED, 147/1 St. Lucia Street, Valletta, VLT 1185, Malta; Business Registration Document # C40069 (Malta) [NPWMD]
• ISIM ATR LIMITED, c/o Irano Hind Shipping Company, PO Box 15875, Mehrshad Street, Sadaghat Street, Opposite of Park Mellat, Vali-e-Asr Ave., Tehran, Iran; 147/1 St. Lucia Street, Valletta VLT 1185, Malta; Business Registration Document # C34477 (Malta); Website www.iranohind.com [NPWMD]
• ISIM OLIVE LIMITED, 147/1 St. Lucia Street, Valletta, VLT 1185, Malta; Business Registration Document # C34479 (Malta) [NPWMD]
• ISIM SAT LIMITED, 147/1 St. Lucia Street, Valletta, VLT 1185, Malta; Business Registration Document # C34476 (Malta) [NPWMD]
• ISIM SEA CHARIOT LIMITED, 147/1 St. Lucia Street, Valletta, VLT 1185, Malta; Business Registration Document # C45153 (Malta) [NPWMD]
• ISIM SEA CRESCENT LIMITED, 147/1 St. Lucia Street, Valletta, VLT 1185, Malta; Business Registration Document # C45152 (Malta) [NPWMD]
• ISIM SININ LIMITED, 147/1 St. Lucia Street, Valletta, VLT 1185, Malta; c/o Irano Hind Shipping Company, PO Box 15875, Mehrshad Street, Sadaghat Street, Opposite of Park Mellat, Vali-e-Asr Ave., Tehran, Iran; Business Registration Document # C37437 (Malta); Website www.iranohind.com [NPWMD]
• ISIM TAJ MAHAL LIMITED, 147/1 St. Lucia Street, Valletta, VLT 1185, Malta; Business Registration Document # C41660 (Malta) [NPWMD]
• ISIM TOUR LIMITED, 147/1 St. Lucia Street, Valletta, VLT 1185, Malta; Business Registration Document # C34478 (Malta) [NPWMD]

December 13, 2011 – Iran Human Rights Designations – The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN list:

• ARAGHI, Abdollah (a.k.a. ARAQI, Abdollah; a.k.a. ARAQI, Abdullah; a.k.a. ERAGHI, Abdollah; a.k.a. ERAQI, Abdollah); DOB 1945; POB Iran; Lieutenant Commander, IRGC Ground Force; Deputy Commander, IRGC Ground Forces; Brigadier General; Former Commander, Greater Tehran’s Mohammad Rasulollah IRGC; Former Chief, Greater Tehran Revolutionary Guards (individual) [IRGC] [IRAN-HR]
• FIROUZABADI, Hassan (a.k.a. AQAI-FIRUZABADI, Hassan; a.k.a. FIROOZABADI, Hassan; a.k.a. FIRUZABADI, Hasan); DOB 3 Feb 1951; POB Mashhad, Iran; Chief of Staff of the Joint Armed Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran; Chairman of the Armed Forces’ Joint Chiefs of Staff; Major General (individual) [IRAN-HR]

OFAC Press Release

November 21, 2011 – Remarks by Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner on Targeting Iran’s Nuclear and Missile Programs – Since President Obama came into office, this administration has put in place an aggressive strategy to stop Iran’s illicit activities. A key part of this strategy has been to impose overwhelming financial pressure on Iran.

Because of this strategy, Iran has been subjected to new and damaging levels of financial and commercial isolation:

• First, we have dramatically reduced Iran’s access to the international financial system. Iranian banks are losing the ability to do business around the world, which in turn has reduced the ability of the Iranian government to finance activities opposed by the international community.
• Second, Iran’s national shipping line – which has transported material in support of Iran’s missile program – is now shut off from many of the world’s major ports and routinely finds its ships seized or turned away.
• And third, Iran’s primary source of revenue – its oil sector – is in decline, because it cannot attract the foreign investment that it desperately needs to maintain production.

Together, the intensification of sanctions by this Administration, alongside our partners around the world, has inflicted substantial damage to the Iranian economy.

To continue these efforts, the Treasury Department today is designating additional entities for their support of Iran’s nuclear and proliferation-related activities.

Today we are also taking the next significant step to escalate the pressure by acting under Section 311 of the USA PATRIOT Act. For the first time, we are identifying the entire Iranian banking sector – including the Central Bank of Iran – as a threat to governments or financial institutions that do business with Iranian banks.

If you are a financial institution and you engage in any transaction involving Iran’s Central Bank or any other Iranian bank operating inside or outside Iran, you are at risk of supporting Iran’s illicit activities: its pursuit of nuclear weapons, its support for terrorism, and its efforts to deceive responsible financial institutions and evade sanctions.

Any and every financial transaction with Iran poses grave risk of supporting those activities.

Financial institutions around the world should think hard about the risks of doing business with Iran.

We are taking this latest action alongside our partners in the United Kingdom and Canada, who announced earlier today that they have implemented similar measures to insulate their banks from Iran. As a result of this coordinated effort, Iran is now cut off from three of the world’s largest financial sectors.

We encourage other leaders around the world to take forceful steps – like the action we are announcing today – to prevent Iran from simply shifting financial activity to banks within their nations.

As we put these new measures in place, and as we continue to work to expand their reach around the world, we will continue to explore other measures. No option is off the table—including the possibility of imposing additional sanctions on the Central Bank of Iran.

The policies Iran is pursuing are unacceptable. Until Iran’s leadership agrees to abandon this dangerous course, we will continue to use tough and innovative means to impose severe economic and financial consequences on Iran’s leadership.

Overview of US sanctions made by Erich Ferrari

November 21, 2011 – OFAC Non-proliferation Designations (SDN – Update) – Fact Sheet: E.O. 13382 Designations on Iran

The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN list:

• RAHIQI, Javad; DOB 24 Apr 1953; POB Marshad, Iran (individual) [NPWMD]

The following entities have been added to OFAC’s SDN list: <sort> FULMEN GROUP (a.k.a. FULMEN COMPANY), P.O. Box 19395/1371, Tehran, Iran; 167, Darya Blvd, Saadat Abad, 1466983565, Iran; No. 167 Darya Blvd, Sharak Ghods, Tehran, Iran; No 57, Lida St, Valiassr Ave, 19697, Tehran, Iran; No. 57, Lida St, After Vanak Sq, Vali-e Asr Ave, 19697, Tehran, Iran; Sadat Abad, Shahra Qod (Shahrak Gharb), Darya Ave, 19697, Tehran, Iran [NPWMD] IRAN CENTRIFUGE TECHNOLOGY COMPANY (a.k.a. “TESA”), Yousef Abad District, No. 1, 37th Street, Tehran, Iran; Khalij-e Fars Boulevard, Kilometre 10 of Atomic Energy Road, Rowshan Shahr, Third Moshtaq Street, Esfahan, Iran [NPWMD] MODERN INDUSTRIES TECHNIQUE COMPANY (a.k.a. RAHKAR COMPANY; a.k.a. RAHKAR INDUSTRIES; a.k.a. RAHKAR SANAYE COMPANY; a.k.a. RAHKAR SANAYE NOVIN; a.k.a. “MITEC”), North Amirabad St., 21 St, No. 37, Tehran, Iran [NPWMD] NEKA NOVIN, Unit 7, No. 12, 13th Street, Mir-Emad St., Motahary Avenue, Tehran 15875-6653, Iran [NPWMD] NOOR AFZAR GOSTAR COMPANY (a.k.a. NOOR AFZA GOSTAR; a.k.a. “NAGC”; a.k.a. “NAGCO”), 4th Floor, Bloc 1, Building 133, Mirdamad Avenue, Tehran, Iran; Opp Seventh Alley, Zarafrshan Street, Eivanak Street, Qods Township, Iran [NPWMD] PARTO SANAT CO., 2417 Valiasr Ave., Next to 14th Street, Tehran 15178, Iran [NPWMD] PAYA PARTOV CO., No. 128 – Mahestan, 7th Street, Iran Zamin Ave., San’at Square, Tehran, Iran [NPWMD] SIMATIC DEVELOPMENT CO., Tehran, Iran [NPWMD] THE NUCLEAR REACTORS FUEL COMPANY (a.k.a. “SUREH”), 61 Shahid Abtahi St., Karegar e Shomali, Tehran, Iran; Persian Gulf Boulevard, Km20 SW Esfahan Road, Iran [NPWMD] YASA PART (a.k.a. ARFA PAINT COMPANY; a.k.a. ARFEH COMPANY; a.k.a. FARASEPEHR ENGINEERING COMPANY; a.k.a. HOSSEINI NEJAD TRADING CO.; a.k.a. IRAN SAFFRON COMPANY; a.k.a. IRANSAFFRON CO; a.k.a. SHETAB G; a.k.a. SHETAB GAMAN; a.k.a. SHETAB TRADING; a.k.a. Y.A.S. CO LTD.), No 17, Balooch Alley, Vaezi St, Shariati Ave, Tehran, Iran; West Lavansai, Tehran 009821, Iran; Sa’adat Abaad, Shahrdari Sq Sarv Building, 9th Floor, Unit 5, Tehran, Iran [NPWMD] </sort>

November 21, 2011 – Fact Sheet: New Sanctions on Iran – Today, the United States is taking a series of actions to confront the threat posed by Iran and significantly increase pressure on Iran to comply with the full range of its international obligations and to address the international community’s longstanding concerns regarding its nuclear program. These steps include: expanding sanctions to target the supply of goods, services, technology, or support (above certain monetary thresholds) to Iran for the development of its petroleum resources and maintenance or expansion of its petrochemical industry; designating eleven individuals and entities under Executive Order 13382 for their role in Iran’s WMD program; and identifying the Islamic Republic of Iran as a jurisdiction of “primary money laundering concern” under section 311 of the USA PATRIOT Act.

These actions underscore the Administration’s continued strong commitment – particularly in light of the IAEA Director General’s most recent report – to hold the Iranian regime accountable for its refusal to comply with its international obligations regarding its nuclear program. The Administration is also sending an unequivocal message to the Government of Iran today that it will continue to face increasing international pressure until it addresses the international community’s legitimate concerns regarding the nature of Iran’s nuclear program.

