From Sanctions Wiki
June 30, 2011 - Four suspects were named (Mustafa Badreddine, Salim Ayyash, Hussein Anaissi & Assad Sabra) in the UN-backed Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) investigating the 2005 murder of Rafiq Hariri, the former Lebanese prime minister, Marwan Charbel, the country's interior minister, has said.
Said Mirza, Lebanon's prosecutor-general, had issued arrest warrants for Mustafa Badreddine, Salim Ayyash, Assad Sabra and Hussein Anaissi, Charbel told the AFP news agency on Friday.
The whereabouts of the suspects, who have been described as senior members of the Hezbollah movement, are unknown.
- UN SECURITY COUNCIL CALLS FOR END TO HOSTILITIES BETWEEN HIZBOLLAH, ISRAEL, UNANIMOUSLY ADOPTING UNSCR 1701 (2006) UN News Item
- UNSCR 1701 (2006) - UN Sanction 1701 (2006)
- UNSCR 1701 (2006) - UN Arms Sanctions
- UNSCR 1636 (2005) - Published October 31, 2005 -This resolution requires Syrian cooperation into the UN-led investigation of the February 14 killing of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri UN SCR 1636 (2005)
July 23, 2012 - EU Council conclusions on Lebanon
The EU reiterates its strong and continued commitment to Lebanon's unity, stability, independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity. For more details follow the link EU conclusions
- EU Common position 2005/888 CFSP 2006/625/CFSP
- COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No 305/2006 of 21 February 2006 imposing specific restrictive measures against certain persons suspected of involvement in the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri.
- EU 1412/2006 Having regard to Common Position 2006/625/CFSP concerning a prohibition on the sale or supply of arms and related material and on the provision of related services to entities or individuals in Lebanon in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution
- EU 305/2006 Common Position 2005/888/CFSP provides for implementation of the measures set out in UNSCR 1636 (2005) and, in particular, the freezing of funds and economic resources of persons registered by the Committee of the Security Council established by paragraph 3(b) of UNSCR 1636 (2005) as suspected of involvement in the planning, sponsoring, organizing or perpetrating of the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri and others on 14 February 2005.
- On 15 September 2006 the EU adopted Council Common Position 2006/625/CFSP (PDF) establishing an embargo on all arms transfers to Lebanon not authorized by the Government of Lebanon or UNIFIL, the UN peacekeeping force. EU Arms Sanctions
- General information EU Sanctions on Lebanon.
EU (Foreign) Terrorist Organizations
July 18, 2011 - The EU Council has concluded that the following groups and entities listed have been involved in terrorist acts within the meaning of Article 1(2) and (3) of Common Position 2001/931/CFSP, that a decision has been taken with respect to them by a competent authority within the meaning of Article 1(4) of that Common Position, and that they should continue to be subject to the specific restrictive measures provided for therein.
- Abu Nidal Organization
More information on the EU FTO page.
Dutch Sanction Law 1977 – Syria & Lebanon 2006
By the adoption of UNSCR 1636 (2005) on 31 October 2005, the United Nations imposed travel restrictions and an assets freeze on all individuals suspected of involvement in the planning, sponsoring, organising or perpetrating of the terrorist bombing in Beirut, Lebanon on 14 February 2005 that killed, amongst others, former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri. Individuals subject to the measures can be designated by the investigating Commission or the Government of Lebanon subject to the agreement of the relevant UN Security Council Sanctions Committee. The measures were introduced 'as a step to assist in the investigation of this crime and without prejudice to the ultimate judicial determination of the guilt or innocence of any individual'.
To date, no targets have been designated.
Massnahmen betreffend Libanon - Der Bundesrat hat am 01.11.2006 Sanktionen betreffend Libanon verhängt und eine entsprechende Verordnung erlassen. Mit der Verordnung setzt die Schweiz die UNO-Sicherheitsratsresolution 1701 (2006) vom 11.08.2006 um.
Die Verordnung sieht folgende Massnahmen betreffend Libanon vor:
- Verbot der Lieferung, des Verkaufs und der Durchfuhr von Rüstungsgütern jeder Art, einschliesslich Waffen und Munition, Militärfahrzeuge und -ausrüstung, paramilitärische Ausrüstung sowie Zubehör und Ersatzteile dafür, nach Libanon.
- Verbot der Gewährung von Dienstleistungen aller Art, einschliesslich Finanzierung, Vermittlungsdienste und technische Ausbildung, im Zusammenhang mit der Lieferung, dem Verkauf, der Durchfuhr, der Herstellung, dem Unterhalt und der Verwendung obgenannter Güter.