New Sanctions under Executive Order (E.O.) 13590:

On November 19, President Obama signed E.O. 13590, which significantly expands existing energy-related sanctions on Iran to authorize sanctions on persons that knowingly provide:

1. Goods, Services, Technology, or Support for the Development of Petroleum Resources: – The sale, lease, or provision of goods, services, technology, or support to Iran that could directly and significantly contribute to the enhancement of Iran’s ability to develop petroleum resources located in Iran could trigger sanctions if a single transaction has a fair market value of $1 million or more, or if a series of transactions from the same entity have a fair market value of $5 million or more in a 12-month period.
2. Goods, Services, Technology, or Support for the Maintenance or Expansion of the Petrochemical Sector: – The sale, lease, or provision of goods, services, technology, or support to Iran that could directly and significantly facilitate the maintenance or expansion of its domestic production of petrochemical products could trigger sanctions if a single transaction has a fair market value of $250,000 or more, or if a series of transactions from the same entity have a fair market value of $1 million or more in a 12-month period.

If a person is found to have provided a good, service, technology, or support described in E.O. 13590, the Secretary of State, in consultation with other agencies, has the authority to impose sanctions, including prohibitions on: foreign exchange transactions; banking transactions; property transactions in the United States; U.S. Export-Import Bank financing; U.S. export licenses; imports into the United States; loans of more than $10 million from U.S. financial institutions; U.S. government procurement contracts; and, for financial institutions, designation as a primary dealer or repository of U.S. government funds.

Designation of Entities under E.O. 13382:

• The U.S. Department of State has designated the Nuclear Reactors Fuel Company, Noor Afzar Gostar Company, Fulmen Group, and Yasa Part under E.O. 13382 for their role in Iran’s nuclear procurement networks. They support a variety of Iran’s proscribed nuclear procurement activities, including centrifuge development, heavy water research reactor activities, and uranium enrichment.

• The U.S. Department of the Treasury also has designated Javad Rahiqi, Modern Industries Technique Company (MITEC), Neka Novin, Parto Sanat, Paya Partov, Simatic, and the Iran Centrifuge Technology Company (TESA) under E.O. 13382. These entities are linked to the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI), which is a key actor in Iran’s nuclear program as the main Iranian organization for research and development activities in the field of nuclear technology, including Iran’s centrifuge enrichment program and experimental laser enrichment of uranium program. The AEOI was listed in the Annex to E.O. 13382 and has been sanctioned by the United Nations in Security Council resolution 1737.

E.O. 13382 blocks the assets under U.S. jurisdiction of the designated persons and prohibits U.S. persons from engaging in transactions involving them.

To view the complete list of designations under E.O. 13382, visit link.

Identification of the Islamic Republic of Iran as a Jurisdiction of “Primary Money Laundering Concern” Under Section 311 of the USA PATRIOT Act:

The U.S. Department of the Treasury identified the Islamic Republic of Iran as a jurisdiction of primary money laundering concern under Section 311 of the USA PATRIOT Act (Section 311) based on Iran’s support for terrorism; pursuit of weapons of mass destruction (WMD); reliance on state-owned or controlled agencies to facilitate WMD proliferation; and the illicit and deceptive financial activities that Iranian financial institutions – including the Central Bank of Iran – and other state-controlled entities engage in to facilitate Iran’s illicit conduct and evade sanctions.

In issuing today’s Finding, Treasury has for the first time identified the entire Iranian financial sector; including Iran’s Central Bank, private Iranian banks, and branches, and subsidiaries of Iranian banks operating outside of Iran as posing illicit finance risks for the global financial system.

The Finding also creates a clear public record of the scope and depth of Iran’s illicit conduct, detailing the involvement of Iranian government agencies and banking institutions in WMD proliferation, support for terrorism, and other illicit conduct. In particular, the Finding includes new information about the Central Bank of Iran’s role in facilitating Iran’s illicit conduct and Iran’s efforts to evade international sanctions.

Today’s action reinforces U.S. and international sanctions already in place against Iran and provides greater certainty that the U.S. financial system is protected from Iranian illicit activity.

Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) also today filed a Notice of Proposed Rule Making (NPRM), in which it proposes imposing a special measure against Iran. While current U.S. regulations already generally prohibit U.S. financial institutions from engaging in both direct and indirect transactions with Iranian financial institutions, this action would require U.S. financial institutions to implement additional due diligence measures in order to prevent any improper indirect access by Iranian banking institutions to U.S. correspondent accounts.

• To view the complete 311 Finding, visit link.
• To view the NPRM, visit link.
• To view a fact sheet on Section 311, visit link.

November 17, 2011 – General License No. 5, under the Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferators Sanctions Regulations – On November 17, 2011 OFAC issued General License No. 5 under the Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferators Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. Part 544, authorizing certain transactions related to the arrest, detention, and judicial sale of the MV Dianthe (f.k.a. Horsham, f.k.a. Iran Bam, IMO No. 9323833), which is a vessel on OFAC’s Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons list. The vessel is currently under arrest in Mundra, India. OFAC GL5 WMD Iran – MV Dianthe

November 03, 2011 – SDN-List changes

The following deletions have been made to OFAC’s SDN list:

• MEKONG SPIRIT Container Ship 12,380DWT 9,616GRT CYPRUS flag (HAFIZ DARYA SHIPPING COMPANY); Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9118513 (Cyprus) (vessel) NPWMD

The following changes have been made to OFAC’s SDN list:

• ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES (a.k.a. ARYA SHIPPING COMPANY; a.k.a. IRI SHIPPING LINES; a.k.a. IRISL; a.k.a. IRISL GROUP), No. 37, Corner of 7th Narenjestan, Sayad Shirazi Square, After Noboyand Square, Pasdaran Ave., Tehran, Iran; No. 37, Aseman Tower, Sayyade Shirazee Square, Pasdaran Ave., P.O. Box 19395-1311, Tehran, Iran [NPWMD] -to- ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES (|a.k.a. IRI SHIPPING LINES; a.k.a. IRISL; a.k.a. IRISL GROUP|), |No. 37, Aseman Tower, Sayyade Shirazee Square, Pasdaran Ave., P.O. Box 19395-1311, Tehran, Iran; No. 37, Corner of 7th Narenjestan, Sayad Shirazi Square, After Noboyand Square, Pasdaran Ave., Tehran, Iran| NPWMD

October 27, 2011 – Designations of Six IRISL Fronts – The US Department of the Treasury designated the following shipping companies pursuant to Executive Order 13382 for being owned or controlled by the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL), Hafiz Darya Shipping Company (HDS Lines), and/or Soroush Sarzamin Asatir Ship Management Company (SSA):

• Galliot Maritime Inc.;
• Indus Maritime Inc.;
• Kaveri Maritime Inc.;
• Melodious Maritime Inc.;
• Mount Everest Maritime Inc.; and
• Rishi Maritime Inc.

Also today, Treasury amended the entry on the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons (SDN) List for SSA to include the company’s new alias, Rahbaran Omid Darya Ship Management Company; identified a new vessel as blocked property of IRISL; and updated 14 other already identified IRISL vessels with new names and/or flag information.

As a result of today’s action, U.S. persons are generally prohibited from engaging in transactions with these entities and any assets they may hold in the U.S. are frozen. OFAC IRISL Panama Notice & OFAC Recent Actions (new identified & updated vessels)

October 13, 2011 – General License on Food – 31 CFR Parts 560 – The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (‘‘OFAC’’) is adopting as final, with changes, a previously issued interim final rule. These changes primarily amend the Sudanese Sanctions Regulations and the Iranian Transactions Regulations by issuing general licenses that authorize the exportation or re-exportation of food to individuals and entities in an area of Sudan other than the Specified Areas of Sudan and in Iran. Certain specified food items, as well as exports to certain persons, requiring a greater level of scrutiny are excluded from the general licenses. – Effective Date: October 12, 2011.

Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 197 / Wednesday, October 12, 2011 / Rules and Regulations

October 13, 2011 – The US Department of the Treasury announced on Oct 13, 2011 the designation of Iranian commercial airline Mahan Air pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13224 for providing financial, material and technological support to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF). Based in Tehran, Mahan Air provides transportation, funds transfers and personnel travel services to the IRGC-QF.

“Mahan Air’s close coordination with the IRGC-QF – secretly ferrying operatives, weapons and funds on its flights – reveals yet another facet of the IRGC’s extensive infiltration of Iran’s commercial sector to facilitate its support for terrorism,” said Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence David S. Cohen. “Following the revelation about the IRGC-QF’s use of the international financial system to fund its murder-for-hire plot, today’s action highlights further the undeniable risks of doing business with Iran.”

Mahan Air provided travel services to IRGC-QF personnel flown to and from Iran and Syria for military training. Mahan Air also facilitated the covert travel of suspected IRGC-QF officers into and out of Iraq by bypassing normal security procedures and not including information on flight manifests to eliminate records of the IRGC-QF travel.

Mahan Air crews have facilitated IRGC-QF arms shipments. Funds were also transferred via Mahan Air for the procurement of controlled goods by the IRGC-QF.

In addition to the reasons for which Mahan Air is being designated today, Mahan Air also provides transportation services to Hizballah, a Lebanon-based designated Foreign Terrorist Organization. Mahan Air has transported personnel, weapons and goods on behalf of Hizballah and omitted from Mahan Air cargo manifests secret weapons shipments bound for Hizballah.

As a result of today’s action, U.S. persons are prohibited from engaging in commercial or financial transactions with Mahan Air and any assets it may hold under U.S. jurisdiction are frozen. OFAC Press Release & OFAC Recent Actions

October 12, 2011 – Treasury Sanctions Five Individuals Tied to Iranian Plot to Assassinate the Saudi Arabian Ambassador to the United States

The US Department of the Treasury announced on October 12, 2011 the designation of five individuals, including four senior Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF) officers connected to a plot to assassinate the Saudi Arabian Ambassador to the United States Adel Al-Jubeir, while he was in the United States and to carry out follow-on attacks against other countries’ interests inside the United States and in another country. As part of today’s action, Treasury also designated the individual responsible for arranging the assassination plot on behalf of the IRGC-QF.

Designated today pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13224 for acting for or on behalf of the IRGC-QF were: Manssor Arbabsiar, a naturalized U.S. citizen holding both Iranian and U.S. passports who acted on behalf of the IRGC-QF to pursue the failed plot to assassinate the Saudi ambassador; IRGC-QF commander Qasem Soleimani; Hamed Abdollahi, a senior IRGC-QF official who coordinated aspects of the plot and oversaw the other Qods Force officials directly responsible for coordinating and planning this operation; Abdul Reza Shahlai, an IRGC-QF official who coordinated this operation; and Ali Gholam Shakuri, an IRGC-QF official and deputy to Shahlai, who met with Arbabsiar on several occasions to discuss the assassination and other planned attacks.

Arbabsiar and Shakuri were named by the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York in a criminal complaint unsealed today connected with the IRGC-QF plot. Among the charges brought against them was conspiracy to engage in foreign travel and use interstate and foreign commerce facilities in the commission of murder-for-hire. According to the criminal complaint, Arbabsiar arranged for $100,000 to be sent from Tehran to the U.S. as a down payment for the assassination of the Saudi ambassador. Two wire transfers totaling approximately $100,000 were sent from a non-Iranian foreign bank to a bank in the United States, to the account of the person recruited by Arbabsiar to carry out the assassination.

“Iran once again has used the Qods Force and the international financial system to pursue an act of international terrorism, this time aimed against a Saudi diplomat,” said David S. Cohen, Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence. “The financial transactions at the heart of this plot lay bare the risk that banks and other institutions face in doing business with Iran.”

As a result of today’s designations, U.S. persons are prohibited from engaging in transactions with these individuals, and any assets they may hold in the U.S. are frozen.

• Manssor Arbabsiar

Arbabsiar met on a number of occasions with senior IRGC-QF officials regarding this plot and acted on behalf of senior Qods Force officials – including his cousin Abdul Reza Shahlai and Shahlai’s deputy Gholam Shakuri – to execute the plot. During one such meeting, a $100,000 payment for the murder of the Saudi ambassador was approved by the IRGC-QF. After this meeting, Arbabsiar arranged for approximately $100,000 to be sent from a non-Iranian foreign bank to the United States, to the account of the person he recruited to carry out the assassination.

• Qasem Soleimani

As IRGC-QF Commander, Qasem Soleimani oversees the IRGC-QF officers who were involved in this plot. Soleimani was previously designated by the Treasury Department under E.O. 13382 based on his relationship to the IRGC. He was also designated in May 2011 pursuant to E.O. 13572, which targets human rights abuses in Syria, for his role as the Commander of the IRGC-QF, the primary conduit for Iran’s support to the Syrian General Intelligence Directorate (GID).

• Hamed Abdollahi

Abdollahi is also a senior IRGC-QF officer who coordinated aspects of this operation. Abdollahi oversees other Qods Force officials – including Shahlai – who were responsible for coordinating and planning this operation.

• Abdul Reza Shahlai

Shahlai is an IRGC-QF official who coordinated the plot to assassinate the Saudi Arabian Ambassador to the United States Adel Al-Jubeir, while he was in the United States and to carry out follow-on attacks against other countries’ interests inside the United States and in another country. Shahlai worked through his cousin, Mansour Arbabsiar, who was named in the criminal complaint for conspiring to bring the IRGC-QF’s plot to fruition. Shahlai approved financial allotments to Arbabsiar to help recruit other individuals for the plot, approving $5 million dollars as payment for all of the operations discussed. Shahlai was designated by Treasury in September 2008 pursuant to E.O. 13438 for threatening the peace and stability of Iraq and the Government of Iraq.

• Ali Gholam Shakuri

Shakuri is an IRGC-QF officer and deputy to Abdul Reza Shahlai who acted on behalf of Shahlai in support of this plot. Shakuri provided financial support to Arbabsiar and met with Arbabsiar several times to discuss the planned assassination and other attacks. With Shakuri’s approval, Arbabsiar arranged for the $100,000 down payment to be sent from a non-Iranian foreign bank to the United States.

Background on Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force The IRGC-QF is the Government of Iran’s primary foreign action arm for executing its policy of supporting terrorist organizations and extremist groups around the world. The IRGC-QF provides training, logistical assistance and material and financial support to militants and terrorist operatives, including the Taliban, Lebanese Hizballah, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command.

IRGC-QF officers and their associates have supported attacks against U.S. and allied troops and diplomatic missions in Iraq and Afghanistan. The IRGC-QF continues to train, equip and fund Iraqi Shia militant groups – such as Kata’ib and Hizballah – and elements of the Taliban in Afghanistan to prevent an increase in Western influence in the region. In the Levant, the IRGC-QF supports terrorist groups such as Lebanese Hizballah and Hamas, which it views as integral to its efforts to challenge U.S. influence in the Middle East.

The Government of Iran also uses the IRGC and IRGC-QF to implement its foreign policy goals, including, but not limited to, seemingly legitimate activities that provide cover for intelligence operations and support to terrorist and insurgent groups. These activities include economic investment, reconstruction, and other types of aid to Iraq, Afghanistan and Lebanon, implemented by companies and institutions that act for or on behalf of, or are owned or controlled by, the IRGC and the Iranian government.

The IRGC-QF was designated by Treasury pursuant to E.O. 13224 in October 2007 for its support for terrorism, and was listed in the Annex to E.O. 13572 of April 2011 as the conduit for Iran’s support to Syria’s GID, the overarching civilian intelligence service in Syria which has been involved in human rights abuses in Syria.

OFAC Press Release

September 14, 2011 – Authorizing the Implementation of Certain Sanctions Set Forth in the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996, as Amended On May 23, 2011, the President signed Executive Order (“E.O.”) 13574, “Authorizing the Implementation of Certain Sanctions Set Forth in the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996, as Amended.” E.O. 13574 states that the Secretary of the Treasury, pursuant to authority under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (“IEEPA”), shall implement certain sanctions that the Secretary of State imposes and selects under the pre-existing authority of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (“ISA”) as amended by the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (“CISADA”).

Among other sanctions, the Secretary of State has chosen to impose an ISA sanction on the persons listed below that involves a prohibition on U.S. financial institutions making certain loans or credits as of the following dates:

May 24, 2011:

1. Tanker Pacific Ship Management (a.k.a Tanker Pacific), Headquarters (Singapore), Tanker Pacific Management (Singapore) Pte Ltd, 1 Temasek Avenue, #38-01,Millenia Tower, Singapore 039192, Website http://www.tanker.com.sg/contact.html

August 26, 2011:

1. Allvale Maritime Inc., 80 Broad Street, Monrovia, Liberia
2. Société Anonyme Monégasque D’Administration Maritime Et Aérienne (a.k.a. S.A.M.A.M.A., a.k.a. SAMAMA), Villa Saint Jean, 3 Ruelle Saint Jena, MC 98000, Monaco

OFAC ISA amendment & Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 178 / Wednesday, September 14, 2011 / Notices

September 13, 2011 – Federal Register Notice Clarifying Previous Sanction Announcement (Taken Question) (Ofer Brothers)

• QUESTION: Why did the Department put out a Federal Register Notice clarifying the sanctions on the Sammy Ofer shipping organization at this time?
• ANSWER: In issuing this clarification, our intent was to sanction the specific entities in the Sammy Ofer shipping organization that were responsible for providing a tanker to Iran. The use of the name “Ofer Brothers Group,” a commonly used trade name, caused confusion for some banks and companies that were trying to comply with U.S. sanctions. The complex nature of the conglomerate’s business structure necessitated that we take the time to look closely at these companies in order to ensure that we were identifying the precise legal names of the entities directly responsible for the sanctionable transaction.

(source US Department of State Sep 13, 2011)

September 13, 2011 – US drops Israeli company (Ofer Brothers) from Iran sanctions list – (Reuters) – The United States on Tuesday removed an Israeli holding company from a sanctions blacklist for trade with Iran, clarifying a step taken in May that cast a shadow over Israel’s richest family.

(source Reuters Sep 13, 2011)

August 10, 2011 – The following changes have been made to OFAC’s SDN list:

BANK MELLI IRAN (a.k.a. BANK MELLI; a.k.a. NATIONAL BANK OF IRAN), PO Box 11365-171, Ferdowsi Avenue, Tehran, Iran; 43 Avenue Montaigne, Paris 75008, France; Room 704-6, Wheelock Hse, 20 Pedder St, Central, Hong Kong; Bank Melli Iran Bldg, 111 St 24, 929 Arasat, Baghdad, Iraq; PO Box 2643, Ruwi, Muscat 112, Oman; PO Box 2656, Liva Street, Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates; PO Box 248, Hamad Bin Abdulla St, Fujairah, United Arab Emirates; PO Box 1888, Clock Tower, Industrial Rd, Al Ain Club Bldg, Al Ain, Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates; PO Box 1894, Baniyas St, Deira, Dubai City, United Arab Emirates; PO Box 5270, Oman Street Al Nakheel, Ras Al-Khaimah, United Arab Emirates; PO Box 459, Al Borj St, Sharjah, United Arab Emirates; PO Box 3093, Ahmed Seddiqui Bldg, Khalid Bin El-Walid St, Bur-Dubai, Dubai City 3093, United Arab Emirates; PO Box 1894, Al Wasl Rd, Jumeirah, Dubai, United Arab Emirates; Postfach 112 129, Holzbruecke 2, D-20459, Hamburg, Germany; Nobel Ave. 14, Baku, Azerbaijan; Unit 1703-4, 17th Floor, Hong Kong Club Building, 3 A Chater Road Central, Hong Kong; all offices worldwide [IRAN] [NPWMD] [IFSR] -to- BANK MELLI IRAN (a.k.a. BANK MELLI; a.k.a. NATIONAL BANK OF IRAN), |PO Box 11365-171, Ferdowsi Avenue, Tehran, Iran; 43 Avenue Montaigne, Paris 75008, France; Room 704-6, Wheelock Hse, 20 Pedder St, Central, Hong Kong; Bank Melli Iran Bldg, 111 St 24, 929 Arasat, Baghdad, Iraq; PO Box 2643, Ruwi, Muscat 112, Oman; PO Box 2656, Liva Street, Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates; PO Box 248, Hamad Bin Abdulla St, Fujairah, United Arab Emirates; PO Box 1888, Clock Tower, Industrial Rd, Al Ain Club Bldg, Al Ain, Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates; PO Box 1894, Baniyas St, Deira, Dubai City, United Arab Emirates; PO Box 5270, Oman Street Al Nakheel, Ras Al-Khaimah, United Arab Emirates; PO Box 459, Al Borj St, Sharjah, United Arab Emirates; PO Box 3093, Ahmed Seddiqui Bldg, Khalid Bin El-Walid St, Bur-Dubai, Dubai City 3093, United Arab Emirates; PO Box 1894, Al Wasl Rd, Jumeirah, Dubai, United Arab Emirates; Postfach 112 129, Holzbruecke 2, D-20459, Hamburg, Germany; Nobel Ave. 14, Baku, Azerbaijan; Unit 1703-4, 17th Floor, Hong Kong Club Building, 3 A Chater Road Central, Hong Kong; Esteghlal St., Opposite to Otbeh Ibn Ghazvan Hall , Basrah, Iraq; all offices worldwide| [IRAN] [NPWMD] [IFSR] – OFAC update Aug 10, 2011

July 29, 2011 – The U.S. Department of the Treasury today announced the designation of six members of an al-Qa’ida network headed by Ezedin Abdel Aziz Khalil, a prominent Iran-based al-Qa’ida facilitator, operating under an agreement between al-Qa’ida and the Iranian government. Today’s action, taken pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13224, demonstrates that Iran is a critical transit point for funding to support al-Qa’ida’s activities in Afghanistan and Pakistan. This network serves as the core pipeline through which al-Qa’ida moves money, facilitators and operatives from across the Middle East to South Asia, including to Atiyah Abd al-Rahman, a key al-Qa’ida leader based in Pakistan, also designated today. OFAC Designation

June 30, 2011 – Updated OFAC Sanctions 31 CFR Chapter V The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) is amending 31 CFR chapter V to replace the list of persons (which includes individuals and entities) with whom transactions and dealings are prohibited by the various economic sanctions programs administered by OFAC that appears at Appendix A to 31 CFR chapter V with information on how to obtain up-to-date lists of such persons on OFAC’s Web site or by other means.