Das SECO kann Ausnahmen von den genannten Verboten bewilligen, sofern die entsprechenden Lieferungen von der Regierung Libanons oder den Interimskräften der UNO im Libanon (UNIFIL) genehmigt wurden.
Massnahmen gegenüber bestimmten Personen in Zusammenhang mit dem Attentat auf Rafik Hariri
Der Bundesrat hat am 21.12.2005 per Verordnung Zwangsmassnahmen gegen Personen beschlossen, die der Beteiligung am Attentat auf den ehemaligen libanesischen Premierminister Rafik Hariri verdächtigt werden. Mit der Verordnung setzt die Schweiz die UNO-Sicherheitsratsresolution 1636 (2005) vom 31.10.2005 um. Die Verordnung sieht folgende Massnahmen vor:
Die von den Finanz- und Reiserestriktionen betroffenen Personen sind vom zuständigen Sanktionskomitee der UNO bisher nicht bezeichnet worden. Sobald diese Namensliste vorliegt, wird sie in die schweizerische Sanktionsverordnung übernommen werden.
On 31 October 2005 the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) adopted resolution 1636 (2005) imposing travel and financial sanctions in relation to Lebanon, in response to the 14 February 2005 terrorist bombing in Beirut that killed former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri and 22 others. Additional sanctions measures were introduced with the adoption of resolution 1701 (2006) following the conflict between Israel and Hezbollah in July 2006.
As a consequence, Australian law now prohibits a variety of conduct (see website)
On August 11, 2006, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1701 imposing sanctions against Lebanon, in response to the continued escalation of hostilities in Lebanon and Israel stemming from Hizbollah's attack of July 12, 2006, on Israel. The resolution was also adopted in recognition of the commitment of the Government of Lebanon to extend its authority over its territory, through its own legitimate armed forces, such that there will be no weapons without the consent of the Government of Lebanon and no authority other than that of the Government of Lebanon.
The Regulations Implementing the United Nations Resolution on Lebanon implement the decisions of the Security Council in Canadian domestic law.
Subject to certain exceptions, the measures imposed against Lebanon include:
- a prohibition on the export of arms and related material to any person in Lebanon; and
- a prohibition on the provision to any person in Lebanon of any technical assistance related to the provision, manufacture, maintenance or use of arms and related material
Article 41 of the United Nations Charter authorises the Security Council to take enforcement measures not involving the use of force in order to give effect to its decisions. These measures often take the form of sanctions. UN Security Council sanctions are binding on all UN member States, including New Zealand, and are implemented in New Zealand law by regulations made under the United Nations Act 1946. All persons and entities in New Zealand, and in many cases New Zealand citizens and companies overseas, must comply with regulations implementing Security Council sanctions. The range of sanctions imposed by the Security Council has included comprehensive economic and trade sanctions as well as more targeted measures such as arms embargoes, travel bans, and financial restrictions. Financial restrictions, otherwise known as an “assets freeze” are one of the most commonly used sanctions imposed by the United Nations Security Council. New Zealand Sanctions
December 17, 2012 - Anti-Terrorism Designation - Designations of Michel Samaha
The Department of State designated Michel Samaha as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist under section 1(b) of Executive Order 13224. Samaha, a former Lebanese Minister of Information and Tourism, was arrested by Lebanese authorities in August 2012 for plotting to carry out terrorist attacks in Lebanon.
The Department of Treasury concurrently designated Michel Samaha as a Specially Designated National pursuant to Executive Order 13441 on the grounds that Samaha’s actions had the purpose or effect of undermining Lebanon’s democratic processes or institutions, contributing to the breakdown of the rule of law in Lebanon, supporting the reassertion of Syrian control or otherwise contributing to Syrian interference in Lebanon, or infringing upon or undermining Lebanese sovereignty.
Samaha has remained in Lebanese custody and has been charged with plotting to assassinate political and religious figures in Lebanon through targeted bombings. The goal of these attacks appears to have been an attempt to incite sectarian clashes in Lebanon on behalf of the Syrian regime. Samaha was also accused of transporting explosives for the planned attacks into Lebanon.
According to available information, in July 2012 former Syrian General Intelligence Directorate chief and current head of the Syrian National Security Bureau Ali Mamluk was involved in a plot with Samaha to conduct bombing attacks against Lebanese political and religious figures in northern Lebanon, and Mamluk provided money and explosives to Samaha for that purpose.