OFAC also is removing Appendix B to 31 CFR chapter V, which includes the names of certain blocked vessels. In addition, OFAC is amending its regulations for a number of the sanctions programs it administers to revise references to Appendix A and to remove references to Appendix B.

Finally, OFAC is amending the Iranian Transactions Regulations, by republishing in alphabetical order the entire list of persons identified in Appendix A to 31 CFR Part 560, to reflect changes to the list since that appendix was last published. Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 126 / Thursday, June 30, 2011 / Rules and Regulations

560 – IRAN ITR – SDN List + This non-exhaustive appendix lists persons determined by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (‘‘OFAC’’) to be the Government of Iran, as defined in § 560.304 of this part. The persons listed below are considered to be the Government of Iran not only when they operate from the locations listed below, but also when they operate from any other location. The names and addresses are subject to change. This part 560 contains prohibitions against engaging in most transactions with persons that meet the definition of the Government of Iran, whether such persons are located or incorporated inside or outside of Iran. Moreover, regardless of whether a person is listed below, if the person comes within the definition of Government of Iran in § 560.304, the prohibitions on engaging in transactions with the person, wherever located worldwide, apply to the same extent they would apply if the person were listed in this appendix. Note that the prohibitions in this part 560 also apply to most transactions with persons located in Iran that are not the Government of Iran. The names of persons listed in this appendix also are included on OFAC’s Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List (‘‘SDN List’’) with the identifier ‘‘[IRAN].’’ Although there is no requirement to block the property and interests of property of persons listed in this appendix, U.S. persons are cautioned that entities identified as owned or controlled by the Government of Iran also may be designated or blocked pursuant to additional sanctions programs administered by OFAC. The entry for a person’s name in this appendix and on the SDN List may include—in addition to the identifier ‘‘[IRAN]’’—identifier(s) for the other sanctions program(s) pursuant to which the person is listed on the SDN List (e.g., ‘‘[IRAN] [NPWMD]’’ or ‘‘[IRAN] [SDGT]’’). Notes to Appendix A to Part 560:

1.The alphabetical list below provides the following information concerning persons determined by OFAC to be the Government of Iran: The name (including known former or alternate names), address, the identifier ‘‘[IRAN]’’, and, if applicable, the identifier(s) denoting other sanctions program(s) pursuant to which the person is blocked.

2. The abbreviations used in this appendix are ‘‘a.k.a.’’ (also known as) and ‘‘f.k.a.’’ (formerly known as).

3. The references to sanctions programs in 31 CFR chapter V include: [IRAN] (Iranian Transactions Regulations, part 560); [IFSR] (Iranian Financial Sanctions Regulations, part 561); [ISA] (Executive Order 13574, 76 FR 30505, May 25, 2011; Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (Pub. L. 104–172) (50 U.S.C. 1701 note), as amended by, inter alia, the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (Pub. L. 111–195)); [NPWMD] (Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferators Sanctions Regulations, part 544); and [SDGT] (Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations, part 594).

4. The names of persons listed in Appendix A to part 560 are published in the Federal Register and included on the SDN List. The SDN List is accessible through the following page on OFAC’s Web site: http://www.treasury.gov/sdn. Additional information pertaining to the SDN List can be found in Appendix A to this chapter. New names of persons determined to be the Government of Iran and changes to existing listings also are published in the Federal Register.

This document and additional information concerning OFAC are available from OFAC’s Web site: http://www.treasury.gov/ofac. Certain general information pertaining to OFAC’s sanctions programs also is available via facsimile through a 24-hour fax-ondemand service, tel.: 202/622–0077. Please consult OFAC’s Web site prior to engaging in transactions that may be subject to the prohibitions contained in part 560. If you have further questions, please contact OFAC’s Sanctions Compliance & Evaluation Division at 202/622–2490 or 800/540–6322 (toll-free).

§ 560.304 Government of Iran. The term Government of Iran includes: (a) The state and the Government of Iran, as well as any political subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof; (b) Any entity owned or controlled directly or indirectly by the foregoing; (c) Any person to the extent that such person is, or has been, or to the extent that there is reasonable cause to believe that such person is, or has been, since the applicable effective date, acting or purporting to act directly or indirectly on behalf of any of the foregoing; and (d) Any person or entity designated by the Secretary of the Treasury as included within paragraphs (a) through (c) of this section.

561 – IRAN IFSR – SDN List + In addition, see § 561.405 concerning entities that may not be listed on the SDN List but whose property and interests in property are nevertheless blocked.

§ 561.405 A person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq. ) (“IEEPA”) has an interest in all property and interests in property of an entity in which it owns, directly or indirectly, a 50 percent or greater interest. The property and interests in property of such an entity, therefore, are blocked, and such an entity is a person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to IEEPA, regardless of whether the entity itself is listed on the Office of Foreign Assets Control’s Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List. [76 FR 38542, June 30, 2011]

562 – IRAN – HRA – SDN List + Additional information pertaining to the SDN List can be found in Appendix A to this chapter. See § 562.406 concerning entities that may not be listed on the SDN List but whose property and interests in property are nevertheless blocked pursuant to this section.

§ 562.406 Entities owned by a person whose property and interests in property are blocked. A person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to §562.201 has an interest in all property and interests in property of an entity in which it owns, directly or indirectly, a 50 percent or greater interest. The property and interests in property of such an entity, therefore, are blocked, and such an entity is a person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to §562.201, regardless of whether the entity itself is listed in the Annex or designated pursuant to Executive Order 13553.

June 30, 2011 – Notice form Lloyd’s List concerning Iranian ports – Ports affected by OFAC sanctioning of Tidewater include: <sort> Bandar Abbas, at the mouth of the Strait of Hormuz Shahid Rajaee Container Terminal, which is the main box port for Iran and which is also located near Bandar Abbas Bandar Imam Khomeini grain terminal, which receives large amounts of the country’s grain in panamax vessels Assaluyeh, which is focused on petrochemicals Khorramshar Aprin Amirabad, which is a part-built multi-purpose port located on the country’s Caspian Sea coast </sort>

Non-US companies are affected if they have US connections.

Container carriers are likely to be affected. Maersk Line operates a weekly containership run providing a connection between Bandar Abbas and Jebel Ali in the United Arab Emirates. Lloyd’s List News Item 20110628

June 29, 2011 – The following individual & entity have been added to OFAC’s SDN list:

• LAW ENFORCEMENT FORCES OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN (a.k.a. IRANIAN POLICE; a.k.a. IRAN’S LAW ENFORCEMENT FORCES; a.k.a. NAJA; a.k.a. NIRUYIH INTIZAMIYEH JUMHURIYIH ISLAMIYIH IRAN) [IRAN-HR] -to- LAW ENFORCEMENT FORCES OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN (a.k.a. IRANIAN POLICE; a.k.a. IRAN’S LAW ENFORCEMENT FORCES; a.k.a. NAJA; a.k.a. NIRUYIH INTIZAMIYEH JUMHURIYIH ISLAMIYIH IRAN) |[SYRIA] [IRAN-HR]|
• MOGHADAM, Ismail Ahmadi (a.k.a. AHMADI-MOGHADDAM, Esma’il; a.k.a. AHMADI-MOQADDAM, Esma’il; a.k.a. MOGHADDAM, Esameel Ahmadi; a.k.a. MOGHADDAM, Ismail Ahmadi); DOB 1961; POB Tehran, Iran; Head of Iranian Police; Alternate Title, Chief, Iran’s Law Enforcement Forces (individual) [IRAN-HR] -to- MOGHADAM, Ismail Ahmadi (a.k.a. AHMADI-MOGHADDAM, Esma’il; a.k.a. AHMADI-MOQADDAM, Esma’il; a.k.a. MOGHADDAM, Esameel Ahmadi; a.k.a. MOGHADDAM, Ismail Ahmadi); DOB 1961; POB Tehran, Iran; Head of Iranian Police; Alternate Title, Chief, Iran’s Law Enforcement Forces (individual) |[SYRIA] [IRAN-HR]|
• RADAN, Ahmad-Reza; DOB 1963; alt. DOB 1964; POB Isfahan, Iran; Deputy Chief, National Police; Deputy Police Chief; Brigadier General (individual) [IRAN-HR] -to- RADAN, Ahmad-Reza; DOB 1963; alt. DOB 1964; POB Isfahan, Iran; Deputy Chief, National Police; Deputy Police Chief; Brigadier General (individual) |[SYRIA] [IRAN-HR]|

OFAC Designation June 29, 2011

June 23, 2011 -OFAC Actions – Specially Designated Nationals List Update

Today, the United States imposed sanctions on Tidewater Middle East Company, an operator of Iranian ports owned by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) that has links to Iranian proliferation activities. We also imposed sanctions against Iran Air, which was designated for providing material support and services to the IRGC and Iran’s Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL), and also has facilitated proliferation-related activities. Today’s sanctions also exposed an Iranian individual and entity for their ties to a company that provided support and weapons to Hizballah on behalf of the IRGC.

The IRGC’s illicit activities and its increasing displacement of the legitimate Iranian private sector in major strategic industries, including in the commercial and energy sectors, are deeply troubling. The IRGC also serves as the domestic “enforcer” for the Iranian regime, continues to play an important proliferation role by orchestrating the import and export of prohibited items to and from Iran, is involved in support of terrorism throughout the region, and is responsible for serious human rights abuses against peaceful Iranian protestors and other opposition participants. Joint Statement & OFAC Fact Sheet & OFAC Press Release

The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN list:

• SHAHRIYARI, Behnam (a.k.a. SHAHRIARI, Behnam; a.k.a. SHAHRYARI, Behnam); DOB 1968; nationality Iran (individual) [SDGT]

The following entities have been added to OFAC’s SDN list:

<sort> BEHNAM SHAHRIYARI TRADING COMPANY, Ziba Building, 10th floor, North Sohrevardi Street, Tehran, Iran [SDGT] IRAN AIR (a.k.a. AIRLINE OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN (HOMA); a.k.a. HAVAPEYMA MELI IRAN HOMA; a.k.a. HOMA; a.k.a. IRAN AIR CARGO; a.k.a. IRAN AIR P J S C; a.k.a. IRANAIR; a.k.a. IRANAIR CARGO; a.k.a. NATIONAL IRANIAN AIRLINES (HOMA); f.k.a. SHERKAT SAHAMI AAM HAVOPAYMAIE JOMHOURI ISLAMI IRAN), P.O. Box 13185-775, Mehrabad Airport, Tehran, Iran; Flour2, Cargo Building, Terminal3, Mehrabad Airport, Tehran, Iran; Bimeh Alborz side – 2km of karaj special road, Iran; Business Registration Document # 8132 (Iran) issued 24 Feb 1961 [NPWMD] IRANAIR TOURS (a.k.a. IRAN AIR TOURS; a.k.a. IRAN AIRTOUR AIRLINE), 187 Mofatteh Cross – Motahari Ave., Tehran 1587997811, Iran; 191 Motah-hari Ave., Dr. Mofatteh Crossroads, Tehran 15879, Iran; 191 – Motahari Ave., Tehran 15897, Iran; 110 Ahmadabad Ave., Between Mohtashami and Edalat Street, Mashhad 9176663479, Iran [NPWMD] MEHR-E EQTESAD-E IRANIAN INVESTMENT COMPANY (a.k.a. MEHR EGHTESAD IRANIAN INVESTMENT COMPANY; a.k.a. MEHR IRANIAN ECONOMY COMPANY; a.k.a. MEHR IRANIAN ECONOMY INVESTMENTS; f.k.a. TEJARAT TOSE’E EQTESADI IRANIAN), No. 18, Iranian Building, 14th Alley, Ahmad Qassir Street, Argentina Square, Tehran, Iran; No. 48, 14th Alley, Ahmad Qassir Street, Argentina Square, Tehran, Iran; Business Registration Document # 103222 (Iran); Website www.mebank.ir; Telephone: 982188526300; Alt. Telephone: 982188526301; Alt. Telephone: 982188526302; Alt. Telephone: 982188526303; Alt. Telephone: 9821227700019l; Fax: 982188526337; Alt. Fax: 9221227700019 [NPWMD] [IRGC] TIDEWATER MIDDLE EAST CO. (a.k.a. TIDE WATER COMPANY; a.k.a. TIDE WATER MIDDLE EAST MARINE SERVICE; a.k.a. TIDEWATER CO. (MIDDLE EAST MARINE SERVICES)), No. 80, Tidewater Building, Vozara Street, Next to Saie Park, Tehran, Iran; Business Registration Document # 18745 (Iran); Email Address info@tidewaterco.com; alt. Email Address info@tidewaterco.ir; Website www.tidewaterco.com; Telephone: 982188553321; Alt. Telephone: 982188554432; Fax: 982188717367; Alt. Fax: 982188708761; Alt. Fax: 982188708911 [NPWMD] [IRGC] </sort>

June 21, 2011 – OFAC Guidance on the Donations of Food and Medicine to Iran and the Non-Specified Areas of Sudan

Donations of food and medicine to Iran and the non-Specified Areas of Sudan, when intended to be used to relieve human suffering, are exempt from the prohibitions of the Iranian Transaction Regulations (“ITR”) and the Sudanese Sanctions Regulations (“SSR”); thus, such donations by U.S. persons do not require an ITR or SSR license issued pursuant to the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000 (“TSRA”). However, the commercial exportation or reexportation of food and medicine to Iran and the non-Specified Areas of Sudan is subject to the licensing requirements of TSRA. OFAC generally regards the exportation or reexportation of medical devices, donated or commercial, to be subject to the TSRA and therefore to require a TSRA license. In addition, the donation of funds to a non-US person for the purchase of food, medicine, or medical devices to be exported to Iran or the non-Specified Areas of Sudan would require a license. OFAC Guidance

June 20, 2011 – OFAC Actions Specially Designated Nationals Update – In Coordinated Action with the Manhattan District Attorney’s Office, Treasury Targets IRISL Front Companies and Executives in the Middle East, Asia and Europe.

The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN list: <sort> GHEZEL AYAGH, Alireza (a.k.a. GHEZELAYAGH, Alireza); DOB 8 Mar 1979; POB Kerman, Iran; nationality Iran; Passport E12596608 (Iran) (individual) [NPWMD] MOGHADDAMI FARD, Mohammad, United Arab Emirates; DOB 19 Jul 1956; nationality Iran; Passport N10623175 (Iran) issued 27 Mar 2007 expires 26 Mar 2012 (individual) [NPWMD] TAFAZOLI, Ahmad (a.k.a. TAFAZOLY, Ahmad; a.k.a. TAFAZZOLI, Ahmad); DOB 27 May 1956; POB Bojnord, Iran; nationality Iran; Passport R10748186 (Iran) issued 22 Jan 2007 expires 22 Jan 2012 (individual) [NPWMD] </sort> The following entities have been added to OFAC’s SDN list: <sort> ATLANTIC INTERMODAL, United Arab Emirates [NPWMD] AZORES SHIPPING COMPANY LL FZE, P.O. Box 5232, Fujairah, United Arab Emirates; Business Registration Document # 2112 (United Arab Emirates); Telephone: 97192282978; Fax: 97192282979 [NPWMD] CRYSTAL SHIPPING FZE, Dubai, United Arab Emirates; Email Address md@pacificship.net ; Fax: 97143591921 [NPWMD] FAIRWAY SHIPPING LTD, 83 Victoria Street, London SW1H 0HW, United Kingdom; Business Registration Document # 6531277 (United Kingdom); Telephone: 02072229255 [NPWMD] GREAT OCEAN SHIPPING SERVICES (L.L.C.), 2nd Floor, Sharaf Building, Al Mina Road, Bur Dubai, Dubai, United Arab Emirates; Business Registration Document # 606318 (United Arab Emirates) issued 5 Feb 2008; Email Address info@oceanshg.com ; Website www.oceanshg.com ; Telephone: 97143525000; Fax: 97143518008 [NPWMD] LEADING MARITIME PTE. LTD. (a.k.a. LEADMARINE), 200 Middle Road, #14-01 Prime Centre 188980, Singapore; Business Registration Document # 200818433E (Singapore) issued 2008; Telephone: 6563343772; Fax: 6563343126 [NPWMD] PACIFIC SHIPPING DMCEST, 206, Sharaf Building, Al Mina Road, Bur Dubai, Dubai, United Arab Emirates; Business Registration Document # 167694 (United Arab Emirates) issued 2008; Email Address ops@pacificship.net; alt. Email Address pacific@pacificship.net; Telephone: 97143595580; Alt. Telephone: 97143516363; Fax: 97143527812 [NPWMD] PEARL SHIP MANAGEMENT L.L.C., Dubai, United Arab Emirates; Email Address technical@pearlsmc.com; Telephone: 97143525333; Fax: 97143518008 [NPWMD] SANTEX LINES LIMITED (a.k.a. SANTEX SHIPPING COMPANY; a.k.a. SANTEXLINES), Suite 1501, Shanghai Zhongrong Plaza, 1088 Pudong (S) Road, Shanghai 200122, China; F23A-D, Times Plaza No. 1, Taizi Road, Shekou, Shenzhen 518067, China [NPWMD] SINOSE MARITIME PTE. LTD., 200 Middle Road, #14-03/04 Prime Centre 188980, Singapore; Business Registration Document # 198200741H (Singapore) issued 1982; Telephone: 6562201144; Fax: 6562240181; Alt. Fax: 6562255614 [NPWMD] </sort>

June 09, 2011 – Update of OFAC’s SDN

Specially Designated Nationals Update The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN list:

• MOGHADAM, Ismail Ahmadi (a.k.a. AHMADI-MOGHADDAM, Esma’il; a.k.a. AHMADI-MOQADDAM, Esma’il; a.k.a. MOGHADDAM, Esameel Ahmadi; a.k.a. MOGHADDAM, Ismail Ahmadi); DOB 1961; POB Tehran, Iran; Head of Iranian Police; Alternate Title, Chief, Iran’s Law Enforcement Forces (individual) [IRAN-HR]

The following entities have been added to OFAC’s SDN list:

• BASIJ RESISTANCE FORCE (a.k.a. BASEEJ; a.k.a. BASIJ; a.k.a. BASIJ-E MELLI; a.k.a. MOBILIZATION OF THE OPPRESSED ORGANIZATION; f.k.a. SAZMAN BASIJ MELLI; a.k.a. SAZMAN-E MOGHAVEMAT-E BASIJ; f.k.a. VAHED-E BASIJ-E MOSTAZAFEEN; f.k.a. “NATIONAL MOBILIZATION ORGANIZATION”; a.k.a. “NATIONAL RESISTANCE MOBILIZATION”; a.k.a. “RESISTANCE MOBILIZATION FORCE”), Iran [IRGC] [IRAN-HR]
• LAW ENFORCEMENT FORCES OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN (a.k.a. IRANIAN POLICE; a.k.a. IRAN’S LAW ENFORCEMENT FORCES; a.k.a. NAJA; a.k.a. NIRUYIH INTIZAMIYEH JUMHURIYIH ISLAMIYIH IRAN) [IRAN-HR]

The following changes have been made to OFAC’s SDN list:

• ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS (a.k.a. AGIR; a.k.a. IRANIAN REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS; a.k.a. IRG; a.k.a. IRGC; a.k.a. ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY CORPS; a.k.a. PASDARAN; a.k.a. PASDARAN-E ENGHELAB-E ISLAMI; a.k.a. PASDARAN-E INQILAB; a.k.a. REVOLUTIONARY GUARD; a.k.a. REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS; a.k.a. SEPAH; a.k.a. SEPAH PASDARAN; a.k.a. SEPAH-E PASDARAN-E ENQELAB-E ESLAMI; a.k.a. THE ARMY OF THE GUARDIANS OF THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION; a.k.a. THE IRANIAN REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS), Tehran, Iran [NPWMD] [IRGC] -to- ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS (a.k.a. AGIR; a.k.a. IRANIAN REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS; a.k.a. IRG; a.k.a. IRGC; a.k.a. ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY CORPS; a.k.a. PASDARAN; a.k.a. PASDARAN-E ENGHELAB-E ISLAMI; a.k.a. PASDARAN-E INQILAB; a.k.a. REVOLUTIONARY GUARD; a.k.a. REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS; a.k.a. SEPAH; a.k.a. SEPAH PASDARAN; a.k.a. SEPAH-E PASDARAN-E ENQELAB-E ESLAMI; a.k.a. THE ARMY OF THE GUARDIANS OF THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION; a.k.a. THE IRANIAN REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS), Tehran, Iran |[NPWMD] [IRGC] [IRAN-HR]|