In August 2012, Samaha provided the explosives and cash to his paid accomplice at Samaha’s residence in Lebanon. On August 9, 2012, the Lebanese Internal Security Forces (ISF) arrested Samaha and brought him to ISF headquarters where, after being confronted with the evidence against him, Samaha admitted to complicity in the plot.
The designations under E.O. 13224 and under E.O. 13441 block all of Samaha’s property interests subject to U.S. jurisdiction and prohibit U.S. persons from engaging in transactions with or for the benefit of Samaha.
The following individual has been added to OFAC's SDN List:
- SAMAHA, MICHEL (a.k.a. SAMAHAH, Mishal Fuad; a.k.a. SAMAHAH, Saadah Al-Naib Mishal Fuad); DOB 09 Sep 1948; POB Jouar, Lebanon; nationality Lebanon; alt. nationality Canada; Passport 7012003 (Lebanon); alt. Passport PE385243 (Canada) (individual) [SDGT] [LEBANON].
September 13, 2012 - Treasury Designates Hizballah Leadership
The U.S. Department of the Treasury today imposed sanctions against Hizballah's leadership in Lebanon, further exposing Hizballah’s active support to the regime of Syrian President Bashar Assad, as well as its role in terrorist activities.
Hasan Nasrallah, Hizballah's Secretary General, is being designated today pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13582, for providing support to the Syrian government. Mustafa Badr Al-Din and Talal Hamiyah, two senior terrorist leaders of Hizballah, are being designated today pursuant to E.O. 13224, for providing support to Hizballah’s terrorist activities in the Middle East and around the world.
“By aiding Assad’s violent campaign against the Syrian people and working to support a regime that will inevitably fall, Hizballah’s ongoing activity undermines regional stability and poses a direct threat to Lebanon’s security,” said Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence David S. Cohen. “Hizballah’s actions, overseen by Hasan Nasrallah and executed by Mustafa Badr Al-Din and Talal Hamiyah, clearly reveal its true nature as a terrorist and criminal organization.”
Hizballah and its leader Hasan Nasrallah have sought to depict their organization as a social and political party, as well as a resistance movement. These efforts are belied by the facts: Hizballah consistently uses terrorism against civilian targets to achieve its goals, and this trend has only increased recently. The last year has witnessed Hizballah’s most aggressive terrorist plotting outside the Middle East since the 1990s. Moreover, in recent months Hizballah has also played an increasingly active role in providing support to the Government of Syria, further enabling the regime to carry out its bloody campaign against the Syrian people.
Under the Assad regime, Syria has been a longstanding supporter of Hizballah -- providing safe haven to Hizballah and routing weapons, in many cases from Iran, to Hizballah in Lebanon. Hizballah, under the direction of Nasrallah, is now returning the favor by providing training, advice, and extensive logistical support to the Government of Syria as the Assad regime continues to wreak havoc on the Syrian people through the use of terror and violence -- Hizballah’s area of expertise.
Today’s designations build upon a number of actions that the U.S. government has taken against Hizballah over the years for its support for terrorism and its role in supporting the violence being perpetrated by the Assad regime against the Syrian people. Hizballah was designated for its support to the Government of Syria pursuant to E.O. 13582 in August 2012. It was also named a Specially Designated Global Terrorist pursuant to E.O. 13224 in October 2001, and listed in the Annex to E.O. 12947 as a Specially Designated Terrorist (SDT) in January 1995. Hasan Nasrallah was designated pursuant to E.O. 12947 in January 1995.
Hasan Nasrallah - Since the beginning of the Syrian people's courageous campaign in early 2011 to secure their universal rights, Hizballah Secretary-General Hasan Nasrallah has overseen Hizballah’s efforts to help the Syrian regime’s violent crackdown on the Syrian civilian population by providing training, advice, and extensive logistical support to the Government of Syria. Hizballah has directly trained Syrian government personnel inside Syria and has facilitated the training of Syrian forces by Iran's terrorist arm, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF). Also under Nasrallah, Hizballah has played a substantial role in efforts to expel Syrian opposition forces from areas within Syria and coordinated its support to the Government of Syria with IRGC-QF and senior Syrian government officials. Indeed, under the direction of Nasrallah, Hizballah since mid-2012 has escalated its support to the Government of Syria.
Mustafa Badr Al-Din - Mustafa Badr Al-Din is a senior Hizballah official who is believed to have replaced his cousin, Imad Mughniyah, as Hizballah's top militant commander after Mughniyah's 2008 death. In June 2011, the prosecutor of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon charged Mustafa Badr Al-Din with the attack on February 14, 2005 that killed former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri and 21 others.