May 23, 2011 (added May 31, 2011) – Guidelines About the Provision of Goods and Services, Including Insurance, to Entities That Ship Refined Petroleum to Iran (CISADA)

Bureau of Economic, Energy and Business Affairs – CISADA SHIPPING AND MARITIME INSURANCE CONSIDERATIONS

On July 1, 2010, President Obama signed into law the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act (CISADA), which expands significantly the energy-related activities that are sanctionable under the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (ISA). We urge companies, including those in the shipping and insurance sectors, to minimize their exposure to the Iranian energy sector and to exercise as much due diligence as possible in doing business, directly or indirectly, with Iranian entities. The information in the Guidance Note will be updated periodically to reflect changes in legislation or industry practice. US Department of State Guidance Note

May 24, 2011 – Executive Order Concerning Further Sanctions on Iran White House Statement & Executive Order

May 24, 2011 – Recent OFAC Actions – ​The President has signed an Executive Order Authorizing The Implementation of Certain Sanctions Set Forth In The Iran Sanctions Act of 1996, As Amended (adding of names) OFAC Actions May 24, 2011

The following entities have been added under ISA to OFAC’s SDN list (their names will appear):

• ASSOCIATED SHIPBROKING (a.k.a. ASSOCIATED SHIPBROKING S.A.M.; a.k.a. “SAM”), Gildo Pastor Center – Block C 4.20, 7 rue du Gabian, Fontvieille MC 98000, Monaco; Website www.associated-shipbroking.mc [ISA]
• PETROCHEMICAL COMMERCIAL COMPANY INTERNATIONAL (|a.k.a. PETROCHEMICAL COMMERCIAL COMPANY INTERNATIONAL LIMITED; a.k.a. PETROCHEMICAL COMMERCIAL COMPANY INTERNATIONAL LTD; a.k.a. PETROCHEMICAL TRADING COMPANY LIMITED; a.k.a. “PCCI”|), P.O. Box 261539, Jebel Ali, Dubai, United Arab Emirates; 41, 1st Floor, International House, The Parade, St. Helier JE2 3QQ, Jersey; Ave. 54, Yimpash Business Center, No. 506, 507, Ashkhabad 744036, Turkmenistan; No. 21 End of 9th St, Gandi Ave, Tehran, Iran; 21, Africa Boulevard, Tehran, Iran; Registration ID 77283 (Jersey); all offices worldwide |[IRAN] [ISA]|
• ROYAL OYSTER GROUP, ROG Corporate Office, Royal Oyster General Trading LLC, P.O. Box 34299, Dubai, United Arab Emirates; Website www.oystersgroup.com [ISA]
• SPEEDY SHIP FZC (a.k.a. SEPAHAN OIL COMPANY; a.k.a. “SPD”), Room 206, 2nd Floor, Building W5B, Dubai Airport Free Zone, P.O. Box 54916, Dubai, United Arab Emirates [ISA]

The following entities have been listed under ISA/CISADA but were NOT listed on the OFAC’s SDN list (their names will not appear):

• Ofer Brothers Group, Ramat Aviv Tower, 40 Einstein St., P.O.B #11, Tel Aviv, 69102 Israel; MATAM Haifa, 9, Andre Saharov St., P.O.B #5090, Haifa, 31905 Israel, Website Ofer Website
• Tanker Pacific Ship Management (a.k.a Tanker Pacific), Headquarters (Singapore), Tanker Pacific Management (Singapore) Pte Ltd, 1 Temasek Avenue, #38-01,Millenia Tower, Singapore 039192, Tanker Pacific Website

Above referenced persons are – as of May 24, 2011 – subject to certain ISA sanctions. U.S. financial institutions are prohibited from making loans or providing credits totaling more than $10,000,000 in any 12-month period to any person listed above unless such person is engaged in activities to relieve human suffering and the loans or credits are provided for such activities. OFAC listing ISA/CISADA

May 24, 2011 – US Department of State – Seven Companies Sanctioned Under the Amended Iran Sanctions Act (ISA/CISADA) Statement US Department of State

Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton has decided to impose sanctions on seven companies under the Iran Sanctions Act (ISA) of 1996, as amended by the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act (CISADA) of 2010, for their activities in support of Iran’s energy sector.

These companies are

• Associated Shipbroking (Monaco),
• Ofer Brothers Group (Israel),
• PCCI (Jersey/Iran),
• Petróleos de Venezuela (PDVSA) (Venezuela).
• Royal Oyster Group (UAE),
• Speedy Ship (UAE/Iran),
• Tanker Pacific (Singapore),

These are the first sanctions imposed by the United States for refined-petroleum related activities under ISA since it was amended by CISADA. By imposing these sanctions, the Secretary sends a stern and clear message to companies around the world: those who continue to irresponsibly support Iran’s energy sector and help facilitate Iran’s efforts to evade U.S. sanctions will face serious consequences.

May 24, 2011 – US Department of State – In response to Iran’s illicit nuclear activities, support for terrorism, and abuse of human rights, the United States and other countries have imposed sanctions. Acting both through the United Nations Security Council, and regional or national authorities, a coalition that includes the United States, the member states of the European Union, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Canada, Australia, Norway, Switzerland, and others have put in place a strong, inter-locking matrix of sanctions measures relating to Iran’s nuclear, missile, energy, shipping, transportation, and financial sectors. Statement US Department of State

May 23, 2011 – Iran, North Korea and Syria nonproliferation Act (INKSNA) The United States imposed sanctions on two Belarusian entities, three Chinese entities and one individual, five Iranian entities and one individual, one North Korean entity, two Syrian entities and one Venezuelan entity.

Sanctioned entities are:

• Belarusian entities – Belarusian Optical Mechanical Association and BelTechExport;
• Chinese entities and individuals – Mr. Karl Lee, Dalian Sunny Industries, Dalian Zhongbang Chemical Industries Company, and Xian Junyun Electronic
• Iranian entities and individuals – Milad Jafari, Defense Industries Organization, Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL), Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Qods Force, SAD Import-Export Company, and Shahid Bakeri Industries Group (SBIG)
• North Korean entity – Tangun Trading
• Syrian entities – Industrial Establishment of Defense and Scientific Studies and Research Center (SSRC)
• Venezuelan entity – Venezuela Military Industries Company (CAVIM)

Sanctions were imposed on these entities as provided in the INKSNA because there was credible information indicating that they had transferred to or acquired from Iran, North Korea, or Syria equipment and technology listed on multilateral export control lists (Australia Group, Chemical Weapons Convention, Missile Technology Control Regime, Nuclear Suppliers Group, Wassenaar Arrangement) or otherwise having the potential to make a material contribution to WMD or cruise or ballistic missile systems.

The sanctions apply to the specific entities above and will be in effect for two years. The sanctions do not apply to these entities’ respective countries or governments.

The sanctions consist of the following:

• No department or agency of the U.S. Government may procure, or enter into any contract for the procurement of, any goods, services or technology from these entities;
• No department or agency of the U.S. Government may provide any assistance to these entities and they shall not be eligible to participate in any assistance program of the U.S. Government;
• U.S. Government sales of any item on the U.S. munitions list (USML) to any of these entities are prohibited, and sales of any defense articles, defense services or design and construction services controlled under the Arms Export Control Act are terminated; and
• New licenses will be denied and any existing licenses suspended, for transfer to these entities of items controlled under the Export Administration Act of 1979 or Export Administration Regulations. INKSNA Statement

May 17, 2011 BANK OF INDUSTRY AND MINE (OF IRAN) – was listed by OFAC in 3 programs (IRAN + NPWMD + IFSR) – previous listing was (IRAN) only. OFAC Action Release & OFAC Press Release + Background

Treasury Designates Iranian State-Owned Bank for Facilitating Iran’s Proliferation Activities – The U.S. Department of the Treasury today announced the designation of Bank of Industry and Mine (BIM), an Iranian state-owned bank used by the Government of Iran to evade U.S. and international sanctions against Iranian financial institutions involved in facilitating transactions in support of Iran’s proliferation activities.

Owned entirely by the Government of Iran, BIM was designated May 17, 2011 pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13382 for providing financial services to Bank Mellat and Europaisch Iranische Handelsbank (EIH), two Iranian banks previously designated by Treasury in connection with Iran’s proliferation activities.

May 05, 2011 the following changes have been made to OFAC’s SDN list; BANK MELLI IRAN ZAO, Number 9/1, Ulitsa Mashkova, Moscow 103064, Russia (NPWMD + IFSR) -to- MIR BUSINESS BANK ZAO (FKA) BANK MELLI IRAN ZAO, Number 9/1, ul Mashkova, Moscow 105062, Russia (NPWMD & IFSR)

Federal Register (ISA / CISADA) Actions April 5, 2011 – Designation of Belarusneft.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE: Public Notice 7408 – Persons and Entities on Whom Sanctions Have Been Imposed Under the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 – AGENCY: Department of State. ACTION: Notice. – DATES: Effective April 5, 2011. SUMMARY: The Secretary of State has determined that Belarusneft has engaged in a sanctionable investment described in section 5(a)(1) of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (ISA) (50 U.S.C. 1701 note) and that certain sanctions should be imposed as a result.