Talal Hamiyah - Talal Hamiyah is the head of Hizballah's External Security Organization (ESO), which maintains organized cells worldwide. The ESO is the Hizballah element responsible for the planning, coordination, and execution of terrorist attacks outside of Lebanon.
June 30, 2011 - Updated OFAC Sanctions 31 CFR Chapter V The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) is amending 31 CFR chapter V to replace the list of persons (which includes individuals and entities) with whom transactions and dealings are prohibited by the various economic sanctions programs administered by OFAC that appears at Appendix A to 31 CFR chapter V with information on how to obtain up-to-date lists of such persons on OFAC’s Web site or by other means.
OFAC also is removing Appendix B to 31 CFR chapter V, which includes the names of certain blocked vessels. In addition, OFAC is amending its regulations for a number of the sanctions programs it administers to revise references to Appendix A and to remove references to Appendix B.
Finally, OFAC is amending the Iranian Transactions Regulations, by republishing in alphabetical order the entire list of persons identified in Appendix A to 31 CFR Part 560, to reflect changes to the list since that appendix was last published. Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 126 / Thursday, June 30, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
549 - LEBANON – SDN List + Additional information pertaining to the SDN List can be found in Appendix A to this chapter. See § 549.411 concerning entities that may not be listed on the SDN List but whose property and interests in property are nevertheless blocked pursuant to paragraph (a) of this section.
§ 549.411 Entities owned by a person whose property and interests in property are blocked. A person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to §549.201(a) has an interest in all property and interests in property of an entity in which it owns, directly or indirectly, a 50 percent or greater interest. The property and interests in property of such an entity, therefore, are blocked, and such an entity is a person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to §549.201(a), regardless of whether the entity itself is designated pursuant to §549.201(a).
April 23, 2013 - Treasury Identifies Kassem Rmeiti & Co. for Exchange and Halawi Exchange Co. as Financial Institutions of “Primary Money Laundering Concern”
In First Use of Section 311 Against a Non-Bank Financial Institution, Treasury Acts to Protect the U.S. Financial System from Foreign Exchange Houses Tied to Global Narcotics and Money Laundering Networks and Hizballah
WASHINGTON – The U.S. Department of the Treasury today named two Lebanese exchange houses, Kassem Rmeiti & Co. For Exchange (Rmeiti Exchange) and Halawi Exchange Co. (Halawi Exchange), as foreign financial institutions of primary money laundering concern under Section 311 of the USA PATRIOT Act (Section 311) – the first time the Department has used Section 311 against a non-bank financial institution. Today’s action reflects the Treasury Department’s continuing commitment to target illicit financial networks that launder millions of dollars in funds for narcotics traffickers and that, in the process, provide substantial financial benefits to the terrorist organization Hizballah. This action will protect the U.S. financial system from these activities and expose entities supporting the network of designated drug kingpin Ayman Joumaa.
“Following Treasury’s action against the Lebanese Canadian Bank, the Joumaa narcotics network turned to Rmeiti Exchange and Halawi Exchange to handle its money laundering needs,” said Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence David S. Cohen. “As our actions against the Lebanese Canadian Bank, Joumaa and the two exchange houses today make clear, the Treasury Department, working with our partners across the Federal government, will aggressively expose and disrupt sophisticated multi-national money laundering organizations that handle drug proceeds for criminal enterprises including the terrorist group Hizballah.”
The Treasury Department’s 311 action against Lebanese Canadian Bank in February 2011, as well as designations in January 2011 of Ayman Joumaa and two exchange houses, Hassan Ayash Exchange and Ellissa Exchange, exposed the Joumaa network’s money laundering scheme and forced these financial institutions out of the U.S. and international financial systems.
Rmeiti Exchange and Halawi Exchange subsequently picked up the network’s money laundering work, including the trade-based money laundering schemes involving used car dealerships in the United States and consumer goods from Asia. Rmeiti Exchange and Halawi Exchange used their foreign money transmitter businesses to process millions of dollars on behalf of narcotics traffickers and money launderers, and attempted to obfuscate the source of illicit funds by comingling or splitting transactions across a variety of businesses, financial institutions, and continents, including in the United States.
In conjunction with today’s findings that Rmeiti Exchange and Halawi Exchange are foreign financial institutions of primary money laundering concerns, Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) also issued an order, effective immediately and with a 120-day duration, that requires U.S. financial institutions to report information on any new or attempted transactions by Rmeiti Exchange and Halawi Exchange. Treasury also today issued a notice of proposed rulemaking that, if adopted as a final rule, would continue the reporting requirement imposed by the order and prohibit any U.S. financial institution from opening or maintaining a correspondent or payable-through account that is used to process a transaction that involves Rmeiti Exchange and Halawi Exchange, effectively cutting off these exchanges from the U.S. financial system.
The Treasury Department will continue to work with the Lebanese Central Bank and other relevant Lebanese authorities to address concerns highlighted by today’s action.
These actions would not have been possible without considerable support from the Drug Enforcement Administration, Customs and Border Protection, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the New Jersey State Police.
Kassem Rmeiti and Co. For Exchange
Rmeiti Exchange, its ownership, management, and associates facilitate extensive transactions for money launderers and drug traffickers. Between 2008 and March 2011, Rmeiti Exchange and its owner provided at least $25 million in payments to U.S.-based car dealers and exporters associated with the Joumaa narcotics and money laundering network. Some of these car dealers and exporters have been named in a civil money laundering and forfeiture action against the Lebanese Canadian Bank, drug kingpins Ayman Joumaa and Ali Mohamed Kharroubi, and Elissa Exchange and Hassan Ayash Exchange, brought by the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York.
Rmeiti Exchange and its management have also conducted financial activities for other money laundering and drug trafficking organizations operating in both Europe and Africa. Between March 2011 and October 2012, Rmeiti Exchange facilitated the movement of at least $1.7 million for Beninoise and Lebanese money launderers and drug traffickers. This included Rmeiti Exchange and Kassem Rmeiti taking on large cash deposits, collecting bulk cash currency, issuing cashier’s checks, and facilitating cross-border wire transfers on behalf of known and suspected money launderers, drug traffickers, and Hizballah affiliates.
As of December 2011, we believe that Hizballah had replaced U.S.-designated Elissa Exchange owner Ali Kharroubi with Haitham Rmeiti – the manager/owner of STE Rmeiti – as a key facilitator for wiring money and transferring Hizballah funds. Rmeiti Exchange, through its owner, Kassem Rmeiti, owns STE Rmeiti. Treasury believes that this activity demonstrates Hizballah’s efforts to adapt after U.S. Government disruptive actions, and illustrates the need for continued action against its financial facilitators.
Halawi Exchange Co. (“Halawi Exchange”)
Halawi Exchange represents a substantial threat to the U.S. and international financial systems, given its extensive illicit financial activity on behalf of a variety of international narcotics trafficking and money laundering networks. Halawi Exchange often employs deceptive practices to disguise this illicit financial activity to mislead U.S. and international banking institutions.
Halawi Exchange facilitates transactions for a network of individuals and companies which launder money through the purchase and sale of used cars in the United States for export to West Africa. In support of this network, management, ownership, and key employees of Halawi Exchange coordinate transactions – processed within and outside of Halawi Exchange – on behalf of Benin-based money launderers and their associates. For example, in early 2012, Halawi Exchange, including its management, ownership, and key employees were involved in arranging multiple wire transfers totaling over $4 million on behalf of one such money laundering network. As of mid-2012, central figures in this scheme planned to move $224 million worth of vehicle shipping contracts through this same network via a Halawi-owned Benin-based car lot, which receives vehicle shipments from the United States.
As of late 2012, Benin-based money launderers continued to use Halawi Exchange to wire transfer money to U.S. car suppliers in support of their money laundering operations. The proceeds of car sales were hand-transported in the form of bulk cash U.S. dollars from Cotonou, Benin to Beirut, Lebanon via air travel and deposited directly into one of the Halawi Exchange offices, which allowed bulk cash deposits to be made without requiring documentation of where the money originated. Halawi Exchange, through its network of established international exchange houses, initiated wire transfers from its bank accounts to the United States without using the Lebanese banking system in order to avoid scrutiny associated with Treasury’s designations of Hassan Ayash Exchange, Elissa Exchange, and its Lebanese Canadian Bank Section 311 Action. Money was then wire transferred via Halawi’s banking relationships indirectly to the United States through countries that included China, Singapore, and the UAE, which were perceived to receive less scrutiny by the U.S. Government.
Additionally, Halawi Exchange is known to have laundered profits from drug trafficking and cocaine-related money laundering networks for a leading Hizballah official and narcotics trafficker. Halawi Exchange has also been routinely used by other Hizballah associates as a means to transfer illicit funds.
To view a Fact Sheet on Section 311 of the USA PATRIOT Act, visit this link.