Federal Register – Vol. 76, No. 65 – Tuesday, April 5, 2011 – Notices – Federal Register

OFAC – Treasury statement concerning Sanctions on Belarusneft by the Secretary of State Pursuant to the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 Treasury statement

Recent OFAC Actions March 23, 2011 Vessel designation and name changes

Designations:

• IRAN DARYA; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9245304 (Iran) (vessel) [NPWMD]
• NARDIS (f.k.a. FERDOS); Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9137246 (Iran) (vessel) [NPWMD]
• PARMIS (f.k.a. IRAN BARAN; f.k.a. PARDIS); Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9245316 (Iran) (vessel) [NPWMD]
• PATRIS; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9137210 (Malta) (vessel) [NPWMD]

Name Changes:

• ALIM; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9465849 (Malta) (vessel) [NPWMD] -to- |CHAIRMAN| (|f.k.a. ALIM; f.k.a. IRAN ALIM|); Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9465849 (Malta) (vessel) [NPWMD]
• AZIM; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9465760 (Malta) (vessel) [NPWMD] -to- |CHAPMAN| (|f.k.a. AZIM; f.k.a. IRAN AZIM|); Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9465760 (Malta) (vessel) [NPWMD]
• HAKIM; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9465863 (Malta) (vessel) [NPWMD] -to- |CHAPAREL| (|f.k.a. HAKIM; f.k.a. IRAN HAKIM|); Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9465863 (Malta) (vessel) [NPWMD]
• IRAN AMIRABAD; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9368003 (vessel) [NPWMD] -to- |SARIR| (|f.k.a. IRAN AMIRABAD|); Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9368003 (vessel) [NPWMD]
• IRAN BASEER; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9010711 (vessel) [NPWMD] -to- |VISTA| (|f.k.a. IRAN BASEER|); Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9010711 (vessel) [NPWMD]
• IRAN BASHEER; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 8215742 (vessel) [NPWMD] -to- |SABRINA| (|f.k.a. IRAN BASHEER|); Vessel Registration Identification IMO 8215742 (vessel) [NPWMD]
• IRAN GHADEER; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9010723 (vessel) [NPWMD] -to- |VIANA| (|f.k.a. IRAN GHADEER|); Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9010723 (vessel) [NPWMD]
• IRAN SAHAR (a.k.a. RA-EES ALI); Vessel Registration Identification IMO 8203608 (vessel) [NPWMD] -to- |SARINA| (|f.k.a. IRAN SAHAR; f.k.a. RA-EES ALI|); Vessel Registration Identification IMO 8203608 (vessel) [NPWMD]
• KARIM (a.k.a. IRAN KARIM); Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9465758 (vessel) [NPWMD] -to- |CHARIOT| (|f.k.a. IRAN KARIM; f.k.a. KARIM|); Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9465758 (vessel) [NPWMD]
• RAHIM (a.k.a. IRAN RAHIM); Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9465746 (vessel) [NPWMD] -to- |CHAPLET| (|f.k.a. IRAN RAHIM; f.k.a. RAHIM|); Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9465746 (vessel) [NPWMD]

Recent OFAC Actions 2/17/2011 BANK REFAH KARGARAN (a.k.a. BANK REFAH; a.k.a. WORKERS’ WELFARE BANK (OF IRAN)), No. 40 North Shiraz Street, Mollasadra Ave, Vanak Sq, Tehran 19917, Iran; all offices worldwide sanctioned in the programs IRAN, NPWMD, IFSR

Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability and Divestment Act of 2010 (H.R. 2194). The act contains provisions that will impact both U.S. and foreign manufacturers and financial institutions. A number of these provisions are extraterritorial in their reach and will likely cause significant operational difficulties for financial institutions in particular.

Ban on Exports and Imports – flat prohibition on US goods, services or technology from the US or by US persons. The only exceptions are for agricultural commodities, food, medicine and medical devices subject to Trade Sanctions Relief Act (TSRA) licensing, humanitarian assistance exports, certain information and informational materials, exports related to the exchange of personal communications over the Internet, exports related to safe operation of aircraft, exports to the IAEA, exports to support activities of non-governmental organizations promoting democracy in Iran and (under an “escape clause”) exports that the President determines are in the U.S “national interest.”

This provision is similar to the ban on U.S. exports to Syria enacted by the U.S. Congress in 2003.

The Act imposes a similar near-total prohibition on direct or indirect imports of articles of Iranian origin into the United States, thereby effectively terminating OFAC general licenses which allowed imports of carpets, pistachios and small gifts from Iran.

Financial Services Prohibitions – The Act contains provisions that could significantly impact the operations of both foreign and domestic banks in the United States and that deserve careful scrutiny by financial institutions.

Foreign Financial Institution Provision – The Act requires the Department of the Treasury to issue regulations within 90 days of enactment, which will “prohibit or strictly limit” the opening or maintenance in the United States of a “correspondent” or “payable-through” account by any foreign bank that engages in prohibited activities. Which include among other things, facilitating a “significant transaction” or providing “significant financial services for” an Iranian bank that has had its property blocked based on proliferation or terrorism reasons (and thus has been named to OFAC’s SDN List under the NPWMD or SDGT programs). Most major Iranian banks, such as Bank Melli, Bank Saderat, etc., have been designated on the SDN List for such reasons, although Bank Markazi (the Central Bank of Iran) has been listed on the SDN List for other reasons and would not appear to be subject to this provision, at least in the absence of further clarification from OFAC.

Domestic Financial Institution Provision – The Act requires Treasury to issue regulations within 90 days of enactment, which prohibit any subsidiary or affiliate (including any foreign subsidiary or affiliate) owned or controlled by a domestic financial institution from “knowingly” engaging in a transaction with or benefitting Iran’s Revolutionary Guards Corps or any of its agents or affiliates whose property is blocked by OFAC. The provision thus applies OFAC’s Iranian Transactions Regulations extraterritorially for the first time, at least in this limited context.

Expansion of Sanctions Under ISA – The Act increases the number of mandatory sanctions under the ISA

1. A prohibition on “foreign exchange” transactions subject to the jurisdiction of the United States by the sanctioned person;
2. A prohibition on “banking transactions,” defined to mean “transfers of credit or payments” between, by, through or to “any financial institution,” and that are subject to U.S. jurisdiction; and
3. A prohibition on “property transactions” (thus effectively blocking assets of the sanctioned party to the extent such assets are subject to U.S. jurisdiction).

In one of the most significant amendments of the ISA made by the Act, imposes three new provisions that expand and deepen sanctions under the existing ISA aimed at Iran’s petroleum industry.

• First, it imposes mandatory sanctions under the ISA extraterritorially on any person who makes an investment of $20 million or more (or a combination of investments, each of which is at least $5 million and which equal or exceed $20 million in the aggregate in any 12 month period) that “directly and significantly contributes” to the enhancement of Iran’s ability to develop “petroleum resources.”
• Second, it does the same as to any person who sells, leases or provides to Iran any goods, services, technology, information or support valued at $1 million or more or with an aggregate fair market value of $5 million or more during any 12 month period which could “directly and significantly facilitate the maintenance or expansion of Iran’s domestic production of refined petroleum products.”
• Third, it imposes mandatory sanctions on any person who (i) provides Iran with refined petroleum products valued at $1 million or more or having an aggregate fair market value of $5 million or more during any 12 month period or (ii) who sells, leases or provides to Iran any goods, services, technology, information or support that “could directly and significantly” contribute to the enhancement of Iran’s ability to import refined petroleum products, subject to the above dollar thresholds.

In connection with the third prohibition, the Act specifically cites covered “services” to include underwriting or providing insurance or reinsurance, financing or brokering, as well as providing ships or shipping services to deliver refined petroleum products (the prohibitions thus directly affect non-U.S. insurers, banks, shipping lines and leasing companies that service Iranian imports of refined petroleum products).

OFAC Iran Sanctions

FinCen

November 21, 2011 – The following documents were submitted (by FinCen) to the Federal Register today:

• Imposition of Special Measure against the Islamic Republic of Iran as a Jurisdiction of Primary Money Laundering Concern (as submitted to the Federal Register) – Notice of Proposed Rule-making – November 21, 2011

• Finding that the Islamic Republic of Iran is a Jurisdiction of Primary Money Laundering Concern (as submitted to the Federal Register) – Notice of Finding – November 21, 2011

Additional information see, Treasury Fact Sheet: New Sanctions on Iran

October 05, 2011 – FinCEN Implements Provision of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010

Regulation Will Require U.S. Banks to Seek Information from Foreign Banks on Iranian Financial Ties

On October 05, 2011 the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) delivered to the Federal Register a final rule to implement section 104(e) of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (CISADA) to complement Treasury’s ongoing efforts to protect the international financial system from abuse by Iran. The final rule will become effective upon publication in the Federal Register.

CISADA requires the Secretary of the Treasury to issue regulations that impose certain requirements on U.S. banks. The rule issued today requires a U.S. bank, upon request from FinCEN, to inquire of specified foreign banks for which the U.S. bank maintains a correspondent account, and report to the Treasury Department, with respect to whether each foreign bank:

• Maintains a correspondent account for an Iranian-linked financial institution designated under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA);
• Has processed one or more transfers of funds within the preceding 90 calendar days for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, an Iranian-linked financial institution designated under IEEPA, other than through a correspondent account; or
• Has processed one or more transfers of funds within the preceding 90 calendar days for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) or any of its agents or affiliates designated under IEEPA.

In August 2010, Treasury published the Iranian Financial Sanctions Regulations (IFSR) to implement sections 104(c) and 104(d) of CISADA. Among its provisions, the IFSR allows Treasury to prohibit U.S. financial institutions from opening or maintaining a correspondent account or a payable-through account in the United States for a foreign financial institution that is found to knowingly facilitate significant transactions or provide significant financial services for Iranian-linked financial institutions or IRGC affiliates designated by the United States. To view a fact sheet on the IFSR, click here.

As soon as the regulation takes effect, FinCEN will issue a number of information requests to U.S. banks regarding several foreign banks that Treasury has reason to believe may be engaged in activity that is sanctionable under the IFSR. Information gained by FinCEN’s implementation of section 104(e) of CISADA will complement efforts to identify foreign financial institutions whose activities are sanctionable under the IFSR. FinCen CISADA Final Rule 31 CFR Part 1060 & FinCen News Room – Final Rule & Fact Sheet on Iranian Financial Sanctions Regulations (IFSR)

April 27, 2011 – FinCEN to Implement CISADA Provision – VIENNA, Va. – The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) today (April 27, 2011) proposed regulations to implement section 104(e) of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (CISADA) to impose a reporting requirement that would be invoked, as necessary, to elicit information valuable in the implementation of CISADA. FinCen Seeks U.S. Banks’ Assistance in Uncovering Iranian Financial Ties.

To read a complete copy of the Proposed Rules on the FinCEN website, click on the following link FinCen CISADA Preamble

US FinCen – AML/CFT Deficiencies Warning List

July 13, 2011 – FinCen adopted the Financial Action Task Force Public Statement on Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorist Financing Risks and FinCen provided guidance on the subject. More detailed information FIN-2011-A011 and FIN-2011-A012

ITAR

ITAR Based sanctions, see chapter on ITAR for more detailed information

• Covers military items (“munitions” or “defense articles”), including goods and technology designed to kill people or defend against death in a military setting
• Includes most space-related technology because of missile technology application
• Includes technical data related to defense articles and services (furnishing assistance including design and use of defense articles)
• Purpose is to ensure U.S. security – no balancing of commercial or research objectives

• January 23, 1984 – 49 FR 2836
• October 29, 1991 – 56 FR 55630
• December 18, 2007 – 72 FR 71575

BIS – EAR

October 03, 2012 – US indicts 164 Companies and Individuals Involved in Russian Military Procurement Network and adds them to BIS Entity List

As a result of an investigation involving an alleged Russian military procurement network, the U.S. Department of Justice announced today that it had unsealed an indictment against two companies and 11 individuals located in the U.S. and Russia and executed a number of search warrants at various residences, businesses and banks in the U.S.

This (BIS) rule amends the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) by adding one hundred and sixty-four persons under one hundred and sixty-five entries to the Entity List. The persons who are added to the Entity List have been determined by the U.S. Government to be acting contrary to the national security or foreign policy interests of the United States. These persons will be listed on the Entity List under twelve destinations. These additions to the Entity List consist of one person under Belize; thirteen persons under Canada; two persons under Cyprus; one person under Estonia; eleven persons under Finland; five persons under Germany; one person under Greece; two persons under Hong Kong; one person under Kazakhstan; one hundred and nineteen persons under Russia; two persons under Sweden; and seven persons under the United Kingdom, including six persons located in the British Virgin Islands.

BIS-EAR Addition Final Rule

December 16, 2011 – This jurisdiction contains Individuals or Entities which are listed by US Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) – EAR. The listed entities may have the status of “Presumption of denial” and are effectively barred from dealing in US-origin items or entities may have the self-explaining status of “case-by-case”.

The detailed Entity List can be found at BIS-EAR Entity List

December 12, 2011 – Department of Commerce – Bureau of Industry and Security – In this rule, the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amends the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) by moving the substantive provisions of the comprehensive sanctions on Syria from General Order No. 2 in Supplement No. 1 to part 736 to a revised § 746.9. This rule also includes conforming changes to the EAR. This rule will facilitate compliance with the comprehensive sanctions on Syria. – This rule is effective December 12, 2011.

Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 238 / Monday, December 12, 2011 / Rules and Regulations

August 18, 2009 – BIS requires a license for the export or reexport to Syria of all items subject to the Export Administration Regulations (EAR), except food and medicines not on the Commerce Control List (CCL). Pursuant to the waiver authority exercised by the President in Executive Order 13338, BIS may consider several categories of items on a case-by-case basis including medicines on the CCL and medical devices; parts and components intended to ensure the safety of civil aviation and the safe operation of commercial passenger aircraft; and telecommunications equipment and associated computers, technology, and software. License applications for other exports and reexports to Syria are subject to a general policy of denial.

US Foreign Terrorist Organizations

September 28, 2012 – Delisting of the Mujahedin-e Khalq – The Secretary of State has decided, consistent with the law, to revoke the designation of the Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK) and its aliases as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) under the Immigration and Nationality Act and to delist the MEK as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist under Executive Order 13224. These actions are effective today. Property and interests in property in the United States or within the possession or control of U.S. persons will no longer be blocked, and U.S. entities may engage in transactions with the MEK without obtaining a license. These actions will be published in the Federal Register.

With today’s actions, the Department does not overlook or forget the MEK’s past acts of terrorism, including its involvement in the killing of U.S. citizens in Iran in the 1970s and an attack on U.S. soil in 1992. The Department also has serious concerns about the MEK as an organization, particularly with regard to allegations of abuse committed against its own members.

The Secretary’s decision today took into account the MEK’s public renunciation of violence, the absence of confirmed acts of terrorism by the MEK for more than a decade, and their cooperation in the peaceful closure of Camp Ashraf, their historic paramilitary base.

The United States has consistently maintained a humanitarian interest in seeking the safe, secure, and humane resolution of the situation at Camp Ashraf, as well as in supporting the United Nations-led efforts to relocate eligible former Ashraf residents outside of Iraq.

US Department of State Press Release & OFAC Resource Center

September 21, 2012 – U.S. to remove Iran group (Mujahedin-e Khalq) from terror list, officials say WaPo News Item

Augustus 30, 2012 – Anti-Terrorism Designations (SDGT) – US designates eight Lashkar-e-Taiba leaders as terrorists, places sanctions

LET was designated by the Department of State as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) and under E.O. 13224 as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist entity in December 2001. LET was added to the UN 1267/1989 Committee’s Consolidated List – its list of sanctioned terrorists – in May 2005.

Despite being banned by the Government of Pakistan in January 2002, LET continues to operate in Pakistan and throughout the region and engage in or support terrorist activities worldwide. LET has conducted numerous terrorist acts against Pakistani, Indian, Afghan, and U.S. interests and is responsible for the November 2008 Mumbai attacks that killed more than 160 people, including six Americans, and the July 2006 Mumbai train bombings that killed more than 180 people.

All of the individuals designated today pursuant to E.O. 13224 were designated for acting on behalf of or providing support either to LET itself or to previously designated members of LET. Today’s action prohibits U.S. persons from engaging in any transactions with these individuals and freezes any assets the designees have under U.S. jurisdiction.

The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

• HAMZA, Amir (a.k.a. HAMZA, Maulana Ameer), Jamia Masjid, al Qadsia, Chauburji Chowk, Lahore, Pakistan; DOB 10 May 1959; POB Sheikhupura, Punjab Province, Pakistan; citizen Pakistan; Passport AB6217491 issued 01 Jun 2006 expires 01 Jun 2011; National ID No. 3520149847497 (Pakistan) (individual) [SDGT].
• MIR, Sajjid (a.k.a. CHAUDARY, Sajid Majeed; a.k.a. CHUHDRI, Sajid Majid; a.k.a. MAJEED, Sajid; a.k.a. MAJID, Sajid; a.k.a. MAJID, Sajjid; a.k.a. MIR, Sajid); DOB 31 Jan 1976; alt. DOB 01 Jan 1978; POB Lahore, Pakistan; nationality Pakistan; Passport KE381676 (Pakistan) issued 14 Oct 2004; National ID No. 3520163573447 (Pakistan) (individual) [SDGT].
• MUJAHID, Abdullah (a.k.a. ABDALLAH, Abu), Mohallah Markaz Tayyeba Street, Muridke, Lahore, Pakistan; DOB 15 May 1970; POB Bhalwal, Sargodha District, Punjab Province, Pakistan; citizen Pakistan; Passport DM1074371 (Pakistan) issued 30 May 2009 expires 29 May 2014; National ID No. 3540118204373 (Pakistan) (individual) [SDGT].
• MUNTAZIR, Abdullah (a.k.a. KHAN, Abdullah; a.k.a. MUNTAZER, Abdullah); DOB 17 Jan 1974; POB Abbottabad, Pakistan; National ID No. 3520203526763 (Pakistan) (individual) [SDGT].
• SAEED, Talha (a.k.a. SAEED, Hafiz Talha; a.k.a. SAEED, Mohammad Talha; a.k.a. SAEED, Tahil), 116-E Block, Johar Town, Lahore, Pakistan; DOB 25 Oct 1975; POB Sarghoda, Punjab Province, Pakistan; Passport BM5971331 (Pakistan) issued 24 Mar 2007 expires 22 Mar 2012 (individual) [SDGT].
• SHEIKH, Qari Muhammad Yaqoob (a.k.a. SHEIKH, Qari Muhammad Yaqub; a.k.a. YAQOOB, Mohammad; a.k.a. YAQOOB, Qari Shaikh Muhammad); DOB 20 Dec 1972; POB Bahawalpur, Punjab, Pakistan; Passport BX5192361 (Pakistan) issued 04 Aug 2007 expires 02 Aug 2012; National ID No. 3120128002365 (Pakistan) (individual) [SDGT].
• WALID, Hafiz Khalid (a.k.a. NAIK, Khalid; a.k.a. WALEED, Khalid); DOB 25 Oct 1974; alt. DOB 1971; POB Lahore, Pakistan; citizen Pakistan; Passport AA9967331 (Pakistan) issued 03 Jun 2006 expires 02 Jun 2011; National ID No. 3410104067339 (Pakistan) (individual) [SDGT].
• YAQUB, Ahmed (a.k.a. GHANI, Hamad; a.k.a. YAKOOB, Mohammad); DOB 1966; alt. DOB 1967; POB Faisalabad, Pakistan; alt. POB Jeda Walah, Punjab Province, Pakistan (individual) [SDGT].

OFAC Recent Actions

May 24, 2012 – Terrorist Designations of the Abdallah Azzam Brigades

The Department of State designated the Abdallah Azzam Brigades (AAB) as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) under Section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act and as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist under section 1(b) of Executive Order 13224. The Abdallah Azzam Brigades (AAB), a militant organization based in both Lebanon and the Arabian Peninsula, was formed in 2009. AAB is led by Saleh al-Qar’awi, who was designated by the Department of State under E.O. 13224. The Department of State also designated AAB’s bomb maker, Abu Jabal, under E.O. 13224 on November 22, 2011.

AAB carried out a July 2010 attack on the Japanese-owned oil tanker M/V M.Star in the Strait of Hormuz. According to a statement released online, AAB claimed that the attack was carried out by its Arabian Peninsula Branch, which calls itself the Yusuf al-’Uyayri Battalions of the Abdullah Azzam Brigades. AAB has repeatedly articulated its intent to carry out attacks against Western interests in the Middle East. In 2010, for instance, the group expressed an interest in kidnapping U.S. and British tourists in the Arabian Peninsula.

In addition, AAB is responsible for numerous indiscriminate rocket attacks on Israeli civilians. These attacks, which have been launched from within Lebanon by the Ziyad al-Jarrah Battalions of the Abdallah Azzam Brigades, have targeted population centers in northern Israel.

The consequences of these designations include a prohibition against knowingly providing material support or resources to, or engaging in transactions with, the Abdallah Azzam Brigades, and the freezing of all property and interest in property of the organization that are in the United States, or come within the United States, or the control of U.S. persons. The Department of State took these actions in consultation with the Departments of Justice and Treasury.

US Department of State Press Release

June 18, 2011 – Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTO) are foreign organizations that are designated by the Secretary of State in accordance with section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), as amended. FTO designations play a critical role in our fight against terrorism and are an effective means of curtailing support for terrorist activities and pressuring groups to get out of the terrorism business.

• Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK) or People’s Mujahedin of Iran (PMOI)
• Jundallah
• al-Qaida Kurdish Battalions (AQKB)

More information on the US FTO page.

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