To view a chart related to this action, visit this link
To view the complete Findings against Kassem Rmeiti & Co For Exchange and Halawi Exchange Co., visit this link
To view the Notice of Proposed Rulemakings, visit this link
To view the Orders imposing Section 311 Special Measure One, visit this link
DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY - Finding that the Lebanese Canadian Bank SAL is a Financial Institution of Primary Money Laundering Concern
AGENCY: Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, Treasury (“FinCEN”), Treasury.
ACTION: Notice of finding - February 10, 2011
SUMMARY: Pursuant to the authority contained in 31 U.S.C. 5318A, the Secretary of the Treasury, through his delegate, the Director of FinCEN, finds that reasonable grounds exist for concluding that the Lebanese Canadian Bank SAL (“LCB”) is a financial institution of primary money laundering concern.
LCB has a controlling financial interest in a number of subsidiaries, including;
- LCB Investments SAL,
- LCB Finance SAL,
- LCB Estates SAL,
- LCB Insurance Brokerage House SAL
- Dubai-based Tabadul for Shares and Bonds LLC
- Prime Bank Limited (Prime Bank) of Gambia
DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY 31 CFR Part 103RIN 1506–AA64 Financial Crimes Enforcement Network; Amendment to the Bank Secrecy Act Laundering Concern
Amendment to the Bank Secrecy Act Regulation Special Measure Against Commercial Bank of Syria, including its Subsidiary, Syrian Lebanese Commercial Bank, as a Financial Institution of Primary Money Laundering Concern 31 CFR Part 103 (RIN 1506-AA64 - 71 F
Final Rule - March 15, 2006 - CBS & SLCB
US Foreign Terrorist Organizations
September 28, 2012 - Delisting of the Mujahedin-e Khalq - The Secretary of State has decided, consistent with the law, to revoke the designation of the Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK) and its aliases as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) under the Immigration and Nationality Act and to delist the MEK as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist under Executive Order 13224. These actions are effective today. Property and interests in property in the United States or within the possession or control of U.S. persons will no longer be blocked, and U.S. entities may engage in transactions with the MEK without obtaining a license. These actions will be published in the Federal Register.
With today’s actions, the Department does not overlook or forget the MEK’s past acts of terrorism, including its involvement in the killing of U.S. citizens in Iran in the 1970s and an attack on U.S. soil in 1992. The Department also has serious concerns about the MEK as an organization, particularly with regard to allegations of abuse committed against its own members.
The Secretary’s decision today took into account the MEK’s public renunciation of violence, the absence of confirmed acts of terrorism by the MEK for more than a decade, and their cooperation in the peaceful closure of Camp Ashraf, their historic paramilitary base.
The United States has consistently maintained a humanitarian interest in seeking the safe, secure, and humane resolution of the situation at Camp Ashraf, as well as in supporting the United Nations-led efforts to relocate eligible former Ashraf residents outside of Iraq.
September 21, 2012 - U.S. to remove Iran group (Mujahedin-e Khalq) from terror list, officials say WaPo News Item
Augustus 30, 2012 - Anti-Terrorism Designations (SDGT) - US designates eight Lashkar-e-Taiba leaders as terrorists, places sanctions
LET was designated by the Department of State as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) and under E.O. 13224 as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist entity in December 2001. LET was added to the UN 1267/1989 Committee's Consolidated List – its list of sanctioned terrorists – in May 2005.
Despite being banned by the Government of Pakistan in January 2002, LET continues to operate in Pakistan and throughout the region and engage in or support terrorist activities worldwide. LET has conducted numerous terrorist acts against Pakistani, Indian, Afghan, and U.S. interests and is responsible for the November 2008 Mumbai attacks that killed more than 160 people, including six Americans, and the July 2006 Mumbai train bombings that killed more than 180 people.
All of the individuals designated today pursuant to E.O. 13224 were designated for acting on behalf of or providing support either to LET itself or to previously designated members of LET. Today’s action prohibits U.S. persons from engaging in any transactions with these individuals and freezes any assets the designees have under U.S. jurisdiction.
The following individuals have been added to OFAC's SDN List:
- HAMZA, Amir (a.k.a. HAMZA, Maulana Ameer), Jamia Masjid, al Qadsia, Chauburji Chowk, Lahore, Pakistan; DOB 10 May 1959; POB Sheikhupura, Punjab Province, Pakistan; citizen Pakistan; Passport AB6217491 issued 01 Jun 2006 expires 01 Jun 2011; National ID No. 3520149847497 (Pakistan) (individual) [SDGT].
- MIR, Sajjid (a.k.a. CHAUDARY, Sajid Majeed; a.k.a. CHUHDRI, Sajid Majid; a.k.a. MAJEED, Sajid; a.k.a. MAJID, Sajid; a.k.a. MAJID, Sajjid; a.k.a. MIR, Sajid); DOB 31 Jan 1976; alt. DOB 01 Jan 1978; POB Lahore, Pakistan; nationality Pakistan; Passport KE381676 (Pakistan) issued 14 Oct 2004; National ID No. 3520163573447 (Pakistan) (individual) [SDGT].
- MUJAHID, Abdullah (a.k.a. ABDALLAH, Abu), Mohallah Markaz Tayyeba Street, Muridke, Lahore, Pakistan; DOB 15 May 1970; POB Bhalwal, Sargodha District, Punjab Province, Pakistan; citizen Pakistan; Passport DM1074371 (Pakistan) issued 30 May 2009 expires 29 May 2014; National ID No. 3540118204373 (Pakistan) (individual) [SDGT].
- MUNTAZIR, Abdullah (a.k.a. KHAN, Abdullah; a.k.a. MUNTAZER, Abdullah); DOB 17 Jan 1974; POB Abbottabad, Pakistan; National ID No. 3520203526763 (Pakistan) (individual) [SDGT].
- SAEED, Talha (a.k.a. SAEED, Hafiz Talha; a.k.a. SAEED, Mohammad Talha; a.k.a. SAEED, Tahil), 116-E Block, Johar Town, Lahore, Pakistan; DOB 25 Oct 1975; POB Sarghoda, Punjab Province, Pakistan; Passport BM5971331 (Pakistan) issued 24 Mar 2007 expires 22 Mar 2012 (individual) [SDGT].
- SHEIKH, Qari Muhammad Yaqoob (a.k.a. SHEIKH, Qari Muhammad Yaqub; a.k.a. YAQOOB, Mohammad; a.k.a. YAQOOB, Qari Shaikh Muhammad); DOB 20 Dec 1972; POB Bahawalpur, Punjab, Pakistan; Passport BX5192361 (Pakistan) issued 04 Aug 2007 expires 02 Aug 2012; National ID No. 3120128002365 (Pakistan) (individual) [SDGT].
- WALID, Hafiz Khalid (a.k.a. NAIK, Khalid; a.k.a. WALEED, Khalid); DOB 25 Oct 1974; alt. DOB 1971; POB Lahore, Pakistan; citizen Pakistan; Passport AA9967331 (Pakistan) issued 03 Jun 2006 expires 02 Jun 2011; National ID No. 3410104067339 (Pakistan) (individual) [SDGT].
- YAQUB, Ahmed (a.k.a. GHANI, Hamad; a.k.a. YAKOOB, Mohammad); DOB 1966; alt. DOB 1967; POB Faisalabad, Pakistan; alt. POB Jeda Walah, Punjab Province, Pakistan (individual) [SDGT].
May 24, 2012 - Terrorist Designations of the Abdallah Azzam Brigades
The Department of State designated the Abdallah Azzam Brigades (AAB) as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) under Section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act and as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist under section 1(b) of Executive Order 13224. The Abdallah Azzam Brigades (AAB), a militant organization based in both Lebanon and the Arabian Peninsula, was formed in 2009. AAB is led by Saleh al-Qar’awi, who was designated by the Department of State under E.O. 13224. The Department of State also designated AAB’s bomb maker, Abu Jabal, under E.O. 13224 on November 22, 2011.
AAB carried out a July 2010 attack on the Japanese-owned oil tanker M/V M.Star in the Strait of Hormuz. According to a statement released online, AAB claimed that the attack was carried out by its Arabian Peninsula Branch, which calls itself the Yusuf al-’Uyayri Battalions of the Abdullah Azzam Brigades. AAB has repeatedly articulated its intent to carry out attacks against Western interests in the Middle East. In 2010, for instance, the group expressed an interest in kidnapping U.S. and British tourists in the Arabian Peninsula.
In addition, AAB is responsible for numerous indiscriminate rocket attacks on Israeli civilians. These attacks, which have been launched from within Lebanon by the Ziyad al-Jarrah Battalions of the Abdallah Azzam Brigades, have targeted population centers in northern Israel.
The consequences of these designations include a prohibition against knowingly providing material support or resources to, or engaging in transactions with, the Abdallah Azzam Brigades, and the freezing of all property and interest in property of the organization that are in the United States, or come within the United States, or the control of U.S. persons. The Department of State took these actions in consultation with the Departments of Justice and Treasury.
June 18, 2011 - Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTO) are foreign organizations that are designated by the Secretary of State in accordance with section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), as amended. FTO designations play a critical role in our fight against terrorism and are an effective means of curtailing support for terrorist activities and pressuring groups to get out of the terrorism business.
- Abdullah Azzam Brigades (AAB)
- Abu Nidal Organization (ANO)
- Asbat al-Ansar
- Palestine Liberation Front
- Palestinian Islamic Jihad
- Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
- PFLP-General Command
More information on the US FTO page.
December 16, 2011 - Terrorist Designation of Saleh al-Qarawi - The Department of State designated Saleh al-Qarawi as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist under section 1(b) of Executive Order 13224. Al-Qarawi al is a senior leader and operative for the Abdullah Azzam Brigades (AAB), a Lebanese militant organization. According to media reports, AAB claimed responsibility for the July 28, 2010 maritime bombing of a Japanese oil tanker, the M. Star. AAB has also claimed responsibility for firing several rockets into Israel from Lebanon since 2009. Prior to his activity with AAB, al-Qarawi fought against U.S. forces in Fallujah, Iraq. While there, he worked with now-deceased Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the former head of al-Qa’ida in Iraq.
November 22, 2011 - The Department of State designated Ibrahim Suleiman Hamad Al-Hablain (also known as Abu Jabal) as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist under section 1(b) of Executive Order 13224. Abu Jabal is an explosives expert and operative for the Abdullah Azzam Brigades (AAB), a Lebanese militant organization. According to media reports, AAB claimed responsibility for the July 28, 2010 maritime bombing of a Japanese oil tanker, the M. Star. AAB has also claimed responsibility for firing several rockets into Israel from Lebanon.
ITAR Based sanctions, see chapter on ITAR for more detailed information
- August 8, 2011 - 76 FR 47990 - Amendment to ITAR §126.1. Denial policy except for exports for UNIFIL and as authorized by the Government of Lebanon.
- December 15, 2006 - 71 FR 75609
- December 17, 2007 - 72 FR 71575
BIS - EAR
October 03, 2012 - US indicts 164 Companies and Individuals Involved in Russian Military Procurement Network and adds them to BIS Entity List
As a result of an investigation involving an alleged Russian military procurement network, the U.S. Department of Justice announced today that it had unsealed an indictment against two companies and 11 individuals located in the U.S. and Russia and executed a number of search warrants at various residences, businesses and banks in the U.S.
This (BIS) rule amends the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) by adding one hundred and sixty-four persons under one hundred and sixty-five entries to the Entity List. The persons who are added to the Entity List have been determined by the U.S. Government to be acting contrary to the national security or foreign policy interests of the United States. These persons will be listed on the Entity List under twelve destinations. These additions to the Entity List consist of one person under Belize; thirteen persons under Canada; two persons under Cyprus; one person under Estonia; eleven persons under Finland; five persons under Germany; one person under Greece; two persons under Hong Kong; one person under Kazakhstan; one hundred and nineteen persons under Russia; two persons under Sweden; and seven persons under the United Kingdom, including six persons located in the British Virgin Islands.
December 16, 2011 - This jurisdiction contains Individuals or Entities which are listed by US Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) - EAR. The listed entities may have the status of "Presumption of denial" and are effectively barred from dealing in US-origin items or entities may have the self-explaining status of "case-by-case".
The detailed Entity List can be found at BIS-EAR Entity List
December 12, 2011 - Department of Commerce - Bureau of Industry and Security - In this rule, the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amends the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) by moving the substantive provisions of the comprehensive sanctions on Syria from General Order No. 2 in Supplement No. 1 to part 736 to a revised § 746.9. This rule also includes conforming changes to the EAR. This rule will facilitate compliance with the comprehensive sanctions on Syria. - This rule is effective December 12, 2011.
August 18, 2009 - BIS requires a license for the export or reexport to Syria of all items subject to the Export Administration Regulations (EAR), except food and medicines not on the Commerce Control List (CCL). Pursuant to the waiver authority exercised by the President in Executive Order 13338, BIS may consider several categories of items on a case-by-case basis including medicines on the CCL and medical devices; parts and components intended to ensure the safety of civil aviation and the safe operation of commercial passenger aircraft; and telecommunications equipment and associated computers, technology, and software. License applications for other exports and reexports to Syria are subject to a general policy of denial.